Religious Movements Among the Turks in Belgium

Abstract

This chapter examines Islamic movements and their organizations and activities among Turkish populations in Belgium. The groups being studied are as follows: the Diyanet, Milli Görüş, the Süleymanlıs, the Nurcu Movement, the Gülen Movement, the Menzil Brotherhood, Shiism, and the Alevis. The chapter also includes the Ülkücü Movement, which engages with religious activities, although the movement is not a religious one. The chapter explains how these Islamic organizations mobilize Muslim communities by clarifying their historical trajectories and geographic and temporal variations in Brussels, Wallonia, and Flanders. All these organizations are nonprofit associations. These movements play roles in the organization of prayers and rituals. They also engage in convergent and divergent religious activities such as the founding of mosques, schools, youth and women’s education, and the propagation of Islamic mysticism.

The Diyanet

The Diyanet is the largest religious organization among the Turks in Belgium, in terms of both participation and the space it occupies. Its mobilization is concerned with a social and cultural geography which is far vaster than other religious groups. It is necessary to focus on three distinct aspects in order to present and understand the Diyanet: the formation of the Diyanet as a religious authority among the Turks, its organization in Belgium, and the types of religious, social, and cultural activities in which the Diyanet engages.

The Formation of the Diyanet as a Religious Authority Among the Turks

The Diyanet (known also as the Presidency of Religious Affairs or Directorate for Religious Affairs) is a religious institution founded in 1924 in the Republic of Turkey. It was established as a religious and administrative authority during a period when Turkey was increasingly secular,¹ modern, and nationalistic following the dissolution of the Ottoman empire (1922) and abolition of the Muslim caliphate (1924). The roots of this religious authority, however, go back to the Seljuq and Ottoman empires founded by Turkish dynasties. The formation of these states was accompanied by the constitution of the religious authority. The Sheikh al-Islam (şeyhülislâm), responsible for issuing religious fatwas (legal advice in the strict sense), constituted the highest religious authority in the Ottoman era.² His role was reconsidered once the Ottomans obtained the title of caliphate in 1517, as the sultan had held both temporal and religious power. Sultan Mahmud II established an administrative unit entitled Evkâf-ı Hümâyun Nezâreti in 1826 to control the religious foundations (vakıf in Turkish or waqf in Arabic). Thus, a similar religious authority preexisted, but neither its function nor the context were completely identical. In 1920, the last public institution (Şeriye ve Evkâf Vekâleti) to precede the Diyanet was established to carry out the Sheikh al-Islam’s functions and manage the affairs of the various religious groups.

The political modernization movement, which occurred after the fall of the Ottoman empire, reduced the sphere of religious authority. The political reforms introduced by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk reorganized religious affairs and leadership structure. The Diyanet was established in this context. It fulfilled two core functions. The first function was strictly linked to the secularization of the state.³ The new Turkish state created a body in charge of religious affairs in order to ensure secularization on the political level. Its second function was to control religion socially, so that the Turkish state could create a homogenous nation.

The 1961 constitution defined the Presidency of Religious Affairs (Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı) as a constitutional institution.⁴ A law concerning the Diyanet from 1965 provided a legal definition of this authority: “to exercise the functions concerning the prayers, rituals and morale of Islam, educate the society on the religion as well as manage the prayer sites.”⁵

The Presidency of Religious Affairs took on a trans-regional character for the first time through a ministerial commission decree in 1978, when the Diyanet introduced ten posts responsible for religious services.⁶ This led to the creation of Diyanet branches outside of Turkey.⁷ Today it is present in 113 countries around the world, one of which is Belgium, the focus of this study.

The Organization of the Diyanet in Belgium

The Diyanet in Belgium should not be thought of as a simple extension of the Diyanet in Turkey. Its importance and jurisdiction are not exactly the same: almost all the mosques are under its control in Turkey, while in Belgium only half the Turkish mosques are affiliated with the Diyanet. This difference mainly arises from the fact that the Diyanet is a formal government institution, thus enjoying a special status in Turkey as part of the state. The foundation of the Diyanet in Belgium was in 1982, and approved through a decree issued by the Kingdom of Belgium.⁸ Its legal statute is part of the laws relating to international associations and unions which date from 1919 and 1954.⁹

The Diyanet is formally structured as a bureaucratic organization, chaired by Coşkun Beyazgül (a bureaucrat with knowledge of Islamic theology), and divided into several hierarchical units: at the top one can find the general committee, beneath this is the board of directors as well as the board of control. All of these councils are composed of several members or officials. Coşkun Beyazgül served as president of the Muslim Executive of Belgium between 2005 and 2008. He is also spokesperson for the Coordinating Council of Islamic Institutions of Belgium (Conseil de Coordination des Institutions Islamiques de Belgique, CIB).¹⁰

The foundation looks after religious, social, and cultural affairs, particularly among the Turks (Muslims from other countries can also benefit from certain services, especially prayers in the mosques). The Diyanet follows a Hanafi Sunni doctrine and Islamic school of law. It groups no fewer than sixty-seven mosques,¹¹ and the number of official members is approximately 28,000 people.¹² It comes into contact with at least 5000 young people through religious and vernacular courses organized by associations and mosques.¹³ All these services and activities benefit at least 100,000 people. The reader might wonder what this number signifies. Indeed, it would be wrong to talk of a permanent commitment of all these individuals, even if a portion of them are regularly involved in the organization and work processes. Nonetheless, this vast zone of influence allows the Diyanet to build popular legitimacy.

The map in Fig. 2.1 showcases the geographic distribution of the mosques affiliated with the two major Islamic and Turkish schemes (the Diyanet and the BIF or Islamic Federation of Belgium). Four mosques are affiliated with the Diyanet in Brussels (two in Schaerbeek, one in Molenbeek, and the other in Anderlecht), twenty-two in Wallonia, and close to thirty-five mosques in Flanders.

Fig. 2.1

Geographic distribution of mosques affiliated with the Diyanet and the BIF in Belgium

What are the Diyanet’s sources of legitimacy? First, it is a state-owned and constitutional institution in Turkey. In the eyes of the Turkish community, this undoubtedly enhances its credibility. Since the Diyanet is popular and familiar as a state-owned institution, its legitimacy partly corresponds to Niklas Luhmann’s concept of the confidence factor.¹⁴ This legitimacy has limits, like every source of authority. In the case of the Diyanet, its source of legitimacy is also sometimes a source of weakness. A religious institution whose legitimacy originates from the state can drive some people to seek an independent source of authority. This may explain why the Diyanet is a major player in the religious field in Turkey and Europe, but its authority is limited, especially since there are numerous other Muslim movements which represent diverse confessional and socio-cultural characteristics, as well as competitions or complementarities between groups.

