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The First Generation of National Security Exceptions: The GATT and Its Legacy

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Book cover National Security Exceptions in International Trade and Investment Agreements

Part of the book series: SpringerBriefs in Law ((BRIEFSLAW))

Abstract

Article XXI of the GATT is at the heart of the first generation of security exceptions in post-Second World War economic treaties. The GATT national security exception grants a Member State discretion to adopt trade-restrictive security measures which ‘it considers necessary for the protection of its essential security interests’. An analysis of the GATT exception’s wording, object and purpose, and drafting history, shows that such discretion was never intended to apply without limits.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    See UN Economic and Social Council, Second Session of the Preparatory Committee of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Employment, Verbatim Report, Thirty-Third Meeting of Commission A, 24 July 1947, E/PC/T/A/PV/33, 21; WTO, Analytical Index of the GATT (pre-1995), 600. Cf. also Deutscher Bundestag (2018), 6.

  2. 2.

    Bhala (1998), 268 et seq; Alexandroff and Sharma (2005), 1572.

  3. 3.

    Alexandroff and Sharma (2005), 1572.

  4. 4.

    Cf. however the GATT cases involving defenses under GATT Art. XXI in Sect. 2.3.1.

  5. 5.

    On these measures as elements of the Trump Administration’s trade policy cf. Koh (2019), 57 et seq; cf. also Sects. 2.3.2 and 2.6.

  6. 6.

    Cf. Russia—Measures Concerning Traffic in Transit, Report of the Panel (5 April 2019) WT/DS512/R.

  7. 7.

    Cf. Sect. 2.3.2.

  8. 8.

    Cf. Russia—Measures Concerning Traffic in Transit, Report of the Panel (5 April 2019) WT/DS512/R, paras 7.72 et seq. A scholar writing on the subject states that, with the Russian case, ‘Pandora’s box has been opened’, Bogdanova (2019).

  9. 9.

    For a description of these cases see Sect. 2.3.2.

  10. 10.

    Russia—Measures Concerning Traffic in Transit, Report of the Panel (5 April 2019) WT/DS512/R.

  11. 11.

    See Herdegen (2016), Chap. XIV.1. On the goals of the WTO cf. Jackson (2006), 84 et seq.

  12. 12.

    See generally Hahn (1991), 561 et seq.

  13. 13.

    Hahn (1991), 562.

  14. 14.

    Cf. Koul (2018), 341 et seq.

  15. 15.

    See generally ibid.

  16. 16.

    General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Art. XXI. For a general overview of GATT Article XXI see Matsushita et al. (2015), 548 et seq.

  17. 17.

    On the structure of the security exception see generally Hahn (1996), 285 et seq.

  18. 18.

    See Vandevelde (2017), 147.

  19. 19.

    See ibid.

  20. 20.

    Cf. Bhala (1998), 276.

  21. 21.

    See Hahn (1996), 292.

  22. 22.

    Ibid.

  23. 23.

    See generally Herrmann et al. (2007), 349 et seq.

  24. 24.

    Charter of the United Nations (adopted 26 June 1945, entered into force 24 October 1945) Art. 103.

  25. 25.

    van den Bossche (2008), 669.

  26. 26.

    See Bhala (1998), 267.

  27. 27.

    See Hahn (1996), 294.

  28. 28.

    General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Art. XXI(b)(i)-(iii).

  29. 29.

    Russia—Measures Concerning Traffic in Transit, Report of the Panel (5 April 2019) WT/DS512/R, para 7.72.

  30. 30.

    Herdegen (2019), § 34 para 23 and § 56 paras 4 et seq. Cf. also Glöckle (2019), 659; Slawotsky (2018), 233. For a detailed analysis of cyber-warfare in international law see Schulze (2015), 7 et seq.

  31. 31.

    On these two categories cf. Hahn (1996), 345 et seq.

  32. 32.

    Russia—Measures Concerning Traffic in Transit, Report of the Panel (5 April 2019) WT/DS512/R, para 7.72.

