Process of China’s WTO Accession: A Questionable Integration

Yue, Jianyong

doi:10.1007/978-3-319-63997-0_2

Process of China’s WTO Accession: A Questionable Integration

Jianyong Yue³

Chapter
First Online: 13 January 2018

1200 Accesses

Part of the book series: Palgrave Studies in Economic History ((PEHS))

Abstract

It took China 15 years to join the WTO—from 1986 until 2001—the period that witnessed the flourishing of hyperglobalization. Its membership stands for the country’s full integration into the international system of global capitalism. Joining the WTO at all costs was a momentous decision made by China’s top leadership at the turn of the millennium. China made extensive commitments on market access during the accession talks. Its humiliating economic diplomacy and reckless quest for membership on harsh “anti-developmental” terms raise a series of doubts about the rationale of the accession.

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Notes

1.
Cited from Cheng (2015), “Capitalism Making and Its Political Consequences: A Comparative Political Economy of China’s Communist Capitalism.”
2.
V. I. Lenin (1956), The Development of Capitalism in Russia, Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, p. 44; Robert Gilpin (2001), Global Political Economy: Understanding the International Economic Order, NJ: Princeton University Press, p. 346; Also Hugo Radice (2015), “National Decline, Capitalist Success,” in Global Capitalism: Selected Essays, Oxon: Routledge, p. 93.
3.
Shi Guangsheng (2009), “A Review of Negotiations on China’s ‘Reentry’ into the GATT and Accession to the WTO,” Hundred-Year Tide (Bainianchao), No. 7.
4.
Li Lanqing (2008), Breaking the Siege: Days when the Door Started to Open, zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, p. 332.
5.
Li Lanqing (2008), Breaking the Siege, p. 336.
6.
Shi Guangsheng (2009), “A Review of Negotiations on China’s ‘Reentry’ into the GATT and Accession to the WTO,” Hundred-Year Tide (Bainianchao), No. 7.
7.
Li Lanqing (2008), Breaking the Siege, pp. 333–334.
8.
MOFTEC and State Council senior officials Sun Zhenyu and Xu Binjin gave detailed accounts of the two talks, Shenzhen, 21/12/1992.
9.
Sun Zhenyu talked about 1992 Sino-US deal on market access, Shenzhen, 21/12/1992.
10.
MOFTEC official Long Yongtu talked about China’s GATT negotiations, Shenzhen, 21/12/1992.
11.
Wang Yi (2006), In the Days of Negotiating China’s Entry into GATT/WTO, Beijing: zhonggong zhongyang dangxiao chubanshe, p. 150.
12.
Japanese Foreign Minister Yoriko Kawaguchi stated in her address for the Asean-Japan Commemorative Summit, that “during the Asian financial crisis of 1997, Japan provided assistance of some 80 billion US dollars to the countries of Asean, demonstrating unequivocally the intensity of Japan’s commitment to the region. Such striking commitment is a result of thirty years of increasingly close cooperation in trade, development, political and security relations,” 10/12/2003. http://www.ph.emb-japan.go.jp/pressreleases/press-64.htm
13.
Reinhard Drifte (2003), Japan’s Security Relations with China since 1989: From balancing to bandwagoning? (The Nissan Institute/Routledgecurzon Japanese Studies) (1st ed.), Oxon: Routledge, pp. 154–155.
14.
A Record of Zhu Rongji’s Remarks (hereafter “Zhu’s Remarks”) (2011), vol. 3, Beijing: renmin chubanshe, p. 63.
15.
Manuscript of Willem E.C. van Kemenade (1999), “China and the World Trade Organization.”
16.
The People’s Daily, 27/11/1998.
17.
Manuscript of Willem E.C. van Kemenade (1999), “China and the World Trade Organization.”
18.
Xinhua News Agency, Beijing, 15/03/1999.
19.
Ibid.
20.
Ibid.
21.
Laurence Brahm (2002), Zhu Rongji & the Transformation of Modern China, Singapore: John Wiley & Sons (Asia) Pte Ltd., p. 267.
22.
China and the World (online) (http://www.zgysj.com), No. 5, 1999. This website was created in 1996 and no longer exists.
23.
Xinhua, Beijing, 15/03/1999.
24.
Brahm (2002), pp. 267–268.
25.
Kemenade public lecture in China Europe International Business School (CEIBS), Shanghai, June 1999.
26.
China and the World (online), No. 5, 1999.
27.
Conversation with an internal source, 2/11/2001.
28.
China and the World (online). No. 5, 1999.
29.
“Special Interview with Long Yongtu: The Accession Negotiations were Accomplished This Way,” (tanpan shi zheyang wancheng de) Caijing, 14/11/2001. http://finance.sina.cim.cn/g/20011114/129329.html
30.
According to an informed source, 12/08/2005.
31.