A second source of legitimacy should be sought within a historical framework. In fact, the Diyanet, which is now a historic institution, went through several stages before it was recognized as a new formal institution during the republican era. Administrative and bureaucratic institutions take time to develop, just as legitimacy and authority do (except charismatic individual authorities). As long as the institutions function, their temporal duration becomes a source of power, legitimacy, and legacy. The legacy of the past is the accumulation of knowledge, the development of a structure which organizes the present and the future. The fact that the Diyanet is a historic institution, especially in the religious field, validates it in people’s minds.

The Types of Religious, Social, and Cultural Activities in Which the Diyanet Engages

The Diyanet has a vast repertoire of activities¹⁵ regarding religious, social, and cultural fields. One of its primary functions concerns religious services, which are carried out and organized in the local mosque. I will later detail these religious practices in the mosque, which play a central role in the mobilization of most religious movements. The management of certain activities and affairs is first and foremost a matter of administrative and bureaucratic management. Indeed, the institution contributes to the construction of mosques, manages them, and designates and pays the salaries of the imams, whose fundamental service is the organization of prayer, one of the duties required to be performed by Muslims five times a day.

A secondary function of the Diyanet is organizing the pilgrimage (Hac organizasyonu) to Mecca. According to Muslim belief, each person is obliged to make the pilgrimage once in their lifetime, provided they have the necessary resources. The Diyanet manages trips to Mecca during the festive period of sacrifice (kurban bayramı in Turkish; al-Eid al-Kabîr, also known as Eid al-Adha in English, meaning feast of sacrifice). When this is effectuated outside the traditional period of Hac (which is pronounced Hajj in English), it is called Umre (oumra in Arabic), of which the Diyanet manages trips from Belgium to Saudi Arabia throughout the year.

Another religious service relates to the death of Muslims. The institution has a fund attributed to funerary charges (cenaze fonu) to take care of matters like burial and repatriation to the country of origin; that is, from Belgium to Turkey. To be eligible for this service, each living person pays a premium each year for their eventual death or the eventual death of their family members. In Turkey, this service is rendered free of charge to Muslim citizens; however, since the service depends on transporting the body between two continents, the Diyanet Foundation needs to raise a fund in Belgium.

Religious instruction can be described as a type of religious activity, but is not a religious practice or ritual per se. Its purpose is religious teaching, as well as training of individuals with religious knowledge or religious frameworks. The Diyanet is investing in this field, as it sends religious instructors in coordination with the education attaché to the Turkish Consulate. It has an educational institution called Houthalen Eğitim Enstititüsü, the educational institute of Houthalen. It has been managed by the Diyanet since 2013 to form religious staff and employees. The institute is inspired by the imam hatib lisesi (Turkish secondary school for becoming an imam) as a reference model. Its teachers are sent by the Diyanet from Turkey. The emergence of this institute can be explained by two factors. Muslim youths are increasingly serving as carriers of two cultures¹⁶ and two languages, whereas their parents only have one culture and language. As such, they are no longer immigrants, but Belgian Muslims. It is this new cultural situation which compelled the Diyanet to renew and adapt its institutions. Furthermore, the Belgian government increasingly requests that the training of imams be conducted in Europe so that they know the context in its cultural and linguistic dimensions. The institute of Houthalen is an example of how the religious establishment is evolving in accordance with the shifting context.

The scope of the Diyanet is not limited to religion: it also includes social and cultural activities. The latter have two aims. First, they aim to fulfill the socio-cultural requirements of Turkish and Muslim community members, while expanding the Diyanet’s sphere of influence within this community. Thus, the Diyanet provides, for example, language courses (Turkish, French, or Flemish),¹⁷ music, art, folklore or theatre courses, and so on. This method aims at a general socialization that is driven by a Muslim religious spirit.¹⁸ Secondly, there are activities aimed at an intercultural rapprochement between Muslims and non-Muslims. For example, language lessons in Turkish are available for non-Turks. Similarly, Diyanet associations invite the Belgian people to celebrations during religious feasts, and to festivities of breaking the fast at sunset (iftar) during the month of Ramadan.

Mіllі Görüş

The Formation of Milli Görüş as a Religious Movement

Milli Görüş was born in 1969 as a political movement. Its emergence should be understood within the framework of political Islam, which is linked to both Turkish and Islamic contexts in the twentieth century. The Turkish political field went through certain fundamental modifications following the end of the single-party system in 1945–1946. The Democratic Party (Demokrat Parti), a conservative liberal party close to the Islamic milieu, came to power in 1950. A military coup d’état terminated the ten-year reign of this party (1950–1960) and culminated in the execution of Prime Minister Adnan Menderes. In 1961, a newly written constitution favored the creation of new political parties. This gave rise to new actors who struggled among themselves between secularism and Islamism in the legal political field.

The global context was the Cold War (1947–1991), when the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt developed as well as Jamâʿat-i İslâmî in Pakistan. These movements impacted Islamic thought and action on a global level. It is within this context of plurality of action and ideological emulation displaying the concerns of political Islam that the movement of Milli Görüş was founded by Necmettin Erbakan. Erbakan was born in 1926 in Sinop in the north of Turkey, from a family that was not strictly pious. He studied engineering at the University of Istanbul (graduated in 1948). He went to the University of Aachen to conduct research in 1951, and worked in the factories of the Ruhr region in Germany. In his memoirs, Erbakan argued that several ideologies and parties that governed Turkey between 1946 and 1969 deceived the Turkish people; the birth of Milli Görüş was seen as a response to this disappointment,¹⁹ as the previous political parties failed to develop Islamic projects. Milli Nizam Partisi (Party of National Order), the first political party of the Milli Görüş movement, gained representation in the Turkish National Assembly in 1970. The party was dissolved after the coup d’état in 1971. Its followers founded a new party called Milli Selamet Partisi (Party of National Salvation) in 1972. The party was part of three coalition governments between 1974 and 1978 at a time when Turkey was suffering from economic crises and political violence between left- and right-wing groups. Although the military coup d’état of 1980 put an end to political parties including Milli Selamet Partisi, a new party called Refah Partisi (Welfare Party) was founded in 1983.

