Abstract
This chapter delves into the cross-strait policy of President Ma Ying-jeou between 2008 and 2016. In essence, its emphasis is on the KMT’s efforts to rehabilitate the ROC’s centrality and ruling legitimacy after years of de-Sinification campaigns pushed by Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian. From this author’s interviews with officials from the KMT, DPP, the Mainland Affairs Council, scholars, and think-tank analysts, this chapter aims to demonstrate that the Ma administration was engaging in a nation-(re)building project to integrate Taiwan and the mainland economically, politically, culturally, and historically. The president had initiated several name rectification policies, including addressing the PRC as “mainland China” instead of “China” or the “PRC”. Strictly following the ROC Constitution promulgated on the Chinese mainland in 1948, Ma further underscored that the relations between both sides are, in fact, not state-to-state since both Taiwan and the mainland are merely two regions, though separate currently due to the Chinese Civil War, that are waiting for reunification under the democratic ROC government. Such an assertion is identical to the reunification position of Chiang Kai-shek and Chiang Ching-kuo. The KMT leader stressed not only on the importance of upholding the “1992 consensus” as the bedrock for cross-strait peace but also of focusing on connecting the Chinese national, historical, and cultural bonds between the compatriots on both sides of the strait. Between 2013 and 2015, Taipei held a high-profile commemoration of the ROC’s struggle against imperialism and fascism in WWII and the KMT’s strenuous efforts to defeat Japan and recover Taiwan back to the embrace of China. The Ma government’s pro-China endeavors, however, led to growing discontent from the Taiwanese people, galvanizing mass demonstrations and ultimately leading to the KMT’s declining electoral fortunes in 2014 and 2016.
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Notes
- 1.
Chang Bi-yu, Place, Identity and National Imagination in Postwar Taiwan (New York: Routledge, 2015), p. 2.
- 2.
Hughes 2011, p. 21.
- 3.
Shirley Lin 2016, p. 31.
- 4.
Ibid.
- 5.
Ibid., p. 210.
- 6.
Jean-Pierre Cabestan, “Cross-Strait Integration and Taiwan’s New Security Challenges.” In Gunter Schubert, (ed.), Taiwan and the “China Impact” (New York: Routledge, 2016), p. 293.
- 7.
Hughes 2011, pp. 18–19.
- 8.
Wang Chi 2015, p. 201.
- 9.
Hughes 2014.
- 10.
John Hsieh, “Taiwan in 2014: A Besieged President amid Political Turmoil,” Asian Survey 55, no. 1 (2015), pp. 142–147.
- 11.
Shirley Lin 2016, p. 220.
- 12.
Wu Chung-li 2016, p. 33.
- 13.
This author’s interview with Dr. Su Chi on July 16 2014, Taipei, Taiwan. Dr. Su was minister of the ROC’s MAC from 1999 to 2000, Taiwan’s legislator from 2005 to 2008, and secretary general of the ROC’s National Security Council for President Ma Ying-jeou from 2008 to 2010. He is now the chairman of the Taipei Forum Foundation.
- 14.
“President Bush and Premier Wen Jiabao Remarks to the Press,” The White House News & Policies (December 9, 2003), accessible at: http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2003/12/20031209-2.html.
- 15.
In Chen’s first inaugural address on May 20, 2000, the new president, to maintain a moderate standing, announced his “five nos” pledge. As long as Beijing has no intention to use military force against Taiwan, the DPP government will not (1) declare independence; (2) change the national title; (3) push forth the inclusion of the so-called state-to-state description in the ROC Constitution; and (4) promote a referendum to change the status quo in regard to the question of independence or unification. For the “fifth no,” Chen affirmed that the abolition of the NUC or the National Unification Guidelines (two institutional arrangements in the ROC that have great constitutional and symbolic meaning for a future reunification with mainland China) will not be an issue. See Su Chi, Taiwan’s Relations with Mainland China (New York: Routledge, 2009), pp. 92–93. For the full text of President Chen’s first inaugural address, see Chen Shui-bian, “Taiwan Stands Up: Presidential Inaugural Address,” (May 20, 2000), accessible at: http://china.usc.edu/(S(vp0nss55wvfm1kbu11v2nn45)A(cFcf0oy-zAEkAAAANThhZWE5OWItMzg0MS00N2E0LTg1ZTgtYTY0NWM3ZmYyNDAxsqzE6IN5ymmiSuRACVYt93gM_-41))/ShowArticle.aspx?articleID=1302.
- 16.