Zhou Xisheng, “zhu zongli fangmei shenming dayi (Premier Zhu Visit the US to Declare Righteous Cause),” The Outlook (liaowang), No. 17, 26/04/1999.
32.
Shen Jiru (1999), “Several Thinkings on the Kosovo Question,” World Economics and Politics, No. 7. This article was actually written on April 24, two weeks ahead of the embassy bombing.
33.
Interview with an informed source, 16/12/1999.
34.
Interview with an informed source, 22/01/2002.
35.
Wan Ming (2007), “The United Stated States, Japan, and the European Union: Comparing Political Economy Approaches to China,” The Pacific Review, 20:3, pp. 397–421 (p. 401).
36.
Drifte (2003), p. 33.
37.
Wan (2007), p. 400.
38.
Algieri (2002); Shambaugh (1996).
39.
Stokes (1999): 180. Sources of Stokes, Algieri Shambough and Lapres are indirectly cited from Wan Ming’s essay (2007).
40.
Raj Bhala (2000), Enter the Dragon: An Essay on China’s WTO Accession Saga, pp. 1469, 1489, 1496. https://law.drupal.ku.edu/sites/law.drupal.ku.edu/files/docs/resources/library/IntlTradeLaw/Enter%20the%20Dragon%20PDF.pdf
41.
Wan (2007), p. 401.
42.
Brahm (2003), p. 269.
43.
Phoenix Panorama, 9/01/2013. http://phtv.ifeng.com/program/fhdsy/detail_2013_01/09/20995008_1.shtml
44.
Shi Guangsheng (2009), “A Review of Negotiations on China’s ‘Reentry’ into the GATT and Accession to the WTO,” Hundred-Year Tide (Bainianchao), No. 7.
45.
Di Yinqing (1999), “A Critique on Sino-U.S. Agreement on China’s WTO Accession,” China and the World (e-journal), No. 41, December. http://www.zgysj.com/99/zs9912a.htm#2
46.
Editorial of the People’s Daily, 16/11/1999.
47.
Mark O’neill, “US and China Sign WTO Deal,” South China Morning Post (SCMP), 16/11/1999.
48.
People’s Daily editorial, 16/11/1999.
49.
Lapres 2000:8, cited from Wan (2007).
50.
Sheel Kohli, “EU Refuses to Rush Agreement,” SCMP, 23/02/2000.
51.
Manuscript of Willem E.C. van Kemenade (1999), “China and the World Trade Organization.”
52.
Mark O’Neill, “Beijing, Europe Sign WTO Deal,” SCMP, 20/05/2000.
53.
Lapres 2000: 8–14; 2001: 507, cited from Wan (2007).
54.
“Beijing Reveals in WTO Achievement,” Reuters in Beijing, 20/05/2000.
55.
Shi Guangsheng (2009), Hundred-Year Tide (Bainianchao), No. 7.
56.
Agreement on Market Access between the People’s Republic China and the United States of America, 15/11/1999. Released by USTR on 14/03/2000.
57.
Nicholas Lardy, “China and the World Trade Organization: Problems on the Road to Liberalization,” http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/apcity/unpan003154.pdf
58.
Ibid.
59.
“WTO Accords Not Without Dangers,” SCMP, 22/05/2002.
60.
Ibid.
61.
Nicholas Lardy (2002), Integrating China into the Global Economy, Washington: Brookings Institution Press, p. 27.
62.
Long Yongtu, “Entry into WTO Is Not Equal to Full Open-Up,” Guangdong Information Daily (Hong Kong), 12/11/1999.
63.
Di Yingqing (1999), “A Critique on Long Yongtu’s Article ‘Entry into WTO Is Not Equal to Full Open-Up,’” China and the World, December. http://www.zgysj.com/99/zs9912a.htm; “WTO Entry Will Put 40 m Chinese Out of Work,” Guardian, 27/01/2001. https://www.theguardian.com/business/2002/jan/27/theobserver.observerbusiness1
64.
China and the World (online), No. 5, 1999. http://www.zgysj.com
65.
Robin Hahnel, “China to Join the WTO: What Does It Mean?” http://www.zmag.org/ZSustainers/ZDaily/1999-12/14landau.htm
66.
Peter Nolan (2001), China and Global Economy: National Champions, Industrial Policy, and the Big Business Revolution, New York: Palgrave, pp. 196–197; Nolan (2002), “China and the Global Business Revolution,” Cambridge Journal of Economics, 26:1, pp. 119–137; Shadlen, K (2005), “Exchanging Development for Market Access? Deep Integration and Industrial Policy under Multilateral and Regional-Bilateral Trade Agreements,” Review of International Political Economy, 12:5, pp. 750–775.
67.
Andrew Walter and Gautam Sen (2003), Analyzing the Global Political Economy, NJ: Princeton University Press, p. 53.
68.
Ibid., p. 57.
69.
UNCTAD (2009), The Least Developed Countries Report 2009: The State and Development Governance, New York and Geneva, p. 151. http://unctad.org/en/docs/ldc2009_en.pdf; Also Shadlen (2005).
