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US Strategic Ambiguity, Rising China, and Taiwan’s Security

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US-China Rivalry and Taiwan's Mainland Policy

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Abstract

This chapter looks at the ramifications of President Ma and the KMT’s “1992 consensus” policy on Taiwan’s relations with the United States. The chapter discusses America’s strategic ambiguity policy and how the KMT’s cross-strait policy has contradicted some of the major premises of Washington’s long-standing interests. The KMT–CCP rapprochement is then analyzed in light of intensification of US–PRC rivalry since 2010, especially in the territorial and maritime contentions in the East and South China Seas.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    “Chinese, U.S. Presidents Hold Telephone Talks on Taiwan, Tibet,” The Xinhua News Agency (March 27, 2008), accessible at: http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2008-03/27/content_7865209.htm. In this author’s interview with Richard Bush, however, he noted that although the Xinhua website did display this news article, it was immediately taken down and never appeared again in the Chinese media. Thus, Beijing probably felt “it was a mistake” to give any official credence to the so-called “one China,” respective interpretations.

  2. 2.

    David G. Brown, “Taiwan Voters Set a New Course,” Comparative Connections, 10, no. 1, (April 2008), p. 4.

  3. 3.

    This chapter has been expanded, revised, and updated from an article written by this author. See Dean P. Chen, “U.S.–China Rivalry and the Weakening of the KMT’s ‘1992 Consensus’ Policy: Second-Image Reversed, Revisited,” Asian Survey 56, no. 4 (2016), pp. 754–778.

  4. 4.

    “Remarks by President Barack Obama at Town Hall Meeting with Future Chinese Leaders,” The White House Office of the Press Secretary (November 16, 2009), accessible at: https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-barack-obama-town-hall-meeting-with-future-chinese-leaders.

  5. 5.

    “Why Taiwan Matters, Part II: Testimony by Kurt Campbell, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Testimony before the House Foreign Affairs Committee,” The US Department of State (October 4, 2011), accessible at: http://www.state.gov/p/eap/rls/rm/2011/10/174980.htm.

  6. 6.

    Brett Benson and Emerson Niou, “Public Opinion, Foreign Policy, and the Security Balance in the Taiwan Strait,” Security Studies 14, no. 2 (2005), pp. 274–289. See also Philip Hsu, “Between Identity Quest and Risk Aversion: Lessons from the Chen Shui-bian Presidency for Maintaining Cross-Strait Stability,” Journal of Contemporary China 19, no. 66 (2010), pp. 693–717.

  7. 7.

    Weixing Hu, “Introduction,” in Weixing Hu ed., New Dynamics in Cross-Strait Relations: How Far can the Rapprochement Go? (New York: Routledge, 2013), p 8 and p. 3.

  8. 8.

    David Shambaugh, China Goes Global (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), pp. 77–78.

  9. 9.

    Robert Sutter, “More American Attention to Taiwan amid Heightened Competition with China,” American Journal of Chinese Studies 22, no. 1 (April 2015), p. 5. See also “Xi’s History Lessons,” The Economist (August 15, 2015), accessible at: http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21660977-communist-party-plundering-history-justify-its-present-day-ambitions-xis-history.

  10. 10.

    On this realist power-politics logic, see Hans Morgenthau, Politics among Nations (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1985) and Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979).

  11. 11.

    For a good summary of this so-called abandonment debate, see Richard Bush, “U.S.–Taiwan Relations since 2008,” in Jean-Pierre Cabestan and Jacques deLisle eds., Political Changes in Taiwan under Ma Ying-jeou (New York: Routledge, 2014), pp. 221–224.

  12. 12.

    Nadia Tsao, “Rohrabacher to Leave Taiwan Caucus Position,” Taipei Times (March 15, 2009), accessible at: http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2009/03/15/2003438534.

  13. 13.

    See Bruce Gilley, “Not So Dire Straits: How Finlandization of Taiwan Benefits U.S. Security,” Foreign Affairs (Jan/Feb 2010), pp. 44–60; Charles Glaser, “Will China’s Rise Lead to War: Why Realism Does Not Mean Pessimism,” Foreign Affairs (March/April 2011), pp. 80–91. See also Charles Glaser, “A U.S.–China Grand Bargain?: The Hard Choice between Military Competition and Accommodation,” International Security 39, no. 4 (2015), pp. 49–90.

