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Cryptographers’ Track at the RSA Conference

CT-RSA 2020: Topics in Cryptology – CT-RSA 2020 pp 538–563Cite as

Policy-Based Sanitizable Signatures

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Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNSC,volume 12006))

Abstract

Sanitizable signatures are a variant of signatures which allow a single, and signer-defined, sanitizer to modify signed messages in a controlled way without invalidating the respective signature. They turned out to be a versatile primitive, proven by different variants and extensions, e.g., allowing multiple sanitizers or adding new sanitizers one- by-one. However, existing constructions are very restricted regarding their flexibility in specifying potential sanitizers. We propose a different and more powerful approach: Instead of using sanitizers’ public keys directly, we assign attributes to them. Sanitizing is then based on policies, i.e., access structures defined over attributes. A sanitizer can sanitize, if, and only if, it holds a secret key to attributes satisfying the policy associated to a signature, while offering full-scale accountability.

The project leading to this work has received funding from the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under grant agreement No 783119 secredas.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    If wanted, a signer can also be a group manager simultaneously, without sacrificing accountability.

  2. 2.

    \(\mathsf {PCH}\)s and \(\mathsf {P3S}\) could be defined for richer policies, e.g., polynomial sized circuits.

  3. 3.

    Although key-verifiability is no property often explicitly used within IND-CCA2 encryption schemes, most encryption schemes are key-verifiable.

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  1. TÜV Rheinland i-sec GmbH, Hallbergmoos, Germany

    Kai Samelin

  2. AIT Austrian Institute of Technology, Vienna, Austria

    Daniel Slamanig

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  1. Kai Samelin
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  1. University of California, Irvine, CA, USA

    Stanislaw Jarecki

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Samelin, K., Slamanig, D. (2020). Policy-Based Sanitizable Signatures. In: Jarecki, S. (eds) Topics in Cryptology – CT-RSA 2020. CT-RSA 2020. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 12006. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-40186-3_23

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