  33. 33.

    See Hahn (1996), 350 et seq.

  34. 34.

    Ibid., 349.

  35. 35.

    Russia—Measures Concerning Traffic in Transit, Report of the Panel (5 April 2019) WT/DS512/R, para 7.74.

  36. 36.

    General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Art. XXI(b).

  37. 37.

    Cf. Sects. 2.4 and 2.5.

  38. 38.

    Hahn (1996), 295.

  39. 39.

    Ibid., 295 et seq.

  40. 40.

    Cf. ibid., 297. The essentiality requirement has also been discussed in the context of investment arbitral proceedings, cf. Deutsche Telekom AG v India, Interim Award (13 December 2017) PCA Case No. 2014-10, para 236.

  41. 41.

    Charter of the United Nations (adopted 26 June 1945, entered into force 24 October 1945) Art. 2(4). For this interpretation of Art. XXI(b) of the GATT see Hahn (1996), 297.

  42. 42.

    See already the statement of the delegate of the United States, JM Leddy, UN Economic and Social Council, Second Session of the Preparatory Committee of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Employment, Verbatim Report, Thirty-Third Meeting of Commission A (24 July 1947) E/PC/T/A/PV/33, 20 et seq. Cf. also Hahn (1996), 295 et seq.

  43. 43.

    Cf. Russia—Measures Concerning Traffic in Transit, Report of the Panel (5 April 2019) WT/DS512/R, para 7.75.

  44. 44.

    See Desierto (2012), 146.

  45. 45.

    Ibid. Cf. also Lee (2018), 301–2 (arguing that GATT Article XXI could cover some ‘commercial situations’).

  46. 46.

    Desierto (2012), 146.

  47. 47.

    Cf. Hahn (1991), 560–1 and 581 (referring to the case of ‘key industries’).

  48. 48.

    Sweden sought to justify measures directed at the protection of the local footwear industry in 1975 on grounds of national security and, in 2018, the United States used the exception to justify measures protecting the national production of steel and aluminum. See Sweden—Import Restrictions on Certain Footwear, Notification by the Swedish Delegation (17 November 1975) L/4250 and United States—Certain Measures on Steel and Aluminium Products, WT/DS544, DS547, DS548, DS550, DS551, DS552, DS554, DS556 and DS564.

  49. 49.

    On the occupation see generally: Krummeich and Schröder (2004); Emmes (2019), 146 et seq.

  50. 50.

    General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Art. XIX. On the interpretation of this provision cf. WTO, WTO Analytical Index, Art. XIX.

  51. 51.

    Hahn (1996), 300 et seq.

  52. 52.

    For an overview see Alexandroff and Sharma (2005), 1574 et seq; Pelc (2016), 101 et seq; Hahn (1996), 319–342; Mavroidis (2005), 214–223. For a detailed presentation of these cases (discussed below) see WTO, Analytical Index of the GATT (pre-1995), Art. XXI (at 600 et seq).

  53. 53.

    Cf. generally the discussion of pre-WTO State practice in Alford (2011), 706 et seq (focusing on GATT practice).

  54. 54.

    GATT Contracting Parties, Third Session, Summary Record of the 22nd Meeting (8 June 1949) CP.3/SR22—II/28, wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/gatt_e/49expres.pdf, accessed 1 September 2019.

  55. 55.

    Ibid., 3. Cf. also GATT, CP.3/SR.22, Corr 1, both quoted in WTO, Analytical Index of the GATT (pre-1995), 600.

  56. 56.

    Communication to the Members of the GATT Council (1982).

  57. 57.

    WTO, Analytical Index of the GATT (pre-1995), 600 (citing the statements of the ECC, Canada, Australia, the US, and Argentina).

  58. 58.

    Cf. ibid.

  59. 59.

    GATT Council, Minutes of the Meeting of 07 May 1982, C/M/157, 10.

  60. 60.

    GATT Council, Minutes of the Meeting of 29–30 June 1982, C/M/159, 19.

  61. 61.