  14. 14.

    Nancy Tucker and Bonnie Glaser, “Should the United States Abandon Taiwan?” The Washington Quarterly 34, no 4 (2011), pp. 23–37.

  15. 15.

    Robert Sutter, “More American Attention to Taiwan amid Heightened Competition with China,” pp. 8–9.

  16. 16.

    Ibid., p. 10.

  17. 17.

    Ibid., pp. 10–11.

  18. 18.

    “Why Taiwan Matters, Part II: Testimony by Kurt Campbell, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Testimony before the House Foreign Affairs Committee.” See also Richard Bush, “U.S.–Taiwan Relations since 2008,” p. 224; and Dennis Hickey, “Parallel Progress: U.S. Taiwan Relations during An Era of Rapprochement,” Journal of Chinese Political Science (2015), online access DOI 10. 1007/s11366-015-9355-1.

  19. 19.

    “Remarks by President Obama and President Xi Jinping in Joint Press Conference,” The White House Office of the Press Secretary (November 12, 2014), accessible at: http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/11/12/remarks-president-obama-and-president-xi-jinping-joint-press-conference.

  20. 20.

    “Remarks by President Obama and President Xi of the People’s Republic of China in Joint Press Conference,” The White House Office of the Press Secretary (September 25, 2015), accessible at: https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/09/25/remarks-president-obama-and-president-xi-peoples-republic-china-joint.

  21. 21.

    “Taiwan: A Vital Partner in East Asia” The US Department of State (May 21, 2015), accessible at: http://www.state.gov/p/eap/rls/rm/2015/05/242705.htm.

  22. 22.

    Robert Sutter, “More American Attention to Taiwan amid Heightened Competition with China,” p. 15.

  23. 23.

    Ibid., p. 9.

  24. 24.

    Nancy Tucker, Strait Talk, pp. 11–16.

  25. 25.

    Robert Sutter et al., “Balancing Acts: The U.S. Rebalance and Asian Pacific Stability,” Sigur Center for Asian Studies, The George Washington University (August 2013), p. 21.

  26. 26.

    Nancy Tucker, Strait Talk: United States–Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009); and Richard Bush and Alan Romberg, “Cross-Strait Moderation and the United States—A Response to Robert Sutter,” PACNET no. 17A (March 12, 2009), p. 1.

  27. 27.

    In addition to the references given in Chap. 1, it is important to stress again that numerous studies have already examined the three Sino-American Communiqués, the TRA, and President Ronald Reagan’s Six Assurances. It is beyond the scope of the present chapter to treat these topics substantively, but suffice it to note that while the communiqués stressed on the normalization of US–PRC diplomatic relations, Washington’s “acknowledgment” of Beijing’s “one-China” principle in which Taiwan is part of the mainland, and that America would eventually end arms sales to Taiwan, the TRA and the Six Assurances actually committed the United States to ensure Taiwan’s security, the maintenance of unofficial US–Taiwan ties, and that America would not push Taipei into any political negotiations with Beijing. These contradictions generate perplexities and ambiguities that serve to prevent either side from recklessly instigating tension and confrontation. See Robert Ross, “The 1995–96 Taiwan Strait Confrontation: Coercion, Credibility, and the Use of Force,” International Security 25, no. 2 (2000), pp. 87–123; Thomas Christensen, “The Contemporary Security Dilemma: Deterring a Taiwan Conflict,” The Washington Quarterly 25, no. 4 (2002), pp. 7–21; Alan Romberg, Rein In at the Brink of Precipice: American Policy toward Taiwan and U.S.-PRC Relations (Washington DC: The Henry L. Stimson Center, 2003); Richard Bush, At Cross Purposes: U.S.-Taiwan Relations since 1942 (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2004); Nancy Tucker, Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009).

  28. 28.

    See Nancy Tucker, “If Taiwan Chooses Unification, Should the United States Care?” Washington Quarterly 25 no. 3 (2002), pp. 15–28; Nancy Tucker and Bonnie Glaser, “Should the United States Abandon Taiwan?”; and Shelley Rigger, Why Taiwan Matters (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littledfield, 2011).

  29. 29.

    Thomas Christensen, “The Contemporary Security Dilemma,” The Washington Quarterly 25, no. 4 (2002), p. 19.

  30. 30.

