Abstract
The paper addresses the puzzle of the identity of the so called sensus communis in Aristotle’s writings, trying to provide a systematic account of Aristotle’s doctrine and to show why and how Aristotle’s theory about the common sensory power is a landmark in the history of philosophical psychology. In my interpretation, some ideas about the cooperation between different sense-powers, which were already outlined in the De anima, but which could not be developed there, are construed in a systematic way in the Parva naturalia. The line of reasoning followed by Aristotle brings him to postulate the existence of a single sense-power, whose activity unifies all the cognitive activities of the animal. The paper addresses also the problem of the solution provided by Aristotle to the problem of consciousness, trying to answer to the puzzle of the very different solutions that the De anima and the Parva naturalia give of this problem.
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Notes
- 1.
- 2.
Cf. 425b12–13: ἀνάγκη ἢ τῇ ὄψει αἰσθάνεσθαι ὅτι ὅρᾷ ἢ ἑτέρᾳ (“it must either be by sight or by some other sense that the percipient perceives that he sees”).
- 3.
ὥστ᾿ ἐπὶ τῆς πρώτης τοῦτο ποιητέον: “Therefore it will be better to admit this of the first in the series” (425b17).
- 4.
ἀπορίαν· εἰ γὰρ τὸ τῇ ὄψει αἰσθάνεσθαί ἐστιν ὁρᾶν, ὁρᾶται δὲ χρῶμα ἢ τὸ ἔχον, εἰ ὄψεταί τις τὸ ὁρῶν, καὶ χρῶμα ἕξει τὸ ὁρῶν πρῶτον.
- 5.
This problem had already been raised, as is well known, by Plato in the Charmides (168d9–e1).
- 6.
The hypothesis, here, is that what should be qualified is the act of seeing.
- 7.
Here Hicks translates “both darkness and light.”
- 8.
φανερὸν τοίνυν ὅτι οὐχ ἓν τὸ τῇ ὄψει αἰσθάνεσθαι· καὶ γὰρ ὅταν μὴ ὁρῶμεν, τῇ ὄψει κρίνομεν καὶ τὸ σκότος καὶ τὸ φῶς, ἀλλʼ οὐχ ὡσαύτως.
- 9.
The non-standard exercise of sight will correspondingly be called “seeing2,” while I will call the standard act of sight “seeing1,” and its proper object will be colour1.
- 10.
Hicks, who reads “αἱ αἰσθήσεις καὶ φαντασίαι,” translates “φαντασίαι” as “images.” I do not think that the concept of “image” can correspond to Aristotle’s concept of “φαντασία.” It seems to me that there isn’t any Greek word which exactly corresponds to the English word “image”; but, as far as representational images are concerned, the Greek word for “image” is “εἰκών.”
- 11.
ἔτι δὲ καὶ τὸ ὁρῶν ἔστιν ὡς κεχρωμάτισται· τὸ γὰρ αἰσθητήριον δεκτικὸν τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ ἄνευ τῆς ὕλης ἕκαστον· διὸ καὶ ἀπελθόντων τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἔνεισιν αἰσθήσεις καὶ φαντασίαι ἐν τοῖς αἰσθητηρίοις.
- 12.
This characterization is meant to capture the essential feature which is shared by the many phantasiai (notice the plural in 422b22–25): i.e. of the many after-effects that remain in the animal body after perception. It seems to me that the definition of phantasia in De anima 3.3, 429a1–2, is meant primarily to define the persistence of these after-effects, i.e. phantasia in its first and second actuality. The power of phantasia is something more difficult to define, and I would prefer not to discuss the details of this (very difficult) topic, which I addressed in Feola (2012).
- 13.
Péter Lautner—if I understand his point—has pointed out to me that the switch of the sense-power from inactivity to activity is an alteratio perfectiva, while the changes in the external environment are not; but I do not think that this distinction, which is very important for other aspects of Aristotle’s theory, matters here; in fact, both the change that we perceive in the environment and the alteratio perfectiva which occurs in our sense-power share a very important common feature: in both changes, there occurs a switch, in the thing which is subject to change, from an initial state where change has not occurred to a state where change has occurred. And what matters for the change to be perceived—in my hypothesis—is that the sense can react to the difference between the initial state and the final one.
