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China, the Moon, and the World

  • Chapter
When China Goes to the Moon...

Part of the book series: Studies in Space Policy ((STUDSPACE,volume 11))

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Abstract

The giant has eventually woken up and is indeed profoundly reshaping the panorama of the twenty-first-century geopolitical and economic realities. The impact of its rise (or resurgence) as a great power on the world stage has also become remarkable in the space arena, where its ambitious space programme is dramatically changing the institutional landscape of global space activities. The leading space powers are fully aware that Beijing’s ascendancy as a space power represents a significant and potentially disruptive occurrence that can no longer be ignored.

China is a sleeping giant. Let her sleep, for when she wakes she will move the world.

Napoleon

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Ikenberry, John (2008). “The rise of China and the future of the West”. Foreign Affairs Vol. 87 (1): 23–37.

  2. 2.

    Moltz, James Clay (2011). Asia’s Space Race: National Motivations, Regional Rivalries, and International Risks. Columbia University Press, New York: p. 55.

  3. 3.

    As the US National Academy of Sciences notes, China’s achievements in space exploration are the latest in a program that “marches steadily and strategically toward what might eventually become a lead role among the nations in spaceflight”. National Academy of Sciences (2014). Pathways to Exploration: Rationales and Approaches for a US Program of Human Space Exploration. The National Academy Press. Washington DC.

  4. 4.

    Cit. National Research Council (2012). NASA Strategic Direction and the Need for a National Consensus. The National Academy Press. Washington DC: p. 1.

  5. 5.

    Blamont, Jacques (2012). “US Space Exploration Strategy: Is there a better way?” Space Policy No. 28 (4): 212–217.

  6. 6.

    The last has occurred in May 2014. For a review of Russian recent launch failures, see “Russian rocket falls back to Earth with Super Satellite”. Space Mart. 16 May 2014. Web. http://www.spacemart.com/reports/Russian_rocket_falls_back_to_Earth_with_super_satellite_999.html. Accessed 18 May 2014.

  7. 7.

    “Russian Space-Based Activities’ Development Strategy until 2030 and Beyond” Aviation Explorer. 27 April 2012. (Russian language source). Web. http://www.aex.ru/docs/8/2012/4/27/1561/. Accessed 18 May 2014.

  8. 8.

    Hulsroj, Peter (2014). “The Psychology and Reality of the Financial Crisis in Terms of Space Cooperation”. In Al-Ekabi, Cenan, Blandina Banares, Peter Hulsroj, Arne Lahcen (eds). ESPI Yearbook on Space Policy 2011/2012. Space in Times of Financial Crisis. Springer, Vienna: pp. 159–168. See also Sect. 7.3.1 for a more detailed analysis.

  9. 9.

    For an analysis of the Japanese “space crisis”, see among the others Moltz, James Clay (2011). Asia’s Space Race: National Motivations, Regional Rivalries, and International Risks. Columbia University Press, New York: pp.55–59.

  10. 10.

    Suzuki, Kazuto (2008). “Basic law for space activities: A new space policy for Japan for the 21st century”. In Schrogl, Kai-Uwe, Charlotte Mathieu, Nicolas Peter (eds). ESPI Yearbook 2006/2007: A new Impetus for Europe. Springer, Vienna: pp. 226.

  11. 11.

    As noted by Kazuto Suzuki, due to the budget decrease, the traditional contract arrangements through JAXA—a rotating prime contractors system and equal distribution of subcontracts—has become no longer affordable or effective. Thus, many space companies in Japan have shrunk the size of operations and several of them have exited the market (e.g. Toshiba). Ibid. pp. 227–228.

  12. 12.

    It must be stressed that while the NASA, ESA, and JAXA budgets did not decrease during the financial crisis, ambitious programmes were not approved and some were terminated (e.g. the Constellation programme, the Aurora programme, and the HOPE programme in Japan). For an analysis of the impact of the financial crisis on decision-making, see Tegnér, Per (2014). “The Effect of the Financial Crisis in terms of Political Decision-Making”. In Al-Ekabi, Cenan, Blandina Banares, Peter Hulsroj, Arne Lahcen (eds). ESPI Yearbook on Space Policy 2011/2012. Space in Times of Financial Crisis. Springer, Vienna: pp. 149–158.

  13. 13.

    Freeman, Marsha. “Is Asia Taking the Lead In Space Exploration”. EIR Science. 25 October 2013. Web. http://www.larouchepub.com/eiw/public/2013/eirv40n42-20131025/32-40_4042.pdf. Accessed 18 April 2014.

  14. 14.

    See Hulsroj, Peter (2014). “The Psychology and Reality of the Financial Crisis in Terms of Space Cooperation”. In Al-Ekabi, Cenan, Blandina Banares, Peter Hulsroj, Arne Lahcen (eds). ESPI Yearbook on Space Policy 2011/2012. Space in Times of Financial Crisis. Springer, Vienna: pp. 159–168.

  15. 15.

    See Strange, Susan (1988). States and Market. Pinter. London.

  16. 16.

    Remarks by the President on US Space Policy. NASA Headquarters, Washington DC. 14 January 2014. Web. http://history.nasa.gov/Bush%20SEP.htm. Accessed 5 May 2014.

  17. 17.

    Logsdon, John M (2008). “Why space exploration should be a global project”. Space Policy 24 (1): pp. 3.

  18. 18.

    Most of the funding for VSE was in fact to be redirected from other NASA activities, including terminating the space shuttle programme in 2010 and ending US participation in the ISS by 2016.

  19. 19.

    For many commentators, it was the Space Shuttle Columbia accident that shook the nation and triggered an in-depth review of the purpose and goals of the human spaceflight programme.

  20. 20.

    As the President would articulate in his remarks: “We will invite other nations to share the challenges and opportunities of this new era of discovery. The vision I outline today is a journey, not a race, and I call on other nations to join us on this journey, in a spirit of cooperation and friendship”. Remarks by the President on US Space Policy. NASA Headquarters, Washington DC. 14 January 2014. Web. http://history.nasa.gov/Bush%20SEP.htm. Accessed 5 May 2014.

  21. 21.

    Sheehan, Michael (2007). The International Politics of Space. Routledge, New York: pp. 181–182.

  22. 22.

    Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency. JAXA Vision—JAXA 2025. Tokyo, Japan. 31 March 2005. Available from: http://www.docstoc.com/docs/87745747/JAXA-Vision.

  23. 23.

    Peter, Nicolas (2008). “Developments in space policies programmes and technologies throughout the world and Europe”. In Schrogl, Kai-Uwe, Charlotte Mathieu, Nicolas Peter (eds). ESPI Yearbook 2006/2007: A new Impetus for Europe. Springer, Vienna: p.96.

  24. 24.

    Harvey, Brian, Henk H.F. Smid, and Theo Pirard (2010). Emerging Space Powers. The New Space Programs of Asia, the Middle East and South America. Springer– Praxis Publishing, Chichester, UK: p. 238. See also Jayaraman, K.S. “ISRO Seeks Government Approval For Manned Spaceflight Program” Space News. 13 November 2006. Web. http://www.spacenews.com/article/isro-seeks-government-approval-manned-spaceflight-program. Accessed 16 May 2014.

  25. 25.

    Manned spaceflight and planetary exploration were exactly the goals that the space programme’s founder, Vikram Sarabhai, had rejected in favour of a developmental rationale. As he insisted, the application of space technology to addressing development goals “is not to be confused with embarking on grandiose schemes” and specifically that “we do not have the fantasy of competing with the economically advanced nations in the exploration of the Moon or the planets, or manned spaceflight”. Quoted from Sheehan, Michael (2007). The International Politics of Space. Routledge, New York: p. 156.

  26. 26.

    Given the stable and cooperative relations, both in space and on Earth, between Japan, India, and the United States, the idea of a space race between the United States and Japan or India has quite obviously not been explored in the literature.

  27. 27.

    Kissinger, Henry (2011). On China. Penguin Books, New York: p. 523.

  28. 28.

    Steinberg, James, and Michael O’ Hanlon (2014). “Keep Hope Alive. How to Prevent US-Chinese Relations From Blowing Up”. Foreign Affairs Vol 93 (4): 107–117.

  29. 29.

    Kissinger, Henry (2011). On China. Penguin Books, New York: p. 519.

  30. 30.

    Ibid. p. 520.

  31. 31.

    Luttwak, Edward (2012). The rise of China vs. the logic of Strategy, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA.

  32. 32.

    Rachman, Gideon. “Times to think more about Sarajevo, less about Munich”. Financial Times. 6 January 2014. See also Blumenthal, Daniel, Mike Green. “Japan and China: not yet 1914 but time to pay attention”. Foreign Policy. 29 January. 2014. Web. http://shadow.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2014/01/28/japan_and_china_not_yet_1914_but_time_to_pay_attention. Accessed 15 March 2014.

  33. 33.