    Robert Sutter, “More American Attention to Taiwan amid Heightened Competition with China,” pp. 6–7.

  31. 31.

    Christopher Hughes, “Revisiting Identity Politics under Ma Ying-jeou,” in Jean-Pierre Cabestan and Jacques deLisle eds., Political Changes in Taiwan under Ma Ying-jeou (New York: Routledge, 2014), pp. 130–131.

  32. 32.

    Jonathan Sullivan, “The Battle for Taiwan’s Soul: The 2016 Presidential Election,” The National Interest (May 3, 2015), accessible at: http://nationalinterest.org/feature/the-battle-taiwans-soul-the-2016-presidential-election-12790.

  33. 33.

    “Taiwan School Textbook Row Highlights Antipathy to ‘One China,’” The Reuters (August 3, 2015), accessible at: http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/08/03/us-taiwan-politics-education-idUSKCN0Q806820150803.

  34. 34.

    Lowell Dittmer, “Taiwan’s Narrowing Strait,” pp. 26–27.

  35. 35.

    Richard Bush, “U.S.–Taiwan Relations since 2008,” p. 229. Emphasis added.

  36. 36.

    Lowell Dittmer, “Taiwan’s Narrowing Strait,” p. 19.

  37. 37.

    Eric Chu of the KMT also visited the United States in mid-November 2015, despite the compressed campaign timeframe resulted from his late declaration of candidacy. Like Tsai in June, Chu was also warmly greeted and accommodated by ranking Obama administration officials from the Department of State, Department of Defense, and the National Security Council. The KMT candidate held a closed-door meeting with prominent think-tank experts and specialists at the Brookings Institution. However, since Chu’s visit followed immediately after the Xi–Ma meeting, his trip created the impression that he needed to reassure the United States that the KMT’s cross-strait policy had not deviated away from America’s security interests. See Alison Hsiao, “Chu Has Messages from Ma for US: KMT Lawmaker,” Taipei Times (November 12, 2015), accessible at: http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2015/11/12/2003632253. See also Debra Ma, “Why the Road to Taiwan’s Presidency Runs through Washington,” Bloomberg Business (November 13, 2015), accessible at: http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-11-13/why-the-road-to-the-taiwan-presidency-runs-through-washington. “Chu Held Talks with U.S. Officials on Visit to Washington,” The Focus Taiwan News (November 13, 2015), accessible at: http://focustaiwan.tw/news/aipl/201511130003.aspx.

  38. 38.

    “Readout of Secretary Kerry’s Travel to Beijing, Seoul, and Seattle, by Daniel Russel, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of East Asian and Far Eastern Affairs,” The US Department of State (May 21, 2015), accessible at: http://fpc.state.gov/242635.htm.

  39. 39.

    On how international power politics and economic relations shape states’ domestic interests, institutions, and preferences, consult literatures on the “second-image reversed” theory discussed in Chap. 1.

  40. 40.

    “U.S. To Have Voice in Taiwan’s 2016 Presidential Election: Bush,” Focus Taiwan News (September 13, 2014), accessible at: http://m.focustaiwan.tw/news/aipl/201409130014.aspx. See also Richard Bush, “Taiwan’s January 2016 Election and Their Implications for Relations with China and the United States,” p. 19.

  41. 41.

    “Washington Says Bush’s Taiwan Remarks His Own,” Taipei Times (September 18, 2014), accessible at: http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2014/09/18/2003599986.

  42. 42.

    “A Strong and Moderate Taiwan, by Thomas Christensen, Deputy Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs,” The US Department of State (September 11, 2007), accessible at: http://2001-2009.state.gov/p/eap/rls/rm/2007/91979.htm.

  43. 43.

    “1992 Consensus Verified by History: Ma,” The China Post (May 15, 2015), accessible at: http://www.chinapost.com.tw/taiwan/china-taiwan-relations/2015/05/15/436072/1992-Consensus.htm.

  44. 44.

    “U.S. Concerned about Taiwan Candidate,” The Financial Times (September 15, 2011), accessible at: http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/f926fd14-df93-11e0-845a-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3bm75hK48.

  45. 45.