70.
WTO and the TRIPs Agreement. http://www.who.int/medicines/areas/policy/wto_trips/en/
71.
Wade (2003), introduction: p. xliv; Peter Nolan (2001), China and Global Economy: National Champions, Industrial Policy, and the Big Business Revolution, New York: Palgrave, p. 152.
72.
China agreed to eliminate and cease “enforcement of trade and foreign exchange balancing requirements, local content and export performance offsets and technology transfer requirements made effective through laws, regulations or other measures.” Accession of the People’s Republic of China Decision of 10 November 2001, Annex 1A III 8 (a): Trade-Related Investment Measures (to be noticed to the Committee on Trade-Related Investment Measures). Also Shadlen (2005).
73.
WTO, Report of the WTO Working Party on the Accession of China (1 October 2001), WT/ACC/CHN/49, at paragraphs 337, 341.
74.
“All laws, regulations and measures relating to the procurement by state-owned and state-invested enterprises of goods and services for commercial sale, production of goods or supply of services for commercial sale, or for non-governmental purposes would not be considered to be laws, regulations and measures relating to government procurement. Thus, such purchases or sales would be subject to the provisions of Articles II, XVI and XVII of the GATS and Article III of the GATT 1994.” Ibid., paragraph 47. This refers mainly to China’s commitment to stop protecting the large-sized SOEs through trade and investment liberalization and acceding to the GPA.
75.
Nolan (2001), “China, the US and the WTO: Battle of the Giants or Defeat of the Pigmies,” (manuscript).
76.
China’s economic openness ranked the ninth. The preceding eight countries of higher openness than China: Ireland, Belgium, the Netherlands, Austria, South Korea, Sweden, Finland and Canada. Deloitte Research (UK), 2005.
77.
Lardy (2002), p. 20.
78.
Peter Nolan (2002), “China and the Global Business Revolution,” Cambridge Journal of Economics, 26:1, pp. 119–137.
79.
Peter Nolan (1995), China’s Rise, Russia’s Fall: Politics, Economics and Planning in the Transition from Stalinism, NY: St. Martin’s Press; Nolan (2001) (manuscript). For “3-globals,” see Peter Nolan (2004), Transforming China: Globalization, Transition and Development, London: Anthem Press, p. 238.
80.
Nolan listed the achievement as below: the SOEs have “grown rapidly in terms of value of sales; absorbed a great deal of modern technology; learned how to compete in the marketplace; substantially upgraded the technical level of their employees; learned wide-ranging new managerial skills; gained substantial understanding of international financial markets; become sought-after partners for multinational companies.” Nolan (2001) (manuscript).
81.
Ibid.
82.
Nolan’s finding of China’s weak competitive capability was so important as to deserve being quoted in full. He pointed out, “This is extremely marked in the high-technology sectors, such as aerospace, complex equipment such as power plants, pharmaceuticals, as well as in ‘mid-technology’ sectors such as integrated oil and petrochemicals and auto components; … even in sectors with apparently less advanced technology, such as steel and coal, there is significant gap with leading global companies in the high value-added segments of the market.” Ibid. Also Nolan (2002), pp. 119–139, with the conclusion that “in these fundamental senses, China’s industrial policy of the past two decades must be judged a failure.”
83.
Nolan (2001) (manuscript).
84.
The Chinese Academy of Sciences, “The Report on China’s Modernization 2005,” 18/02/2005.
85.
Zhu Gaofeng et al., (ed.) (2003), China’s Manufacturing in the Age of Globalization (Chap. 9), Beijing: shehui kexue wenxian chubanshe.
86.
Ibid., pp. 15–19; 351–352.
87.
Ibid. The book’s “references” are clearly suggestive of the influence of liberal economists on these authors.
88.
ETMA first appeared in the 1980s when the severe shortage of hard currency forced the Chinese government to open up certain segments of domestic market to foreign investors to exchange for the latter’s technology transfer. It became part and parcel China’s national development strategy from 1992.
89.
See the Report, pp. 17, 312.
90.
UNCTAD (2001), “Transfer of Technology—UNCTAD Series on Issues in International Investment Agreements,” p. 15. http://unctad.org/en/docs/psiteiitd28.en.pdf
91.
The Report (2003), p. 310; Chen Man (2001), “A Comprehensive Analysis on the Effect of FDI on Chinese Economy,” Strategy and Management, No. 3.
92.
In December 2004, China Central Television (CCTV), the largest state television station controlled by the party’s powerful Propaganda Department and professionally guided by the State General Administration of Broadcasting and Television (SRABT) under the Ministry of Culture, launched an all-out propaganda offensive on the great achievements of China’s economic development three years after it joined the WTO. In a CCTV’s interview with Wu Jinglian. He, on the one hand, admitted the huge impact had taken effect, placing domestic enterprises in a difficult situation; but on the other hand, asserted that the domestic enterprises fared better after the WTO entry by citing the example of the Number One Auto Corporation based in Changchun. In 2011, ten years after China joined the WTO, Wu defended ETMA in the auto industry, asserting that without substantial market opening, the rapid development of China’s auto industry was unlikely. Nanfang Daily, 19/08/2011. http://www.chinanews.com/auto/2011/08-19/3269919.shtml
93.
