Abstract
The special theory of relativity influences the philosophy of time in important, yet at first sight contrasting ways, as this chapter shows: it undermines a global past-present-future distinction, but at the same time preserves an asymmetric relation between earlier and later events which are causally connectable. On the basis of the first point, arguments towards a universal determinism have been made by Wim Rietdijk and Hilary Putnam, but the criticism advanced in particular by Howard Stein shows that these arguments fail. It is then discussed which options, if any, there are for carving up spacetime into determinate or “fixed” versus indeterminate or “open” regions. Finally, it is shown that special relativity’s characteristic light-cone structure is linked to relatively macroscopic objects, or “endurers” in philosophical jargon.
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Notes
- 1.
Given at the end of Appendix A. I am adopting the convention of setting c = 1.
- 2.
R. J. Russell, Time in Eternity: Pannenberg, Physics, and Eschatology in Creative Mutual Interaction (2012), pp. 264–265.
- 3.
The reasons are given in Appendix A, and the philosophical difficulties associated with switching the temporal order of causally connectable events will be discussed in more detail in Sect. 11.2. Note also that x and y, here referred to as “events”, can of course simply be thought of as points situated in spacetime, whether or not there is anything noteworthy occurring there. We might therefore alternatively say that Kxy holds between any two points x and y in spacetime exactly if whatever is going on at y can influence what happens at x.
- 4.
Cf. M. Tooley, Time, Tense and Causation (1997), p. 255.
- 5.
“Interaction with the absorber as the mechanism of radiation”, Reviews of Modern Physics (1945). For a brief, nontechnical exposition, see R. J. Russell (2012), pp. 340–347.
- 6.
C. W. Rietdijk, “A rigorous proof of determinism derived from the special theory of relativity”, Philosophy of Science (1966). H. Putnam, “Time and physical geometry”, The Journal of Philosophy (1967).
- 7.
“On Einstein-Minkowski space-time”, The Journal of Philosophy (1968); “On relativity theory and openness of the future”, Philosophy of Science (1991).
- 8.
Time and Reality (1995), p. 167.
- 9.
Rietdijk (1966), p. 342.
- 10.
Putnam (1967), pp. 240–243 and 246. Emphases in the original.
- 11.
pp. 244–245.
- 12.
Rietdijk (1966), pp. 341 and 343.
- 13.
As a side note, K. Popper has argued that SR in fact rules out the possibility of a Laplacian demon, and hence of a physically deterministic universe, since the information necessary in order to predict an event will only be available for an observer in the event’s future. “Thus the demon of special relativity is no longer that of Laplace; for this demon, as opposed to Laplace’s, cannot predict; he can only retrodict.” See K. Popper, The Open Universe: An Argument for Indeterminism (1988), pp. 57–62.
- 14.
Stein (1991), p. 159.
- 15.
Rietdijk (1966), p. 342.
- 16.
Stein (1968), pp. 15–16.
- 17.
Stein (1968), pp. 22–23, emphases in the original.
- 18.
Stein (1968), pp. 21–22.
- 19.
Discussed by Augustine of Hippo in his De Civitate Dei, V, 9.
- 20.
W. Löffler, Einführung in die Logik (2008), pp. 216–217.
- 21.
Cf. Dorato (1995), pp. 69–70.
- 22.
Cf. Stein (1991), p. 148.
- 23.
I will use the term “hypersurface” rather than “hyperplane” for the more general case of a not necessarily flat (n-1)-dimensional surface embedded in an n-dimensional space.
- 24.
Dorato (1995), p. 131.
- 25.
pp. 137–139.
- 26.
pp. 140–145.
- 27.
pp. 148–149.
- 28.
Putnam (1967), p. 246. Emphases in the original.
- 29.
In E. J. Lowe’s words, “while an electron is one entity of a certain kind, there may apparently be no fact of the matter as to which electron an electron is and consequently nothing which ‘makes it the very electron that it is’.” See his article “Individuation”, in M. J. Loux, D. W. Zimmerman (eds.) The Oxford Handbook of Metaphysics (2003), here p. 78. Emphases in the original.
- 30.
“Eine … wesentliche Eigenschaft der Zeit ist die Auszeichnung eines Richtungssinnes; und dieser wiederum beruht darauf, dass die Zeit—und nur sie—die Dimension der Wirkungslinien ist, auf die wir ja die Raum-Zeit-Lehre aufgebaut haben. So ist die Zeit die Faserrichtung der Mannigfaltigkeit, diejenige Richtung, in der sich die Kausalketten erstrecken, während der Raum nur das Nebeneinander der Faserbündel aufnimmt. Die Richtung der Kausalketten ist zugleich die Richtung der Weltlinien von sich identisch bleibenden Dingen, die einen ausgezeichneten Spezialfall einer Kausalkette bedeuten… Die Punkte einer zeitartigen Weltlinie aber nennen wir Zustände desselben Dinges … Nun hat freilich die Lehre von der Genidentität eine Erschütterung erfahren durch die Auflösung des Substanzbegriffs… [daher] ist die Wahl der Faserung mit einer gewissen Willkür behaftet.” H. Reichenbach, Philosophie der Raum-Zeit-Lehre (1977), pp. 317–318. Emphases in the original.
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Saudek, D. (2020). The Impact of the Special Theory of Relativity on the Philosophy of Time. In: Change, the Arrow of Time, and Divine Eternity in Light of Relativity Theory. Palgrave Frontiers in Philosophy of Religion. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-38411-1_3
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