    For a good overview of Japan’s foreign and security affairs after WWII, see Roberto Bendini, In-Depth Analysis: Japan Foreign and Security Policy at a Crossroads (European Union: Directorate-General for External Policies Policy Department, August 2015), accessible at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/IDAN/2015/549065/EXPO_IDA(2015)549065_EN.pdf. See also Dennis Hickey and Lilly Kelan Lu, “Japan’s Military Modernization: The Chinese Perspective,” in James Hsiung ed., China and Japan at Odds (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007); pp. 95–112; and Emma Chanlett-Avery and Ian Rinehart, The U.S.–Japan Alliance (Washington DC, Congressional Research Service, Feb 9, 2016), p. 2, accessible at https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33740.pdf.

  46. 46.

    Roberto Bendini, Japan Foreign and Security Policy at a Crossroads, p. 12.

  47. 47.

    Emma Chanlett-Avery and Ian Rinehart, The U.S.-Japan Alliance, p. 6.

  48. 48.

    Quoted from Sheila Smith, Intimate Rivals: Japanese Domestic Politics and a Rising China (New York: Columbia University Press, 2016), p. 6.

  49. 49.

    Emma Chanlett-Avery and Ian Rinehart, The U.S.–Japan Alliance, pp. 14–15.

  50. 50.

    Ibid.

  51. 51.

    Ibid., p. 4.

  52. 52.

    Ibid., pp. 9–10.

  53. 53.

    Ankit Panda, “Obama: Senkakus Covered under U.S.–Japan Security Treaty,” The Diplomat (April 24, 2014), at http://thediplomat.com/2014/04/obama-senkakus-covered-under-us-japan-security-treaty/. While backing Tokyo’s effective administration over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands since 1971, the United States has refrained from taking a stance on the sovereignty issue, hence leaving China, Japan, and Taiwan asserting their respective sovereignty claims over these island territories.

  54. 54.

    Sheila Smith, Intimate Rivals, pp. 18–19.

  55. 55.

    Emma Chanlett-Avery and Ian Rinehart, The U.S.-Japan Alliance, p. 4.

  56. 56.

    Vladimir Terehov, “Japan’s Foreign Policy Message of Early 2016,” New Eastern Outlook (Feb 9, 2016), at http://journal-neo.org/2016/02/09/japan-s-foreign-policy-messages-of-early-2016/.

  57. 57.

    Gardiner Harris, “In Obama’s Visit to Hiroshima, a Complex Calculus of Asian Politics,” The New York Times (May 26, 2016), at http://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/26/world/asia/obama-hiroshima-visit.html.

  58. 58.

    “Amid Tension, China’s Blocks Vital Exports to Japan,” The New York Times (September 22, 2010), accessible at: http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/23/business/global/23rare.html.

  59. 59.

    Jeffrey Bader, Obama and China’s Rise, pp. 106–107.

  60. 60.

    Ibid., p. 108.

  61. 61.

    Interview with the MAC official, who requested to remain anonymous. President Ma, on August 5, 2012, broached the idea of an “East China Sea Peace Initiative,” suggesting that all parties should “refrain from antagonistic conduct” and “shelve controversies,” by establishing a mechanism for cooperation on jointly exploring and developing the region. See Tsai Zheng-jia, “ROC Takes Lead with East China Sea Peace Initiative,” Taiwan Today (August 13, 2012); accessible at: http://taiwantoday.tw/ct.asp?xItem=194661&ctNode=426.

  62. 62.

    Tuan Cheng, “Taiwan-U.S. Relations: Close but Uncertain,” China Report 49, no. 4 (2013), p. 381.

  63. 63.

    Bill Hayton, The South China Sea (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2014), pp. 97–98. See also Stein Tonnesson, “The South China Sea: Law Trumps Power,” Asian Survey 55, no. 3 (May/June 2015), p. 462.

  64. 64.

    Lowell Dittmer, “Taiwan’s Narrowing Straits,” p. 23. Chien-peng Chung, Domestic Politics, International Bargaining and China’s Territorial Disputes (New York: Routledge, 2004), pp. 28–31. This point was also confirmed by a DPP official who requested to remain anonymous during my interview. The official mentioned that Ma’s policy has been quite hostile toward Japan.

  65. 65.

    For a good sketch of the Senkaku/Diaoyu contentions between the PRC, Taiwan, and Japan after 2012, see Wei-chin Lee, “A Quartet in Disharmony: Taiwan, Japan, China, and the U.S. in the Diaoyu(Tai)/Senkaku Islands Disputes in the 2010s,” American Journal of Chinese Studies (Special Issue, 2014), pp. 95–109; and Chong-Pin Lin, “Behind Rising East Asian Maritime Tensions with China: Struggle without Breaking,” Asian Survey 55, no.3 (May/June 2015), pp.480–483.

