Abstract
In this chapter I gather together some, but not all, of the most important results of the previous chapters. In other words, it is worth reading each chapter in its own right, as the current chapter simply uses the other results to the degree that they contribute to its main focus, the chimera of the realistic future scenarios of the union. I first present the current situation of the union in a very concise section. This is followed by a presentation of five possible future scenarios, from marginalisation and collapse to a full-blown federal empire. These scenarios are then discussed in a section which explores some of the greatest challenges the union will face in the near future, such as Brexit, immigration, problems with economic co-ordination, defence and foreign policy, democratisation versus the interests of the united capitalists of Europe, and the articulation of political interest criticising the EU, often taking the form of populist movements. The closing section discusses the issue of whether the EU is an emerging empire, and if so, what kind of empire it is.
Notes
- 1.
Variation in the available resources between member states can be described as follows: if the GDP per capita PPP of EU28 is measured by the index 100, variation within the union ranges from 264 in Luxembourg, 177 in Ireland and 128 in Austria and the Netherlands to 47 in Bulgaria , 58 in Croatia , 64 in Latvia and 68 in Greece and Hungary (Eurostat 2015). The breakdown of resources between citizens in different member states can be described with Gini coefficients (the lower the figure theoretically varying between 0 and 100, the less inequality there is). They range from 37.9 in Lithuania and 37.4 in Romania to 23.7 in Slovakia , 24.5 in Slovenia and 25.4 in Finland and Sweden (Eurostat, see source 2 in Table 13.1).
- 2.
This emphasis naturally distinguishes Zielonka’s view from a simple collapse of the EU and a view involving parallel nationalist closures of all the European countries , a vision of a world resembling that before the Second World War. Such an alternative is, in a sense, a possible sixth scenario, but this is not discussed here because it would mean that practically all existing cross-national and transnational European networks fall apart (including those channelling the flow of goods and services from one part of Europe to another), and it is difficult to believe that this could happen, even in circumstances where it had strong political support. This support is not even forthcoming today, when even nationalist and populist movements would not be willing to give up the benefits of many forms of cross-national interaction.
- 3.
More space is created for the propaganda of populist movements by the tendency to concentrate on the ‘truthfulness’ of statements, suggesting that the speaker’s authentic feelings are the only criterion for truth. This tendency marginalises the two other claims of validity usually presented alongside aesthetic or therapeutic authenticity in the tradition running from Kant and Parsons to Habermas (1984), i.e. cognitive and normative validity. This tendency towards vernacular aestheticisation of publicity creates room for anyone presenting ‘alternative truths’ to omit expert scientific interpretations and collectively-binding moral rules , as long as s/he can convince the audience of the sincerity of the feelings expressed (towards immigrants, for example).
- 4.
Müller (2016: 49–60) suggests that the term ‘illiberal democracy’ should not be used to refer to populist regimes such has Hungary and Poland because they do not honour the rule of law and the rights of political opposition, and are therefore not democracies at all. I agree with the description but find the lexical suggestion too cautious. The term ‘liberal democracy’ was coined in the West after the Second World War to make a distinction between the Western capitalist democracies and the Soviet type of socialist democracies. The latter could easily have been called ‘illiberal democracies ’ because they were built on the idea of the ‘dictatorship of the proletariat’ and restricted the freedom of speech of the opposition in ways comparable to the current populist regimes in Hungary and Poland . We need to be able to differentiate these kinds of regimes (which restrict the rights of political opposition but are formally democracies), and dictatorships pure and simple. Since Müller does not provide a better alternative here I shall use the term ‘illiberal democracies ’ for that purpose and hope that the term ‘illiberal’ points clearly enough to the fact that such formally democratic regimes are not full democracies in the sense of freedom of speech and rule of law .
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Heiskala, R. (2018). Future Challenges for the EU: Five Scenarios from Collapse and Marginalisation to the Emergence of a Federal Empire. In: Heiskala, R., Aro, J. (eds) Policy Design in the European Union. Palgrave Studies in European Political Sociology. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-64849-1_13
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