The Turkish political field of the 1990s was characterized by the success of Refah in the local and national elections. The party won municipalities in Ankara and Istanbul in 1994. It won a majority of seats in the national elections in 1995 and established a government of coalition with Doğru Yol Partisi (True Path Party, a liberal right-wing party) in 1996. Nonetheless, a “semi-coup d’état”²⁰ interrupted the coalition in 1997, and consequently the Turkish Constitutional Court dissolved the Welfare Party in 1998. The followers of Milli Görüş established two political parties: Fazilet (Virtue Party, founded in 1997) and Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (AKP, Justice and Development Party, founded in 2001) characterized by the leadership of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. The AKP, which has been governing Turkey since 2002, comes from the Milli Görüş movement, but does not define itself as a party of Milli Görüş. On the other hand, Fazilet Partisi resulted in a new political party named Saadet Partisi (Felicity Party) in 2001, which nowadays defines itself as the unique representative of Milli Görüş in Turkey.

The Organization of Milli Görüş in Belgium

There is an apparent gap between the establishment of the Diyanet in 1924 in Turkey and the beginning of its organization in 1982 in Belgium. This is not the case for Milli Görüş, which launched its organization in 1975 in Brussels, Antwerp, and Zolder. Milli Görüş began to mobilize in 1969 in Germany at the same time as in Turkey. Indeed, members of Milli Görüş, exiled to Europe because of the political conflicts in Turkey, quickly sought to gain a social base within the immigrant community.

Nowadays in Belgium, there are two structures affiliated with Milli Görüş. The first is the Islamic Federation of Belgium (Fédération Islamique de la Belgique in French, Belçika İslam Federasyonu in Turkish, BIF) and the second is the Saadet Partisi (SP ). Saadet Partisi is a political party founded in 2001 in Turkey.²¹ The party opened a local office in Brussels (Schaerbeek) and has about 2000 members in Belgium.²² Besim Özışık, who lives in Verviers, is the party representative. The Saadet Partisi also has branches for youth and women. Since the mosques and associations are organized and grouped under the name of the BIF, it is relevant to describe the BIF in a more detailed way.

The BIF, as a federation, is a more complex and larger organization than the Saadet Partisi . It is a part of the IGMG (Islamische Gemeinschaft Milli Görüş ), which can qualify as a confederation in Europe. The IGMG in Europe emerged as a gathering mechanism for various groups of pious workers coming together around small prayer rooms (mescid in Turkish) in the 1960s and 1970s.²³ In the 1980s, these groups formed federations that were grouped under the center of the IGMG. This organization is currently present in fourteen countries, including Belgium, with 518 mosques under its control, 17,000 employees, and 27,000 members. It is headquartered in Germany. Its bureaucratic structure is as follows. The presidency bureau (başkanlık divanı) is the decision-making organ and the highest body. It is composed of different units: a president, a secretary general, people in charge of the organization, financial affairs, youth, women’s section, and irşad (this term refers to the concept of showing the just way in Islam). Furthermore, the IGMG is committed to important missions on European and international levels (including Belgium). It has an internal aid association called Hasene International, the headquarters of which is in Cologne. It also publishes a bimonthly review titled Camia,²⁴ which contains spiritual information and covers the events and activities organized by the IGMG, or Muslims in Europe.

The BIF in Belgium has a centralized structure. It is organized as one region and is presided over by Ekrem Şeker (who graduated from an imam hatib lisesi in Turkey, and speaks both Flemish and Turkish).²⁵ Its headquarters is in Brussels and it mobilizes around mosques. The mosques or local associations constitute small units of organizations essential to the larger body. The federation oversees twenty-eight mosques and associations, as well as two schools. As the map in Fig. 2.1 shows, it manages three mosques in Brussels, ten mosques in Wallonia, and sixteen mosques in Flanders.

Types of Religious, Social, and Cultural Actions

Similar to the Diyanet, the Milli Görüş movement combines religious, social, and cultural activities. Its main activities focus on the religious sphere. Milli Görüş is committed to building mosques and nominates imams to the mosques affiliated with the BIF. Based on my observations in the field, I can report that the movement appoints imams who have already lived in Belgium or Europe more than Diyanet does.²⁶ When the mosque is recognized by the Muslim Executive, the Belgian government pays the imam’s salary.

Like the Diyanet, the BIF disposes of funeral funds which function similarly: the fund is in charge of the funeral affairs of those paying contributions to it. Likewise, the federation organizes trips for pilgrimage for those who carry out the rituals of Hac or Umre in Mecca.

Milli Görüş manages two different types of schools. The first is Virtue, an Islamic school established in Schaerbeek-Brussels in 2015. It is a “confessional teaching school,”²⁷ which had about 100 pupils in 2015. The second is the Institute of Islamic Sciences Ibn-i Sina, established in Mons near the Belgian-French border. This institute began to function as a boarding school for young women in 1991, and then progressively changed into a school for women, who are residents of Europe and older than sixteen (the two conditions of registration), to receive religious education. The school has about 160 pupils registered. The pupils in this institute all come from Europe and the ban on the headscarf in secondary schools plays a considerable role in student attendance. Moreover, the existence of this school shows the importance attributed to the role of woman within these Islamic structures, because women, as female and maternal authorities, play a role in the transmission of religious tradition and culture to the children in the family.

Lastly, the movement undertakes a set of social and cultural actions which address both Muslims and non-Muslims. The reason Milli Görüş is capable of organizing such a varied repertoire of activities lies in the fact that it is one of the oldest movements organized in Belgium or in the rest of Europe. Mobilization is indeed a question of historicity, which creates a tradition of resources. This is why the movement is able to promote social and community programs like social support to the poor, regular tourist trips in Europe and Turkey, sports and musical activities, conferences and symposiums for students, as well as Arabic, Turkish, French, and Flemish courses.

The Süleymanlıs

The Süleymanlıs (Süleymanlılar in Turkish) is an Islamic community (cemaat); its name is attributed to Süleyman Hilmi Tunahan (1888–1959). Its followers call themselves the students of Süleyman Hilmi Tunahan Efendi, or Süleyman Hilmi Tunahan Efendi’nin talebeleri. Süleyman Hilmi Tunahan was a müderris (instructor in the Islamic school), dersiâm (a title given to those who teach during the Ottoman empire, which, like müderris, does not exist anymore), and also an imam, scholar, or Muslim master (maître musulman). He was born in 1888 in Silistra (in the village of Ferhatlar/Razgrad), which was at that time part of the Ottoman empire, and is currently in Bulgaria. He was trained in Islamic sciences in the medrese (Islamic school) to become a müderris. Kemalist reforms like the law of tevhid-i tedrisat (unification of education) or the closure of medrese suppressed Islamic schools and education. The emergence of the Süleymanlıs community resembles the appearance of the Nurcu community: it was a response to the crisis and the emptiness driven by the lack of religious services and teachings. Tunahan served as imam between 1930 and 1936 in the mosque, and was later suspended from exercising this activity, but he was committed to teaching the Koran during the interdiction of religious activities. Similar to the Nurcu Movement, secrecy constituted at that time a mechanism to maintain religious practices. The government officially allowed Koranic courses in 1949 to provide Islamic teaching, which became freer during the period of Democratic Party government of 1950–1960. Thus, Süleyman Hilmi Tunahan founded the Koranic courses. The objective was to train pupils who read the Koran in Arabic script and to diffuse this teaching in society. For the Süleymanlıs, this place and principle of teaching constitute an essential way to propagate Muslim belief.