    “Abe compares Japan-China tension to Britain, Germany before World War I”. The Asahi Shinbun. 24 January 2014. Web. http://ajw.asahi.com/article/behind_news/politics/AJ201401240076/. Accessed 15 March 2014.

  34. 34.

    The visits to the Yasukuni shrine by Japanese government’s officials are part of a broader issue known as rekishi mondai (the problem of history) dealing with Japan’s purported reluctance to atone for its militarism and occupation of East and South East Asia during the 1930s. Part of this problem is also the rejectionism contained in the textbooks adopted by the MEXT (the so-called kyokasho mondai) and by politicians of the Liberal Democratic Party with regard to issues like the Nanjing massacre or invasion of China.

  35. 35.

    The so-called fumie gaiko (expiate diplomacy) pursued by the Chinese government to keep Japanese diplomatic outreach down is, for instance, not much appreciated by Tokyo, given that Japan is the only country in the world to have denied its own ius ad bellum and that China also continues to falsify “historical facts” in its textbooks.

  36. 36.

    Roulo, Claudette. “Pacom Area of Responsibility Defined by Superlatives”. American Forces Press Service. 16 January 2014. Web. http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id = 121499. 16 March 2014.

  37. 37.

    For many analysts, there are striking differences in the current geopolitical context that could make the analogy erroneous. For an analysis of this issue, see Gadi, Franz-Stefan. “Let’s Drop the Anglo-German Historical Analogy Once and For All When Discussing China”. China–US Focus. 7 February 2014. Web. http://www.chinausfocus.com/foreign-policy/lets-drop-the-anglo-german-historical-analogy-once-and-for-all-when-discussing-china/. Accessed 16 March 2014.

  38. 38.

    Besides the growing number of articles in the media, the idea of an intra-Asian space race (Japan, China, and India) has been brilliantly described in the literature, by a number of eminent scholars, such as Ajey Lele or James Clay Moltz. Others, like Erich Seedhouse, have on the contrary argued that a new space race is bound to take place but that this will be between China and the United States.

  39. 39.

    See, for instance, Zhang, Yongjin (2013). “The eagle eyes the dragon in space—A critique”. Space Policy 29 (2):113–120.

  40. 40.

    National Research Council (2012). NASA Strategic Direction and the Need for a National Consensus. The National Academy Press. Washington DC.

  41. 41.

    Suzuki, Kazuto (2013). “The contest for leadership in East Asia: Japanese and Chinese approaches to outer space”. Space Policy 29 (2): 99–106.

  42. 42.

    “Moon Lander Selene 2”. Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency. Web. http://www.jspec.jaxa.jp/e/activity/selene2.html. Accessed 5 May 2014. See also Tanaka, S. et al. (2013). “Present status of the Selene-2”. 44th Lunar and Planetary Science Conference. Web. http://www.lpi.usra.edu/meetings/lpsc2013/pdf/1838.pdf. Accessed 5 May 2014.

  43. 43.

    “Japanese Official Calls for Space Cooperation With China”. Kyodo News Service. 25 September 2008. See Saiget, Robert J. “Shenzhou 7 Astronauts Brace For Space Walk”. Space Daily. 26 September 2008. Web. http://www.spacedaily.com/reports/Shenzhou_7_Astronauts_Brace_For_Space_Walk_999.html. Accessed 6 May 2014.

  44. 44.

    Quoted from Ibid.

  45. 45.

    Suzuki, Kazuto (2013). “The contest for leadership in East Asia: Japanese and Chinese approaches to outer space”. Space Policy 29 (2): 99–106.

  46. 46.

    Peter, Nicolas (2008). “Developments in space policies programmes and technologies throughout the world and Europe”. In Schrogl, Kai-Uwe, Charlotte Mathieu, Nicolas Peter (eds). ESPI Yearbook 2006/2007: A new Impetus for Europe. Springer, Vienna: p. 96.

  47. 47.

    “GSLV Mark III”. Indian Space Research Organisation. Web. http://www.isro.org/Launchvehicles/GSLVMARKIII/mark3.aspx. Accessed 10 May 2014.

  48. 48.

    Peter, Nicolas (2009). “Developments in space policies programmes and technologies throughout the world and Europe”. In Schrogl, Kai-Uwe, Charlotte Mathieu, Nicolas Peter (eds). ESPI Yearbook on Space Policy 2007/2008: From Policies to Programmes. Springer, Vienna 2009: p. 81.

  49. 49.

    Also echoing the Chinese approach, it was decided that the first mission would be for a day, while the second for a week. Harvey, Brian, Henk H.F. Smid, and Theo Pirard (2010). Emerging Space Powers. The New Space Programs of Asia, the Middle East and South America. Springer– Praxis Publishing, Chichester, UK: p. 238.

  50. 50.

    Jayaraman, K.S. “ISRO Seeks Government Approval For Manned Spaceflight Program” Space News. 13 November 2006. Web. http://www.spacenews.com/article/isro-seeks-government-approval-manned-spaceflight-program/. Accessed 18 May 2014. En passant, it is noteworthy that apparently in order to motivate such large expenditure, the scientific community started to “convince” politicians about the long-term prospect of getting helium-3 from the lunar surface.

  51. 51.

    See Euroconsult (2014). Profiles of Government Space Programs, Analysis of Over 80 Countries & Agencies. Euroconsult Profiles Series, Paris.

  52. 52.

    The GSLV experienced problems in April 2010 when the main cryogenic engine on India’s domestically produced third stage failed to ignite. See Moltz, James Clay (2011). Asia’s Space Race: National Motivations, Regional Rivalries, and International Risks. Columbia University Press, New York: p. 125.

  53. 53.

    “Human space flight mission off ISRO priority list”. NDTV. 16 August 2013. Web. http://www.ndtv.com/article/india/human-space-flight-mission-off-isro-priority-list-406551. Accessed 18 May 2014. The position was also clarified in a personal interview with Ajey Lele, where he stressed, “As of today, a human mission is not in our space agenda. We are in a very early phase of developing a few critical technologies required for realising a human mission”. Lele, Ajey (2014). Mission Mars. India’s Quest for the Red Planet. Springer, New Delhi: pp. 120–124.

  54. 54.

    Planning Commission, Government of India. Twelfth five year plan (2012/2017). Faster, More Inclusive and Sustainable Growth. New Delhi, India. 2013: pp. 264–268.

  55. 55.

    (Emphasis added). “Human space flight mission off ISRO priority list”. NDTV. 16 August 2013. Web. http://www.ndtv.com/article/india/human-space-flight-mission-off-isro-priority-list-406551. Accessed 18 May 2014. In ISRO Space Vision 2025, the objective is limited to the development of a space vehicle capable of putting two humans into LEO and returning safe to Earth, something that China achieved as early as 2003.

  56. 56.

    The mission has been a landmark achievement for India, demonstrating its technological prowess and providing the country with a significant source of national pride, as confirmed by the speech made by Prime Minister Modi in September 2014, immediately after the Mangalyaan spacecraft entered Mars orbit: “History has been created. We have dared to reach out into the unknown and have achieved the near impossible […] the success of our space programme is a shining symbol of what we are capable of as a nation”. Quoted from “India wins Asia’s Mars race as spacecraft enters orbit”. Mars Daily. 24 September 2014. Web. http://www.marsdaily.com/reports/India_wins_Asias_Mars_race_as_spacecraft_enters_orbit_999.html. Accessed 10 October 2014.

  57. 57.

    Quoted from Lele, Ajey (2014). Mission Mars. India’s Quest for the Red Planet. Springer, New Delhi: p. 112.

  58. 58.

    As also stressed by the physicist Barath Gopalalswamy, the space programme’s broadening to space exploration indicates that “India no longer views space as only enhancing the living conditions of its citizens but also as a measure of global prestige”. Quoted from Moltz, James Clay (2011). Asia’s Space Race: National Motivations, Regional Rivalries, and International Risks. Columbia University Press, New York.

  59. 59.

    As the document stresses, “significant developments have taken place in the area of societal applications of space technology. Some of the important ones are: (a) expansion of tele-education network to over 55.000 classrooms; (b) telemedicine facilities in over 382 hospitals”. See Planning Commission, Government of India. Twelfth five year plan (2012/2017). Faster, More Inclusive and Sustainable Growth. New Delhi, India. 2013: pp. 264–268.

  60. 60.

    The new “Basic Law for Space activities” introduced a series of major administrative and conceptual changes. In particular the switch of space planning from the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT) to the Prime Minister’s Cabinet underscores a shift in attitude concerning the strategic importance of space for national security and other areas. The new law also removes the ban on any defensive governmental uses of space. Cit. Peter, Nicolas (2009). “Developments in space policies programmes and technologies throughout the world and Europe”. In Schrogl, Kai-Uwe, Charlotte Mathieu, Nicolas Peter (eds). ESPI Yearbook on Space Policy 2007/2008: From Policies to Programmes. Springer, Vienna 2009: p. 53.

  61. 61.