  66. 66.

    Lowell Dittmer, “Taiwan’s Narrowing Straits,” p. 24.

  67. 67.

    Wei-chin Lee, “A Quartet in Disharmony,” p. 105.

  68. 68.

    Ryo Sahashi, “Japan–Taiwan Relations since 2008: An Evolving practical, Non-Strategic Partnership,” in Jean-Pierre Cabestan and Jacques deLisle, eds., Political Changes in Taiwan under Ma Ying-jeou, pp. 232–246. See also Katherine Tseng Hui-Yi, “New Challenges to the New Leadership: The Deterioration of the Diaoyu Island Dispute,” in Zheng Yongnian and Lance Gore, eds., China Entering the Xi Jinping Era (New York: Routledge, 2015), pp. 285–302.

  69. 69.

    Tuan Cheng, “Taiwan–U.S. Relations,” p. 381. See also “Joint Press Conference with President Obama and Prime Minister Abe of Japan,” The White House (April 24, 2014), accessible at: http://www.whitehouse.gov/photos-and-video/video/2014/04/24/president-obama-holds-press-conference-prime-minister-abe-japan#transcript.

  70. 70.

    J. Michael Cole, “China’s ADIZ: Taiwan’s Dilemma,” The Diplomat (November 28, 2013), accessible at: http://thediplomat.com/2013/11/chinas-adiz-taiwans-dilemma/. See also Shannon Tiezzi, “Why China’s Air Defense Identification Zone Is Terrible for Cross-Strait Relations,” The Diplomat (November 28, 2013), accessible at: http://thediplomat.com/2013/11/why-chinas-air-defense-identification-zone-is-terrible-for-cross-strait-relations/.

  71. 71.

    Tuan Cheng, “Taiwan-U.S. Relations,” p. 381.

  72. 72.

    Lowell Dittmer, “Taiwan’s Narrowing Straits,” pp. 27–28.

  73. 73.

    Bill Hayton, The South China Sea, pp.86–89.

  74. 74.

    Stein Tonnesson, “The South China Sea,” p. 469.

  75. 75.

    Jeffrey Bader, Obama and China’s Rise, p. 81.

  76. 76.

    Avery Goldstein, “U.S.-China Interactions in Asia,” in David Shambaugh ed., Tangled Titans (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2013), pp. 263–264.

  77. 77.

    Ibid., p. 270.

  78. 78.

    “U.S. Accuses the Chinese of Harassing Naval Vessel,” The New York Times (March 9, 2009), accessible at: http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/09/world/asia/09iht-ship.3.20710715.html?_r=0.

  79. 79.

    Chong-Pin Lin, “Behind Rising East Asian Maritime Tensions with China,” p. 485.

  80. 80.

    Stein Tonnesson, “The South China Sea,” p. 464.

  81. 81.

    Avery Goldstein, “U.S.-China Interactions in Asia,” p. 273.

  82. 82.

    Secretary Clinton’s remarks at the ARF are quoted from Bill Hayton, The South China Sea, p. 191.

  83. 83.

    “Remarks by President Obama to the Australian Parliament,” The White House—Office of the Press Secretary (November 17, 2011), accessible at: http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/11/17/remarks-president-obama-australian-parliament.

  84. 84.

    Hillary Clinton, “America’s Pacific Century,” Foreign Policy (November 2011), accessible at: http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/10/11/americas_pacific_century. Clinton essentially coined the term “pivot” in this article. See also Mark Manyin, et al., “Pivot to the Pacific? The Obama Administration’s ‘Rebalancing’ toward Asia,” Congressional Research Service Report for Congress (March 28, 2012), pp. 1–29.

  85. 85.

    For a detailed analysis on each of these dimensions, see Robert Sutter et al., “Balancing Acts: The U.S. Rebalance and Asian Pacific Stability,” Sigur Center for Asian Studies (August 2013), pp. 11–16.

  86. 86.

    Chris Buckley, “Xi Jinping’s Rapid Rise in China Presents Challenges to the U.S.,” The New York Times (November 11, 2014), accessible at: http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/12/world/asia/president-xi-jinping-makes-it-his-mission-to-empower-china.html.