    United States—Trade Measures affecting Nicaragua, Report of the Panel (13 October 1986) L/6053 (not adopted).

  62. 62.

    Ibid., paras 3.1 et seq.

  63. 63.

    Cf. ibid., para 4.1.

  64. 64.

    United States—Trade Measures affecting Nicaragua, Communication from Nicaragua (8 May 1985) L/5802; GATT Council, Minutes of the Meeting of 17–19 July 1985, C/M/191, 43; see also WTO, Analytical Index of the GATT (pre-1995), 603.

  65. 65.

    GATT Council, Minutes of the Meeting of 12 March 1986, C/M/196, 7.

  66. 66.

    United States—Trade Measures affecting Nicaragua, Report of the Panel (13 October 1986) L/6053 (not adopted), para 5.3.

  67. 67.

    Cf. Sweden—Import Restrictions on Certain Footwear, Notification by the Swedish Delegation (17 November 1975) L/4250.

  68. 68.

    Ibid.

  69. 69.

    Alexandroff and Sharma (2005), 1574.

  70. 70.

    Cf. Communication to the Members of the GATT Council (1982).

  71. 71.

    Cf. GATT Council, Minutes of the Meeting of 12 March 1986, C/M/196, 7.

  72. 72.

    Cf. GATT, Minutes of the Meeting held in the Centre William Rappard on 18 March 1992, C/M/255 (10 April 1992).

  73. 73.

    Ibid., 14–18.

  74. 74.

    Ibid. Cf. also Mavroidis (2012), 374.

  75. 75.

    For a critical discussion of the expectations about the role of the WTO cf. Goldsmith and Posner (2005) 158 et seq.

  76. 76.

    Fukuyama (1989). Cf. also Fukuyama (1992), xi et seq. In a recent publication, Fukuyama reflects on his own approach in light of the present-day political reality: Fukuyama (2018) xii et seq.

  77. 77.

    United States—The Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act, Request for the Establishment of a Panel by the European Communities (8 October 1996) WT/DS38/2.

  78. 78.

    Sanger (1997); Alexandroff and Sharma (2005), 1576.

  79. 79.

    United States—The Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act, Constitution of the Panel Established at the Request of the European Communities (20 February 1997) WT/DS38/3. On the debate cf. Spagnole (1998), 1313 et seq.

  80. 80.

    United States—The Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act, Communication from the Chairman of the Panel (25 April 1997) WT/DS38/5.

  81. 81.

    Alford (2011), 758. See also Lindsay (2003), 1312.

  82. 82.

    Russia—Measures Concerning Traffic in Transit of Ukrainian Products, Request for Consultations by Ukraine (21 September 2016) WT/DS512/1, G/L/1151; Russia—Measures Concerning Traffic in Transit of Ukrainian Products, Constitution of the Panel Established at the Request of Ukraine (7 June 2017) WT/DS512/4. On this rupture with the restrictive use of the security exception see Glöckle (2019), 653–654.

  83. 83.

    Russia—Measures Concerning Traffic in Transit, Report of the Panel (5 April 2019) WT/DS512/R, paras 7.1 et seq.

  84. 84.

    Ibid., paras 7.5 et seq.

  85. 85.

    Ibid., paras 7.3 et seq.

  86. 86.

    Ibid., para 7.4.

  87. 87.

    Ibid., para 3.2.

  88. 88.

    Ibid., para 7.33.

  89. 89.

    That is: Australia, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, the European Union, India, Japan, Korea, Moldova, Norway, Paraguay, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Turkey, and the United States (ibid., para 1.6).

  90. 90.

    Russia—Measures Concerning Traffic in Transit of Ukrainian Products, WT/DS512, Third Party Executive Summary of the United States of America (27 February 2018); cf. Russia—Measures Concerning Traffic in Transit, Report of the Panel (5 April 2019) WT/DS512/R, paras 7.51 et seq.

  91. 91.

