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Confining Adversary Actions via Measurement

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Book cover Graphical Models for Security (GraMSec 2016)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNSC,volume 9987))

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Abstract

Systems designed with measurement and attestation in mind are often layered, with the lower layers measuring the layers above them. Attestations of such systems must report the results of a diverse set of application-specific measurements of various parts of the system. There is a pervasive intuition that measuring the system “bottom-up” (i.e. measuring lower layers before the layers above them) is more robust than other orders of measurement. This is the core idea behind trusted boot processes. In this paper we justify this intuition by characterizing the adversary actions required to escape detection by bottom-up measurement. In support of that goal, we introduce a formal framework with a natural and intuitive graphical representation for reasoning about layered measurement systems.

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Acknowledgments

I would like to thank Pete Loscocco for suggesting and guiding the direction of this research. Many thanks also to Perry Alexander and Joshua Guttman. Their valuable feedback on during the formation of these ideas was invaluable. Thanks also to Sarah Helble and Aaron Pendergrass for lively discussions about implementations of measurement and attestation systems. Finally, I would like to thank the anonymous reviewers as well as the GraMSec participants for their insightful comments and suggestions for improving the paper.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. The MITRE Corporation, Bedford, USA

    Paul D. Rowe

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  1. Paul D. Rowe
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Correspondence to Paul D. Rowe .

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Editors and Affiliations

  1. INSA Rennes & IRISA, Rennes, France

    Barbara Kordy

  2. KTH Royal Institute of Technology , Stockholm, Sweden

    Mathias Ekstedt

  3. University of Canterbury , Christchurch, New Zealand

    Dong Seong Kim

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Rowe, P.D. (2016). Confining Adversary Actions via Measurement. In: Kordy, B., Ekstedt, M., Kim, D. (eds) Graphical Models for Security. GraMSec 2016. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 9987. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-46263-9_10

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-46263-9_10

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  • Publisher Name: Springer, Cham

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-319-46262-2

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-319-46263-9

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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