Susan Shirk, China: Fragile Superpower, pp. 209–210.
- 17.
Nancy Tucker, Strait Talk, p. 278.
- 18.
Quote taken from Susan Shirk, China: Fragile Superpower, p. 209.
- 19.
Quote taken from Dennis Hickey, “Rapprochement between Taiwan and the Chinese Mainland,” p. 235.
- 20.
Nancy Tucker, Strait Talk, p. 271.
- 21.
Thomas Christensen, “A Strong and Moderate Taiwan,” A Speech to the U.S.-Taiwan Business Council at the Defense Industry Conference, Annapolis, Maryland (September 11, 2007), accessible at: http://2001-2009.state.gov/p/eap/rls/rm/2007/91979.htm.
- 22.
S. Philip Hsu, “Between Identity Quest and Risk Aversion,” pp. 715–716. This view point was also expressed by the DPP party official during interview with this author.
- 23.
This author’s interview with Su Chi. This point was also confirmed by an official in Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council, who requested to remain anonymous during an interview with this author on August 7, 2014, Taipei, Taiwan.
- 24.
Fu-Kuo Liu, “Ma Ying-jeou’s Rapprochement Policy: Cross-Strait Progress and Domestic Constraints,” in Jean-Pierre Cabestan and Jacques deLisle eds., Political Changes in Taiwan under Ma Ying-jeou, pp. 139–155.
- 25.
Fell, Government and Politics in Taiwan, p. 134.
- 26.
Daniel Lynch, “Taiwan’s Self-Conscious Nation-Building Project,” p. 517.
- 27.
Ibid., pp. 521–526.
- 28.
Fell, p. 134.
- 29.
Hughes, “Revisiting Identity Politics under Ma Ying-jeou,” p. 122.
- 30.
Fell, p. 135.
- 31.
Ibid., pp. 223–224. See also Frank Muyard, “Midterm Analysis of the Ma Ying-jeou Administration,” China Perspective (2010), p. 19.
- 32.
See “A Conversation with Ma Ying-jeou,” The Council on Foreign Relations (March 20, 2006), accessible at: http://www.cfr.org/china/conversation-ma-ying-jeou-rush-transcript-federal-news-service-inc/p10217. See also “Ma Reaffirms ‘1992 Consensus and ‘3Nos,’” The China Post (August 29, 2011), accessible at: http://www.chinapost.com.tw/taiwan/china-taiwan-relations/2011/08/29/314938/Ma-reaffirms.htm.
- 33.
Clark and Tan, Taiwan’s Political Economy, p. 142.
- 34.
Hughes, “Revisiting Identity Politics under Ma Ying-jeou,” p. 122. See also Fell, Government and Politics in Taiwan, pp. 96–97.
- 35.
Ibid., pp. 219–220.
- 36.
Interview with Dr. Chao Chun-shan, on July 8, 2014, Taipei, Taiwan. Dr. Chao was appointed by the Ma administration as chairman of Taiwan’s Prospect Foundation and the Foundation on Asia-Pacific Peace Studies. Dr. Chao is a close brain trust for President Ma Ying-jeou on cross-strait relations. The ROC Constitution (1947), NUC Resolution (1991), and the Act Governing Relations between the People of the Taiwan Area and the Mainland Area (1992) all stipulate that Taiwan and the mainland are “areas” or “regions” under the sovereignty of the Republic of China. For the full text of the Act Governing Relations between the People of the Taiwan Area and the Mainland Area, see http://www.mac.gov.tw/ct.asp?xItem=106120&ctNode=5914&mp=3. See also, Office of the President, Republic of China, “Zongtong Chuxi Zhonghua Minguo Shinxian 60 Nian Yantao Hui”[President Ma Attending the Conference on the 60th Anniversary of the ROC Constitution], (December 21, 2008); accessible at: http://www.president.gov.tw/Default.aspx?tabid=131&itemid=14549&rmid=514&sd=2008/12/21&ed=2008/12/25.
- 37.
SEF and ARATS are semi-government organizations (also known colloquially as the “white gloves”) representing Taipei and Beijing, respectively, to negotiate socio-economic, technical, and functional issues between the two sides. The official government organizations—ROC’s MAC and the PRC’s TAO—are responsible for managing cross-strait relations but did not meet directly. It was not until 2014 did the chiefs of MAC and TAO (Wang Yu-chi and Zhang Zhijun, respectively) met directly and formally opened up the “official channel.”
- 38.
