Abstract
In light of the emerging threat of powerful quantum computers appearing in the near future, we investigate the potential attacks on Bitcoin available to a quantum-capable adversary. In particular, we illustrate how Shor’s quantum algorithm can be used to forge ECDSA based signatures, allowing attackers to hijack transactions. We then propose a simple commit–delay–reveal protocol, which allows users to securely move their funds from non-quantum-resistant outputs to those adhering to a quantum-resistant digital signature scheme. In a previous paper (Stewart et al. R. Soc. Open Sci. 5(6), 180410 (2018)) [1] we presented a similar scheme with a long fixed delay. Here we improve on our previous work, by allowing each user to choose their preferred delay–long for a low risk of attack, or short if a higher risk is acceptable to that user. As before, our scheme requires modifications to the Bitcoin protocol, but once again these can be implemented as a soft fork.
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- 1.
The ECDLP is intractable only in specific groups, like the one used in Bitcoin.
- 2.
Qubits are the equivalent of bits for QCs.
- 3.
Consuming an UTXO secured by pk necessarily reveals pk in order to verify the signature.
- 4.
Opcodes are used in challenge scripts to perform any operations such as: hashing, signature verification, addition, etc. There are several unused opcodes reserved for extending the capabilities of challenge scripts.
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Ilie, D.I., Knottenbelt, W.J., Stewart, I.D. (2020). Committing to Quantum Resistance, Better: A Speed-and-Risk-Configurable Defence for Bitcoin Against a Fast Quantum Computing Attack. In: Pardalos, P., Kotsireas, I., Guo, Y., Knottenbelt, W. (eds) Mathematical Research for Blockchain Economy. Springer Proceedings in Business and Economics. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-37110-4_9
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