The Süleymanlıs identify themselves with the nakşibendi tradition, and more precisely with the branch derived from İmam-ı Rabbani (1564–1624). This is why the doctrines of İmam-ı Rabbani keep an essential place in their realm, structuring the tasawwuf or Muslim mysticism. Süleyman Hilmi Tunahan gave importance to the readings of Mektubat (Letters)²⁸ by İmam-ı Rabbani, which is an intellectual source to the Süleymanlıs. Within the community, people consider that Süleyman Hilmi Tunahan belongs to the filiation (silsile) of Nakşibendi as the thirty-third chain, and this filiation was closed with him. This aspect is important, because they consider those who direct the community following the death of Tunahan as administrators, who do not have the same grade or status as nakşibendi sheikhs. Upon the death of Tunahan in 1959, Kemal Kaçar (1917–2000) and Ahmet Arif Denizolgun (1955–2016) successively occupied the place of leadership. Kaçar was the husband of Tunahan’s daughter, while Denizolgun was his grandson. At present, Alihan Kuriş, an architect born in 1979 and a nephew of Denizolgun, is the head of the community. All three personalities grew up within the community and belong to the family of Tunahan. Nonetheless, this is not a religious leadership, but rather it is symbolic. The man who occupies this position of direction is the administrator of the major affairs of the community. He is especially considered as and called an opinion leader (kanaat önderi), who helps to ensure the unity of the community (such leadership status is rarely found in Western cultures). This is an example illustrating how the same person can have the status of both a manager and an opinion leader within an Islamic community.

The community of Süleymanlı has had a presence in Belgium since the 1970s. There is no official name like Süleymanlı, neither in Turkey, Belgium, nor anywhere else. In Belgium, the community is officially denominated as the Union of Islamic Cultural Centers in Belgium (Union des Centres Culturels Islamiques de Belgique, UCCIB ; Belçika İslam Kültür Merkezleri Birliği), which was established in 1979. This means that there was a certain affiliation with the Süleymanlı community within the first generation of Turkish immigrants who founded this association. The UCCIB has been mobilizing since then through cultural and educational centers and mosque networks. Like most of the associations and cultural centers established by Muslims, the UCCIB undertakes religious and cultural activities. It is involved in the religious field thanks to the services of the mosque, and the organization of courses on religion within its educational centers. These educational centers enable simultaneously the organization of courses of school support for young Belgian citizens coming from Turkey and the Balkan countries.

The essential content of religious courses consists of the teaching of the Koran. They aim to teach the reading and understanding of the Koran. In these courses, a tiny book by Süleyman Hilmi Tunahan is used. This is one of the few texts written by him and has seven pages. It presents the Arabic alphabet with a didactic technique to make learning relatively quick for beginners who initiate reading of the Koran in Arabic. This book is called a cüz (component or part a book), which one can notice any moment when a Süleymanlı milieu is visited.

The color dark blue sometimes characterizes the realm of Süleymanlıs, because in general they wear garments like cap (takke), shirt, or pants in this color. I had an opportunity to discuss with one of the followers of the Süleymanlıs the importance and signification of dark blue. It is not a question of the sacredness of the color, but rather a combination of sympathy, symbolism, esthetics, and the historical experience of this community. I was told that the wife of Süleyman Hilmi Tunahan was making dark blue velvet caps when the Turkish state repressed the Süleymanlı Movement during the republican period. It was also a time when followers lived in poverty and gradually rallied around Süleyman Hilmi Tunahan. Since then, they have preferred and admired this color. Dark blue is not the only color the Süleymanlıs wear; they also wear a white cap (beyaz takke) and green clothes, as many Muslims do.

Unlike the Diyanet and Milli Görüş, the Süleymanlıs are a decentralized organization. Though I underlined the official existence of this community as the UCCIB federation in Belgium, every cultural, educational center, or mosque established by persons affiliated with the community is not officially attached to the federation. They are administratively independent from the UCCIB. They operate locally and autonomously and not everything is managed by the UCCIB center. The mosque of Selimiye in Saint-Josse, one of the most modern mosques built according to Anatolian and Brussels architecture, is linked with the UCCIB. There are about twenty mosques and associations affiliated with the Süleymanlıs in Belgium, especially in Brussels, Antwerp, Verviers, Ghent, Beringen, and Charleroi.

The Nurcu Movement

Nurcu is a religious and social movement formed by the followers of Said-i Nursi (1876–1960) in the twentieth century in Turkey. Said-i Nursi, also referred to as Bediüzzaman, was a Muslim thinker (mütefekkir), scholar (âlim), and man of religious action. He was born in 1876 in the village of Nurs, located in the district of Hizan of Bidlis, a Kurdish province in eastern Anatolia. Two distinguishing factors influenced the life of Said-i Nursi before the emergence of the Nurcu Movement. The first set of factors was political. Bidlis was a place of war between the Ottomans and the Russians in 1878 as well as the during the First World War (1914–1918), which Said-i Nursi participated in and was taken as a prisoner of war by the Russians for two years. He also lived during the period of meşrutiyet of the Young Turks (1908–1918), which was a constitutionalist, nationalist, and authoritarian movement. The period of the Young Turks was characterized by the overthrow of the Sultan Abdülhamid regime. Said-i Nursi opposed the massacres of Armenians, since he was against most of the politics of the Young Turks. He witnessed later the dissolution of the Ottoman dynasty, the Muslim caliph, and the emergence of the Turkish Republic, which was on the way to becoming secularized by Kemalist reforms which he did not favor, but rather found preferable to a violent rebellion.