    Russia—Measures Concerning Traffic in Transit, Report of the Panel (5 April 2019) WT/DS512/R, paras 7.35 et seq; see also the submissions of Australia and the European Union: Russia—Measures Concerning Traffic in Transit of Ukrainian Products, WT/DS512, Third Party Written Submission of the European Union (8 November 2017); Russia—Measures Concerning Traffic in Transit of Ukrainian Products, WT/DS512, Third Party Oral Statement by the European Union (25 January 2018); Russia—Measures Concerning Traffic in Transit of Ukrainian Products, WT/DS512, Third Party Oral Statement of Australia (25 January 2018).

  92. 92.

    Russia—Measures Concerning Traffic in Transit, Report of the Panel (5 April 2019) WT/DS512/R, para 8.1(a)(i).

  93. 93.

    Ibid., para 8.2.

  94. 94.

    Ibid., paras 7.53 et seq. On the significance of the Panel report see also Glöckle (2019), 652, 655 and 658–659.

  95. 95.

    For example: Ukraine—Measures Relating to Trade in Goods and Services, WT/DS525; United Arab Emirates—Measures Relating to Trade in Goods and Services, and Trade Related Aspects of IP Rights, WT/DS526; United States—Certain Measures on Steel and Aluminium Products, WT/DS544, DS547, DS548, DS550, DS551, DS552, DS554, DS556 and DS564; Russia—Measures on the Importation of Live Pigs, Pork and Other Pig Products from the European Union, WT/DS475.

  96. 96.

    United States—Steel and Aluminium Products, DS544 (China), DS547 (India), DS548 (European Union), DS550 (Canada), DS551 (Mexico), DS552 (Norway), DS554 (Russian Federation), DS556 (Switzerland) and DS564 (Turkey).

  97. 97.

    For instance, China was joined by Bahrain, Brazil, Canada, Colombia, Egypt, the European Union, Guatemala, Hong Kong, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Japan, Kazakhstan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Norway, Qatar, Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, South Africa, Switzerland, Chinese Taipei, Thailand, Turkey, Ukraine, and Venezuela. See United States—Certain Measures on Steel and Aluminium Products, WT/DS544, case overview, wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds544_e.htm, accessed 1 September 2019.

  98. 98.

    See United States—Certain Measures on Steel and Aluminium Products, Request for the Establishment of a Panel by China (19 October 2018) WT/DS544/8.

  99. 99.

    Cf., for example, United States—Certain Measures on Steel and Aluminium Products, Communication from the United States (13 April 2018) WT/DS544/2.

  100. 100.

    Ibid.

  101. 101.

    For an overview of ongoing disputes involving the GATT security exception see Voon (2019), 46 et seq.

  102. 102.

    Charnovitz (2018), Lester (2018), Weiler (2018).

  103. 103.

    Cf. also the analysis of these two questions with regard to investment treaties in Sects. 3.2.2 and 3.2.3.

  104. 104.

    For some indicative examples see Alford (2011), 697 et seq; Bhala (1998), 268 et seq; Burke-White and von Staden (2008), 376 et seq. Cf. also Russia—Measures Concerning Traffic in Transit of Ukrainian Products, WT/DS512, Third Party Executive Summary of the United States of America (27 February 2018); CC/Devas (Mauritius) Ltd., Devas Employees Mauritius Private Limited, Telecom Devas Mauritius Limited, Award (25 July 2016) PCA Case No. 2013-09, para 219 n 286.

  105. 105.

    See generally: Schloemann and Ohlhoff (1999), 431 et seq. Cf. also the discussion in Anuradha (2018), 313 et seq.

  106. 106.

    See Sect. 2.5.

  107. 107.

    Russia—Measures Concerning Traffic in Transit, Report of the Panel (5 April 2019) WT/DS512/R, para 7.80. In Russia—Measures Concerning Traffic in Transit, the Panel reached this conclusion based on an in-depth analysis of subsequent practice, which was attached as an Appendix to the Report. Cf. Russia—Measures Concerning Traffic in Transit, Report of the Panel (5 April 2019) WT/DS512/R, 106 et seq (‘Appendix—Subsequent Conduct Concerning Article XXI of the GATT 1947’).

