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Optimal Inspection Plans

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Cyber-Security in Critical Infrastructures

Abstract

In this chapter, we consider games for the computation of optimal strategies of how, how often, and when to inspect along a production line, or general industrial process. We review basic concepts of statistical tests, conducted whenever the defender chooses its action to “inspect”, and to understand cheating strategies for the adversary trying to escape detection along the statistical test. This non-detection game is then embedded into an outer sequential game over several stages of inspection, accounting for limited resources and possibilities of the defender to check repeatedly. We also consider inspections as a defense pattern against advanced persistent threat (APT), with two models suitable for two distinct type of APTs: the FlipIt game is discussed as a model when the APT’s goal is to gain longest possible control over an infrastructure, without wishing to damage or destroy it permanently. Complementary to this is the Cut-The-Rope game about defending against an APT whose goal is hitting a vital asset and to destroy or at least permanently damage a critical infrastructure.

Truth is confirmed by inspection and delay; falsehood by haste and uncertainty.

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Rass, S., Schauer, S., König, S., Zhu, Q. (2020). Optimal Inspection Plans. In: Cyber-Security in Critical Infrastructures. Advanced Sciences and Technologies for Security Applications. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-46908-5_9

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-46908-5_9

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  • Publisher Name: Springer, Cham

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-030-46907-8

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-030-46908-5

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