    In that year the MEXT formed a study group called “Consultation Group for National Strategy for Space” that eventually proposed establishing a new law for space activities. Suzuki, Kazuto (2008). “Basic law for space activities: A new space policy for Japan for the 21st century”. In Schrogl, Kai-Uwe, Charlotte Mathieu, Nicolas Peter (eds). ESPI Yearbook 2006/2007: A new Impetus for Europe. Springer, Vienna: pp. 225–238.

  62. 62.

    It is, for instance, remarkable that Abe Shinzo, the future prime minister of Japan, published a programmatic book explaining the pro-cooperation posture Japanese government would adopt vis-à-vis China. Abe, Shinzo (2006). Utsukushii Kuni he (Towards a beautiful nation). Bungei Shunju, Tokyo: p. 152.

  63. 63.

    The so-called no-war clause of Japan’s constitution states: Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes. In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized. This restriction on the fundamental right of national self-defence is of course radical and can only be understood in the context of the post-World War II era during which the Japanese Constitution was written or imposed.

  64. 64.

    Suzuki, Kazuto (2013). “The contest for leadership in East Asia: Japanese and Chinese approaches to outer space”. Space Policy 29 (2): 100.

  65. 65.

    See Soeya, Yoshihide et al. (eds) (2011). Japan as a ‘Normal Country’? A Nation in Search of Its Place in the World. University of Toronto Press, Toronto.

  66. 66.

    Japan’s anti-militaristic posture has gradually eroded since the end of the Cold War and in particular after the launch of the US Global War on Terrorism in 2001. Japan has become more involved in peacekeeping operations, and in 2007 Japan’s Defence Agency was transformed into a fully fledged Ministry of Defence.

  67. 67.

    See Pekkanen, Sadia M. and Paul Kallender-Umezu (2010). In Defense of Japan. From the Market to the Military Space Policy. Stanford University Press, Stanford, CA.

  68. 68.

    Suzuki, Kazuto (2008). “Basic law for space activities: A new space policy for Japan for the 21st century”. In Schrogl, Kai-Uwe, Charlotte Mathieu, Nicolas Peter (eds). ESPI Yearbook 2006/2007: A new Impetus for Europe. Springer, Vienna: pp. 225–238.

  69. 69.

    Article 2 of the Basic Space Law stipulates that the use of space systems for national and international security comply with both the framework of international agreements and a pacifist constitution. Ibid. p. 234.

  70. 70.

    See Lanna, Noemi (2010). Il Giappone e il Nuovo Ordine in Asia Orientale. L’altra faccia dell’ascesa della Cina. Vita e Pensiero, Milano.

  71. 71.

    Suzuki, Kazuto (2013). “The contest for leadership in East Asia: Japanese and Chinese approaches to outer space”. Space Policy 29 (2): 101.

  72. 72.

    Ibid. p. 101.

  73. 73.

    Ibid. p. 103.

  74. 74.

    Kissinger, Henry (2011). On China. Penguin Books, New York: p. 515.

  75. 75.

    For a detailed account on the evolution of the US–Japan Security Treaty, see Hook, Glenn D. et al. (2012). Japan’s International Relations. Routledge, Oxon: pp. 126–152.

  76. 76.

    This strategic imitative was already launched during Mr. Abe’s first tenure as prime minister (September 2006–September 2007) and named the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Japan, the United States, India, and Australia) as a solution to the maritime disputes involving China. The new strategy is based on “three pillars: (1) reinvigorating the US-Japan alliance; (2) a reintroduction of the UK and France to Asia’s international security realm; and (3) bolstering international cooperation between key democracies in the Indo-Pacific, such as India and Australia”. Miller, J. Berkshire. “The Indian Piece of Abe’s Security Diamond”. The Diplomat. 29 May 2013. Web. http://thediplomat.com/2013/05/the-indian-piece-of-abes-security-diamond/. Accessed 10 May 2014. For Shinzo Abe’s announcement on the Asia’s Democratic Security Dialogue, see Abe, Shinzo. “Asia’s Democratic Security Diamond”. 27 December 2012. Web. http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/a-strategic-alliance-for-japan-and-india-by-shinzo-abe. Accessed 10 May 2014.

  77. 77.

    For a detailed description of Indian involvement is security-related space activities, see Moltz, James Clay (2011). Asia’s Space Race: National Motivations, Regional Rivalries, and International Risks. Columbia University Press, New York: pp. 127–131. See also Lele, Ajey (2013). Asian Space Race: Rhetoric or Reality? Springer, New Delhi: pp. 118–190.

  78. 78.

    Ibid. pp. 188–189.

  79. 79.

    Cit. Moltz, James Clay (2011). Asia’s Space Race: National Motivations, Regional Rivalries, and International Risks, Columbia University Press, New York: p. 128.

  80. 80.

    Xuetong, Yan (2012). “The weakening of the unipolar configuration”. In Leonard, Mark (ed). China 3.0. European Council on Foreign Relations, London: p 11.pp. 118–123.

  81. 81.

    The idea that India is bound to overtake China has been debated for more than a decade now. According to several scholars, India has adopted an Import-Substitution Industrialisation (ISI), not an Export-Oriented Industrialisation (EOI), strategy. Thus, unlike China, India is not dependent on export for its economic growth, having principally relied on internal consumption. According to the projections, by 2050 India’s economy will rank second after that of China, and the demographic prospects, as stressed, will in the long-term play in New Delhi’s favour. See Mazzei, Franco, Vittorio Volpi (2010). La rivincita della Mano Visibile. Il Modello economico asiatico e l’Occidente. Egea, Milano. See also Huang, Yasheng, and Tarun Khanna. “Can India Overtake China?”. Foreign Policy. 1 July 2003. Web. http://foreignpolicy.com/2003/07/01/can-india-overtake-china/. Accessed 16 July 2014.

  82. 82.

    United Nations’ Department of Economic and Social Affairs. World Population Prospects. The 2012 Revision. United Nations. New York, 2013. Web. http://esa.un.org/wpp/documentation/pdf/WPP2012_%20KEY%20FINDINGS.pdf.

  83. 83.

    Smith, Jeff M. “India and China: The End of Cold Peace?” The National Interest. 10 February 2014. Web. http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/india-china-the-end-cold-peace-9853. 28 May 2014.

  84. 84.

    Ibid.

  85. 85.

    Ibid.

  86. 86.

    Ibid.

  87. 87.

    See “India uncertain as Abe looks for anti-China Alliance”. Global Times. 18 February 2014. Web. http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/843272.shtml. Accessed 28 May 2014. See also Miller, J. Berkshire. “The Indian Piece of Abe’s Security Diamond”. The Diplomat. 29 May 2013. Web. http://thediplomat.com/2013/05/the-indian-piece-of-abes-security-diamond/. Accessed 28 May 2014.

  88. 88.

    Japan has been in the vanguard of the regional integration process in the past 20 years: suffice to think of its 1990 proposal for the creation of an East Asia Economic Caucus (EAEC) or the 1997 proposal about the establishment of an Asian Monetary Fund. While these initiatives have failed, thanks to the United States, others have been more successful, like the East Asia Community (EAC) meetings launched in 2008 and the leadership Japan exercises within the Asian Development Bank.

  89. 89.

    More information on APRSAF available at the website: http://aprsaf.org.

  90. 90.

    Rathgeber, Wolfgang (2007). “China Posture in Space. Implications for Europe”. ESPI Report 3. European Space Policy Institute, Vienna: 54.

  91. 91.

    See Aliberti, Marco (2013). “Regionalisation of Space Activities in Asia?”. ESPI Perspectives 66. European Space Policy Institute, Vienna.

  92. 92.

    Robinson, Jana (2012). Europe-Japan Strategic Partnership: the Space Dimension. ESPI Report 40. European Space Policy Institute, Vienna: p. 36.

  93. 93.

    For more information, see “Kibo Utilisation Office for Asia”. Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency. Web. http://iss.jaxa.jp/en/kuoa/index.html. Accessed 3 June 2014.

  94. 94.

    Moltz, James Clay (2011). Asia’s Space Race: National Motivations, Regional Rivalries, and International Risks, Columbia University Press, New York: p. 68. Recent meetings have been held in Jakarta (Indonesia, 2006), Bangalore (India, 2007), Hanoi (Vietnam, 2008), Bangkok (Thailand, 2010), Melbourne (Australia, 2010) Singapore (2011), Kuala Lumpur (Malaysia, 2012), and Hanoi (Vietnam 2013).

  95. 95.

    In 2011, for instance, the Japanese government provided about $1 billion of ODA to Vietnam, which was also intended to facilitate the purchasing of a Japanese Earth observation satellite (ASNARO). Suzuki, Kazuto (2013). “The contest for leadership in East Asia: Japanese and Chinese approaches to outer space”. Space Policy 29 (2): 103.

  96. 96.

    Aliberti, Marco (2013). “Regionalisation of Space Activities in Asia?”. ESPI Perspectives 66. European Space Policy Institute, Vienna.