  87. 87.

    Aaron Friedberg, A Contest for Supremacy; Avery Goldstein, “First Thing First: The Pressing Danger of Crisis Instability in U.S.-China Relations,” International Security 37, no. 4 (Spring 2013), pp. 49–89. See also John Mearsheimer, “The Gathering Storm: China’s Challenge to U.S. Power in Asia,” The Chinese Journal of International Politics 3 (2010), pp. 381–396, and Ashley Tellis, “U.S.-China Relations in a Realist World,” in David Shambaugh, ed., Tangled Titans, pp. 75–100.

  88. 88.

    Ashley Tellis, “Balancing without Containment: A U.S. Strategy for Confronting China’s Rise,” The Washington Quarterly 36, no. 4 (2013), pp. 111–112.

  89. 89.

    Jeffrey Bader, Obama and China’s Rise, p. 69.

  90. 90.

    See the US Department of State, Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs, Limits in the Sea No. 143, China: Maritime Claims in the South China Sea (The US Department of State Report, December 5, 2014), accessible at: http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/234936.pdf. Bill Hayton, The South China Sea, Chapter 2.

  91. 91.

    Shannon Tiezzi, “Taiwan’s South China Sea Headache,” The Diplomat (November 4, 2015), accessible at: http://thediplomat.com/2015/11/taiwans-south-china-sea-headache/. See also Zheng Wang, “Chinese Discourse on the ‘Nine-Dashed Line’: Rights, Interests, and Nationalism,” Asian Survey (May/June 2015), pp. 502–524.

  92. 92.

    Bill Hayton, The South China Sea, p. 53.

  93. 93.

    Lynn Kuok, “Tides of Change: Taiwan’s Evolving Position in the South China Sea and Why Other Actors Should Take Notice,” East Asia Policy Paper No. 5 (Washington DC: The Center for East Asia Policy Studies at Brookings Institution, May 2015), p. 6. See also “Joining the Dashes,” The Economist (October 4, 2014), accessible at: http://www.economist.com/news/asia/21621844-south-china-seas-littoral-states-will-fight-museums-archives-and.

  94. 94.

    Lynn Kuok, “Tides of Change,” p. 7.

  95. 95.

    US Department of State, Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs, Limits in the Sea, p. 24.

  96. 96.

    Ibid., pp. 19–22.

  97. 97.

    Bill Hayton, The South China Sea, p.99. See also the US Department of State, Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs, Limits in the Sea No. 143, China: Maritime Claims in the South China Sea (The US Department of State Report, December 5, 2014), accessible at: http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/234936.pdf.

  98. 98.

    “Joining the Dashes.”

  99. 99.

    Lynn Kuok, “Tides of Change,” p. 9. Shannon Tiezzi, “Taiwan Will Not Cooperate with China in South China Sea,” The Diplomat (May 15, 2014), accessible at: http://thediplomat.com/2014/05/taiwan-will-not-cooperate-with-china-in-south-china-sea/. To be sure, on May 26, 2015, the Ma administration issued the “South China Sea Peace Initiative,” calling all claimants to shelve disputes over sovereignty and cooperate on sharing natural resources. This is based on President Ma’s “East China Sea Peace Initiative” proclaimed in August 2012 to urge China and Japan to exercise restraint on the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. See “Taiwan Offers South China Sea Peace Plan,” The Reuters (May 26, 2015), accessible at: http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/05/26/us-taiwan-south-china-sea-idUSKBN0OA16420150526.

    Bill Hayton, The South China Sea, p.99. See also the US Department of State, Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs, Limits in the Sea No. 143, China: Maritime Claims in the South China Sea (The US Department of State Report, December 5, 2014), accessible at: http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/234936.pdf.

  100. 100.

    Lynn Kuok, “Tides of Change,” p. 13.

  101. 101.

    “South China Sea: Try Not to Blink,” The Economist (May 30, 2015), accessible at: http://www.economist.com/news/asia/21652348-china-asserts-itself-naval-and-air-power-and-america-responds-risks.

  102. 102.

    Helene Cooper, “Challenging Chinese Claims, U.S. Sends Warships near Artificial Island Chain,” The New York Times (October 26, 2015), accessible at: http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/27/world/asia/challenging-chinese-claims-us-sends-warship-near-artificial-island-chain.html.

