Abstract
Assessing the efficacy of a codified constitution has proven to be a very challenging proposition. In this chapter, I aim to contribute to the response to the challenge posed by observational equivalence of different types of motivation to behave in accordance with the constitution. I do so by focusing on a case of constitutional enforcement in Mexico under the authoritarian ruling of the PRI. I argue that understanding when and how constitutions are enforced in authoritarian contexts is interesting and relevant in itself, but also that it can shed fresh analytical light on constitutional efficacy under democratic regimes. Mexico was governed by a hegemonic party system centered in a powerful executive from 1929 to 2000. During these seven decades, the PRI had control over the Administration, the Federal Congress, the states’ Governments, and the Judiciary. The President was the cornerstone of a well-disciplined political system: he was the head of the government and the head of the party. Nevertheless, during this president-centered era, Article 83 of the Constitution that establishes a six-year presidential term without re-election was neither altered nor violated, by any President. Without doubt this constituted a very strong constraint on power on otherwise powerful individuals. Why could presidents neither change Article 83 nor violate it? Was Article 83 efficacious? How can we know? And what lesson can we draw from this case about how to assess constitutional efficacy in general? To answer these questions, I analyze President Miguel Alemán’s (1946–1952) unsuccessful attempt to seek re-election.
For Russell Hardin, in memoriam.
His generosity and integrity both academic and personal have been, and will continue to be, a motivational force.
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Notes
- 1.
For instance, the constitution mandated life tenure for Supreme Court Justices. However, every 6 years the incoming president used to appoint as much as 72% of the Court (Ruiz Cortines, 1952–1958) and no less than 36% (López Mateos, 1958–1964). “The president could thus somehow create vacancies to be filled by justices he appointed or, in other words, he could either dismiss justices or induce early retirements” (Magaloni 2003, 228–289). See also: Valdés Ugalde (2010).
- 2.
Every incoming president amended the constitution to make it fit his political agenda: as much as 66 constitutional provisions were altered in the presidential term of Miguel de la Madrid Hurtado (1982–1988).
- 3.
An example of these changes was the transformation of the selection of candidates from primary elections to local party assemblies that enabled more control of the party leaders over the governors, senators, and deputies candidacies (Servín 2001, 129).
- 4.
The PRI had a formal president but as stated earlier the President of the Republic was the political leader of the party.
- 5.
As I have said Lombardo Toledano was an important union leader who strongly opposed Alemán’s reelection. He was close both to President Cárdenas and to President Ávila Camacho.
- 6.
For instance, many messages were expressed in negative form. As I stated before, the Generals’ denial of the “rumors” of a possible split from the PRI left wing actually brought that possibility to the table, and this was the way the message was understood by the politicians of the time and by the foreign analysts. In the same connection, stating that the president would never promote his reelection actually meant that he shouldn’t.
- 7.
General Sánchez Taboada (1895–1955) was a hero of the Constitutionalist Army. He executed the death sentence of Emiliano Zapata. He was Governor of Baja California, Secretary of Marine, and president of the PRI both in Mexico City and at national level. It was known that General Taboada supported the presidential candidacy of Fernando Casas and strongly opposed any attempt to amend the constitution.
- 8.
He eventually deposed his candidacy in favor of General Henríquez to more effectively “defend the principles of the revolution.”
- 9.
Note this conceptualization of constitutional efficacy refers only to the organic sections of constitutions (i.e. to articles that establish the functions and powers of constituted organs).
- 10.
Note that the need of separating these two senses in which a constitution is a coordination device follows from the recognition that an account of modern constitutional government requires a two-stage theory (see Hardin 1998, 83).
- 11.
Neither ex-president nor PRI president has constitutional status (i.e. they are not part of the constitution).
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Pozas-Loyo, A. (2018). Assessing Constitutional Efficacy: Lessons from Mexico’s Hegemonic Party Era. In: Christiano, T., Creppell, I., Knight, J. (eds) Morality, Governance, and Social Institutions. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-61070-2_9
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