  97. 97.

    UN General Assembly Resolution 45/72 of 11 December 1990. For more information on the process that led to the establishment of the centre, see the CSSTEAP website: http://www.cssteap.org/background. Accessed 6 June 2014.

  98. 98.

    The main task of the centre is to develop the skills and knowledge of university educators, environmental research scientists, and project personnel in the design, development, and application of space science and technology for subsequent application in national and regional development and environment management. For more information, see “Objectives of the Centre”. Centre for Space Science and Technology Education in Asia and the Pacific. Web http://www.cssteap.org/objectives-of-center. Accessed 6 June 2014.

  99. 99.

    It should be noted that Japan has, in a sense, given up competing in the global market for commercial satellite launches, given the expanding, fierce competition of global providers and the high costs of its space services. Japan has indeed on some occasions used Indian launchers. See Moltz, James Clay (2011). Asia’s Space Race: National Motivations, Regional Rivalries, and International Risks. Columbia University Press, New York: pp. 61–62.

  100. 100.

    Planning Commission, Government of India. Twelfth five year plan (2012/2017). Faster, More Inclusive and Sustainable Growth. New Delhi, India. 2013: pp. 264–268.

  101. 101.

    The target countries of India’s space launch services are not only Asian neighbours. Thanks to the reliability and relatively low cost of its services, India has launched satellites for Argentina, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Indonesia, Israel, Japan, the Netherlands, Singapore, South Korea, Switzerland, and Turkey. See Moltz, James Clay (2011). Asia’s Space Race: National Motivations, Regional Rivalries, and International Risks, Columbia University Press, New York: p. 126.

  102. 102.

    Quoted from ibid. p. 126.

  103. 103.

    Suzuki, Kazuto (2013). “The contest for leadership in East Asia: Japanese and Chinese approaches to outer space”. Space Policy 29 (2): 99.

  104. 104.

    For a detailed overview of India–Russia space cooperation, see Mathieu, Charlotte (2008). “Assessing Russia’s space cooperation with China and India. Opportunities and Challenges for Europe”. ESPI Report 12. European Space Policy Institute, Vienna.

  105. 105.

    For more detailed information on the Indo-American space partnership, see Correll, Randal (2006). “US-India Space Partnership: the Jewel in the Crown”. Astropolitics Vol. 4 (2): 159–177. For a more recent analysis, see Gopalalswamy, Barath (2011). “Indo-US Space Cooperation: Aiming Higher”. CSIS Issue Perspectives Vol. 1 (2): 1–3.

  106. 106.

    According to Charlotte Mathieu, triangular cooperation India–China–Russia is unlikely, mainly because it might not be in Russia’s interest to promote cooperation between those two countries and bring its two partners closer. In addition, at the moment India and China have neither particular needs nor real opportunities to work together on space projects. Mathieu, Charlotte (2008). “Assessing Russia’s space cooperation with China and India. Opportunities and Challenges for Europe”. ESPI Report 12. European Space Policy Institute, Vienna.

  107. 107.

    The current US space exploration policy focuses on an Asteroid Retrieval Mission (ARM). See also Chap. 7 for further information.

  108. 108.

    Following the line of argument expressed by Henry Kissinger’s in his book on China. See Kissinger, Henry (2011). On China. Penguin Books, New York: p. 525.

  109. 109.

    In the light of the considerations stated in Chap. 3 and Sect. 5.4, China’s interest in dispelling the prospect of a space race appears consistent, both strategically and economically. See also Sect. 6.3.1 in this regard. In addition, as aptly noted by Joan Johnson-Freese, “China’s slow, incremental program, juxtaposed with highly advanced, but largely politically stalled US efforts, creates a tortoise and hare scenario that China, as the underdog, significantly benefits from”. Cit. Johnson-Freese, Joan (2006). “A New US-Sino Space relationship: Moving Toward Cooperation”. Astropolitics Vol. 4 (2): 148.

  110. 110.

    See Hilborne, Mark (2013). “China’s rise in space and US policy responses: a collision course?” Space Policy 29 (2): 121.

  111. 111.

    Cit. National Research Council (2012). NASA Strategic Direction and the Need for a National Consensus. The National Academy Press. Washington DC: p.44.

  112. 112.

    Cit. Zhang, Yongjin (2013). “The eagle eyes the dragon in space—A critique”. Space Policy 29 (2): 120.

  113. 113.

    Among others, see, for instance, Ashley Tellis’ recommendations to the House Armed Services Subcommittees on Strategic Forces and Sea-power and Projection Forces of 28 January 2014. Tellis, Ashley (2014). “Does China Threaten the United States in Space?”. Testimony to the House Armed Services Subcommittees on Strategic Forces and Sea-power and Projection Forces. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. See also Pavelec, Sterling Michael (2012). “The Inevitability of the Weaponisation of Space: Technological Constructivism Versus Determinism”. Astropolitics Vol. 10 (1): 39–48.

  114. 114.

    Cit. Cheng, Dean (2011). “China’s Space Program: A Growing Factor in US Security Planning”. The Heritage Foundation, Backgrounder No. 2594.

  115. 115.

    See, for instance, Lopez, Laura Delgado (2012). “Predicting an Arms Race in Space: Problematic Assumptions for Space Arms Control”. Astropolitics Vol. 10 (1): 49–67. See also Krepon, Michael, and Julia Thompson (eds) (2013. Anti-satellite Weapons, Deterrence and Sino-American Space Relations. Stimson Center, Washington DC.

  116. 116.

    Based on a new concept of technological development, S. M. Pavelec of the Air Command and Staff College has, for instance, strongly argued that “as technology advances, space weaponisation not only is likely, but indeed is inevitable in the near future”. Interestingly, his core argument is that “the development of these weapons is inevitable and should therefore be accelerated in the United States, given the country’s position as the lone superpower, to command and control the space commons. If the United States leads this drive for development, then in the end, as with thermonuclear weapons, space weapons will make the world more, not less, secure, and will contribute to the spread of democratic peace and globalized capitalism”. Cit. Pavelec, Sterling Michael (2012). “The Inevitability of the Weaponisation of Space: Technological Constructivism Versus Determinism”. Astropolitics Vol. 10 (1): 39–48.

  117. 117.

    See Sect. 6.4 for a more detailed account of China’s international outreach. For an interesting essay on Sino-Latin America cooperation, see Delgado-Lopez, Laura M (2012). “Sino-Latin American space cooperation: A smart move”. Space Policy Vol. 28 (1): 7–14.

  118. 118.

    The total package China offers as global provider definitively undercuts both Western and Russian prices: 20 million € for the LM-2, 40 million € for the LM-3A, 50 million € for the LM-3C, 60 million € for the LM-3B, and 40 million € for the LM-4. See Harvey, Brian (2013). China in Space. The Great Leap Forward. Springer, New York.

  119. 119.

    Rathgeber, Wolfgang (2007). “China Posture in Space. Implications for Europe”. ESPI Report 3. European Space Policy Institute, Vienna. See also Suzuki, Kazuto (2013). “The contest for leadership in East Asia: Japanese and Chinese approaches to outer space”. Space Policy 29 (2): 99–106.

  120. 120.

    See Moltz, James Clay (2011). Asia’s Space Race: National Motivations, Regional Rivalries, and International Risks, Columbia University Press, New York: p. 203.

  121. 121.

    Shirk, Susan L. (2008). China. Fragile Superpower. Oxford University Press, New York: p. 268.

  122. 122.

    See Kissinger, Henry (2011). On China. Penguin Books, New York: p. 534.

  123. 123.

    Cit. Moltz, James Clay (2011). Asia’s Space Race: National Motivations, Regional Rivalries, and International Risks. Columbia University Press, New York: p. 13.

  124. 124.

    Cit. Logsdon, John M. (2008). “Why space exploration should be a global project”. Space Policy 24 (1): 4.

  125. 125.

    During this historic speech the President said… “Why, therefore, should man’s first flight to the moon be a matter of national competition? Surely we should explore whether the scientists and astronauts of our two countries—indeed of all the world—cannot work together in the conquest of space, sending someday to the Moon not the representatives of a single nation, but representatives of all our countries”. Ibid. p. 4.

  126. 126.

    Pollpeter, Kevin (2007). “Competing perceptions of the US and Chinese Space Programs”. China Brief Vol. 7 (1): 4.

  127. 127.

    Zhaoyao. Wang. “China Manned Space Program to Carry out International Cooperation in an Open Manner”. China Manned Space Engineering Office. 25 September 2013. Web. http://en.cmse.gov.cn/show.php?contentid = 1350. Accessed 4 June 2014.

  128. 128.

    For a detailed analysis of the changing context of space activities, see two contributions of Nicolas Peter, respectively: Peter, Nicolas (2008). Space Exploration 2025: Global Perspectives and Options for Europe. ESPI Report 14. European Space Policy Institute, Vienna; and: Peter, Nicolas (2006). “The changing geopolitics of space activities” Space Policy 22 (2): 100–109.

