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Measuring Governance As If Institutions Matter: A Proposal

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Abstract

Given governance is still a hazy concept, the chapter goes back to the fundamentals that enable collective action trying to understand good governance as the result of quality institutions shaping social interaction in the public realm. Going beyond available indicators, the chapter wants to provide some sound criteria for measuring the quality of institutions and, by doing so, to investigate governance. At this aim, the chapter, first, presents the criteria that should define the quality of institutions; second, provides empirical evidence of the explanatory capacity of the suggested criteria; and, third, provides some practical procedures and examples that can be useful to transform the analytical approach into governance indicators. The chapter concludes with some policy implications drawn from the analysis.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Universidad Complutense de Madrid, Madrid, Spain

    José Antonio Alonso

  2. Universidad Rey Juan Carlos, Madrid, Spain

    Carlos Garcimartín

Authors
  1. José Antonio Alonso
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  2. Carlos Garcimartín
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, European University Institute, San Domenico di Fiesole, Italy

    Debora Valentina Malito

  2. Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, European University Institute, San Domenico di Fiesole, Italy

    Gaby Umbach

  3. Law Department, European University Institute, Firenze, Italy

    Nehal Bhuta

Annex. Variables: Definition and Sources

Annex. Variables: Definition and Sources

All variables have been normalised to range between 0 and 1 by computing \( Xi=\frac{xi- xmin}{xmax- xmin} \) or \( =1-\frac{xi- xmin}{xmax- xmin} \), where i stands for Panamá or Uruguay, and x max and xmin refer to the highest and lowest values of the relevant variable for Latin American countries.

Coverage::

Percentage of population participating in social protection and labour programmes (all social insurance) (last available). Source: ASPIRE, The World Bank

Social expenditure stability::

Social expenditure as a percentage of GDP coefficient of variation, 2000–2009. Source: ECLAC

Unemployment::

Long-term unemployment: unemployed 12 months or more as a percentage of total unemployment; 2009–2012. Source: ILO

Social expenditure::

Social expenditure as a percentage of total public expenditure (last available). Source: own calculations based on ECLAC

Poverty::

Poverty headcount ratio at national poverty levels (% of population) (last available); Source: The World Bank

Percentage of school enrolment::

Primary school completion rate (bottom 20%/top 20%); 2005. Source: ECLAC

Poverty reduction::

Annual reduction of poverty headcount ratio (2000–2013). Source: own calculations based on The World Bank

Territorial disparities::

Coefficient of variation of regional GDP per head. Source: based on Garcimartín, C., Rivas, L., Díaz de Sarralde, S. and Alonso, J. A (2009): ¿Es viable un Fondo de Cohesión Social Iberoamericano? Georgetown University- Universia VOL. 3 NUM. 1

Regional representatives in the National Parliament::

Neither Uruguay nor Panamá has regional representatives in their parliaments

Number of strikes per year::

Strikes and lockouts, 2008. Source: ILO

Trust in political institutions::

Percentage of population who trust political institutions and the state; 2013. Source: ECLAC

Sub-employment::

Sub-employment rate (last available). Source: ECLAC

Membership of labour unions::

As a percentage of employees, 2010. Source: ILO

Institutionalised democracy and participation::

Polity variable in the Polity IV Project. 2013

Regime stability::

Durable variable in the Polity IV Project. 2013

Institutionalised constraints on decision-making powers::

Xconst variable in the Polity IV Project. 2013

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Alonso, J.A., Garcimartín, C. (2018). Measuring Governance As If Institutions Matter: A Proposal. In: Malito, D., Umbach, G., Bhuta, N. (eds) The Palgrave Handbook of Indicators in Global Governance. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-62707-6_4

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