  108. 108.

    Balan (2018), 2.

  109. 109.

    Balan (2018), 5.

  110. 110.

    On the drafting history of GATT Articles XX and XXI see WTO, Analytical Index of the GATT (pre-1995), 608.

  111. 111.

    For an overview cf. Mavroidis (2012), 84.

  112. 112.

    United States—Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, Report of the Panel (7 November 1989) L/6439-36S/345, para 5.9.

  113. 113.

    On the structure of exceptions and the determination of the burden of proof see Benzing (2010), 644 et seq (particularly analyzing the WTO Agreement).

  114. 114.

    See Russia—Measures Concerning Traffic in Transit of Ukrainian Products, WT/DS512, Third Party Written Submission of the European Union (8 November 2017) 4.

  115. 115.

    Second Session of the Preparatory Committee of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Employment, Verbatim Report, Thirty-Third Meeting (24 July 1947) E/PC/T/A/PV/33, 26 et seq.

  116. 116.

    Cf. GATT Arts. XXII and XXIII.

  117. 117.

    GATT Art. XXII(1) (emphasis added).

  118. 118.

    Cf. GATT Art. XXIII.

  119. 119.

    ‘Decision Concerning Article XXI of the General Agreement’ (2 December 1982) L/5426.

  120. 120.

    The complaint was however finally rejected. GATT/CP.3/SR.22, 9, quoted from WTO, Analytical Index of the GATT (pre-1995), 606. Cf. also the presentation of GATT dispute settlement practice in Sect. 2.3.1.

  121. 121.

    On GATT practice cf. Sect. 2.3.1.

  122. 122.

    Russia—Measures Concerning Traffic in Transit of Ukrainian Products, WT/DS512, Third Party Written Submission of the European Union (8 November 2017), paras 15–16. See also the EU’s emphasis on the difference between the case and the terms of reference of a previous dispute, referred to by the Russian Federation (at 4, para 17). Cf. United States—Trade Measures affecting Nicaragua, Report of the Panel (13 October 1986) L/6053 (not adopted), para 5.3.

  123. 123.

    Russia—Measures Concerning Traffic in Transit of Ukrainian Products, WT/DS512, Third Party Written Submission of the European Union (8 November 2017), paras 15–16.

  124. 124.

    Article 7(1) DSU.

  125. 125.

    Russia—Measures Concerning Traffic in Transit, Report of the Panel (5 April 2019) WT/DS512/R, para 7.53.

  126. 126.

    Ibid., para 7.56.

  127. 127.

    Section 3.1 presents and discusses these decisions in more detail. It must be noted, however, that the ICJ has so far analyzed FCN treaties using a language different to the GATT.

  128. 128.

    Sempra Energy International v. Argentina, Award (28 September 2007) ICSID Case No. ARB/02/16, para 384.

  129. 129.

    Russia—Measures Concerning Traffic in Transit of Ukrainian Products, WT/DS512, Third Party Executive Summary of the United States of America (27 February 2018), para 7.59.

  130. 130.

    For a discussion of the peculiarities of Article XXI cf. Pelc (2016), 93 et seq (following, however, a different approach as to the justiciability of the security exception).

  131. 131.

    Cf. Desierto (2012), 161–163.

  132. 132.

    Cf. Vandevelde (2017), 509.

  133. 133.

    US Department of State, Preliminary Draft—Charter for the International Trade Organization of the United Nations, As Drafted at the London Meeting October 15–November 26, 1946, by the Preparatory Committee of the International Conference on Trade and Employment, 31, Art. 37 lit. c, d and e. For an overview of the drafting history of GATT Article XXI cf. Hahn (1996), 311–319.

  134. 134.

    US Department of State, Preliminary Draft—Charter for the International Trade Organization of the United Nations, As Drafted at the London Meeting October 15–November 26, 1946, by the Preparatory Committee of the International Conference on Trade and Employment, 31, Art. 37 lit. c, d and e. On the London Draft see generally Wilcox (1947), 529 et seq.