“President Ma Delivers Address at Symposium on 1992 Consensus,” (November 9, 2012), accessible at: http://english.president.gov.tw/Default.aspx?tabid=1124&itemid=28549&rmid=3048. For more substantive discussions of the “1992 consensus” or the OCRI policy, both the views from the KMT government and the People’s Republic of China, see Su Chi and Cheng An-guo eds., Yige Zhongguo Gezi Biaoshu Gongshi De Shishi [One China, Respective Interpretations: A Historical Account of the Consensus] (Taipei: National Policy Foundation, 2003); Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait (ARATS) eds., Jiuer Gongshi Lishi Cunzheng [The Historical Documentations of the 1992 Consensus] (Beijing: Jiuzhou Press, 2005); Su Chi, Taiwan’s Relations with Mainland China, especially Chapter 1; and Arthur Ding and Lin Join-sane eds., Jiuer Gongshi Ershi Zhounian Xueshu Yantao Huiyi Shilu [The 1992 Consensus: The 20th Anniversary Academic Conference Records] (Taipei: The Strait Exchange Foundation and National Chengchi University’s Institute of International Relations, 2012).
- 39.
This author’s interview with Chao Chun-shan.
- 40.
Interview with Dr. Su Chi. This was also confirmed by this author’s interview with the MAC official.
- 41.
Interview with Dr. Su Chi. He further elaborated that on the “one-China” issue, the CCP’s position is “yes”, KMT “yes, but…” and the DPP “no.” While both the KMT and CCP could agree on the “yes” part, there is no room for any compromise between the CCP and DPP. Hence, he thought, the “1992 consensus” could serve as a useful terminology especially for the DPP, which rejects “one China.” Nonetheless, the DPP has refused to accept the “1992 consensus.”
- 42.
Interview with the MAC official.
- 43.
Interview with the MAC official, who requested to remain anonymous. See also “Full Text of Hu Jintao’s Report at 18th Party Congress,” (November 17, 2012), accessible at: http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/special/18cpcnc/2012-11/17/c_131981259_11.htm.
- 44.
Ma Ying-jeou, “Building National Security for the Republic of China,” Videoconference with the Center for Strategic & International Studies (May 12, 2011), p. 2, accessible at: csis.org/files/attachments/110512_President_Ma_CSIS.pdf.
- 45.
In my interviews with Chao Chun-shan and Su Chi, they both noted that President Ma had aimed to create a balance between the ROC and Taiwan. But, clearly, Ma viewed the ROC, rather than Taiwan, as the central Chinese state, established in 1912 and continuing to exert independent sovereignty even after the government retreated from mainland China in 1949. Ma’s emphasis on the ROC set him apart from the DPP.
- 46.
Interview with the MAC official who requested to remain anonymous.
- 47.
Baohui Zhang, “Taiwan’s New Grand Strategy,” p. 273.
- 48.
Jacques deLisle, “Taiwan and Soft Power,” p. 279.
- 49.
See “President Ma’s National Day Address,” Office of the President, Republic of China (October 10, 2013), accessible at: http://english.president.gov.tw/Default.aspx?tabid=491&itemid=30933&rmid=2355.
- 50.
Interview with Chao Chun-shan. This confusion results from the fact that both the ROC and PRC Constitutions are “one China” based. Hence, Taipei’s and Beijing’s sovereignty claims are essentially identical and overlapping.
- 51.
Dafydd Fell, Government and Politics in Taiwan, p. 224. See also Gunter Schubert, “Between Strategic Change and Ideological Adjustment: The DPP’s China Policy Debate in the Aftermath of the 2012 National Elections,” Taiwan Political Science Review 16, no. 2 (2012), pp. 250–251.
- 52.
Elena Atanassova-Cornelis, “Shifting Domestic Politics and Security Policy in Japan and Taiwan: The Search for a Balancing Strategy between China and the U.S.,” Asian Pacific Review 20, no. 1 (2013), p 65.
- 53.
Bilateral trade was at around $134 billion in 2014 whereas Taiwan’s investment in China was $14.6 billion in 2010. See “Cross-Strait Economic Statistics Monthly No. 279,” the Mainland Affairs Council, Republic of China (Taiwan), July 28, 2016, accessible at: http://www.mac.gov.tw/ct.asp?xItem=115183&ctNode=5934&mp=3.
- 54.
Lowell Dittmer, “Taiwan’s Narrowing Strait,” pp. 15–16.
- 55.
Interview with Chao Chun-shan.
- 56.