  103. 103.

    Christopher Hughes, “Revisiting Identity Politics under Ma Ying-jeou,” p. 127. See also Lowell Dittmer, “Taiwan’s Narrowing Strait,” pp. 24–27.

  104. 104.

    Robert Sutter, “Hardening Competition with China—Implications for U.S. Taiwan Policy,” China & U.S. Focus Digest (September 5, 2014), accessible at: http://www.chinausfocus.com/foreign-policy/hardening-competition-with-china-implications-for-us-taiwan-policy/.

  105. 105.

    Robert Sutter, “More American Attention to Taiwan amid Heightened Tension with China,” p. 12.

  106. 106.

    Ibid.

  107. 107.

    William Lowther, “U.S. Senate Reaffirms TRA, ‘Six Assurances,’” Taipei Times (July 9, 2016), accessible at: http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2016/07/09/2003650668.

  108. 108.

    Robert Sutter, “Hardening Competition with China—Implications for U.S. Taiwan Policy.” See Jeffrey Bader, “The U.S. and China’s Nine-Dash Line: Ending the Ambiguity,” Brookings Institution (Feb 6, 2014), accessible at: http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2014/02/06-us-china-nine-dash-line-bader. See also William Lowther, “Glaser Urges Ma to be Proactive in South China Sea,” Taipei Times (April 17, 2014), accessible at: http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2014/04/17/2003588239; and Bill Hayton, The South China Sea, p. 265. Hayton posited, “The chances of a freer debate on Chinese history are much greater in Taiwan than on the mainland. There are already a number of ‘dissident’ academics in rethinking aspects of twentieth-century history. Taiwan is also where the archives of the Republic of China, the government that first drew up the ‘U-shaped [Dashed] line,’ are stored. An open and thorough examination of the haphazard process through which the line came to be drawn might convince opinion-formers to reexamine some of the nationalist myths they have long declared to be gospel truth.”

  109. 109.

    “KMT, DPP Presidential Candidates Comment on South China Sea Strategy,” The Focus Taiwan News (October 28, 2015), accessible at: http://focustaiwan.tw/news/aipl/201510280032.aspx.

  110. 110.

    John J. Mearsheimer, “Taiwan’s Dire Straits,” The National Interest (March/April 2014), pp. 29–39.

  111. 111.

    “Testimony of Daniel R. Russel, Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, U.S. Department of State before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs,” (April 3, 2014), accessible at: http://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Russel_Testimony1.pdf.

  112. 112.

    Jason Pan, “Reliance on China Makes Taiwan Vulnerable: Clinton,” Taipei Times (June 25, 2014), accessible at: http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2014/06/25/2003593606. For the original interview transcript, see Business Weekly no. 1389 (June 30, 2014–July 6, 2014), pp. 58–73.

  113. 113.

    “Remarks by President Obama and President Xi Jinping in Joint Press Conference,” The White House-Office of the Press Secretary (November 12, 2014), accessible at: http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/11/12/remarks-president-obama-and-president-xi-jinping-joint-press-conference.

  114. 114.

    Austin Ramzy, “Chinese Leader and Head of Taiwan’s Kuomintang Discuss Economy and Disaster Response,” The New York Times (May 4, 2015), accessible at: http://sinosphere.blogs.nytimes.com/2015/05/04/eric-chu-xi-jinping-kuomintang-china-taiwan/?_r=0. For formal KMT press release on Eric Chu’s opening remarks during his meeting with Xi Jinping, see http://www.kmt.org.tw/2015/05/blog-post_78.html.

  115. 115.

    “Chu, Xi, Looking Forward to Greater Cross-Strait Cooperation,” Focus Taiwan News (May 4, 2015), accessible at: http://focustaiwan.tw/news/acs/201505040014.aspx.

  116. 116.

    “KMT Chief Calls for Continued Cooperation across Taiwan Strait,” Focus Taiwan News (May 4, 2015), accessible at: http://focustaiwan.tw/news/acs/201505040012.aspx.

  117. 117.

    “Xi Calls on Building Community of Shared Destiny across the Taiwan Strait,” The Xinhua News Agency (May 4, 2015), accessible at: http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2015-05/04/c_134208776.htm.

  118. 118.

