Skip to main content

Introduction

  • Chapter
  • First Online:
  • 1577 Accesses

Part of the book series: International Economic Association Series ((IEA))

Abstract

This book is the outcome of a roundtable organized by us and held in Montevideo, Uruguay, on May 26–27, 2016. It is an ambitious project because of the breadth of its reach. There is increasing recognition, albeit with a long history of forays into this, from the time of Karl Polanyi (1944), through the writings of Mark Granovetter (1985), to the emergence of new institutional economics (see North 1990; Williamson 2000), that economics cannot be viewed in isolation. It is a discipline embedded in institutions, politics, and the law and, if we are to be more effective in terms of the impact of economic policy, we have to recognize this embeddedness and design our interventions with this in mind. Further, the perpetrators of corruption often work, hand in hand, with the functionaries of government, who, ironically, are supposed to enforce the law (see, for instance, Kugler et al. 2005). The World Bank’s most-recent World Development Report on Governance and the Law (World Bank 2017) is a recognition of the significance of these perspectives. And our roundtable assembled some of the finest minds that have contributed to this multidisciplinary venture to do a stocktaking of the best ideas and how they can be put to action on the ground. It was an engaging two days of discussion and debate.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution.

Notes

  1. 1.

    See Basu (2000) for an analysis of how to situate economics within sociology and politics.

  2. 2.

    It is arguable that the (high) predictability and the (contained) size of bribes may have also played a role. In addition, China has used a strategy of asymmetric punishment which may have contributed to keeping corruption within limits (Berlin and Spagnolo 2015).

  3. 3.

    An emblematic case is Singapore that fares extremely high both in anti-corruption and in crony capitalism indexes.

  4. 4.

    See Schelling (1980).

  5. 5.

    A less benign interpretation is that in Italy prosecution is mandatory but because of the malfunctioning of the judiciary indictment is random. This would sustain the same set of equilibria with a less favorable view of the judiciary.

  6. 6.

    Measured by difference in the luminosity per capita in the homelands of the different ethnic groups, using both Alesina et al. (2016), and the Growup dataset from Girardin et al. (2015).

  7. 7.

    See Ferraz and Finan (2008).

  8. 8.

    More precisely, they compare the outcome of municipalities that have been audited twice versus those that have only been audited once.

References

  • Alesina, Alberto, Stelios Michalopoulos, and Elias Papaioannou. 2016. Ethnic Inequality. Journal of Political Economy 124: 428–488.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Avis, Eric, Claudio Ferraz, and Frederico Finan. 2016. Do Government Audits Reduce Corruption? Estimating the Impacts of Exposing Corrupt Politicians. Working Paper, w22443. National Bureau of Economic Research.

    Google Scholar 

  • Basu, Kaushik. 2000. Prelude to Political Economy: A Study of the Social and Political Foundations of Economics. Oxford: OUP.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Berlin, Maria Perrotta, and Giancarlo Spagnolo. 2015. Leniency, Asymmetric Punishment and Corruption. Evidence from China. Working Paper No. 34. Stockholm Institute of Transition Economics. Stockholm School of Economics.

    Google Scholar 

  • Ferraz, Claudio, and Frederico Finan. 2008. Exposing Corrupt Politicians: The Effects of Brazil’s Publicly Released Audits on Electoral Outcomes. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 123: 703–745.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Girardin, Luc, Philipp Hunziker, Lars-Erik Cederman, Nils-Christian Bormann, and Manuel Vog. 2015. GROWup–Geographical Research on War, Unified Platform. Zurich: ETH Zurich.

    Google Scholar 

  • Granovetter, Mark. 1985. Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem of Embeddedness. American Journal of Sociology 91: 481–510.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Kugler, Maurice, Thierry Verdier, and Yves Zenou. 2005. Organized Crime, Corruption and Punishment. Journal of Public Economics 89: 1639–1663.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • North, Douglass C. 1990. Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Polanyi, K. 1944. The Great Transformation. Boston: Beacon Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Schelling, Thomas C. 1980. The Strategy of Conflict. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Williamson, Oliver E. 2000. The ‘New Institutional Economics’: Taking Stock, Looking Ahead. Journal of Economic Literature 38 (3): 595–613.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • World Bank. 2017. World Development Report: Governance and the Law. Washington: World Bank.

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Kaushik Basu .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2018 The Author(s)

About this chapter

Check for updates. Verify currency and authenticity via CrossMark

Cite this chapter

Basu, K., Cordella, T. (2018). Introduction. In: Basu, K., Cordella, T. (eds) Institutions, Governance and the Control of Corruption. International Economic Association Series. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-65684-7_1

Download citation

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-65684-7_1

  • Published:

  • Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, Cham

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-319-73822-2

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-319-65684-7

  • eBook Packages: Economics and FinanceEconomics and Finance (R0)

Publish with us

Policies and ethics