  135. 135.

    US Department of State, Preliminary Draft—Charter for the International Trade Organization of the United Nations, As Drafted at the London Meeting October 15–November 26, 1946, by the Preparatory Committee of the International Conference on Trade and Employment, 31, Art. 37 lit. c, d and e.

  136. 136.

    For an analysis of the difference between Article XX and Article XXI of the GATT cf. Pelc (2016), 93 et seq (discussing the chapeau of GATT Article XX at 129–133, but arguing at 122 that Article XXI is ‘not actionable’).

  137. 137.

    Cf. van den Bossche (2008), 620–621; Koul AK (2018), 343.

  138. 138.

    Cf. van den Bossche (2008), 620–621. The chapeau of Article XX reads as follows: ‘Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on international trade, nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by any contracting party of measures […]’. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Article XX.

  139. 139.

    GATT Art. XX. For a detailed study of the chapeau of GATT Art. XX see Bartels (2015), 95 et seq.

  140. 140.

    United States—Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, Report of the Appellate Body (12 October 1998) WT/DS58/AB/R, para 158.

  141. 141.

    Ibid., para 159.

  142. 142.

    General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Art. XXI(b) (emphasis added).

  143. 143.

    Russia—Measures Concerning Traffic in Transit of Ukrainian Products, WT/DS512, Third Party Executive Summary of the United States of America (27 February 2018) 1.

  144. 144.

    China—Measures Related to the Exportation of Various Raw Materials, Reports of the Panel (5 July 2011) WT/DS394/R, WT/DS395/R, WT/DS398/R, para 7.276.

  145. 145.

    GATT Art. XI:2(a).

  146. 146.

    China—Measures Related to the Exportation of Various Raw Materials, Reports of the Panel (5 July 2011) WT/DS394/R, WT/DS395/R, WT/DS398/R, para 7.276.

  147. 147.

    Ibid.

  148. 148.

    Ibid. See also the request of the European Union to remove any reference to Art. XXI of the GATT from the Panel Report, ibid. para 6.22.

  149. 149.

    GATT Art. XXI(b) (emphasis added).

  150. 150.

    For an overview of the structure of GATT Article XXI(b) cf. Berrisch (2003), 156–158.

  151. 151.

    For an author considering this aspect of the GATT security exception prior to the Panel Report in Russia—Traffic in Transit cf. Mendenhall (2012), 316.

  152. 152.

    Russia—Measures Concerning Traffic in Transit, Report of the Panel (5 April 2019) WT/DS512/R, paras 7.62–7.82.

  153. 153.

    Ibid., para 7.82.

  154. 154.

    Balan (2018), 15.

  155. 155.

    Russia—Measures Concerning Traffic in Transit, Report of the Panel (5 April 2019) WT/DS512/R, para 7.65.

  156. 156.

    For a brief commentary cf. Bogdanova (2019).

  157. 157.

    Russia—Measures Concerning Traffic in Transit, Report of the Panel (5 April 2019) WT/DS512/R, para 7.70 et seq.

  158. 158.

    Ibid., paras 7.70–7.71.

  159. 159.

    Ibid., paras 7.66 et seq. For a critical analysis of this aspect of the Panel Report see Glöckle (2019), 655 et seq.

  160. 160.

    Russia—Measures Concerning Traffic in Transit, Report of the Panel (5 April 2019) WT/DS512/R, para 7.77.

  161. 161.

    Schill and Briese (2009), 120 et seq, in particular 137; Balan (2018), 10. In its third party submission in Russia—Traffic in Transit, the Australian Government formulated an slightly different standard of review: ‘Rather, a panel is both empowered and required to assess whether the invoking Member in fact considered that action to be necessary; and whether that (necessary) action was in fact taken ‘for the protection of’ a Member's essential security interests.’, Russia—Measures Concerning Traffic in Transit of Ukrainian Products, WT/DS512, Third Party Oral Statement of Australia (25 January 2018), para 22 (emphasis in original).