Chang Hui-Ching, and Richard Holt, Language, Politics and Identity in Taiwan (New York: Routledge, 2015), p. 3.
- 57.
Ibid., p. 5.
- 58.
Ibid., p. 9.
- 59.
Hughes, “Revising Identity Politics under Ma Ying-jeou,” pp. 123–124.
- 60.
Interview with Ma (Jesse) Wei-min on July 14, 2016, Taipei, Taiwan. Ma is the editor-in-chief of the Apple Daily Newspaper in Taiwan. The Apple Daily has the largest readership and circulation in Taiwan.
- 61.
Lynch, pp. 515–516.
- 62.
Ibid.
- 63.
The DPP calls Ma’s behaviors “authoritarian” and intending to push for “de-Taiwanization.” See Chris Wang, “Historians Insist Ma Should Leave Textbooks Alone,” Taipei Times (July 12, 2012), accessible at: http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2012/07/17/2003537940.
- 64.
Ma Ying-jeou, Original Native Spirit: the Model Story of Taiwan [Yuanxiang jingshen: Taiwan de dianfan gushi] (Taipei, Taiwan: Tianxia Publishers, 2007).
- 65.
Hughes 2011, p. 18.
- 66.
Grace Tsoi, “Taiwan Has Its Own Textbook Controversy Brewing,” Foreign Policy (July 21, 2015), accessible at: http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/07/21/taiwan-textbook-controversy-china-independence-history/.
- 67.
Ibid.
- 68.
“Curriculum Academic Sparks Fury,” Taipei Times (August 2, 2015), accessible at: http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2015/08/02/2003624442.
- 69.
Grace Tsoi, “Taiwan Has Its Own Textbook Controversy Brewing.”
- 70.
This author’s interview with Chou Chih-wei on July 28, 2016, Taipei, Taiwan. Chou is the chairperson of the KMT’s Culture and Communications Committee.
- 71.
Grace Tsoi, “Taiwan Has Its Own Textbook Controversy Brewing.”
- 72.
Ibid.
- 73.
Ibid.
- 74.
“Taiwan’s New Government Drops ‘China-Centric’ Curriculum after Widespread Protests,” HKFP (June 1, 2016), accessible at: https://www.hongkongfp.com/2016/06/01/taiwans-new-govt-drops-china-centric-curriculum-after-widespread-protests/.
- 75.
Hughes, “pp. 124–125, p. 129.
- 76.
President Ma Ying-jeou’s National Day Address 2011, “A Century of Struggle, a Democratic Taiwan,” Office of the President, Republic of China (Taiwan), October 10, 2011, accessible at: http://english.president.gov.tw/Default.aspx?tabid=1124&itemid=25533&rmid=3048.
- 77.
Ibid.
- 78.
“Ma Reaffirms Validity of Cairo Declaration,” Taiwan Today (December 3, 2013), accessible at: http://taiwantoday.tw/ct.asp?xitem=212265&CtNode=414.
- 79.
On the controversies surrounding Taiwan’s postwar legal status, see Edward Dreyer, “The Myth of ‘One China,’” in Peter Chow, ed., The One China Dilemma, pp. 19–36; and also in the same volume, J Bruce Jacobs, “Taiwan’s Colonial History and Postcolonial Nationalism,” pp. 37–56; and Huang-chih Chiang and Jau-yuan Huang, “On the Statehood of Taiwan: A Legal Reappraisal,” pp. 57–80.
- 80.
“Taiwan President Remembers Nationalist Victory in Sino-Japanese War,” Reuters (July 4, 2015), accessible at: http://www.reuters.com/article/us-taiwan-military-idUSKCN0PE0HS20150704.
- 81.
“President Ma Attends Opening Ceremonies for Exhibits Commemorating the 70th Anniversary of Victory in War of Resistance and Taiwan Retrocession,” Office of the President, Republic of China (Taiwan), July 3, 2015, accessible at: http://english.president.gov.tw/Default.aspx?tabid=491&itemid=35152&rmid=2355.
- 82.
See Lloyd Eastman, Seeds of Destruction (Stanford University Press, 1984) and Rana Mitter, Forgotten Ally (First Mariner books, 2013).
- 83.
“President Ma Attends Opening of Exhibit Commemorating 70th Anniversary of ROC’s Victory in War Against Japan and Taiwan’s Retrocession,” Office of the President, Republic of China (Taiwan), August 15, 2015, accessible at: http://english.president.gov.tw/Default.aspx?tabid=491&itemid=35468&rmid=2355.
- 84.
Ibid.