The second set of elements and changes that impacted the life of Said-i Nursi were cultural:²⁹ it was a time of long and in-depth transformation for the Muslim community, during which changes were implemented in a rapid and authoritarian manner. Indeed, the Muslim societies of the Ottoman empire were going through a crisis because of the weakening of the medrese system (namely, Islamic education) and the emergence of new ideological, Westernized, materialist, and nationalist movements, which defined the society and culture outside a religious frame. Kemalist Turkey abolished the medrese, promoted the Latin script (which replaced the Arabic alphabet), and invented a new Westernized style of dress. It is in this political and cultural context that Said-i Nursi appeared as a religious leader and the Nurcu emerged as a müceddidi movement.

Said-i Nursi was exiled from eastern Anatolia and moved to Central Anatolia following the Sheikh Said rebellion motivated by Kurdish and Islamic elements, though Said-i Nursi did not defend this rebellion. Indeed, Said-i Nursi constituted a risk for the Kemalist regime due to his charisma and influence on Kurdish society, which would result in a popular mobilization against the government. However, because of his exile, his charisma increasingly extended to the Turkish society in Central Anatolia and resulted in religious mobilization. Said-i Nursi lived for many years in exile and was forcefully displaced between many Anatolian villages and provinces, including Afyon, Emirdağ, Burdur, Eskişehir, Kastamonu, and Barla. He was imprisoned for years and was constrained to house arrest for more than twenty years after his release from prison. This repression did not drive the Nurcu toward illegality or radicalism, but developed a culture of secrecy to maintain their religious activities, which have become much more visible and less secret in contemporary Turkey. Said-i Nursi wrote a great part of his collection of Risâle-i Nur (Risâle-i Nur külliyatı) during his years of exile and imprisonment. Not long after his return to southeast Turkey, he died in Urfa in 1960.

The Nurcu Movement, in its own primary definition, is a community founded on the readings and understanding of the books of Risâle-i Nur, which aims to do “service” (hizmet) in favor of the Islamic religion. After the death of Said-i Nursi, several different Nurcu movements appeared, such as the Okuyucu, the Med-Zehra, and the Yazıcı.

Belgium is a place of mobilization, especially for the okuyucular, which is one of these groups. The term okuyucu is “reader” in English. It is a religious community which is based on the readings of Risâle-i Nur and conversation (sohbet ). The first circle of okuyucu was formed in the 1990s in Belgium; the associations appeared in the early 2000s. There are circles composed of men and the women who gather to undertake these activities in the association. The names of these associations sometimes include the term medrese, as is the case for Risale-i Nur medresesi in Brussels. In reality, however, this is not a medrese in the traditional sense; it functions rather as a house where people enter without shoes, eat, drink tea or coffee before or after conversations, and conduct readings of Risale-i Nur. This type of Nurcu house serves as a place of sociability for people in their free time, after school or work. I noticed that both young people and adults, ranging between 15 and 50 years old, participate in the sessions of conversations and readings, festivities with both Turks and Kurds. I observed very close and friendly relations between “members.” I use the term in a social sense, because there is no official membership and procedure to enter a Nurcu circle. It depends only on participation in reading and conversation. I remarked that the Nurcu place, as a place of socialization, gives pleasure and contentment to people who gather there. In this space, there is an imbrication of the social and cultural spheres. Religious ties, and society’s interest in religion, ultimately develop friendship, similarity, and proximity among people. If not, friendship and brotherhood appear where there is identity, likeness, common values, and interests.³⁰ These give rise to invisible ties which create the group and the community.³¹

The Gülen Movement

This movement came out of the Nurcu Movement and emerged during the twentieth century in Turkey. A circle of Nurcu followers, “talebe of Nur,”³² formed a cemaat around imam Fethullah Gülen (born in 1938 in Erzurum, a province in the east of Turkey).³³ Fethullah Gülen served as imam in the mosques of Diyanet in different Turkish provinces, among which Edirne and İzmir constituted two particular places and periods in the formation of the group. The group was committed to undertaking activities in the educational field during the 1970s, which would later become a central space of mobilization in Turkey, Central Asia, Africa, Europe, and the USA. The networks of education developed to be structured around two educational and cultural places during the 1980s and 1990s in Turkey: schools and dershane.³⁴ The educational institutions of this movement are not religious in Turkey or anywhere else, including Belgium. Together with this engagement in the educational field, the movement constructed commercial networks and media channels that also developed throughout the world (in about 160 countries). In Turkey, there were about 1000 schools before July 15, 2016, the date of the coup d’état attempt attributed to persons affiliated with the Gülen Movement within the Turkish army. The Turkish government closed the schools and other cultural, media, and commercial institutions. Belgium, like Germany, is one of the European countries which has received many asylum applications from people affiliated with the Gülen Movement since the attempted coup d’état in 2016.

The Organization of the Gülen Movement in Belgium

A particularity of the movement is that it does not mobilize around the mosques, either in Belgium or anywhere else. This strategy is what makes this movement different from most of the other Turkish and Arabic religious organizations (there are mosques established, for example in the UK, but this is rare). This means that the networks operate in a different manner within society and culture, comparatively. The networks of the movement have been present in Belgium since 1988–1989, but became institutionalized around 1997, via the foundation of a cultural association in Brussels. Through the multiplication of associations, the movement subsequently formed a network in civil society inscribed within several social, economic, and cultural dynamics. The majority of these associations are organized within a federation (an umbrella organization according to its own definition) called the FEDACTIO (Federation of Active Associations in Belgium, established in 2010; Belçika Aktif Dernekler Federasyonu in Turkish; Federation des Associations Actives en Belgique in French; Federatie van Actieve Vereningingen van Belgie in Flemish). The BETIAD (Association of Turkish and Belgian Entrepreneurs, founded in 1997; Association d’entrepreneurs turcs et belges in French; Belçika Türk İşadamları Derneği in Turkish; Federatie van Actieve Ondernemers van Belgie in Flemish) is another type of association which gathers industrial entrepreneurs. (According to its website, it assembled nearly 1200 entrepreneurs in 2016.³⁵) Similar to the FEDACTIO, of which it is a founding member, the BETIAD operates on a national scale in the following regions: Brussels, Antwerp, Hainaut, Liège, Limburg, and Ghent.

The Gülen Movement in Belgium is not necessarily composed or developed by the generation of immigrant workers who arrived in Belgium in the 1960s and 1970s. Most of the associations have been established by young people, as they have cultural experience, knowledge, education, and university diplomas. This structural disposition shapes, in part, the mobilization, as will be presented below.

