Abstract
The South African discourse over corruption reveals a philosophical and practical contradiction between a liberal conceptualization of constitutional democracy entailing a neutral state and a liberation movement’s vision of the democratic state as an instrument to bring about fundamental economic and social transformation. According to the African National Congress (ANC) leadership, the democratic state should function as a means to an end, namely, bringing about the end of white minority economic, social, and cultural power. The state and its various entities ranging from government departments to the large state-owned enterprises are to be used as a mechanism to bring about black economic empowerment, and the subsequent enrichment of ANC connected individuals and groups is justifiable as part of that transformation process.
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Notes
- 1.
Transparency International Corruption Perception Index is available on http://www.transparency.org and indicates that South Africa has slipped from position 33 in the mid-1990s down to position 61 in 2015, on par with Italy, Greece, and Bangladesh.
- 2.
Chipkin (2012), op. cit., suggests that the conception of the state within the ANC is based on a Marxist-Leninist position and therefore provides the ‘vanguard of the proletariat’ a highly privileged position in using the state to fulfill the interests of the working class.
- 3.
The details of the public protector’s report were highly anticipated by the public and the full report can be accessed on several sites—see News24 at www.news24.com and several other media outlets such as the Mail and Guardian at www.m&g.com.
- 4.
For a detailed account of the Nkandla affair, see Thomas A. Koelble (2017). Up to this point, the most elaborate corruption scandal involved a mining magnate, Brett Kebble, who was involved in an enormous financial scandal before committing ‘assisted suicide’ (see Sergeant 2012; Wiener 2011). Kebble had bribed many ANC leaders across the board but particularly ANC Youth League leaders and was hailed as a ‘hero of the liberation movement’.
- 5.
Both Mbete and Mkhwebane are regarded as Zuma allies by the media, at least at this point. Since much of the report is based on a wide range of newspaper interviews and other public sources, the presidency suggests that there is nothing new in the report. However, the report brings together, for the first time, a comprehensive account of the networks involved in the affair referred to as ‘state capture’ by the friends and associates of the president.
- 6.
Van Rooyen had been a less-than-successful ANC local councilor and was, at one point, the major of Merafong, Khutsong, in Gauteng province. Irate residents of the township burned down his house in 2006 in response to van Rooyen moving the town from North West to Gauteng province. The move was seen as potentially damaging to the ability of the municipality in gaining access to state and provincial resources.
- 7.
South Africa was, at that point, rated one step above junk bond status by the three major credit rating institutions (Moody’s, S&P, and Fitch). All three rating agencies cited their concern over the political situation in South Africa and warned that any indication from the Zuma government to push through controversial spending programs would result in a downgrade to junk status.
- 8.
The argument that the rand should be allowed to fall in value is popular with parts of the ANC’s Youth League. The argument is made that the more worthless the currency, the more ‘white monopoly capitalists’ lose wealth and will be forced to exit from the South African economy, making way for black South Africans to regain wealth and property. See Collen Maine, ANCYL spokesperson, in Khoza (2016).
- 9.
The firing of Pravin Gordhan on May 30, 2017, has kicked off large-scale protests against the Zuma regime, not unlike those in South Korea and Brazil against the Park and Rousseff governments. There are many non-governmental organizations across South Africa calling for a tax boycott.
- 10.
The chairperson of SAA is rumored to be a mistress to the president and was involved in a highly dubious attempt to lease aircraft from Airbus through a ‘third party’ that would have been the first beneficiary should SAA default on its loan. Several journalists have likened the SAA story to the Russian ‘grabification’ processes after the fall of communism, when Soviet SOEs were left to default and their creditors were able to ‘grab’ whatever was left over—see Gosam (2016), which outlines the complex story in detail.
- 11.
Molefe resigned as CEO of ESKOM on November 11, 2016, in the wake of the public protector’s report claiming to have ‘done nothing wrong’ and that he ‘turned around’ after the utility had failed to deliver sufficient power to the country in 2014 and 2015, causing ‘rolling blackouts’ across the country. He has since been appointed to Parliament as an ANC member of Parliament and was rumored to be Zuma’s potential successor to Gordhan. His appointment as finance minister would have drawn a great deal of negative press given his role at ESKOM and his close links to the Gupta business group.