- 14.
“This distinction between the perceiving and perceiving that we perceive … is impossible without some degree of psychical continuity …. It implies elementary memory, which again implies that φαντασία, as sensory presentation, is not any longer a mere momentary appearance, but a faculty of storing up αἰσθήματα, to become φαντάσματα” (Beare 1906, 289–290).
- 15.
Due to lack of space, I cannot discuss here the details of Aristotle’s theory: my interpretation of this much-debated matter can be found in Feola (2014).
- 16.
The overall system built up by external sense-organs and the heart.
- 17.
Ward (1988, 230 n10): “the relation of the stimulated sense-organ and the sensible object is similar to the relation of, say, a polar projection map and the terrain it maps, as opposed to, say, a physical relief map and what it maps, in that the sense-organ resembles the sensible object analogically but not qualitatively.”
- 18.
Aristotle admits that we can perceive not only environmental features but also sensory motions produced in our sense-organs by those sensible features: cf. e.g. Somn. 1, 454a2–4. I would prefer to leave open the very important question about the status of these alterations in the sense-organs: are they alterationes perfectivae as the switch of the sense-power from inactivity to activity is? Do they occur in time or are they instantaneous? What I would like to say is: (1) I am inclined to think that the correct answer to the first question is “yes”: in my account of Aristotle’s theory of elementary perception, there is numerical identity between the change in the sense-organ and the switch of the sense-power from inactivity to activity (see Feola, 2014); and (2) the answer to the second question is that (i) what matters for the perceptual process to be effective is that the perceptual switch is accomplished in a single moment of time, but (ii) as far as such an accomplishment is an instantaneous fulfilment of a process previously developed during time, then the complexity of the problem seems to exceed the possibility of treating it here: anyway, I articulated my point of view on this last topic in Feola (2015). Once again, I would like to thank Péter Lautner for having made me notice how complex the task of clarifying this part of Aristotle’s doctrine about sense-powers is.
- 19.
As far as blue2 is, by definition, the sensory state by which we perceive the blue1.
- 20.
Cf. Insomn. 3, 462a2–8: if I am sleeping, and I am not able to notice the absurdity of seeing Coriscus while I am asleep, I will not notice the difference between Coriscus and his φάντασμα.
- 21.
Sorabji (1979, 49): “it is through awareness of the organ that we are aware that we are seeing.” I would prefer to say: “through awareness of a change in the organ.”
- 22.
Kahn (1979, 7): “a problem raised and tentatively discussed in the De Anima is renewed and finally resolved in successive treatises of the Parva Naturalia.”
- 23.
Hett translates “is conscious” here, which seems more an interpretation (a correct one, indeed) than a translation.
- 24.
I prefer to translate “distinguishes” instead of Hett’s “judges,” because I do not believe that Aristotle endowed perception with propositional judgement.
- 25.
The passage is translated by Hett in this way: “for it is not by sight that one is aware that one sees; and one judges and is capable of judging” etc., because he follows the punctuation that Ross too would follow in his edition.
- 26.
See note 25.
- 27.
ἐπεὶ δʼ ὑπάρχει καθʼ ἑκάστην αἴσθησιν τὸ μέν τι ἴδιον, τὸ δέ τι κοινόν, ἴδιον μὲν οἷον τῇ ὄψει τὸ ὁρᾶν, τῇ δʼ ἀκοῇ τὸ ἀκούειν, καὶ ταῖς ἄλλαις ἑκάστῃ κατὰ τόν αὐτὸν τρόπον, ἔστι δέ τις καὶ κοινὴ δύναμις ἀκολουθοῦσα πάσαις, ᾗ καὶ ὅτι ὁρᾷ καὶ ἀκούει αἰσθάνεται (οὐ γὰρ δὴ τῇ γε ὄψει ὁρᾷ ὅτι ὁρᾷ, καὶ κρίνει δὴ καὶ δύναται κρίνειν ὅτι ἕτερα τὰ γλυκέα τῶν λευκῶν οὔτε γεύσει οὔτε ὄψει οὔτε ἀμφοῖν, ἀλλά τινι κοινῷ μορίῳ τῶν αἰσθητηρίων ἁπάντων· ἔστι μὲν γὰρ μία αἴσθησις, καὶ τὸ κύριον αἰσθητήριον ἕν, τὸ δʼ εἶναι αἰσθήσει τοῦ γένους ἑκάστου ἕτερον, οἷον ψόφου καὶ χρώματος) ….