  129. 129.

    As noted by Nicolas Peter, the multiplication of space agencies, which is an ongoing process, can also be considered a direct result of the new geopolitical context that arose from the end of the Cold War and the subsequent break-up of the USSR, which led to the creation of national space agencies in Kazakhstan in 1991, in Ukraine in 1992, and Russia in 1992. This trend is still ongoing. Cit. Peter, Nicolas (2006). “The changing geopolitics of space activities” Space Policy 22 (2): 102.

  130. 130.

    Ibid. p. 102.

  131. 131.

    The most recent examples are the Belarus Space Agency (2010), Sri Lanka Space Agency (2010), Agencia Espacial Mexicana (2010), South African Space Agency (2011), and Turkmenistan National Space Agency (2011).

  132. 132.

    Peter, Nicolas (2008). “Space Exploration 2025: Global Perspectives and Options for Europe”. ESPI Report 14. European Space Policy Institute, Vienna: 31.

  133. 133.

    Cit. National Research Council (2012). NASA Strategic Direction and the Need for a National Consensus. The National Academy Press. Washington DC: 2.

  134. 134.

    Cit. ibid. p. 31.

  135. 135.

    David Held’s definition of Globalisation. See Held, David, Anthony McGrew, David Goldblatt, and Jonathan Perraton (eds) (1999). Global Transformations: Politics, Economics and Culture. Stanford University Press, Stanford: p. 2.

  136. 136.

    For an extensive analysis on the accelerating processes of globalisation in the space sector, see Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (2014). The Space Economy at a Glance 2014. OECD Publishing, Paris.

  137. 137.

    Peter, Nicolas (2006). “The changing geopolitics of space activities” Space Policy 22 (2): 108.

  138. 138.

    “Resurgence” is the term used by Andrew Hurrell in a renowned essay to indicate a long-standing tendency initiated in the 1960s and then revived since the 1990s. As he interestingly observes: “the past decade has witnessed a resurgence of regionalism in world politics. Old regionalist organizations have been revived, new organizations formed, and regionalism and the call for strengthened regionalist arrangements have been central to many of the debates about the nature of the post-Cold War international order. The number, scope and diversity of regionalist schemes have grown significantly since the last major regionalist wave in the 1960s”. Cit. Hurrell, Andrew (1995). “Explaining the resurgence of regions in world politics”. Review of International Studies No. 21: 331–358.

  139. 139.

    The Confrencia Espacial de las Américas (CEAs) was launched as an effort to facilitate cooperation among Latin American countries. Although these countries have not moved beyond the talking-shop level, there is increasing support for the creation of a pan-American cooperation structure, aimed at stimulating continental synergies in terms of space capabilities. See United Nations’s website: http://www.un-spider.org/event-en/3747/2010-11-15/vi-space-conference-americas. More recently Brazil has taken the lead in such initiative. See also “Brazil Proposes Latin American Space Alliance”. Parabolic Arc. 17 November 2013. Web. http://www.parabolicarc.com/2013/11/17/brazil-proposes-latin-american-space-alliance/. Accessed 15 June 2014.

  140. 140.

    The ISNET is an interstate, non-political agency under the umbrella of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC). The purpose of ISNET is to promote space science, space technology, and their applications in OIC member countries (Bangladesh, Iraq, Indonesia, Morocco, Niger, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia and Turkey, Syria, Iran, Sudan, Azerbaijan, Senegal, Egypt, and Jordan). See ISNET website: http://www.isnet.org.pk/pages/membership.asp.

  141. 141.

    There is no formal coordination yet of the space efforts of African countries, although many African countries are in favour of the constitution of an African Space Agency. A study is under way with the support of ITU, to evaluate current initiatives and study a possible joint African space policy. In the meantime a first pan-African telecommunications satellite (RascomStar) was contracted to Thales Alenia and launched by Ariane in 2010. In addition, in 2009, an agreement was signed in Algiers between Algeria, South Africa, Kenya, and Nigeria to create the African Resource Management Constellation, a constellation of satellites on the model of the SSLT’s Disaster Monitoring Constellation, comprising four, potentially five, satellites. See Timberlake, Ian. “Africa eyes joint space agency”. Phys.org. 4 September 2012. Web. http://phys.org/news/2012-09-ministers-african-space-agency.html. Accessed 25 July 2014.

  142. 142.

    For an additional analysis in this regard with an eye to the Asian context, see Aliberti, Marco (2013). “Regionalisation of Space Activities in Asia?” ESPI Perspectives 66. European Space Policy Institute, Vienna.

  143. 143.

    Members are ASI (Italy), CNES (France), CNSA (China), CSA (Canada), CSIRO (Australia), DLR (Germany), ESA (Europe), ISRO (India), JAXA (Japan), KARI (South Korea), NASA (USA), SSAU (Ukraine), Roscosmos (Russia), and UKSA (United Kingdom).

  144. 144.

    Cit. “The Global Exploration Strategy. The Framework for Coordination”. International Space Exploration Coordination Group. April 2007. Web. http://www.globalspaceexploration.org/c/document_library/get_file?uuid=119c14c4-6f68-49dd-94fa-af08ecb0c4f6&groupId=10812.

  145. 145.

    Cit. Dupas, Alain (2009). “International Cooperation in space exploration: Lessons from the past and perspective for the future”. In Schrogl, Kai-Uwe, Charlotte Mathieu, Nicolas Peter (eds). ESPI Yearbook on Space Policy 2007/2008: From Policies to Programmes. Springer, Vienna 2009: p. 163.

  146. 146.

    Ibid. p. 164.

  147. 147.

    National Academy of Sciences (2014). Pathways to Exploration: Rationales and Approaches for a US Program of Human Space Exploration. The National Academy Press. Washington DC.

  148. 148.

    Krasner, Stephen D (1983). “Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables”. In Krasner, Stephen D (eds). International Regimes. Cornell University Press, Ithaca, NY.

  149. 149.

    The literature on iterated prisoner’s dilemma shows that when the transparency level of the states’ action increases and fears of defection are consequently reduced, incentives to cooperate inevitably increase. See Axelrod, Robert, and R.O. Keohane (1993). “Achieving Cooperation Under Anarchy: Strategies and Institutions”. In Baldwin, D. A. (ed). Neorealism and neoliberalism: the contemporary debate. Columbia University Press, New York.

  150. 150.

    Blamont, Jacques (2012). “US Space Exploration Strategy: Is there a better way?” Space Policy No. 28 (4): 214.

  151. 151.

    Cit. Krowlikoski, Alanna (2011). “China’s Civil and Commercial Space Activities and their Implications”. In Hearing: The Implications of China’s military and civil space programs. US–China Economic and Security Review Commission (2011). Web. http://www.uscc.gov/Hearings/hearing-implications-china’s-military-and-civil-spaceprograms. Accessed 15 June 2014.

  152. 152.

    Cit. Pei, Minxin (2014). “How China and America See Each Other”. Foreign Affairs Vol. 93 (2): 143–147.

  153. 153.

    Interestingly, this position is also endorsed by a realist thinker such as Henry Kissinger. See Kissinger, Henry (2011). On China. Penguin Books, New York: p. 512.

  154. 154.

    Shambaugh, David (2002). “European and American Approaches to China: Different Bed, Same Dreams?” Asian Papers No 15. Sigur Center for Asian Studies: p.3.

  155. 155.

    For an interesting analysis on the concept of “responsible power”, see Shirk, Susan L. (2008). China. Fragile Superpower. Oxford University Press, New York: pp. 105–139.

  156. 156.

    Chimerica was coined by the historian Niall Fergusson to describe the symbiotic nature of current and future relations between China and the United States. See Fergusson, Niall (2008). The Ascent of Money: A Financial History of the World. Penguin Press, New York. On the idea of a Sino-American G2, see Bergsten, Fred C (2008). “A partnership of equals”. Foreign Affairs Vol. 87 (4): 57–69.

  157. 157.

    Brzezinski, Zbigniew. “Remarks at a Seminar Commemorating the 30th Anniversary of the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations between China and the United States”. National Committee on US–China Relations. 12 January 2009. Web. http://www.ncuscr.org/files/Zbigniew%20Brzezinski.pdf. Accessed 18 July 2014.

  158. 158.

    Zoellick, Robert B., and Justin Yifu Lin. “Recovery: A Job for China and the US”. The Washington Post. 6 March 2009. Web. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/03/05/AR2009030502887.html. Accessed 18 July 2014.

  159. 159.

    Kissinger, Henry. “The World must forge a new world order or retreat to chaos”. The Independent. 20 January 2009. Web. http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/commentators/henry-kissinger-the-world-must-forge-a-new-order-or-retreat-to-chaos-1451416.html. Accessed 18 July 2014.

  160. 160.

