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Contradiction of Strategic Goals as a Major Constrain of Chinese Power in the South China Sea

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Book cover Power Politics in Asia’s Contested Waters

Part of the book series: Global Power Shift ((GLOBAL))

Abstract

This chapter analytically connects theoretical works on power in international politics with the conflict development in the South China Sea (SCS) from the Chinese perspective. Power will be defined as a capability of an actor to achieve and/or sustain a desired situation and it will be understood as a fluid and issue-specific ability. Due to this nature of power, it is impossible to chart a general power ranking of states. On the other hand, it is possible to discuss various sources of power with regards of specific policy-issues, how these power sources influence strategies actors take and outcomes of their interactions. China’s ‘desired situation’ will be understood in line with (former Chinese State Councilor) Dai Bingguo’s three core interests of preserving political system, territorial integrity, and sustained development. While the regime security will be regarded as the final interest of the Chinese government, two further ‘core interests’ supporting it would translate into two concrete goals in the SCS—safeguarding the sovereignty as perceived by Chinese public, and sustaining vital economic partnerships with international partners. Chinese policies and their outcomes will be interpreted as successes/failures against the proposed goals and it will be discussed in the conclusion what sources of power have brought them about. It will be argued that the fundamental constrain of Chinese actions in the SCS is the inherent contradiction between its desired goals, as the protecting the territorial integrity is causing anti-Chinese sentiments and potentially threatens economic interactions and development of the country.

The text was funded by the project of Masaryk University ‘Europe in Changing International Environment' (MUNI/A/1316/2014). Some of the arguments in this chapter were presented as “China’s Goals and Interests in the South China Sea” at the “Conference on the Socio-Economic Transition of China: Opportunities and Threats” in 2014 in Olomouc, the Czech Republic. Besides, preliminary parts of the text have been previously published by the author: in 2013 as a policy paper of Institute of Asian Studies/CENAA as “The Long Term Perspective of the South China Sea Dispute”, available at (http://www.asian.sk/wp-content/uploads/2014/08/south-china-sea1.pdf); in 2013 as an essay in an on-line journal Global Politics as “China’s Swinging National Interest in the South China Sea”, available at (http://www.globalpolitics.cz/eseje/chinas-swinging-national-interest-in-the-south-china-sea); and in 2014 as a chapter of “Panorama of Global Security Environment in 2013”, published by CENAA in Bratislava, as “The Chessboard of South China Sea: Game Modeling of the Dispute Dynamics.”

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Notes

  1. 1.

    A simple search for “China rising” at Amazon generates at least dozen of titles, including those of David Kang (2007), Yong Deng and Fei-Ling Wang (2004), Jan Wilem Blankert (2009), and Goodman and Segal (2013).

  2. 2.

    The idea about the decline of the US is questioned, although with varying rationalization, for example by Joseph Nye (2010), Michael Cox (2012) or Robert Kagan (2012)—and explicitly rejected by President Obama (2012).

  3. 3.

    The general usefulness of ‘common sense’ when dealing with power of countries acknowledges also Yan Xuetong (2006).

  4. 4.

    This might be changing recently with China building up artificial features around the natural pieces of territory, as will be discussed in the next section.

  5. 5.

    This doomsday scenario is of course hard to confirm. While China is highly dependent on imports and especially those from the Middle East coming via South China Sea, causing so-called Malacca dilemma, it is questionable whether really a single day breakage could affect social stability in the country. While officially national secret, China keeps certain national reserves of oil and gas and in recent years it is expanding it by 2020 up to 90 days, which would be in compliance with the recommendation of the International Energy Association (2014). From this perspective it is unlikely, that the economy would be in shortage of energy supplies if the shipping lane experiences disruptions. On the other hand, China, unlike other countries, has never experienced energy supplies crisis and this might increase its psychological aversion towards such event. Therefore, dramatic market reactions could in fact take place and these on turn affecting Chinese domestic social situation.

  6. 6.

    There has been successful drilling from not-contested areas of the sea by all the involved actors including China, Vietnam, and the Philippines.

  7. 7.

    In this chapter ‘Chinese government’ and the ‘Party’ were understood as synonymous term both meaning the top decision makers of China. From the perspective of the Chinese political system, it would most of the time apply to the Politburo Standing Committee. Due to dual nature of Chinese political system, most (if not all) highest politicians in China have more than one position and the Politburo members are also represented in various parts of the government and elsewhere, creating relatively centralized political machinery.

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Correspondence to Richard Q. Turcsányi .

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Turcsányi, R.Q. (2016). Contradiction of Strategic Goals as a Major Constrain of Chinese Power in the South China Sea. In: Fels, E., Vu, TM. (eds) Power Politics in Asia’s Contested Waters. Global Power Shift. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-26152-2_9

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