The network of the Gülen Movement manages two series of schools, which have dozens of entities. The difference between the two linguistic regimes is the schools of Lucerna, taught in Flemish, and écoles des Etoiles (schools of stars), which are taught in French. Both types are free non-denominational schools (écoles libres non confessionnelles) that offer primary and secondary education. The schools called Lucerna consist of four secondary schools (collèges, which are situated in Antwerp, Brussels, Ghent, and Houthalen) and three basis schools (in Hoboken, Anderlecht, and Genk), whereas the écoles des Etoiles, the first of which appeared in 2005, are five educational institutions, namely two secondary schools (Brussels and Charleroi) and three primary schools (Brussels, Charleroi, Liège).

The emergence of these schools needs to be studied in more detail (which is beyond the scope of this study), but one can assume a few characteristics of these schools. Their foundation corresponds to a period of development in Islamic networks in Turkey during the 2000s. Two religious movements, the AKP in the political field and the Gülen Movement in the social, economic, and cultural fields, maximized their interests against Kemalist actors in Turkey. It was then a time when power relations changed in favor of Islamic organizations. The extension of the Gülen Movement may have increased its legitimacy and power within the Turkish communities in Belgium. Nonetheless, the impact of social, cultural, and political issues related to Turkey would never be a unique determinant. Indeed, the appearance of the schools is derived from a cultural and educational need within the context of demographic expansion. This argument is based on my general observations and certain texts which cite this factor, although it is unfortunately not possible to establish the statistics to prove it.³⁶ (The argument also can apply to the schools of the Milli Görüş.) The schools were generally established in urban districts which are ethnically mixed. These schools are typically places that are easy to access for students, who can avoid making long trips during the day. This technical factor, seemingly banal at first sight, becomes important as long as the schools offer a quality education to pupils coming from the families of the middle class, who are motivated by social mobility. The education is not religious, as underlined earlier. The terms étoile (meaning star in English) and Lucerna suggest the idea of “something that shines and to which one should get closer,” or a “guide that enlightens and orients.” These terms do not have a religious connotation, necessarily. Comparatively, they are used less religiously than the term “virtue,” which is the name of a school of the Milli Görüş (the BIF), which evokes a moral and conservative notion. More than half of the pupils of the schools, similar to those of the Milli Görüş, come from Muslim families with Turkish and Moroccan origins or from the Balkan countries. Nevertheless, one should specify that neither the pupils nor the instructors come exclusively from the Muslim immigrant population, as there are many non-Muslim students and instructors.

There are two features of the organization of power. The schools are founded by the support of a group of Turkish-Muslim businessmen, parents, and instructors. Once they fulfill a certain number of administrative criteria, especially a sufficient number of students being reached, they are subsidized by the Wallonia or Flemish Federation. These entrepreneurs legitimize the foundation of the schools through moralism and civism in their discourses. The schools’ websites refer to similar symbols, as the supporters or followers of the Gülen Movement try to engage frequently in intercultural dialogue. Terms such as moral, civil, or civism have positive connotations, but nevertheless seem too vast. It would be relevant to explain how these actors construct themselves in a general manner and how this self-construction is being confronted with resistance from those who oppose them, either in Turkey or in the rest of the world. The movement has been defining itself as Hizmet (service) for several decades, in the sense that a service is rendered to society through education and teaching. The notion of cemaat is used together with Hizmet for self-definition: while the latter refers to the action, the former refers to the identity of the group. However, both of them have been contested since the 1990s in different ways. Kemalist actors identified the movement as reactionary (irticacı), while the AKP began to define it as a structure invading the Turkish state in 2012–2013. In short, the categories which the movement members constructed for themselves enter into conflict with their opponents to define the reality—which is variable given the time—and this symbolic conflict structures the field of power. As the actors and their mutual relations of power evolve, the conflict takes on new characteristics. Why do I mention these internal struggles which Turkey has been going through for years? Indeed, the autonomy of these types of religious groups, in the Belgian context, seems to be limited, given the scope of these conflicts and the number of actors involved. The Gülen Movement’s room for maneuver has decreased in Belgium since the conflict began with the Turkish government in 2012. Because support within Turkish society has decreased considerably since July 15, 2016, the possibilities for action remain limited for persons affiliated with the movement.

Types of Activities of the Movement

The typologies of action which I constructed to present to the principal groups are necessary to categorize the activities of the Gülen Movement as well. There are four types of action: commerce, such as the activities of the BETIAD; media; education; and intercultural dialogue. Thus, it is concluded that similar types of activities characterize several religious movements, as one can find similar activities organized by the Diyanet, the BIF, or the Gülen Movement. There are, however, major differences in the Gülen Movement as well, since its activities are not hierarchized in the same manner as other Turkish religious organizations. Indeed, intercultural dialogue constitutes a central mode of action for the movement thanks to the platform of Intercultural Dialogue located in Brussels, which organizes conferences and invites European academics, journalists, or politicians as moderators. In other Islamic groups, there is no specialized section to organize such activities; rather, they are integrated with cultural activities. Furthermore, the media affiliated with Gülen was more influential and organized, until July 2016, while other groups did not have their own media channels in Belgium. (Turkish-speaking people consult the newspapers and watch TV channels transmitted from Turkey, but their cultural, popular, and nationalist aspects are much more important than the religious ones because they are not Islamic media.) Zaman Belgique (Zaman Belgium), a newspaper published exclusively in Belgium and Luxembourg, was closed in August 2016. This is one of the indicators which shows the conflict between the Gülen Movement and the Turkish government, and how these actions subsequently narrowed the field of mobilization while decreasing its agency; namely, the capacity for action in Belgium. Finally, educational institutions affiliated with the movement are more numerous, and there is a chair of Fethullah Gülen specialized in studies of the Gülen Movement at the Katholieke Universiteit te Leuven.

After the failed coup d’état in July 2016 in Turkey, the structure of the movement was substantially weakened, but it persists outside the country. However, the networks of power lost strength in Belgium, as in several countries throughout the world. This weakening depends on multiple factors. The first is linked with effects of the conflict with the AKP government. Popular support for and the social legitimacy of the movement have decreased within Turkish communities in both Turkey and Europe since 2012, in particular after July 15, 2016. Indeed, the confrontation of an Islamic movement with the Turkish government or state is likely to produce negative effects on the public perception of such a movement. These effects were even more negative on the Gülen Movement, because the AKP is a political party coming from an Islamic movement. Second, the repression of the Turkish government led to important cadres in Turkey being jailed, and the defection of some members who ultimately abandoned the cause and the organization. Finally, the financing of the movement weakened after the confiscation of enterprises and the interdiction of educational and commercial activities by the government in Turkey. Consequently, the relation of the movement with the state and society profoundly changed between 2012 and 2018 in Turkey: the movement maintains its activities almost exclusively within the diaspora. One should underline that the politics of Muslim countries’ government significantly impacts the public opinion of immigrant societies living in Europe, and this seems not to be limited to Turkish immigrants. I do not have statistical confirmation, but I witnessed evidence that after the closure of the Gülen Movement in Morocco on the demand of the AKP, certain Moroccan families withdrew their children from the écoles des Etoiles in Wallonia.