    The “Pacific Community” is defined by Kissinger as a region to which the United States, China, and other states all belong and in whose peaceful development they participate. Sino-American cooperation will enable other major countries to participate in the construction of a system perceived as joint rather than polarised between Chinese and American blocs. Kissinger, Henry (2011). On China. Penguin Books, New York: p. 523.

  161. 161.

    Cit. Economy, Elizabeth C., and Adam Segal (2009). “The G-2 Mirage”. Foreign Affairs Vol. 88 (3): 14–23.

  162. 162.

    See, for instance, Wesley, Clark. “Getting real about China” The New York Times. 10 October 2014.

  163. 163.

    See one of the first articles on the Congagement strategy: Khalilzad, Zalmay (1999). “Congage China”. RAND Issue Paper. Web. http://www.rand.org/pubs/issue_papers/IP187.html.

  164. 164.

    Luttwak, Edward (2012). The rise of China vs. the logic of strategy. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA: pp. 213–247.

  165. 165.

    Cit. Ibid. p. 214.

  166. 166.

    Cit. Barysch, Katina, Charles Grant, and Mark Leonard (2005). “Embracing the Dragon: The EU’s Partnership with China”. Centre for European Reform, London.

  167. 167.

    The expression “string of pearls” is generally used to indicate China’s maritime strategy. It entails the establishment of a series of military and economic nodes around China. Simply put, every node is a “pearl”, a sphere of influence that is secured and maintained through the use of economic, geopolitical, diplomatic, or military means. See “String of Pearls. Meaning. Policy. Implications”. The Barrel. 18 December 2012. Web. http://thebarrel.in/string-of-pearls-meaning-policy-implications/#Several_things_included_in_Chinese_String_of_Pearls. Accessed 20 September 2014. For an analysis on China’s strings of pearls, see also Kim, Shee Poon (2011). “An Anatomy of China’s ‘String of Pearls’ Strategy”. The Hikone Ronso No.387.

  168. 168.

    Engdahl, William F. “Obama’s Geopolitical China ‘Pivot’: The Pentagon Targets China”. Global Research. 2 February 2013. Web. http://www.globalresearch.ca/obama-s-geopolitical-china-pivot-the-pentagon-targets-china/32474. Accessed 20 September 2014. See also Nathan, Andrew J. and Andrew Scobell (2012). “How China sees America”. Foreign Affairs. Vol. 91 (5): 32–58.

  169. 169.

    Ikenberry, John (2008). “The rise of China and the future of the West”. Foreign Affairs Vol. 87 (1): 23–37.

  170. 170.

    Kissinger, Henry (2011). On China. Penguin Books. New York, 2011: p. 523.

  171. 171.

    Note: it was just a few weeks after the “Joint Communique on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations” of 1 January 1979.

  172. 172.

    The decision was valuable as it opened up the possibility of selling the country high technology at a better rate than that sold to the USSR and to transfer selected “dual-use” technology.

  173. 173.

    In his message to the Congress on 11 July 1983, Reagan stressed: “It is in our fundamental interest to advance our relations with China. Science and Technology are an essential part of that relationship and I have taken steps recently to ensure that China has improved access to US technology it needs for its economic modernisation goals”. Quoted from Myrrhe, Jacqueline (2013). “Hop-on and hop-off, ….but where do you go ? US-China space cooperation -An attempt to achieve the impossible”. In Lan, Chen, and Jacqueline Myrrhe (eds). Go Taikonauts. All about China’s space programme. Issue 11. February 2014: 47–63.

  174. 174.

    Kulacki, Gregory (2011). “US and China need contact, not cold war”. Nature. Vol. 474: 444.

  175. 175.

    Harvey, Brian (2013). China in Space. The Great Leap Forward. Springer, New York: p.100.

  176. 176.

    Ibid. p. 100.

  177. 177.

    Overall 18 launches were contracted over this period, of which 15 were successful.

  178. 178.

    Harvey, Brian (2013). China in Space. The Great Leap Forward. Springer, New York: p.15.

  179. 179.

    A commission (the Cox Commission) was set up after the LM launch failure of 14 February 1996 and in particular following American allegations of Chinese technology espionage and the deliberate transfer of sensitive technology to China by US corporations such as Hughes and Lockheed Martin. Hughes and Loral workers were accused of having handed over to Chinese officials responsible for the accident investigation sensitive technical information with potential military uses. This in turn led to an additional investigation. According to Cox, the Chinese had “over decades and in a systematic way, [used] fair means and foul, neutral scientific conferences, licensing arrangements, dual use military-civilian technologies, and straightforward spying to ferret out information on nuclear technology, computers, rockets, submarines, and atomic bombs”. Ibid. p.158.

  180. 180.

    Ibid. p.156.

  181. 181.

    See Rathgeber, Wolfgang (2007). “China’s Posture in Space. Implications for Europe”. ESPI Report 3. European Space Policy Institute, Vienna: p. 40.

  182. 182.

    Wheeler, Larry. “US Losing Unofficial Space Race, Congressmen Say”. Space.com. 31 March 2006. Web. http://www.space.com/1232-losing-unofficial-space-race-congressmen.html. Accessed 25 July 2014.

  183. 183.

    Johnson-Freese, Joan (2006). “A New US-Sino Space relationship: Moving Toward Cooperation”. Astropolitics Vol. 4 (2): 134.

  184. 184.

    Quoted from Rathgeber, Wolfgang (2007). “China’s Posture in Space. Implications for Europe”. ESPI Report 3. European Space Policy Institute, Vienna: 40.

  185. 185.

    See “China/US Should Cooperate In Space: Astronaut”. Red Orbit. 30 April 2011. Web. http://www.redorbit.com/news/space/2038588/chinaus_should_cooperate_in_space_astronaut/. Accessed 25 July 2014.

  186. 186.

    Quoted from Kulacki, Gregory (2011). “US and China need contact, not cold war”. Nature. Vol. 474: 444.

  187. 187.

    Harvey, Brian (2013). China in Space. The Great Leap Forward. Springer, New York.

  188. 188.

    Quoted from Mervis, Jeffery “Spending Bill Prohibits US-China Collaborations”. Science. 21 April 2011. Web. http://news.sciencemag.org/technology/2011/04/spending-bill-prohibits-US-china-collaborations. Accessed 26 July 2014.

  189. 189.

    Chinese space officials were in fact initially prohibited from attending the conference, but Senator Frank Wolf then clarified that the law did not ban Chinese officials participating in multilateral fora or events. See “Wolf Letter To NASA’s Bolden Correcting Record On Restrictions Involving Chinese Nationals”. Press Release. 8 October 2013. Web. http://wolf.house.gov/press-releases/wolf-letter-to-nasas-bolden-correcting-record-on-restrictions-involving-chinese-nationals/. Accessed 21 July 2014.

  190. 190.

    US–China Economic and Security Review Commission. Hearing: The Implications of China’s military and civil space programs. 2011. Web. http://www.uscc.gov/Hearings/hearing-implications-china’s-military-and-civil-spaceprograms. Accessed 18 July 2014.

  191. 191.

    Gallo, William. “Could US work with China on Space Issues?” Voice of America News. 11 June 2013. http://www.voanews.com/content/could-us-work-with-china-on-spaceissues/1679451.html?goback = %2Egde_139815_member_249152883. Accessed 21 July 2014.

  192. 192.

    Johnson, Andrew (2014). “An Agreement to Disagree”. In Lan, Chen, and Jacqueline Myrrhe (eds). Go Taikonauts. All about China’s space programme. Issue 12. May 2014: pp. 21–26.

  193. 193.

    Morring, Frank “NASA China meet on possible cooperation”. Aviation Week & Space Technology. 16 January 2014. Web. http://aviationweek.com/space/nasa-china-meet-possible-cooperation. Accessed 21 July 2014.

  194. 194.

    Morring, Frank. “Bolden Meets Human-Spaceflight Chief During China Visit”. Aviation Week & Space Technology. 3 December 2014. Web. http://aviationweek.com/space/bolden-meets-human-spaceflight-chief-during-china-visit. Accessed 5 December 2014.

  195. 195.

    Kulacki, Gregory (2011). “US and China need contact, not cold war”. Nature. Vol. 474: 444.

  196. 196.

    As recognised as early as 2004 by a Defence Science Board report, “the US government is reflexively inclined toward Cold-War-style responses to the new threat(s), without a thought or a care as to whether these were the best responses to a very different strategic situation”. Quoted from Johnson-Freese, Joan (2006). “A New US-Sino Space relationship: Moving Toward Cooperation”. Astropolitics Vol. 4 (2): 148.

  197. 197.

    Kulacki, Gregory (2011). “US and China need contact, not cold war”. Nature. Vol. 474: 444.

  198. 198.

    Moltz, James Clay (2011). “China’s Space Technology: International Dynamics and Implications for the United States”. In Hearing: The Implications of China’s military and civil space programs. US-China Economic and Security Review Commission (2011). Web. http://www.uscc.gov/Hearings/hearing-implications-china’s-military-and-civil-spaceprograms. Accessed 15 June 2014.