Internal remarks of Li Rongrong, Minister of the SASAC and Wang Zhongming, director of the research center of the State Asset Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC). Cited from Peter Nolan’s public lecture at LSE’s China Week in mid-February 2005.
94.
He Bi, “Excess Opening Brought Political and Economic Crisis to China,” http://www.wyzxwyzx.com/Article/Class4/200706/19776.html; also http://finance.sina.com.cn/j/20050228/13451389655.shtml
95.
Shi Weigan, Re-examining the Role of FDI: of 28 Major Industries, 21 Controlled by the MNCs, Guangzhou: nanfengchuang, 28/08/2006.
96.
Private conversation with Peter Nolan in January 2002.
97.
As a matter of fact, the “transitional period” was partially terminated by the Wen Jiabao administration after Zhu Rongji stepped down in March 2003 that went beyond the WTO deal to further liberalize foreign investment in industrial certain sector. See report “Cars: Driving Ambitions?” (David Murphy), Far Eastern Economic Review, 27/05/2004.
98.
Chinese newspapers and magazines before and after China joined the WTO were deluged with such an account.
99.
“China and the World Trading System,” speech delivered by WTO Director General Renato Ruggiero at Beijing University, 21/04/1997. http://www.wto.org/french/news_f/sprr_f/china_f/htm
100.
The so-called universal MFN principle was imposed by the USA with a view to scraping the European imperial trading blocs; while non-discrimination or reciprocity made free trade less free by restricting developing nations’ access to advanced countries’ market. Walter and Gautam (2003), Analyzing the Global Political Economy, pp. 31–32.
101.
Brahm (2003), p. 264.
102.
This was evidenced by an internal party document issued in late 2001. There were altogether 48 clauses on 32 pages specifying how the pros and cons of China’s WTO deal should be reported by the domestic media under the tight control of the party (He 2006, 83). A typical example of this was the analytical article on Beijing Youth Daily. It emphasized the expected benefits China was hoping so enthusiastically to reap from the enlarged global markets in the first place; then admitted the certain pains that the country’s deep integration would incur to those industries where China was being in a remarkable comparative and/or competitive disadvantage, such as agriculture, automobiles, chemicals, pharmaceuticals, banking and insurance. Beijing Youth Daily, 16/11/1999.
103.
Lardy (2002), p. 20.
104.
Zhang Hanlin (1999), A Guiding Book on the World Trade Organization, Beijing: duiwai jingji maoyi daxue chubanshe. http://www.cctv.com/oriental/dfzz/jmnr/20021219/20.html
105.
Yu Yongding and Zheng Bingwen (2000), “The Research Report On China’s Entry Into WTO: The Analysis of the China’s Industries,” Beijing: shehui kexue wenxian chubanshe, Beijing, January 1. Main points can be found at: http://www.bjtextile.com/members/discussion/wto/wto2002-1.htm
106.
Ibid.
107.
Wang Xiangwei, “WTO Barrier Falls to Cheers and Warnings,” SCMP, 21/09/2000.
108.
Julia Han, “Zhu Urges Faster Implementation of Social Security,” SCMP, 20/11/2000.
109.
Zhu Rongji told audience at the press conference upon the closing of the National People’s Congress on March 5th, “our entry into the WTO will bring us a number of new problems, we are facing many arduous tasks … we should lose no time in preparing for China’s entry into the WTO and fulfilling our tasks in the transitional period.” Zhu Rongji spoke at the NPC on 5/03/2001, People’s Daily, 6/03/2001.
110.
Wu Jinglian thought the accession a life-or-death struggle for Chinese enterprises, especially the SOEs (more on footnote 257).
111.
People’s Daily (editorial), 11/11/2001.
112.
According to a Chinese scholar involved in the policy consulting of the WTO accession, the central government randomly sent out 5075 questionnaires to investigate to what extent government officials and managers of SOEs knew about the WTO and relevant rules. The result was astounding. Less than 30% of the respondents could tell clearly what the WTO was; and less than 10% could answer the rules-related questions. Source: internal lecture in Shenzhen by Professor Hou Tieshan of Dalian Polytechnic University in 2001. Therefore, the Chinese government decided to launch programs to train professionals in WTO rules among the bureaucrats and SOE managers. However, the contents of the training programs were biased and misleading and strictly conformed to the party’s propaganda.
113.
Brahm (2002), p. 264.
114.
Ibid.
115.
Wing Thye Woo (2001), “Recent Claims of China’s Economic Exceptionalism—Reflections Inspired by WTO Accession,” China Business Review, 12:2/3, pp. 107–136.