    Xi’s remarks on the “1992 consensus” are quoted from Alan Romberg, “Squaring the Circle: Adhering to Principle, Embracing Ambiguity,” China Leadership Monitor (July 2015), pp. 7–8.

  119. 119.

    “Xi-Chu Meeting Consolidated Sino-Taiwanese Cooperation Framework,” Deutsche Welle (May 4, 2015), accessible at: http://www.dw.de/xi-chu-meeting-consolidated-sino-taiwanese-cooperation-framework/a-18428392.

  120. 120.

    “Opposition Party Raises Alarm over Chu-Xi Meeting,” Focus Taiwan News (May 4, 2015), accessible at: http://focustaiwan.tw/news/aipl/201505040034.aspx.

  121. 121.

    “Daily Press Briefing by Jeff Rathke,” The US Department of State (May 4, 2015), accessible at: http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2015/05/241844.htm#CHINA.

  122. 122.

    “1992 Consensus Verified by History: Ma,” The China Post (May 15, 2015), accessible at: http://www.chinapost.com.tw/taiwan/china-taiwan-relations/2015/05/15/436072/1992-Consensus.htm.

  123. 123.

    “U.S. Takes No Stance on ‘1992 Consensus’: AIT Spokesman,” The China Post (May 16, 2015), accessible at: http://www.chinapost.com.tw/taiwan/china-taiwan-relations/2015/05/16/436153/US-takes.htm.

  124. 124.

    “Stable Cross-Strait Ties Key to Taiwan-U.S. Relations: U.S. Officials,” The China Post (May 22, 2015), accessible at: http://www.chinapost.com.tw/taiwan/national/national-news/2015/05/22/436643/Stable-cross-strait.htm. On Thornton’s full speech transcript, see “Taiwan: A Vital Partner in East Asia” The US Department of State (May 21, 2015), accessible at: http://www.state.gov/p/eap/rls/rm/2015/05/242705.htm.

  125. 125.

    “Readout of Secretary Kerry’s Travel to Beijing, Seoul, and Seattle, by Daniel Russel, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of East Asian and Far Eastern Affairs.”

  126. 126.

    Susan Thornton, “Taiwan: A Vital Partner in East Asia.”

  127. 127.

    Alan Romberg, “Squaring the Circle: Adhering to Principle, Embracing Ambiguity,” p. 13.

  128. 128.

    Interview with Robert Sutter.

  129. 129.

    “DPP China Affairs Committee: Maintaining Cross-Strait Status Quo,” the Democratic Progressive Party International Site (April 10, 2015), accessible at: http://english.dpp.org.tw/dpp-china-affairs-committee/.

  130. 130.

    “Foreign Press Center Briefing on Visit of Japan’s Prime Minister,” US Department of State Foreign Press Center Briefing with Special Assistant to the President and National Security Council (NSC) Senior Director for Asian Affairs Evan Medeiros (April 27, 2015), accessible at: http://iipdigital.usembassy.gov/st/english/texttrans/2015/04/20150428315048.html?CP.rss=true#axzz3ZB7fIsVI.

  131. 131.

    Tsai Ing-wen, “Taiwan Can Build on U.S. Ties,” The Wall Street Journal (June 1, 2015), accessible at: http://www.wsj.com/articles/taiwan-can-build-on-u-s-ties-1433176635.

  132. 132.

    “Taiwan Meeting the Challenges Crating a Model of New Asian Value,” Tsai’s Speech at the CSIS (June 3, 2015), accessible at: http://csis.org/files/attachments/150603_Tsai_Ing_wen_transcript.pdf.

  133. 133.

    Alan Romberg, “Squaring the Circle: Adhering to Principle, Embracing Ambiguity,” pp. 2–3.

  134. 134.

    Nadia Tsao, “DPP’s Tsai Visits White House, U.S. State Department,” Taipei Times (June 6, 2015), accessible at: http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2015/06/06/2003620029.

  135. 135.

    Marie Harf, “Daily Press Briefing,” The US Department of State (June 5, 2015), accessible at: http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2015/06/243249.htm#CHINA.

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  1. Political Science, Ramapo College of New Jersey, Mahwah, New Jersey, USA

    Dean P. Chen

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Chen, D.P. (2017). US Strategic Ambiguity, Rising China, and Taiwan’s Security. In: US-China Rivalry and Taiwan's Mainland Policy. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-47599-8_5

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