  199. 199.

    Hitchens, Teresa, and David Chen (2008). “Forging a Sino-US ‘grand bargain’ in space”. Space Policy Vol 24 (3): 128–131.

  200. 200.

    Position expressed by former astronaut Leroy Chiao in a testimony for the US–China Economic and Security Review Commission in 2013. Quoted from Johnson, Andrew (2014). “An Agreement to Disagree”. In Lan, Chen, and Jacqueline Myrrhe (eds). Go Taikonauts. All about China’s space programme. Issue 12. May 2014: pp. 21–26.

  201. 201.

    Cit. Krolikowski, Alanna (2011). “China’s Civil and Commercial Space Activities and their Implications”. In Hearing: The Implications of China’s military and civil space programs. US-China Economic and Security Review Commission (2011). Web. http://www.uscc.gov/Hearings/hearing-implications-china’s-military-and-civil-spaceprograms. Accessed 15 June 2014.

  202. 202.

    Cit. Johnson, Andrew (2014). “An Agreement to Disagree”. In Lan, Chen, and Jacqueline Myrrhe (eds). Go Taikonauts. All about China’s space programme. Issue 12. May 2014: pp. 21–26.

  203. 203.

    Cit. Johnson-Freese, Joan (2006). “A New US-Sino Space relationship: Moving Toward Cooperation”. Astropolitics Vol. 4 (2): 134.

  204. 204.

    Cit. Logan, Jeffrey (2007). “China’s Space Program: Options for US-China Cooperation”. Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, Washington DC.

  205. 205.

    Chambers, Rob (2009). “China space program: a new tool for PRC “soft power” in international relations?”. Dissertation, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA.

  206. 206.

    Logsdon, John M (2008). “Why space exploration should be a global project”. Space Policy 24 (1): 3–5.

  207. 207.

    According to official records (NASA website http://history.nasa.gov/Apollomon/Apollo.html), the NASA budget increased from $500 million in 1960 to a high point of $5.2 billion in 1965. In that year NASA funding level represented 5.3 % of the federal budget. In total, between 1959 and 1973 NASA spent $23.6 billion on human spaceflight, exclusive of infrastructure and support, of which nearly $20 billion was for Apollo. This expenditure would amount to $110 billion in 2010 terms!.

  208. 208.

    See Lo, Bobo (2008). Axis of convenience: Moscow, Beijing and the new geopolitics. Brookings Institution Press, Washington DC.

  209. 209.

    Cit. Seedhouse, Erich (2010). The New Space Race. China vs the United States, Springer—Praxis Publishing, Chichester, UK: p. 212.

  210. 210.

    In addition, US laws and regulations, such as the International Traffic in Arms Regulations, can greatly complicate international cooperation. For modest projects, the added complexity can easily make things more expensive and slower to complete. National Research Council (2012). NASA Strategic Direction and the Need for a National Consensus. The National Academy Press. Washington DC: p. 44.

  211. 211.

    Seedhouse, Erich (2010). The New Space Race. China vs the United States, Springer – Praxis Publishing, Chichester, UK: p. 212.

  212. 212.

    Wolf, Frank. “US Should Not Cooperate With People’s Liberation Army to Help Develop China’s Space Program”. Press Release. 2 November 2011. Web. http://wolf.house.gov/media-center/press-releases/wolf-us-should-not-cooperate-with-peoples-liberation-army-to-help#.U6yH39zLTj0. Accessed 28 July 2014.

  213. 213.

    See Seedhouse, Erich (2010). The New Space Race. China vs the United States, Springer—Praxis Publishing, Chichester, UK: p. 207.

  214. 214.

    Tsien Hsue Chien was accused of spying and of communist sympathies. For a more detailed account, see Harvey, Brian (2013). China in Space. The Great Leap Forward. Springer, New York.

  215. 215.

    Known in Chinese as Yujun Yumin (locating military potential in civilian capabilities), the CMI policy recommends efforts to leverage investments made in the civilian sector by finding an application with military potential.

  216. 216.

    US–China Economic and Security Review Commission. 2013 Annual Report to Congress. US Government Printing Office, Washington DC, United States. November 2013: p. 230. This view has been well reflected in a letter written by Senator Frank???? Wolf to James Clapper in December 2013, which states: “Given that China does not separate civilian and military space programs, its purportedly civilian space accomplishments suggest concomitant military applications as well”. Quoted from Johnson, Andrew (2014). “An Agreement to Disagree”. In Lan, Chen, and Jacqueline Myrrhe (eds). Go Taikonauts. All about China’s space programme. Issue 12. May 2014: pp. 21–26.

  217. 217.

    National Academy of Sciences (2014). Pathways to Exploration: Rationales and Approaches for a US Program of Human Space Exploration. The National Academy Press. Washington DC.

  218. 218.

    Ibid.

  219. 219.

    Ibid.

  220. 220.

    Cit. Blamont, Jacques (2012). “US Space Exploration Strategy: Is there a better way?” Space Policy No. 28 (4): 213.

  221. 221.

    Cit. National Research Council (2012). NASA Strategic Direction and the Need for a National Consensus. The National Academy Press. Washington DC: p. 44.

  222. 222.

    After the release of report NASA issued a statement welcoming the report: “There is a consensus that our horizon goal should be a human mission to Mars”, the US space agency said, adding “the stepping stone and pathways thrust of the NRC report complements NASA’s on-going approach”. See “US Needs to reexamine NASA’s China exclusion policy”: report. Xinhua News. 5 June 2014. Web. http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/sci/2014-06/05/c_133384132.htm. Accessed 15 July 2014.

  223. 223.

    “Forum for New Leaders in Science”. National Academy of Science—Space Studies Board (2014). Washington DC. Web. http://sites.nationalacademies.org/SSB/SSB_086017.htm/. Accessed 15 July 2014.

  224. 224.

    Leone, Dan. “Frank Wolf, House’s Top NASA Appropriator, Retiring in 2015”. Space News. 10 April 2014. Web. http://www.spacenews.com/article/civil-space/38756frank-wolf-house’s-top-nasa-appropriator-retiring-in-2015. Accessed 15 July 2014.

  225. 225.

    US–China Economic and Security Review Commission. 2013 Annual Report to Congress. US Government Printing Office, Washington DC, United States. November 2013.

  226. 226.

    In this regard the eventual congressional approval to share information on air traffic management with China that in November 2014 enabled Charles Bolden’s meeting with Wang Zhaoyao, director of the CMSEO, is remarkable.

  227. 227.

    US–China Economic and Security Review Commission. 2013 Annual Report to Congress. US Government Printing Office, Washington DC, United States. November 2013: p. 230.

  228. 228.

    See Yeo, Nicole. “China’s Participation in Cobra Gold 2014: A Golden Opportunity for the United States?” China–US Focus. 11 March 2014. Web. http://www.chinausfocus.com/foreign-policy/chinas-participation-in-cobra-gold-2014-a-golden-opportunity-for-the-united-states/. Accessed 18 July 2014.

  229. 229.

    Morring, Frank “NASA China meet on possible cooperation”. Aviation Week & Space Technology. 16 January 2014. Web. http://aviationweek.com/space/nasa-china-meet-possible-cooperation. Accessed 21 July 2014.

  230. 230.

    Also to be noted is that although the restriction remains in place in the current budget, the law includes a provision allowing discussions to go forward if NASA can certify that there is not a threat of revealing sensitive security information.

  231. 231.

    Harvey, Brian (2013). China in Space. The Great Leap Forward. Springer, New York: p. 100.

  232. 232.

    Japan and the United States were, quite ironically, the first countries China had tried to establish space cooperation with after the launch of Deng Xiaoping’s Gaige Kaifang in 1976. The process was initiated in 1977–1979 with a series of exchange visits and meetings, leading to some cooperative projects.

  233. 233.

    Mathieu, Charlotte (2008). “Assessing Russia’s space cooperation with China and India. Opportunities and Challenges for Europe”. ESPI Report 12. European Space Policy Institute, Vienna: pp. 21–22.

  234. 234.

    Harvey, Brian (2007). The rebirth of the Russian Space Program. 50 Years after Sputnik, New Frontiers. Springer—Praxis Publishing, Chichester, UK.

  235. 235.

    The Russians, however, refused to sell RD-170 engines, a powerful LOX/Kerosene engine originally used for the first stage of Energya. See Ibid.

  236. 236.

    Harvey, Brian (2004). China’s Space Program. From Conception to Manned Spaceflight. Springer, New York.

  237. 237.

    As noted by Charlotte Mathieu, it is remarkable that while the Chinese received training at Star City to become taikonauts, no Chinese ever flew with the Russians as “passenger” and vice versa. Mathieu, Charlotte (2008). “Assessing Russia’s space cooperation with China and India. Opportunities and Challenges for Europe”. ESPI Report 12. European Space Policy Institute, Vienna: p. 21.

  238. 238.