The Nationalist Ülkücü Movement and Religion

The Ülkücü Movement as a Historical Category in the Turkish World

The Ülkücü Movement is a Turkish nationalist movement which began in the 1940s, and was organized for the first time as a political party in the 1960s in Turkey. Influenced by the radical Turkist ideas of Nihal Atsız (1905–1975), the movement grew under the leadership of Colonel Alparslan Türkeş (1917–1997). Indeed, the arrest of these two personalities gave rise to the formation of a Turkist protest group in Ankara in 1944. The passage to a multi-party system in 1945, and the establishment of a new liberal constitution in 1961, favored the emergence of new political parties in the Turkish political system. Thus, Cumhuriyetçi Köylü Millet Partisi (Republican Peasants’ Nation Party) was founded in 1958 as the first political party representing the Ülkücü Movement. The party took the name of Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi (MHP – Nationalist Action Party) in 1969, and the MHP was dissolved after the military coup d’état in 1980. The group was then reestablished in 1993. Today, it is the fourth largest party in the Turkish National Assembly.

The MHP never gained power by becoming the party with the most seats in legislative elections. Nonetheless, it generally won an average of 10 percent of the votes within the National Assembly, varying given the historical conjunctures. The party sometimes directed government coalitions, for example between 1999 and 2002. The MHP should be considered both a political party and a social movement. Indeed, it is a right-wing political party which has organized social movements and demonstrations in the street, which at times have resulted in acts of political violence. This habitus of the movement is derived from the cleavages that occurred between the radical left- and right-wing groups during the 1960s and 1970s, and has been recurring since then, depending on the Kurdish conflict in question.

The word ülkücü can literally be translated as “idealists,” the term which I use to refer to those who belong to this movement. The English texts sometimes refer to Ülkücü as Grey Wolves (bozkurtlar in Turkish), a term employed by Türkeş to designate the Ülkücü youth, which was later more frequently used.³⁷ The symbolic field of the movement is represented by three moon crescents and a wolf howling in front of a red background. The animal is shaped by a hand that forms the head of the wolf by keeping the index finger and little finger straight, and then curling the middle and ring fingers to touch the thumb. The wolf is a political sign which one can notice among Ülkücü members in Turkey and Europe, including Belgium. In general, Islamic movements do not employ this type of sign and totemic symbol to represent themselves. It is one of the features specific to cultural, ethnic, and nationalist groups, showing that this movement is essentially nationalist.

The Ülkücü Organization in Belgium

It is more pertinent to use the term Ülkücü than MHP, because the former refers to a grouping much larger than the MHP, which does not exist officially in Belgium. It is the Belçika Türk Federasyonu (BTF, Turkish Federation of Belgium in English; Fédération turque de Belgique in French; Verbond der Turkse Verenigingen in België in Flemish) that represents the Ülkücü Movement. The federation is organized in the three federal regions of Belgium, in particular in Marchienne-au-Pont, Verviers, Liège, Antwerp, Berchem, Brussels, and Ghent. The federation has branches of youth, women’s, and student organizations. Its associations are generally referred to as Turkish hearth (or club), Türk Ocağı. Ocak is translated as hearth, and also means fire or kitchen, and it metaphorically signifies home. It constitutes the principal place of the Ülkücü and is charged with Turkish cultural activities.

The reader can reasonably ask why I present this nationalist organization while this research deals mostly with religion among Turkish communities. The organization is part of the research because its activities extend to the religious field. However, the federation cannot be handled in the same as an Islamic federation because the primary finality of action is not religious. There are three types of action which correspond to three objectives. The central purpose is to promote the Turkish nationalist cause and sentiments. As a member of the Turkish Federation of Europe, the headquarters of which is in Germany, the organization organizes a congress (kurultay) at both national and European levels, with other federal members in Europe. One of the most remarkable activities consists of the organization of demonstrations or celebrations about events that occur in the Turkish world (not only in Turkey, but also in Central Asia or Turkish-speaking communities in the Middle East).

A second purpose, linked with the first, is different as well because it operates in a more reactionary way. It consists of building a public opinion against the Kurdish and Armenian causes. The Belgian and international contexts matter in this case: Belgium is a state that recognized the Armenian question as genocide, which neither the Turkish government nor the great majority of Turks consider to be true. They rather perceive it as interethnic conflict or deportation of the Armenian people from Anatolia during the First World War. It is thus a dynamic of differentiation giving rise to conflict and Turkish nationalist mobilization. Furthermore, the Kurdish diaspora is continually capable of mobilizing and consequently triggering countermobilization of Turkish nationalists. Within this context, the Ülkücü Movement mobilizes in the street and organizes demonstrations, particularly when Kurdish or Armenian questions become more topical in Turkey or Belgium.

Third, some but not all activities have religious purposes. The federation manages roughly ten mosques and prayer houses. It has a funeral services fund called Hilal Cenaze Fonu. Similar to the Diyanet and Milli Görüş, there is organization for Hac or Umre. During the month of Ramadan, it organizes festivities and the communal meal(s) for breaking the fast. Thus, one notices that the federation is organized within the frame of some essential Islamic practices. At this point, a question which remains essential is: Why does a nationalist movement invest in the religious field?

Many factors can explain this investment. The first depends on the features and composition of the persons who constitute the group. Indeed, the Ülkücü Movement is formed by various individuals who occupy superior or subordinate positions within the movement. These people, all nationalist in nature, are divided in two groups: the first is nationalist and conservative, while the second group is nationalist, secularist, and Kemalist. In addition, there are two sorts of social base apportioned between nationalist Kemalism and religious nationalism. It seems that secular nationalism is less important in Belgium, as the majority of immigrants come from Central Anatolia. In Turkey, compared to Central Anatolia, people who support the Turkish nationalist movement in the Aegean, Mediterranean, and Marmara (Thrace) regions are less conservative and religious (this observation concerns only the comparison of the Ülkücü, and is not an integral comparison between these regions). However, Belgium has very few immigrants coming from the coastal regions of western Turkey which are characterized by greater economic prosperity. Furthermore, the competition with the AKP decreases the importance of this social base, as the AKP also mobilizes religious nationalism, resulting in the development of religious nationalism more than secular nationalism.³⁸

A second factor is linked with the effects of generation and historical conjuncture. The movement’s formation in Belgium corresponds to the 1970s and 1980s, when the radical cleavage between the left and right wings was reigning within Turkish society. Conservative and religious members or sympathizers of the Ülkücü Movement perceived communism as atheism. Nationalist movements mobilized religious values and identity to frame society. The Ülkücü built prayer houses in Belgium during the 1970s and 1980s.

