Abstract
In this chapter, Molefe reflects on the bioethical question of abortion in light of the African personhood-based view of dignity. The central question is whether the idea of personhood would permit or forbid abortion. He ultimately defends the view that forbids abortion. To secure this conclusion, he structures the chapter as follows. He begins with questions of methodology. He first proposes what he takes to be a suitable method to engage on the question of abortion. He rejects approaches employed by some of the leading scholars in African philosophy like Benezet Bujo, Mabogo Ramose and Godfrey Tangwa since they are based on controversial metaphysical views. Secondly, he considers Kai Horsthemke’s essay—‘African Communalism, Persons, and Animals’—that argues that the idea of personhood takes the young, women, homosexuals and animals not to have moral status. In the third section, it offers arguments that neutralise Horsthemke’s arguments by proposing a more plausible interpretation of Menkiti’s moral philosophy that accommodates the young in the moral community, among others. Finally, Molefe considers two possible objections against his view.
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Notes
- 1.
The case in point is Anne Warren (1997), whereas she believes that abortion is permissible, she rejects infanticide. She struggles, however, to offer a convincing case regarding why one is permissible and the other not.
- 2.
I hasten to clarify that I should not be read as suggesting that Horsthemke operates on the assumption that abortion ought to be permissible (or, even impermissible). Two things are clear from reading Horsthemke’s essay. Firstly, he lists entities that are excluded by the idea of personhood from the moral community, such as the young, women and homosexuals. In this regard, he seems to be merely reporting the practical consequences of the idea of personhood. Secondly, he is, however, committed to criticising this idea for failing to include animals in the moral community. For my part, my interest is just to evaluate whether it is true that the idea of personhood excludes the young, particularly foetuses, from the moral community.
- 3.
Some scholars of African thought have also considered the idea of ontological progression from an ‘it’ to an ‘it’ (see Etieyibo 2018; Matolino 2011). These scholars tend to focus on a metaphysical analysis of the ontological progression. My focus will be on the ethics of abortion that can be read from referring to infants as ‘its’.
- 4.
In this essay, I will also briefly consider the moral candidature of mentally disabled individuals and animals alongside the question of abortion because Horsthemke’s criticism against the idea of the personhood includes them. I touch on these other cases to suggest the robustness of the idea of personhood. The suggestion will be that the idea of personhood, at least its view of moral status, does have the resources to accommodate much more than just the young.
- 5.
It is important that, here, I am considering an idea of moral status entailed by the idea of personhood qua moral virtue.
- 6.
I italicise this word, ‘normative’, to bring the following consideration to the attention of the reader. The reader will do well to note the ambiguity of the normative idea of personhood; it could refer to either a patient- or an agent-centred notion of personhood (see Chap. 2). In this particular instance, and, in fact, in this chapter and the entire book, I derive a conception of moral status/dignity (the patient-centred notion of personhood) from the agent-centred notion of personhood.
- 7.
We invoke theories because they offer us principles that we can apply to a variety of situations—that is, they are generalisable. The problem of a plastic concept like that defended by Tangwa is that it defies the very logic of having a theory in the first place since it seems to imply that we have to solve moral problems on a case-by-case basis. I take this to be the case because the idea of plasticity rejects the objective rules and rigidity associated with theories, instead preferring flexibility as crucial feature. I think the case-by-case approach is the upshot of plasticity in the concept of a person, which betrays its usefulness as a theory.
- 8.
I touch on the question of the mentally disabled and animals, in part, because in Chap. 2 I criticised Ikuenobe’s view of dignity for failing to accommodate the young and animals. I think it is only fair to the reader to give her a sense of how this idea can accommodate the mentally disabled and animals, albeit in a sketchy form.
- 9.
In this chapter, I will not be drawn to issues regarding the fact that some animals can be greater subjects of sympathy, to some extent, than infants and mentally injured human beings. The point of this section is to outline a preliminary, and by all means, rough response to questions regarding animals and the mentally disabled. It suffices to appreciate that animals and mentally disabled individuals are secured their moral standing on the basis, at minimum, that they can be objects of sympathy. Even those animals that can be subjects of sympathy can only be so in a limited way since they cannot pursue and develop personhood in the fullest sense of the term.
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Molefe, M. (2020). Personhood and Abortion in African Philosophy. In: An African Ethics of Personhood and Bioethics. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-46519-3_3
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