- 85.
Interview with a DPP party official in the Department of China Affairs, who requested to remain anonymous, Taipei, Taiwan, July 22, 2014.
- 86.
Gunter Schubert, “Between Strategic Change and Ideological Adjustment,” pp. 233–270.
- 87.
Interview with DPP party official.
- 88.
Ibid.
- 89.
J. Michael Cole, “Ma and Xi Hold ‘Historic’ Meeting in Singapore,” Thinking Taiwan (November 7, 2015), accessible at: http://thinking-taiwan.com/ma-xi-historic-meeting-singapore/.
- 90.
Gunter Schubert, “Between Strategic Change and Ideological Adjustment,” p. 246.
- 91.
The DPP’s “Taiwan Independent Clause” calls for the creation of the Republic of Taiwan. The “Resolution,” on the other hand, was ratified in May 1998 to moderate the DPP’s pro-independence position and to strengthen the electoral prospects of Chen Shui-bian for the coming presidential election in March 2000. See Gunter Schubert, “Between Strategic Change and Ideological Adjustment,” p. 239. See also Su Chi, Taiwan’s Relations with Mainland China, pp. 98–99.
- 92.
DPP, “Resolutions Regarding Taiwan’s Future,” (May 1999), accessible at: http://dpptaiwan.blogspot.tw/2011/03/1999-resolution-regarding-taiwans.html.
- 93.
Gunter Schubert, “Between Strategic Change and Ideological Adjustment,” p. 240.
- 94.
Interview with Dr. Su Chi. He commented that the DPP obviously dislikes the ROC but could use it for pragmatism.
- 95.
DPP, “Resolutions Regarding Taiwan’s Future.”
- 96.
Ibid.
- 97.
Chang and Holt, “Taiwan and ROC,” p. 312.
- 98.
Ibid., p. 313.
- 99.
“DPP’s Chair Tsai Ing-wen’s Comments on Proposed Freeze on Independence Platform,” (July 22, 2014), accessible at: http://dpptaiwan.blogspot.tw/2014/07/dpp-chair-tsai-ing-wens-comments-on.html.
- 100.
“Public Views on Current Cross-Strait Relations,” the Mainland Affairs Council, Republic of China (Taiwan), March 29, 2016, accessible at: http://www.mac.gov.tw/public/Attachment/651313484572.pdf.
- 101.
“Public Views on Current Cross-Strait Relations,” the Mainland Affairs Council, ROC (Taiwan), November 11, 2015, accessible at: http://www.mac.gov.tw/public/Attachment/5122916242137.pdf.
- 102.
“Public Views on Current Cross-Strait Relations,” March 29, 2016.
- 103.
Chang and Holt, “Taiwan and ROC,” p. 302.
- 104.
Interview with the DPP official.
- 105.
“Changes in the Taiwanese/Chinese Identity of Taiwanese as Tracked in Surveys by the Election Study Center, National Chengchi University (NCCU), 1992–June 2014,” accessible at http://esc.nccu.edu.tw/course/news.php?Sn=166.
- 106.
Brett Benson and Emerson Niou, “Public Opinion, Foreign Policy, and the Security Balance in the Taiwan Strait,” Security Studies 14, no. 2 (2005), p. 286.
- 107.
S. Philip Hsu, “Between Identity Quest and Risk Aversion,” pp. 715–716.
- 108.
Interview with the MAC official.
- 109.
“Ma Warns against Exaggerations on Cross-Strait Ties,” Overseas Office of the Republic of China (Taiwan) (April 2014), accessible at: http://www.taiwanembassy.org/ca/yvr/ct.asp?xItem=494792&ctNode=2237&mp=2.
- 110.
“Public Views on Current Cross-Strait Relations,” March 29, 2016.
- 111.
Interview with the DPP party official. The MAC official also concurred on this point, commenting that, in recent years, Beijing has relaxed somewhat when Taipei asserts “one China” is the ROC. But, internationally, Beijing never concedes on the fact that “one China” is the PRC.
- 112.
“China to New Pope: Welcome, But Stay Away from Taiwan,” The Washington Times (March 14, 2013), accessible at: http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/mar/14/china-new-pope-welcome-stay-away-taiwan/.
- 113.
Liao Da-chi et al., “The Decline of ‘Chinese Identity in Taiwan?!—An Analysis of Survey Data from 1992 to 2012,” East Asia 30 (2013), pp. 273–290. These growing trends were also confirmed during this author’s interview with Dr. Liao Da-chi, July 17, 2014, Kaohsiung, Taiwan. She is a professor and director of the Institute of Political Science at the National Sun-Yat-sen University.