- 28.
Beare (1906, 289): “the direct objects of this sensus communis are not the αἰσθητά, strictly speaking, but the αἰσθήματα or impressions of the special senses.” I would prefer to say: the coming-to-be of the αἰσθήματα in the sense-organs.
- 29.
This sensory power will not pertain to any single organ: it pertains to the whole animal: “They [sc. the five senses] are capacities enjoyed by the perceptual system as a whole, which is constituted by the controlling organ and whatever primary sense-organs any particular type of animal possesses” (Everson 1995, 291).
- 30.
Cf. e.g. Insomn. 3, 461b3–7. I here translate “δοκεῖν” as “to be assessed”; but I do not think that Aristotle thought that the δοκεῖν is a power of the faculty of reason. Acts of the faculty of reason are, certainly, the ὑπολαμβάνειν (“assuming (that something is real)”) and the δοξάζειν (“believing”).
- 31.
καὶ τῇ ἐπαλλάξει τῶν δακτύλων τὸ ἓν δύο φαίνεται, ἄλλʼ ὅμως οὔ φαμεν δύο· κυριωτέρα γὰρ τῆς ἁφῆς ἡ ὄψις. The meaning here seems to be that the various sense-powers do differ in contributing to the overall activity of the κύριον, according to the different weight of the data they provide.
- 32.
I alter Hett’s translation here, by substituting Hett’s “think” with “hold,” because, according to me, the cognitive act here at stake is not an instance of thinking.
- 33.
Cf. supra n33.
- 34.
διὸ καὶ τοῖς πυρέττουσιν ἐνίοτε φαίνεται ζῷα ἐν τοῖς τοίχοις ἀπὸ μικρᾶς ὁμοιότητος τῶν γραμμῶν συντιθεμένων. … ἐὰν δὲ μεῖζον ᾖ τὸ πάθος, καὶ κινεῖσθαι πρὸς αὐτά.
- 35.
Modrak (1989, 138) assumes that the κύριον is the cognitive power—whether sense or reason or intellect—which is most able to judge in the given circumstance at stake. But I couldn’t find any passage in Aristotle where the κύριον is identified with the intellectual or rational power. Quite the contrary: in De insomniis 1, 458b29, the verb δοκεῖν, which is the verb that describes the act of the κύριον, describes the fact that the Sun appears to be as large as a human foot, even when there is a more authoritative power (in this case, δόξα) which denies this fact. So, the κύριον will be only the most authoritative cognitive power of that given sentient being qua sentient being (i.e. without taking into account the rational power).
- 36.
Beare (1906, 307 n. 1) finds it disturbing that Aristotle credits perceptions to people that walk in sleep (cf. Somn. 2, 456a26). But if we understand sleep as the interruption of the activity of the power that coordinates sensations and perceptions, and not as the interruption of the activity of receiving them, the problem is solved: people that walk in sleep are able to perceive, and to react to the environment, but only in a peculiar way; they are able to perform more or less long chains of actions, but they are unable to understand the meaning of what they are doing in the frame of an overall perception of the situation, precisely because they temporarily lack the power to coordinate the many perceptions under a unifying faculty.
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Acknowledgements
I would like to thank my commentator at the conference, Péter Lautner, for his very careful critical remarks about the first draft of this paper, and the editors for their remarks about the second draft.
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Feola, G. (2018). The Unity of Sense-Power in the De anima and Parva naturalia . In: Bydén, B., Radovic, F. (eds) The Parva naturalia in Greek, Arabic and Latin Aristotelianism. Studies in the History of Philosophy of Mind, vol 17. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-26904-7_2
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