Abstract
The alliance between the US and the Republic of Korea (ROK) achieved and maintained a high point of solidity during Barack Obama’s terms. The two countries’ cooperation on trade, security, human rights, and other issues advanced on the back of shared strategic interests, military cooperation, diplomacy, commerce, and mutual understanding between the respective governments and broader populations. Moreover, Obama’s charm and charisma made him personally popular in the ROK. Yet this “Obama premium” papered over an inability during his mandate to resolve heightened tension on the Korean Peninsula in particular and East Asia in general. Obama’s “strategic patience” vis-à-vis North Korea failed to stop Pyongyang’s advances in its nuclear weapons program. Obama’s “rebalancing” toward East Asia was more than a slogan, but nonetheless failed to contribute much to solving the region’s problems.
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Notes
- 1.
Jaehyeon Lee. “South Korea and the South China Sea: A Domestic and International Balancing Act,” National Bureau of Asian Research, Asia Policy 21 (2016). Accessed January 22, 2017. http://nbr.org/publications/element.aspx?id=863
- 2.
US Forces Korea had 28,500 active troops as of January 2017.
- 3.
Global Edge. Accessed January 22, 2017. http://globaledge.msu.edu/countries/south-korea/tradestats
- 4.
Excluding services amounting to 36 bn USD.
- 5.
Ibid.
- 6.
Jiyoon Kim, “Measuring a Giant: South Korean Perceptions of the United States,” Asan Report—Public Opinion Studies Program (2015). Accessed January 22, 2017. http://en.asaninst.org/contents/measuring-a-giant-south-korean-perceptions-of-the-united-states
- 7.
There are no similar data for Hu.
- 8.
Japan also has a significant historical animosity vis-à-vis China that the ROK does not share.
- 9.
Mark Manyin et al, “US-South Korea Relations,” Congressional Research Service—R41481 (October 20, 2016). Accessed January 22, 2017. https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R41481.pdf
- 10.
Participant countries: the US, the ROK, the PRC, Japan, Russia, the DPRK.
- 11.
Nuclear Threat Initiative, “The Six-Party Talks and President Obama’s North Korea Policy” (2016). Accessed January 22, 2017. http://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/obamas-north-korea-policy
- 12.
The first occurred in October 2006.
- 13.
Barack Obama and Myung-Bak Lee, “Joint Vision for the Alliance of the United States of America and the Republic of Korea,” White House Statement (June 16, 2009). Accessed January 22, 2017. http://www.cfr.org/proliferation/joint-vision-alliance-united-states-america-republic-korea/p19643
- 14.
VOA, “Clinton Calls ‘Exploratory Meeting’ with North Korea ‘Quite Positive’,” VOA (December 10, 2009). Accessed January 22, 2017. http://www.voanews.com/a/clinton-calls-exploratory-meeting-with-north-korea-quite-positive-78980687/416329.html
- 15.
The policy of more open engagement with the DPRK by the ROK, during the liberal presidential tenures of Kim Dae Jung and Roh Moo Hyun.
- 16.
Scott Snyder, “U.S. Policy Toward North Korea,” Council on Foreign Relations (January 2013). Accessed January 22, 2017. http://www.cfr.org/north-korea/us-policy-toward-north-korea/p29962
- 17.
UNSC sanctions also require the assent (or abstention) of the UNSC’s other permanent members, including Russia. It is beyond this chapter’s scope to deal with this issue.
- 18.
US-Korea Institute, US-Korea Yearbook (2010), Johns Hopkins University—SAIS (May 2011), p. 26. Accessed January 22, 2017. http://uskoreainstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/05/2010-SAIS-US-Korea-Yearbook.pdf
- 19.
Siegfried Hecker, “What I Found in North Korea,” Foreign Affairs (December 9, 2010). Accessed January 22, 2017. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/northeast-asia/2010-12-09/what-i-found-north-korea
- 20.
Ibid.
- 21.
The most well known of the exercises are Key Resolve/Foal Eagle and Ulchi-Freedom Guardian.
- 22.
This excludes a residual force of counter-artillery units stationed near the DMZ to suppress DPRK artillery attacks, and limited “tripwire” forces above the Han River.
- 23.
Office of the US Trade Representative, Fact Sheet (March 2016). Accessed January 22, 2017. https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/fact-sheets/2016/March/Four-Year-Snapshot-KORUS
- 24.
Park’s term for conditional engagement with Pyongyang.
- 25.
US Defense Department, “Joint Communiqué: The 45th ROK-US Security Consultative Meeting” (October 2, 2013). Accessed January 22, 2017. http://archive.defense.gov/pubs/Joint%20Communique,%2045th%20ROK-U.S.%20Security%20Consultative%20Meeting.pdf
- 26.
Park’s efforts with China ran parallel to pushing forward on Trustpolitik.
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Richey, M. (2018). South Korea’s Perceptions of Obama’s Foreign Policy Toward Northeast Asia. In: Maass, M. (eds) The World Views of the Obama Era. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-61076-4_12
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