116.
Brahm (2002), p. 279.
117.
Stephen Roach (at China Development Forum in Beijing), “China: Straight Talk from Zhu,” 27/03/2002. www.morganstanley.com/GEFdata/digests/20020327-wed.html (This hyperlink no longer exists).
118.
Peter Nolan viewed China’s WTO entry an event of historic significance, comparable to the country’s opening up after the Opium Wars. Nolan (2001) (manuscript).
119.
Brahm (2003), p. 280.
120.
quanqiu qiyejia (Global Entrepreneurs), April issue 2004.
121.
“Lucky, Kodak and Fuji: Life-or-Death Struggle vs. Co-Prosperity through Competitive Cooperation,” 21st Century Business Herald, 28/05/2001.
122.
Ibid.
123.
Interestingly, Kodak’s JV initiative was not aimed at controlling Lucky in the first place, but blocking its main rival Fuji reaching a JV agreement with Lucky. “Is Kodak the Santa Claus?” Caijing, No. 23, 5/11/2003.
124.
http://www.csrc.gov.cn/cms/uploadFiles/600135_2003_n.77093521328.pdf; http://www.csrc.gov.cn/cms/uploadFiles/600135_2002_0.1061046629140.pdf; http://www.csrc.gov.cn/cms/uploadFiles/600135_2004_n.94182234944.pdf
125.
A fieldwork carried out by Peter Nolan and Wang Xiaoqiang in which I was involved in Gongyuan Film-making Plant in January 2001.
126.
Wu Jinglian made this remark in one of his serial lectures to the China Europe International Business School (CEIBS) in November 1999.
127.
Press Conference 15/03/2001. People’s Daily, 16/03/2001.
128.
Zhu Rongji’s Answers to Journalists’ Questions, p. 105, Beijing: renmin chubanshe, 2009. Wang Xiangwei, “Mainland Stands at the End of WTO Struggle,” SCMP, 17/09/2001.
129.
Wen Tiejun (2004), “Impact of WTO Entry on Chinese Peasants, Agriculture, and Rural Development,” http://www.moa.gov.cn/fwllm/jjps/200405/t20040509_201786.htm. A good example is the import surge of soybeans after China joined the WTO. See report “The Fall of Soybeans (dadou lunxian),” 14/12/2006, Twentieth-first Century Economic Report. http://finance.sina.com.cn/g/20061214/10363164364.shtml
130.
“‘Floor,’ ‘Ceiling,’ and China’s Food Security Dilemma,” Pengpai News, 22/08/2015. http://www.thepaper.cn/newsDetail_forward_1365998
131.
According to an informed source, 16/04/2000.
132.
Zhu’s Remarks (2011), v.2, p. 375; v.3, p. 184; v.4, p. 197.
133.
Nick Mathiaso, “WTO Entry Will Put 40 m Chinese Out of Work,” The Observer, 27/01/2002. http://observer.guardian.co.uk/business/story/0,,639832,00.html; Salomon Smith Barney (investment bank) estimated that “within five years after the WTO entry, China will have 40 million people unemployed, 5–10 million rural workers, 10 million laid-off SOE workers, and 20 million non-SOE workers (Far East Economic Review, 5 October 2000).” See S. M. Shafaeddin (2002), “Some Implications of Accession to WTO for China’s Economy,” International Journal of Development Issues, 1:2, pp. 93–128. http://unctad.org/en/docs/osgrs80_en.pdf
134.
Most estimates put the figure of unemployment caused by China’s WTO accession in the initial years around 10 million. http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/apcity/unpan011943.pdf; http://news.creaders.net/society/2001/11/01/356820.html; http://business.sohu.com/result.html; A.S. Bhalla, Shufang Qiu (2004), The Employment Impact of China’s WTO Accession, London and NY: RoutledgeCurzon, pp. 66–69.
135.
This remark made by Zhu in private appeared on Chinese website but was removed very shortly.
136.
Vivien Pik-Kwan Chan, “NPC Prepares Laws for Entry into Trade Body,” SCMP, 21/11/1999; William Kazer, “Rush to Adjust Laws for WTO,” SCMP, 15/06/2000; Mark O’Neill and Reuters, “Long Haul Starts on Law Revision,” SCMP, 4/07/2000; Xinhua, 23/04/2001.
137.
Yangcheng Evening News, 29/10/2000.
138.
Edith Terry, “One Very Positive Big Deal,” SCMP, 19/09/2001.
139.
Enoch Yiu, “Officials Hold Key to Success of Law Changes,” SCMP, 2/07/2001.
140.
“Online Newshour: Trade Dealer,” 18/11/1999. http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/white_house/july-dec99/barshefsky_11-18.html
141.
Mark O’Neill, “Textile City Prepares for Big WTO Windfall,” SCMP, 22/11/1999.
142.
Interview with managers of a large-sized SOE in Shanghai in May 1999.