  162. 162.

    Balan (2018), 15–16.

  163. 163.

    Cf. the discussion in Russia—Measures Concerning Traffic in Transit, Report of the Panel (5 April 2019) WT/DS512/R, para 7.63. Cf. also: Balan (2018), 15; Hahn (1996), 294.

  164. 164.

    Russia—Measures Concerning Traffic in Transit, Report of the Panel (5 April 2019) WT/DS512/R, para 7.131.

  165. 165.

    Ibid., para 7.132.

  166. 166.

    Ibid., paras 7.132–7.33. On the relevance of good faith for the interpretation of treaties see generally Kolb (2017), 62 et seq.

  167. 167.

    Cf. Case Concerning Certain Questions of Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, Djibouti v France, Judgment (4 June 2008) [2008] ICJ Rep 177, 229. In that case, the ICJ discussed the standard of review applicable under a Convention on Mutual Assistance signed between France and Djibouti in 1986, which provided that a State ‘may refuse a request for mutual assistance if it considers that execution of the request is likely to prejudice sovereignty, […] security, […] ordre public or other […] essential interests’ (Art. 2, cited by the ICJ at 192, para 28). The Court (at 229, para 145) held that the State’s discretion under such provision was in any case subject to the requirement of good faith (‘[W]hile it is correct, as France claims, that the terms of Article 2 provide a State to which a request for assistance has been made with a very considerable discretion, this exercise of discretion is still subject to the obligation of good faith codified in Article 26 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. […] This requires it to be shown that the reasons for refusal to execute the letter rogatory fell within those allowed for in Article 2. […] The Court will examine all of these elements’). For an author discussing this case in connection with Article XXI of the GATT see Balan (2018), 17.

  168. 168.

    Cf. LG&E Energy Corp. et al. v Argentina, Decision on Liability (3 October 2006) ICSID Case No. ARB/02/1, para 214 (stating, in reference to Article XI of the Argentina-US BIT, that ‘[w]ere the Tribunal to conclude that the provision is self-judging, Argentina’s determination would be subject to a good faith review anyway’). For an author analyzing the good faith requirement in detail see Eisenhut (2010), 462–4.

  169. 169.

    Following the analysis of Stephan Schill and Robyn Briese, this includes the following questions: ‘[W]hether the factual basis of its decision was adequate and properly investigated, whether the appreciation of the governing legal framework was correct, whether the State abided by the proper procedure and whether it was guided in the exercise of discretion by relevant and pertinent considerations in view of the purpose of the treaty in question.’, Schill and Briese (2009), 137.

  170. 170.

    Russia—Measures Concerning Traffic in Transit, Report of the Panel (5 April 2019) WT/DS512/R, para 7.134 et seq.

  171. 171.

    On this balance cf. also Sect. 2.5. Cf. also Glöckle (2019), 658.

  172. 172.

    Bhala (1998), 269 et seq.

  173. 173.

    Cf. WTO, ‘Principles of the trading system’, Understanding the WTO, wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact2_e.htm, accessed 1 September 2019.

  174. 174.

    Russia—Measures Concerning Traffic in Transit, Report of the Panel (5 April 2019) WT/DS512/R, para 7.130.

  175. 175.

    CC/Devas (Mauritius) Ltd., Devas Employees Mauritius Private Ltd. and Telecom Devas Mauritius Ltd. v India, Award on Jurisdiction and Merits (25 July 2016) PCA Case No. 2013-09, para 245. Cf. also the discussion in Sect. 3.2.3.2.

  176. 176.

    Cf. the discussion in CC/Devas (Mauritius) Ltd., Devas Employees Mauritius Private Ltd. and Telecom Devas Mauritius Ltd. v India, Award on Jurisdiction and Merits (25 July 2016) PCA Case No. 2013-09, para 245. Cf. also Sect. 3.2.3.2.

  177. 177.