- 12.
In a parliamentary motion of no-confidence in the president, held on November 11, 2016, initiated by the opposition parties, Gordhan and several other ANC parliamentarians pointedly abstained from voting for the president. Prior to the vote, ANC leaders had appealed to all ANC members to support the president.
- 13.
The Hawks investigative unit is itself a creation of Zuma’s problems with the law. He disbanded the Scorpions investigation unit and replaced it with the Hawks after the Scorpions had investigated his close friend and ally, Police Commissioner Jackie Selebi, and convicted him of fraud and corruption in 2010.
- 14.
The attempts to intimidate Gordhan took place over a prolonged period of time and involved several highly questionable moves by the NPA and the Hawks. Rumors spread that the finance minister was to be arrested and for weeks Gordhan operated under a cloud of suspicion and uncertainty.
- 15.
There have even been reports of credible death threats against the minister. In a related story unfolding at the public broadcaster, the SABC, journalists fell afoul of the Zuma acolyte and CEO of SABC, Hlaudi Motsoneng. Motsoneng has defied various court orders to desist from running the SABC after the High Court determined that Motsoneng had not only lied about his credentials but that he had misused his position to enrich himself. Motsoneng fired eight SABC journalists for disobeying his order not to report on service delivery and other anti-ANC protests. Some of these journalists also received death threats and have taken the matter to court.
- 16.
The South African Constitutional Court ruled in 2016 that a court order by the South African High Court forcing the NPA to reinstate an investigation against Zuma that had been abandoned in 2007 involving over 780 charges of corruption must be reactivated. The NPA has, not surprisingly, been very reluctant to heed these court orders but was nimble and extremely quick off the mark when it came to charging Gordhan.
- 17.
Recent events in Brazil around the Petrobas corruption scandal and the impeachment of Dilma Rousseff as well as charges against the former president Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva come to mind.
- 18.
As this story is unfolding at the time of writing, it is likely that there are unforeseen but immediate consequences. The other rating agencies have declared themselves as highly concerned with the political situation in South Africa and are likely to follow suit. The president has mobilized his considerable support base within the ANC to shore up his factions’ hold over the party. And his opponents both within and outside of the ANC are busily mobilizing their supporters, while taxpayers’ associations are mobilizing for a potential tax revolt against corruption within the regime.
- 19.
For a set of articles dealing with the failure of land reform, the BEE initiatives, and the general social and economic climate, see the edited volume by Thenjiwe Meyiwa et al. (2015).
- 20.
See, for instance, Julius Malema’s speech to his supporters outside of the Newcastle Magistrate’s Court on November 7, 2016, where he was charged with contravention of the Riotous Assemblies Act of 1956 for calling for the occupation of land. Malema argued that ‘[w]e want everything that comes with the land … the minerals, gold, diamonds, platinum, coals, everything that comes with the land belongs to us’. He continued that ‘we are not calling for the slaughter of white people, at least for now… the rightful owners of the land are black people…’ and that the real enemy of the EFF was not Zuma but ‘white monopoly capital’ and that South Africa was ‘controlled from London’ (Goba and Jordaan 2016).
- 21.
Before his expulsion from the ANC, Julius Malema was heavily involved in this form of tendering and became one of the few politicians to be forced by the South African Revenue Service to pay taxes on his ill-gotten gains. Most ‘tenderpreneurs’, as they are euphemistically called, are politically protected enough to go unpunished.
- 22.
Interview with a leading Swedish Social Democratic politician, academic, and trade unionist in Gothenburg, September 2014, who asked to remain anonymous. He was directly involved in the clandestine funding of anti-apartheid activities throughout the 1970s and 1980s through trade union channels.
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Koelble, T.A. (2018). Caught Between Liberation and Liberalism. In: Kubbe, I., Engelbert, A. (eds) Corruption and Norms. Political Corruption and Governance. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-66254-1_7
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