143.
Ibid. and interviews with some central government officials in June/July 2005.
144.
In 2001, Chinese vice foreign minister Li Zhaoxing went to Nankai University in Tianjin to make a speech on China’s WTO accession. He claimed that many of the developing countries had fallen victims to the economic globalization, but China would surely benefit from the globalization. Logical links were invisible in his speech on how China would become a winner in the end. Interview with a professor in political science at Nankai University.
145.
Zhang Naigen (2011), “On the Changes of Chinese Legal System for Implementing the WTO Laws,” The Legist (faxuejia), Issue (1), pp. 9–18. http://article.chinalawinfo.com/ArticleHtml/Article_59681.shtml
146.
Protests by a handful of New-Left scholars against China’s WTO accession were ignored by all domestic and most international media.
147.
One economically backward coastal city deputy-mayor, when interviewed by the party’s mouthpiece, trumpeted the great historical significance of the WTO accession and the “historical opportunity” the accession would bring to the city. Her reasoning was exactly the same as the party’s cliché of “short-term pains but long-term gains.” Up until today, the city remains the most backward among the dozen cities within the province.
148.
Wang Xiangwei, “WTO Barriers Falls to Cheers and Warnings,” SCMP, 21/09/2000. Long Yongtu said in a special interview on October 22, 2001, less than one month before China entered the WTO, “It is inappropriate for such a lot many people not having much knowledge of the WTO accession to talk about what preparations need to be done.” An abstract of speech by vice-minister of Moftec Long Yongtu on the international trade forum at the 90th Guangzhou Export Fair, Chinese Entrepreneurs (zhongguo qiyejia), No. 11, 2001.
149.
Gu Haibing, “Three Questions with MOFTEC,” 18/01/2002. http://www.dajun.com.cn/rushisanwen.html (this hyperlink no longer exists); China’s protocol of accession to the World Trade Organization (Chinese translation): http://www.people.com.cn/GB/jinji/31/179/20020125/656050.html; “MOFTEC Enriching Itself from Translating WTO Documents,” https://www.secretchina.com/news/gb/2002/01/22/10590.html.%E4%B8%96%E8%B4%B8%E6%96%87%E4%BB%B6%E4%B8%AD%E8%AF%91%E6%9C%AC%E7%88%86%E5%87%BA%E4%B8%AD%E5%9B%BD%E5%A4%96%E7%BB%8F%E8%B4%B8%E9%83%A8%E4%BB%8E%E4%B8%AD%E7%89%9F%E5%88%A9.html; Liu Jingdong (2007), “An Interpretation of the ‘Judicial Review Clause’ of the Accession Protocol of the People’s Republic of China,” http://www.iolaw.org.cn/showArticle.aspx?id=2133
150.
Twenty-First Century Business Herald, 17/12/2001.
151.
Gu Haibing, “Three Questions with MOFTEC,” 18/01/2002. http://www.dajun.com.cn/rushisanwen.html
152.
Caoan Jushi, “Who Can Be So Shameless?” Caoan Jushi argued that under such untransparent arrangements, neither domestic enterprises nor the government was able to ready themselves for the fatal impacts. https://www.peacehall.com/news/gb/pubvp/2002/12/200212170446.shtml
153.
Han Deqiang (2000), Collision—The Pitfall of Globalization and China’s Realistic Choice (Chap. 1), Beijing: jingji guanli chubanshe.
154.
Wang Shaoguang (2002), “When the Pie Is Made Bigger…,” Dushu (Beijing), No. 2.
155.
Ibid.
156.
The nationalists were the least explicit in terms of their stance over the CCP’s decision to join the WTO.
157.
Shi Zhong (Wang Xiaodong) (1995), “The Logic of Comparative Advantage should not be Pushed to the Extreme,” Strategy and Management, No. 3. This article was absorbed into his book published in 1999, titled The Chinese Road under the Shadow of Globalization, Beijing: zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe, 1999. This book was the third influential work on Chinese nationalism after China Can Say No (1996) and Behind the Demonizing of China (1996) in the 1990s.
158.
Wang Xiaodong, “Chinese Nationalism under the Shadow of Globalization,” 7/02/2005. http://www.lse.ac.uk/collections/asiaResearchCentre/pdf/Transcript/WANGXiaodongFinalTranscriptEnglish.pdf
159.
http://blog.dwnews.com/?p=21740&cpage=1
160.
http://economist.icxo.com/htmlnews/2008/10/14/1321401_1.htm
161.
The three conditions are: “full employment, capital immobility and similar capacities to produce goods for the world market.” Ray Kiely (2006), New Political Economy of Development: Globalization, Imperialism, Hegemony, Oxon: Palgrave, p. 14.
162.
“Traitor Long Yongtu in the Twenty-First Century” (ershiyi shiji hanjian zhi long Yongtu). http://www.wyzxsx.com/Article/Class22/200807/45136.html
163.