    There is some controversy as regards to the intention of the treaty drafters. Thus, the United States’ third-party submission in Russia—Measures Concerning Traffic in Transit (arguing in favor of a completely deferential standard of review) heavily relies on the historical understanding and the drafting history of the essential security clause. See Russia—Measures Concerning Traffic in Transit of Ukrainian Products, WT/DS512, Third Party Executive Summary of the United States of America (27 February 2018) 2 et seq.

  178. 178.

    Cf. Russia—Measures Concerning Traffic in Transit, Report of the Panel (5 April 2019) WT/DS512/R, paras 7.96 et seq.

  179. 179.

    Cf. Vandevelde (2017), 145 et seq (addressing the drafting history of the security exception of the ITO Charter under the suggestive heading ‘the cold war comes to Geneva’).

  180. 180.

    Goldstein (1998), 36–37.

  181. 181.

    Ibid., 37.

  182. 182.

    For an overview of the drafting history of GATT Art. XXI cf. Pelc (2016), 95 et seq; Hahn (1996), 311 et seq.

  183. 183.

    Vandevelde (2017), 509 et seq.

  184. 184.

    Ibid., 510.

  185. 185.

    Ibid.

  186. 186.

    Ibid.

  187. 187.

    Cf. Statement of the delegate of the United States, JM Leddy, UN Economic and Social Council, Second Session of the Preparatory Committee of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Employment, Verbatim Report, Thirty-Third Meeting of Commission A (24 July 1947) E/PC/T/A/PV/33, 21.

  188. 188.

    Ibid, 20. For a discussion of this statement cf. Loewenfeld (2008), 917.

  189. 189.

    Statement of the delegate of the United States, JM Leddy, UN Economic and Social Council, Second Session of the Preparatory Committee of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Employment, Verbatim Report, Thirty-Third Meeting of Commission A (24 July 1947) E/PC/T/A/PV/33, 21.

  190. 190.

    For an author ascribing Article XXI of the GATT a self-judging character see Alford (2011), 702 et seq.

  191. 191.

    Bhala (1998), 270 et seq. Bhala admits that there is still some risk of abuse (at 275 et seq).

  192. 192.

    Alford (2011), 758. Cf. also Lindsay (2003), 1310–1313, particularly at 1312.

  193. 193.

    The mainstream view seems to have turned from optimism to pessimism. Cf. Koh (2019), 57 et seq. See also Voon (2019), 47–48 (specifically discussing Roger Alford’s views from a present-day perspective at 47). On the discussion see also the analysis of the German Federal Parliament’s Research Service, Deutscher Bundestag (2018), 4 et seq (also discussing Alford’s views at para 7).

  194. 194.

    Cf. Sects. 3.2.2 and 3.2.3.

  195. 195.

    Cf. Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Energie, Kleine Anfrage der Abgeordneten Alexander Kulitz, Michael Theurer, Grigorios Aggelidis, weiterer Abgeordneter und der Fraktion der FDP betr.: Position der Bundesregierung zu den WTO-Reformen, BT Drucksache 19/11/11481 (6 August 2019), 8.

  196. 196.

    Cf. Sect. 2.5.

  197. 197.

    Cf. ibid.

  198. 198.

    Cf. ibid.

  199. 199.

    See ibid.

  200. 200.

    Cf. Russia—Measures Concerning Traffic in Transit of Ukrainian Products, WT/DS512, Third Party Written Submission of the European Union (8 November 2017); Balan (2018), Desierto (2012), 227; Schill and Briese (2009), 106 et seq.

  201. 201.

    Cf. Sect. 2.5.

  202. 202.

    On deference cf. also Sects. 3.2.3.2 (focusing on investment law) and Chap. 5

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    Sebastián Mantilla Blanco

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    Alexander Pehl

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Mantilla Blanco, S., Pehl, A. (2020). The First Generation of National Security Exceptions: The GATT and Its Legacy. In: National Security Exceptions in International Trade and Investment Agreements. SpringerBriefs in Law. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-38125-7_2

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