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World, Mind, and Perception (The Correct View)

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Beyond Meaning: A Journey Across Language, Perception and Experience

Part of the book series: Perspectives in Pragmatics, Philosophy & Psychology ((PEPRPHPS,volume 25))

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Abstract

In this chapter, we introduce and discuss the modern scientific view of perception, whereby sensory systems are not mere physical transducers but systems of classification and interpretation of the external world, developed in the course of the human evolutionary history to serve the perceiver in the task of surviving in its environmental niche. We also discuss how the modern view of perception offers an answer to Descartes’ skeptical argument and, ultimately, a way to reconciling the divide between world and mind.

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Fiorin, G., Delfitto, D. (2020). World, Mind, and Perception (The Correct View). In: Beyond Meaning: A Journey Across Language, Perception and Experience. Perspectives in Pragmatics, Philosophy & Psychology, vol 25. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-46317-5_33

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