Long Yongtu claimed, “It is a completely out-of-date mentality that a country’s industry will be able to develop if only it is protected by the state. Facts have proved that the industry can develop only in an open environment,” Zaobao, 2/12/2001.
164.
For instance, Xue Rongjiu, Professor at UIBE and the Chairman of China’s WTO research council, stated that the concept of “national industry” was unsuitable since it was no longer the age of “semi-feudal, semi-colonial” society, as it was before 1949. There is a great change in connotation of this concept. In light of the spirit of WTO, continued use of this concept is inappropriate. He proposed using a new concept, “domestic industry,” which covers all enterprises in operation within the Chinese border, including not only the SOEs, but the collectively owned and private firms, as well as the wholly owned foreign firms and JVs that are making contributions to China’s economic development (“Council Chairman says, The Concept of ‘National Industry’ is Out-Of-Date,” Guangzhou Daily, 6/12/1999). Liu Shijin, Director of Industry Department of the State Council’s Development and Research Centre, contended that conflicts of interest between Chinese and foreign investors should not be mixed together. He agreed with Xue Rongjiu in arguing that Chinese auto enterprises, whether local or foreign firms, are Chinese enterprises (“Two Important Understandings of China’s Auto Industry,” 2/09/2002). However, there are quite a number of scholars who, though they endorsed the open policy, held contrarian views in the big debate regarding the redefinition of national industry in 1996. Their views, however, fell on deaf ears in practical policy dimensions (Qianxian, No. 7, 1997).
165.
George Gilboy (2004), “The Myth of China’s Miracle,” Foreign Affairs, 83:4, pp. 33–48.
166.
Interview with Ding Li, senior research fellow at Guangdong Academy of Social Sciences, 25/07/2007.
167.
Ma Guochuan (2008), A Collection of Interviews with Chinese Economists (fengyujiancheng: zhongguo zhuming jingjixuejia fangtanlu), Beijing: SDX Joint Publishing House, p. 189.
168.
Ibid.
169.
The source of the rumor was the US-based ejournal “China and the World” run by a group of overseas Taiwanese Maoists. Actually, the long article that appeared on The Economist three days after the signing of China–US deal was overwhelmingly about economics and made virtually no mention of political impact. See “The Real Leap Forward,” The Economist, 18/11/1999. http://www.economist.com/node/259987
170.
Valentine M Moghadam (2005), Globalizing Women: Transnational Feminist Networks, Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, p. 35.
171.
Yu Zuyao, “Still Impoverished behind Prosperity,” China Economic Times, 4/03/2002.
172.
Liu Junning, “The Political Significance of China’s Accession to the WTO,” http://www.jiuding.org/Article/Class8/plwz/200509/210.html
173.
He Qinglian, “What Is the Goodness of Joining the WTO?” Duowei News, 2/04/2000.
174.
Zong Fengming (2007), Zhao Ziyang: Captive Conversation, Hong Kong: Open Press, p. 295.
175.
Su Shaozhi (2006), Democracy Cannot Wait, Hong Kong: Greenfield Bookstore, p. 196.
176.
Ibid.
177.
Cui Zhiyuan, “Joining the WTO Is Not China’s Pressing Task,” Zaobao, 6/07/1999.
178.
Cui Zhiyuan (1999), “Stimulating Domestic Demand Is a Revolution,” Review of International Economics (Beijing: guoji jingi pinglun), No. 5–6.
179.
Su (2006), Democracy Cannot Wait, pp. 196–197.
180.
Yang Xiaokai, “The Two Possible Outcomes of China’s Accession to the WTO,” http://www.boxun.com/hero/yangxk/45_1shtml
181.
It is an open secret that the Chinese communist officials deeply despise the intellectuals. Interview with an informed source, 07/08/2005.
182.
According to a well-informed source.
183.
CCTV documentary EP. 1–12: “Deng Xiaoping,” 1997. http://tv.cntv.cn/videoset/C14817; http://list.youku.com/albumlist/show/id_1375329.html?&ascending=0
184.
According to a well-informed source.
185.
Di Yinqing (1999), “A Critique on Sino-US Agreement on China’s WTO Accession,” China and the World (e-journal), No. 41, December, see webpage: http://www.zgysj.com/99/zs9912a.htm#2
186.
Long Yongtu, “Talks were Accomplished this Way,” Caijing, 5/11/2011. http://magazine.caijing.com.cn/20011105/111966.shtml
187.
Hui Feng (2006), The Politics of China’s Accession to the WTO, New York: Routledge, p. 6.
188.
It is said that Tian Jiyun, a former ally of Zhao Ziyang and famous reformist leader in the Politburo, was rather displeased with Zhu’s “minefield” rhetoric, since such wording was a reminder of Zhu’s heroism alone with all others being barriers to his reform. Conversation with an informed source in May 1999.
189.