    Cit. Ibid. p 21.

  239. 239.

    The mission, launched in November 2011, from Baikonur Cosmodrome was a failure. Harvey, Brian (2007). The rebirth of the Russian Space Program. 50 Years after Sputnik, New Frontiers. Springer—Praxis Publishing, Chichester, UK.

  240. 240.

    In January 2006, Sergei Ivanov, “declared India–Russia’s only cooperation partner in GLONASS”. Rathgeber, Wolfgang (2007). “China Posture in Space. Implications for Europe”. ESPI Report 3. European Space Policy Institute, Vienna: p. 48.

  241. 241.

    It should be recalled that this agreement followed Russia’s decision to disable American GPS ground stations on its territory in May 2014. See “China and Russia Continue to Deepen Space Cooperation”. LaRouche PAC. 1 July 2014. Web. http://larouchepac.com/node/31183. Accessed 28 July 2014.

  242. 242.

    The draft treaty can be read as a way for both actors to oppose alleged US space dominance, but for Russia it is also an instrument to prevent a dangerous arms race, whose costs could not be sustained by Russia.

  243. 243.

    See Kondapalli, Srikanth (2010). “China’s space programme and Asia”. In Kai-Uwe Schrogl, Wolfgang Rathgeber, Blandina Banares, Christophe Venet (eds). ESPI Yearbook on Space Policy 2008/2009: Setting New Trends. Springer, Vienna: pp. 286–299.

  244. 244.

    Cit. Peter, Nicolas “The changing geopolitics of space activities” Space Policy 22 (2): 102.

  245. 245.

    For more on AP-MCSTA and its transformation into APSCO, see the organisation website: http://www.apsco.int/default.asp.

  246. 246.

    The Secretariat of APSCO currently consists of four departments, namely, the Department of External Relations and Legal Affairs, the Department of Strategic Planning and Program Management, the Department of Education and Training and Database Management, and the Department of Administration and Finance.

  247. 247.

    To avoid hegemony of the organisation by a particular state, Article 18 of the APSCO Convention states that financial contributions of any one state shall not exceed 18 % of the approved budget of the organisation. This provision, however, does not prevent China from leading the organisation in terms of decision-making. Cit. Aliberti, Marco (2013). “Regionalisation of Space Activities in Asia?”. ESPI Perspectives 66. European Space Policy Institute, Vienna.

  248. 248.

    The fields of cooperation identified by Article 6 of the Convention are space technology and applications, Earth observation, space science research, education and training, space law, policy, and regulations. Together with a development plan, concrete projects have been approved by council meetings in each of these fields. Ibid.

  249. 249.

    Cit. Rathgeber, Wolfgang (2007). “China Posture in Space. Implications for Europe”. ESPI Report 3. European Space Policy Institute, Vienna: p. 54.

  250. 250.

    China and Brazil, through the mechanism of the Space Cooperation Subcommittee of the Sino-Brazilian High-level Coordination Commission, have worked out a comprehensive bilateral space cooperation plan, actively promoted the research and development of the China–Brazil Earth resources satellites, continued to maintain data consistency of their Earth resources satellites, and expanded the application of their data into regional and global contexts.

  251. 251.

    In 2013 China launched the first Bolivian telecommunications satellite and provided training for the (recently established) satellite operator. See Tiezzi, Shannon. “China’s space diplomacy”. The Diplomat. 24 December 2013. Web. http://thediplomat.com/tag/china-aerospace-science-and-technology-corporation/. Accessed 30 July 2014.

  252. 252.

    For an analysis of Sino-Latin America cooperation, see Delgado-Lopez, Laura M (2012). “Sino-Latin American space cooperation: A smart move”. Space Policy Vol. 28 (1): 7–14.

  253. 253.

    De Selding, Peter. “Chinese Hardware, Financing Changing Satcom Landscape”. Space News. 18 January 2013. Web. http://www.spacenews.com/article/satellite-telecom/33244chinese-hardware-financing-changing-satcom-landscape. Accessed 30 July 2014.

  254. 254.

    See United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs. Report on the United Nations/China Workshop on Human Space Technology. Beijing, China. 16–20 September 2013. Web. http://www.oosa.unvienna.org/pdf/sap/hsti/China2013/A.AC.1050_HSTI_WS.China.pdf. Accessed 31 July 2014.

  255. 255.

    Correll, Randall, and Nicolas Peter (2005). “Odyssey: Principles for Enduring Space Exploration” Space Policy 21 (4): 251–258.

  256. 256.

    Broniatovski, D.A., et al. (2006). “The Case for Managed International Cooperation in Space Exploration”. Center for Strategic and International Studies. Washington DC.

  257. 257.

    Cit. Peter, Nicolas “The changing geopolitics of space activities” Space Policy 22 (2): 100.

  258. 258.

    Ibid.

  259. 259.

    In December 2007, the Moscow court sentenced Igor Reshetin, the chief executive of TsNIIMAsh-Export, a producer of rockets and missiles working closely with the Russian Space Agency, to 11.5 years in prison for passing dual-purpose technology to China. “The other three defendants in the criminal case were sentenced to five to 11 years. Investigators said Reshetin and his co-accused had transferred know how that could be used to design nuclear missiles to China Precision Machinery Import-Export Corporation, causing losses to Russia of 110 million roubles”. Cit. “Reshetin sentenced for 11.5 years for passing technology to China”. RIA Novosti. 3 December 2007. Web. http://en.ria.ru/russia/20071203/90747889.html. Accessed 2 August 2014.

  260. 260.

    Cit. Hulsroj, Peter (2014). “The Psychology and Reality of the Financial Crisis in Terms of Space Cooperation”. In Al-Ekabi, Cenan, Blandina Banares, Peter Hulsroj, Arne Lahcen (eds). ESPI Yearbook on Space Policy 2011/2012. Space in Times of Financial Crisis. Springer, Vienna: pp. 159–168.

  261. 261.

    Quoted from “China and Russia Continue to Deepen Space Cooperation”. LaRouche PAC. 1 July 2014. Web. http://larouchepac.com/node/31183. Accessed 2 August 2014. See also “Russia, China Ready to Cooperate in Space, Explore Mars”. Space Travel. 1 July 2014. Web. http://www.space-travel.com/reports/Russia_China_Ready_to_Cooperate_in_Space_Explore_Mars_999.html. Accessed 2 August 2014.

  262. 262.

    Cit. Kotkin, Stephen (2009). “The Unbalanced Triangle”. Foreign Affairs. Vol. 88 (5): 130–138.

  263. 263.

    See Medeiros, Evan S (2009). China’s International Behaviour. Activism, Opportunism and Diversification. RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, CA: p. 100.

  264. 264.

    As documented by Evan Medeiros. Beginning with Gorbachev’s normalisation of Sino-Soviet relations in 1989, China–Russia relations have since undergone a sea change. Beijing has made gradual and consistent efforts to upgrade relations, driven largely, but not exclusively, by mutual concerns about US power and the US democracy-promotion agenda. In 1994, China and Russia formed a “cooperative partnership”, followed by a “strategic cooperative partnership” in 1996, and the signing of a full treaty on “Good Neighbourliness, Friendship, and Cooperation” in 2001. These agreements led to a series of sustained high-level interactions, which remain the “thickest” part of this bilateral relationship. Since 1996, Chinese and Russian leaders have held annual summit meetings. Ibid. pp. 101–102.

  265. 265.

    The SCO is a six-member security group founded in 2001 by China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan with the objective, at least in Russia’s view, of forging a quasi-military alliance that could counter NATO. China is, however, quite hesitant in this regard: see China’s reaction in the 2008 Georgia crisis. Within the organisation, cooperation mainly includes joint military exercises, intelligence sharing, and counterterrorism, but economic and cultural cooperation is also covered.

  266. 266.

    Cit. Kotkin, Stephen (2009). “The Unbalanced Triangle”. Foreign Affairs. Vol. 88 (5): 130–138.

  267. 267.

    See Lo, Bobo (2008). Axis of convenience: Moscow, Beijing and the new geopolitics. Brookings Institution Press, Washington DC.

  268. 268.

    For an analysis on the agreement, see Koch-Weser, Iacob, and Craig Murray (2014). “The China-Russia Gas Deal: Background and Implications for the Broader Relationship”. US–China Economic and Security Review Commission Staff Research Backgrounder, Washington DC.

  269. 269.

    See a previous ESPI study by Charlotte Mathieu on Russian cooperation with China and India, also providing an assessment on triangular cooperation Russia–India–China. See Mathieu, Charlotte (2008). “Assessing Russia’s space cooperation with China and India. Opportunities and Challenges for Europe”. ESPI Report 12. European Space Policy Institute, Vienna.

  270. 270.

    Cit. Ibid. p. 25.

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    Marco Aliberti

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Aliberti, M. (2015). China, the Moon, and the World. In: When China Goes to the Moon.... Studies in Space Policy, vol 11. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-19473-8_6

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