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Cryptographers’ Track at the RSA Conference

CT-RSA 2020: Topics in Cryptology – CT-RSA 2020 pp 610–637Cite as

Cut-and-Choose for Garbled RAM

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Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNSC,volume 12006))

Abstract

Garbled RAM, introduced by Lu and Ostrovsky in 2013, provides a novel method for secure computation on RAM (Random Access Machine) programs directly. It can be seen as a RAM analogue of Yao’s garbled circuits such that the computational complexity and communication complexity only grow with the running time of the RAM program, avoiding the inefficient process of first converting it into a circuit. It allows for executing multiple RAM programs on a persistent database, but is secure only against semi-honest adversaries.

In this work we provide a cut-and-choose technique for garbled RAM. This gives the first constant-round two-party RAM computation protocol secure against malicious adversaries which allows for multiple RAM programs being executed on a persistent database. Our protocol makes black-box use of the one-way functions, and security of our construction is argued in the random oracle model.

P. Miao—Work done while the author is a student at the University of California, Berkeley. Research supported in part from a DARPA/ARL SAFEWARE Award, AFOSR Award FA9550-15-1-0274, NSF CRII Award 1464397 and a research grant from the Okawa Foundation. The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the funding agencies.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Interestingly for oblivious transfer extension we do know black-box construction based on stronger assumptions [IKNP03].

  2. 2.

    Additionally, black-box constructions enable implementations agnostic to the implementation of the underlying primitives. This offers greater flexibility allowing for many optimizations, scalability, and choice of implementation.

  3. 3.

    In this paper we focus on the standard persistent notion where later programs and inputs can be chosen adaptively.

  4. 4.

    For the readers who are familiar with [GLO15]: Each GC originally had two parameters \(\mathsf {const}\) and \(\mathsf {keys}\) hard-coded inside it, and had \(\mathsf {mem}\), \(\mathsf {inp}\) or \(\mathsf {dyn}\) as input. Now \(\mathsf {const}\) and \(\mathsf {keys}\) are pulled out to be part of the input, and every circuit takes \(\mathsf {mem}, \mathsf {inp}, \mathsf {dyn}\) as part of the input, so that all the circuits have the same topology.

  5. 5.

    \(\tilde{M}\) is proportional to \(M\) with poly-logarithmic factors, and \(\tilde{t}\) is proportional to \(t\) with poly-logarithmic factors. For our purpose we do not need to specify the concrete numbers, but one may refer to [GLO15] for details.

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Acknowledgements

The author would like to thank Sanjam Garg for many insightful discussions and helpful comments on the write-up.

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  1. Visa Research, Palo Alto, USA

    Peihan Miao

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    Stanislaw Jarecki

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Miao, P. (2020). Cut-and-Choose for Garbled RAM. In: Jarecki, S. (eds) Topics in Cryptology – CT-RSA 2020. CT-RSA 2020. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 12006. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-40186-3_26

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