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Delicate Equilibrium: Indonesia’s Approach to the South China Sea

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Power Politics in Asia’s Contested Waters

Part of the book series: Global Power Shift ((GLOBAL))

Abstract

While China’s more assertive posture in the South China Sea over the past few years has led to an increasing focus on the responses by claimant states, less attention has been given to Indonesia’s evolving position as an interested party. That is unfortunate given Jakarta’s influential role as a global middle power, a leader in ASEAN, and its willingness to act as an ‘honest broker’ in the South China Sea disputes. This chapter aims to clarify Indonesia’s approach to the South China Sea issue, focusing particularly on the period from 1990 onwards. This chapter argues that in spite of some adjustments after recent trends—including increased Chinese assertiveness—Indonesia’s approach has remained largely unchanged. Indonesia continues to stick to what I term a “delicate equilibrium” approach on the South China Sea issue, pursuing a hedging strategy comprised of four elements: engagement, enmeshment, traditional balancing and soft-balancing.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    For a detailed examination of China’s assertiveness, see: Johnston (2013).

  2. 2.

    For a comparison of claimant states, see: Parameswaran (2015a).

  3. 3.

    For an examination of the debate and a response, see: Parameswaran (2014a).

  4. 4.

    Leifer (1997).

  5. 5.

    Djalal (2000).

  6. 6.

    Indonesia officially does not even include China as one of the ten countries with which maritime boundaries need to be settled.

  7. 7.

    Agustiawan (2011).

  8. 8.

    Hatta (1953).

  9. 9.

    Author interviews with Indonesian elites, July–August 2014.

  10. 10.

    Koh (2011).

  11. 11.

    Djalal (2009).

  12. 12.

    See: Roy (2005).

  13. 13.

    For the traditional balancing and bandwagoning dichotomy, see: Walt (1990).

  14. 14.

    Goh (2005).

  15. 15.

    Cheng-Chwee (2008).

  16. 16.

    Hatta (1953).

  17. 17.

    Supriyanto (2012).

  18. 18.

    She refers to this as “buying security on the cheap” (Anwar 1994).

  19. 19.

    See for example: Laksmana (2011).

  20. 20.

    Novotny (2010).

  21. 21.

    Johnston and Ross (1999).

  22. 22.

    Sukma (2009). For an evolution of engagement between Indonesia and China, see: Murphy (2014).

  23. 23.

    Leifer (1999).

  24. 24.

    Arsana and Schofield (2013).

  25. 25.

    Leifer (1999).

  26. 26.

    Sukma (2009). For a theoretical treatment of strategic partnerships, see: Parameswaran (2014b).

  27. 27.

    For an elaboration of this point, see: Storey (2011).

  28. 28.

    Goh (2007).

  29. 29.

    For a succinct summary of this important distinction by an Indonesian diplomat, see: Oegroseno (2014a).

  30. 30.

    Djalal (2000).

  31. 31.

    Waltz (1979).

  32. 32.

    How (1996).

  33. 33.

    The Jakarta Post, August 6, 1976.

  34. 34.

    Pape (2005). For an argument against the concept of soft balancing, see: Brooks and Wohlforth (2005).

  35. 35.

    Leifer (1999).

  36. 36.

    Ibid.

  37. 37.

    The Straits Times (1995).

  38. 38.

    For an inside account of China’s role, see: Thayer (2012).

  39. 39.

    Author conversation with Indonesian official, 2014.

  40. 40.

    Xinhua (2013).

  41. 41.

    Jokowi first unveiled the global maritime fulcrum and its five pillars at a speech at the East Asia Summit in November 2014. See: Witular (2014). For a recent public Chinese articulation of the compatibility of the two agendas, see: Zhaoxing (2015).

  42. 42.

    Gokkon (2014).

  43. 43.

    For a rare public argument on this, see: Bower (2012).

  44. 44.

    “Statement of ASEAN Foreign Ministers on ASEAN’s Six-Point Principles on the South China Sea.” Copy seen by author, July 20, 2012.

  45. 45.

    Author conversation with Indonesian expert, 2013.

  46. 46.

    Natalegawa (2013).

  47. 47.

    At least one of Jokowi’s foreign policy advisers has said that the concept did not have enough clarity in order to be pursued specifically.

  48. 48.

    For a summary of some of the concerns, see: Parameswaran (2014c).

  49. 49.

    The Straits Times (2014).

  50. 50.

    Rahmat (2014). Separately, Indonesia’s then defense minister Purnomo Yusgiantoro also announced plans to build a helicopter base later that year. Tempo (2014).

  51. 51.

    Jakarta Globe (2014).

  52. 52.

    Conboy (2014).

  53. 53.

    Parameswaran (2015b).

  54. 54.

    Author conversation with Indonesian expert, 2014.

  55. 55.

    Permanent Mission of Indonesia to the United Nations, “Communication Dated 8 July 2010,” Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS), UN Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea.

  56. 56.

    Arsana and Schofield (2013).

  57. 57.

    For more details, see: The National Institute for Defense Studies (2012). Indonesian vessels encountered a similar problem in another incident in 2013. For a public report in Bahasa Indonesia, see: For a public report of the incident in Bahasa Indonesia, see: Garuda Militer (2013).

  58. 58.

    An Indonesian official the author spoke to confirmed that this would constitute a red line, but also said that this was far from happening.

  59. 59.

    Meick (2014).

  60. 60.

    For an example of such a view, see: Nabbs-Keller (2014).

  61. 61.

    See, for instance: Connelly (2014).

  62. 62.

    Center for a New American Security (2014).

  63. 63.

    For an explanation of the sink the vessels policy, see: Parameswaran (2015c).

  64. 64.

    For an articulation of some of these alternatives, see: Supriyanto (2012) and Hellendorff and Kellner (2014).

  65. 65.

    Oegroseno (2014b).

  66. 66.

    ANTARA News (2014).

  67. 67.

    For an elaboration of this point, see: Parameswaran (2014d).

  68. 68.

    Sukma (2011).

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Parameswaran, P. (2016). Delicate Equilibrium: Indonesia’s Approach to the South China Sea. In: Fels, E., Vu, TM. (eds) Power Politics in Asia’s Contested Waters. Global Power Shift. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-26152-2_15

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