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Online Auction and Optimal Stopping Game with Imperfect Observation

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Intelligent Information and Database Systems (ACIIDS 2020)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNAI,volume 12033))

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Abstract

The paper examines a multi-stage game-theoretic model of an auction where the participants (players) set minimum threshold price levels above which they are ready to sell. Price offerings are a sequence of independent and identically distributed random variables. A two-person game in which each player is interested in selling at a price higher than the competitor’s is considered. Optimal threshold pricing strategies and expected payoffs of the players are determined. Numerical modeling results are presented.

Supported by “The Double-Hundred Talent Plan” of the Shandong Province, China (grant no. WST2017009).

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Institute of Applied Mathematical Research of the Karelian Research Centre of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Pushkinskaya Str., 11, Petrozavodsk, 185910, Russia

    Vladimir Mazalov & Anna Ivashko

  2. School of Mathematics and Statistics, Qingdao University, Institute of Applied Mathematics of Shandong, Qingdao, 266071, China

    Vladimir Mazalov

Authors
  1. Vladimir Mazalov
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  2. Anna Ivashko
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Corresponding author

Correspondence to Anna Ivashko .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Applied Informatics, Wrocław University of Science and Technology, Wrocław, Poland

    Ngoc Thanh Nguyen

  2. King Mongkut's Institute of Technology Ladkrabang, Bangkok, Thailand

    Kietikul Jearanaitanakij

  3. Faculty of Computer Science and Information, University Teknologi Malaysia, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia

    Ali Selamat

  4. Department of Applied Informatics, Wrocław University of Science and Technology, Wrocław, Poland

    Bogdan Trawiński

  5. King Mongkut's Institute of Technology Ladkrabang, Bangkok, Thailand

    Suphamit Chittayasothorn

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Mazalov, V., Ivashko, A. (2020). Online Auction and Optimal Stopping Game with Imperfect Observation. In: Nguyen, N., Jearanaitanakij, K., Selamat, A., Trawiński, B., Chittayasothorn, S. (eds) Intelligent Information and Database Systems. ACIIDS 2020. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 12033. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-41964-6_13

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-41964-6_13

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  • Publisher Name: Springer, Cham

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-030-41963-9

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-030-41964-6

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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