Wu Jichuan, Minister of Information Industry (MII), openly opposed Zhu’s market access commitments on China’s sensitive infant information industries, arguing that the liberalization would seriously endanger China’s national security. Wu was bold enough to challenge Zhu because he had the backing of his mentor, former Premier Li Peng, now the Chairman of China’s legislature, the National People’s Congress. However, Jiang intervened and warned Wu not to oppose the WTO deal. Wu had to give in. According to an informed source.
190.
Interview with Wang Xiaoqiang, 2/02/2001.
191.
Long Yongtu, “Talks were Accomplished this Way,” Caijing, 5/11/2011. http://magazine.caijing.com.cn/20011105/111966.shtml
192.
Diplomacy has always been a taboo that precludes open debates and defiance from within or outside the bureaucracy since the late Premier Zhou Enlai made two iron rules for compliance: there is nothing in diplomacy that is unimportant; and there is limited empowerment in diplomacy. These two rules inherited from Zhou centralized the power of foreign policymaking in the hands of top leaders, particularly the General Secretary. During the WTO talks, Jiang’s trusted aide, PSE member and First Deputy-Premier Li Lanqing suggested mimicking the way border treaty negotiations were conducted most secretly by keeping the party and the country unknown “until the last minute of the signing of the agreement.” See report on Twenty-First Century Business Herald, 19/11/2011. http://s.21so.com/index.php?r=qlinks/index&id=201111_c9f64cd5b41c04778171a6493df71dd6
193.
“Jiang Zemin’s Speech at the National Conference on Science and Technology,” 26/05/1995. http://news.xinhuanet.com/st/2006-1/07/content_4021964.htm
194.
CCTV-jiaodianfangtan (focus), March 1999.
195.
http://baike.baidu.com/view/303969.htm
196.
Fan Hengshan, head of a Department of the System Reform Office of the State Council, complained that even many of the central government ministers were kept unknown of the details of the WTO agreements. “Dialogue between Famous Economists and Entrepreneurs on WTO,” http://finance.sina.com.cn/g/20011106/125923.html
197.
When state bank managers demanded MOFTEC negotiators not to make excessive concessions in some sensitive fields, the latter pretended to agree but did the opposite according to the directives of Zhu Rongji without further notifying the former. Interview in a Southern Province with a senior state bank manager, July 20, 2006.
198.
Han Deqiang, “The Pros and Cons of China’s Accession to the WTO, Dynamics and Debates,” a speech addressed to the European Parliament, 26/06/2001. http://www.wyzxsx.com/Article/Class17/200411/845.html
199.
John Pomfret, “Experts: Chinese Leadership Lacks Vision,” Washington Post, 28/10/1999.
200.
Zong (2007), citing then General Secretary Jiang Zemin’s chief political adviser Liu Ji’s words, p. 116.
201.
Hui Feng (2006), pp. 240–241.
202.
Huang Qifan told the audience at China Europe International Business School (CEIBS) on November 16, 1999.
203.
Some comments even attributed it to the private need of President Jiang Zemin “to increase his standing in China and China’s standing in the world.” David Roche, “Euphoria will Wear off when the Fed Raises Rates,” SCMP, 16/11/1999.
204.
Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping (hereafter “Deng’s Works”) (1993), vol. 3, Beijing: renmin chubanshe, pp. 353 (in year 1990), 383 (in year 1992).
205.
According to Liang Shoude, Deng viewed US hegemonic order as both the source of prosperity and the source of instability. Thus, the CCP remained committed to “maintain world peace and oppose hegemonism” until 2002 when the CCP held the 16th National Party’s Congress in November. Viewing “the possibly of a new world war [is] not ‘less likely,’ but ‘totally unlikely in the foreseeable future,’” the CCP eschewed mention of “opposing hegemonism” and rephrased its world outlook into “maintain world peace, and promote common development,” Seminar on Chinese Foreign Policy and Grand Strategy, 16–17/10/2003, Peking University. Jiang’s Reports in 1997 and 2002: http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64162/64168/64568/65445/4526290.html (Jiang Zemin’s Political Report addressed to the 15th National Party’s Congress: Part 9: Foreign Policy, 12/09/1997); http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64162/64168/64569/65444/4429116.html (Jiang Zemin’s Political Report addressed to the 16th National Party’s Congress: Part 9: Foreign Policy, 8/11/2002).
206.
“Long Yongtu: The More Open the Economy, the Safer the Country,” New Beijing Daily (Xinjinbao), 10/12/2006. http://finance.qq.com/a/20061210/000064.htm
207.
According to multiple internal sources.
208.
“Peaceful Rise: China Faces the World as a ‘Friendly Elephant,’” Xinhua, 24/04/2004. http://www.china.com.cn/chinese/zhuanti/boao/551888.htm

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Jianyong Yue

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Yue, J. (2018). Process of China’s WTO Accession: A Questionable Integration. In: China's Rise in the Age of Globalization. Palgrave Studies in Economic History. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-63997-0_2

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