- 114.
This agreement, signed by SEF and ARATS in June 2013, is a follow-up to ECFA. The purpose is to reduce restrictions on trade in services and expand the scope of market and business for service suppliers. The KMT government has tried to assure the Taiwanese service sectors that the pact would provide preferential treatments for Taiwanese service suppliers in mainland China and that stringent regulations would be implemented to make sure that liberalization would not compromise Taiwan’s economy. See “ECFA: Q &A about the Cross-Straits Agreement on Trade in Services,” (Taipei: Ministry of Economic Affairs, ROC, 2014). However, according to critics, the government’s lack of sufficient communication and information-sharing has galvanized enormous skepticism from Taiwan’s public, who remain confused over the specific implications of the agreement.
- 115.
Interview with Ma Wei-ming.
- 116.
“Sunflower Sutra,” The Economist (April 8, 2014), accessible at: http://www.economist.com/blogs/banyan/2014/04/politics-taiwan.
- 117.
“Public’s Views on Current Cross-Strait Relations,” the Mainland Affairs Council Republic of China (Taiwan), December 25, 2014, http://www.mac.gov.tw/public/Attachment/52514151258.pdf.
- 118.
“Public’s Views on Current Cross-Strait Relations,” the Mainland Affairs Council Republic of China (Taiwan), (August 2008), accessible at: http://www.mac.gov.tw/public/Attachment/96315264474.pdf.
- 119.
“Public’s Views on Current Cross-Strait Relations,” MAC, August 9, 2016, accessible at: http://www.mac.gov.tw/ct.asp?xItem=115356&ctNode=5649&mp=1.
- 120.
Cabestan 2016, pp. 295–296.
- 121.
“Tsai Blasted for ‘Government-in-Exile’ Remark,” Taipei Times (May 27, 2010), accessible at: http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2010/05/27/2003473982.
- 122.
“On the Antlers of a Dilemma: The Ambitions of Ma Ying-jeou, Taiwan’s President, Collide with Popular Suspicion of China,” The Economist (March 29, 2014), accessible at: http://www.economist.com/news/asia/21599812-ambitions-ma-ying-jeou-taiwans-president-collide-popular-suspicion-china. For instance, Ma’s offensives against the Legislative Yuan Speaker Wang Jin-pyng in September 2013 also triggered backlashes against the president. See “Politics in Taiwan: Daggers Down,” The Economist (September 21, 2013), accessible at: http://www.economist.com/news/asia/21586546-struggle-between-president-and-ruling-party-heavyweight-has-consequences-islands.
- 123.
Richard Bush, “Cross-Strait Relations: Not a One-Way Street,” The Brookings Institution (April 22, 2016), accessible at: http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/order-from-chaos/posts/2016/04/22-cross-strait-relations-bush.
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Author’s Interviews
Interview with Chao Chun-shan, July 8, 2014, Taipei, Taiwan. Chao served as Chairman of Taiwan’s Prospect Foundation and the Foundation on Asia-Pacific Peace Studies during the Ma Ying-jeou administration.
Interview with Su Chi, July 16 2014, Taipei, Taiwan. Su was Minister of Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council (MAC) from 1999 to 2000, Taiwan’s legislator from 2005 to 2008, and Secretary General of the ROC’s National Security Council for President Ma Ying-jeou from 2008 to 2010. He is now the chairman of the Taipei Forum Foundation.
Interview with Liao Da-chi, July 17, 2014, Kaohsiung, Taiwan. Liao is Professor and Director of the Institute of Political Science at the National Sun-Yat-sen University.
Interview with an official from the DPP’s Department of China Affairs, who requested to remain anonymous, July 22, 2014, Taipei, Taiwan.
Interview with an official in Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council, who requested to remain anonymous, August 7, 2014, Taipei, Taiwan.
Interview with Ma (Jesse) Wei-min, July 14, 2016, Taipei, Taiwan. Ma is the editor-in-chief of the Apple Daily Newspaper in Taiwan.
Interview with Chou Chih-wei, July 28, 2016, Taipei, Taiwan. Chou was the Chairperson of the KMT’s Culture and Communications Committee from April 2016 to October 2016.
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Chen, D.P. (2017). The KMT Rebuilds the ROC: Useful Foreign Foes and Enemies from Within. In: US-China Rivalry and Taiwan's Mainland Policy. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-47599-8_4
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-47599-8_4
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