The third factor, perhaps most importantly, relates to mobilizing the power of religion. Religion is more than a spontaneous force, it is capable of mobilizing daily life, whereas nationalist causes like anti-Armenianism and anti-Kurdism are not always sufficient in mobilizing society, especially in Belgium. These motives simply do not have regularity. This argument goes beyond the analysis of Turkish nationalism but helps, at the same time, to explain why Islamic groups are capable of mobilizing their social bases. Indeed, social links between society and associative movements are constructed through religious and spiritual ties, which operate usually in holy places.

The Menzіl Brotherhood

The Nakşibendi is a Sufi brotherhood that was formed in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. It relies on the tradition of tasawwuf, a Muslim mystic system of thought. When it refers to a mystical Muslim current, it is Sufism. The Nakşibendi constitutes one of the most widespread Sufi movements in the Muslim world, especially in Central Asia and Turkey. Historically, it has been divided into two forms: müceddidiye and hâlidiyye. The origin of the Nakşibendi müceddidiye dates back to Sirhindi, also known as İmam-ı Rabbani by the Turks, a Muslim mystic thinker who lived in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries in South Asia. As for Nakşibendi hâlidiyye, its name is derived from Mevlâna Hâlid-i Bağdâdi, who lived in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries during the time of the Ottoman empire (in the current territories of Iraq and Syria). The hâlidiyye branch of Nakşibendi became widespread in Kurdistan (or Mesopotamia) and Anatolia, as well as in Syria under the leadership of Mevlâna Hâlid-i Bağdâdi.

The Menzil Brotherhood belongs to the hâlidiyye doctrine of Nakşibendi. The brotherhood’s center is currently situated in Adıyaman, a Kurdish province in southeastern Turkey. The name Menzil comes from the Menzil village in Kâhta, a district in Adıyaman. Although Menzil is a geographic location, it also has a Sufi meaning: in the tasawwuf, menzil signifies the different degrees, stages of the journey, or spiritual pathways that humankind goes through in its quest for the Islamic truth (hakikat).³⁹ This brotherhood, like every other Nakşi order, legitimizes itself through its affiliation to the chain of order (silsile), which can be traced back from the current Sheikh to the Prophet of Islam. The relationship of the master with his disciples (şeyh-mürid) is fundamental to the group’s constitution and affiliation; current followers are devoted to Gavs-ı Sani Şeyh Seyyid Abdulbaki, who resides in Menzil.

The Menzil Brotherhood is the most widespread hâlidi movement in Belgium as well as in Turkey and Europe. It has existed in Belgium since 1983. It was introduced and spread through the country by Yarbay, a charismatic individual about whom I will go into greater detail in Chap. 3. Yarbay, exiled to Germany, played an important role in the mobilization of the brotherhood in Europe. Menzil followers have associations in Belgium, but unlike the majority of the Muslim-Turkish movements, they do not have a mosque or imam within these associations. In everyday language, these organizations are often referred to as vakıf, or traditional mystic places such as dergâh, and tekke,⁴⁰ where people partake in Sufi activities.

Sufi practices are based on the concept of seyr-i sülûk. Seyr signifies the “course” or the “itinerary,” and sülûk refers to the “journey.” Thus, seyr-i sülûk literally means the “path” or the “travel route.” The person who follows this route is called sâlik, derviş,⁴¹ or mürid, who wants to become a perfect human being (insan-ı kâmil). His journey starts with the practice of tevbe (penance) and the derviş, mürid, or sâlik passes through states of being (hal). When a “state of being” is consolidated, it becomes a status, a maqam. The seyr-i sülûk encompasses different statuses to eliminate nefs (ego), a necessary condition to becoming the perfect being. In the Menzil Brotherhood, it is the level or “stage of the journey” (mertebe) at which the individual has arrived that shows his belonging to the brotherhood; there is a link between the meşreb (affiliation or identity; each degree also means a Menzil in Sufism), character, and morality with the status one achieves in Sufism.

Generally speaking, the internal practices can be summarized in two categories: the vird or zikir, and the conversation. Zikir means evocation or recall in Arabic. In Sufism, zikir relates to the different practices of the evocation of Allah. It is a rite aimed at leading a man or woman into a spiritual and sentimental state. In the tarikat orders, there exist two forms of zikir: the vocal zikir (cehri) and the silent zikir (hafi). One of the Menzil’s characteristics is that it is a brotherhood that practices the silent zikir. When this zikir is exercised individually, it is vird. When it is done within a circle, it is called hatme.

The second category of practice is sohbet (conversation). Like zikir, the conversation may come in various forms, but the difference is that it is not a ritual; sohbet , which exists in all Muslim groups, is a form of exchange of words. It is an essential element that structures the religious habitus. A conversation can take place not only between the master and the derviş, but also among friends or mürid (disciples), meaning that it is not strictly hierarchical. It takes place within a circle where people are seated. The conversation may consist of query–response or rely on the diffusion and transmission of mystical knowledge and sentiments via stories and oral accounts, especially menkıbes.

All these mechanisms, which have practical and emotional aspects, generate a group of piety (takva) and asceticism (zühd). The general atmosphere in the circles is respect, sincerity, and mutual confidence. Even if Muslim organizations share a common semantic field, mystical orders (tarikat) have a more specific language. The Menzil disciples with whom I spoke on several occasions have a repertory of vocabulary, images, and metaphors such as sır-ı hikmet (secret wisdom), kapı (the door), gavs (a senior title attributed to the Sufi sheikh, which means the one who helps), muhabbet (love), and so on. To give an example among others, they sometimes use the expression “this door is open to everybody,” which means that anyone can find the path of Menzil. The historical menkıbes create a common symbolic universe comprised of the various characters of derviş, evliyas, and mürşid. Sufis are trained to follow the same path as these historical figures.

Sufism is embedded within the field of religious faith, which addresses both the heart and the mind, according to Sufis. Menzil mysticism has created a socially shared imaginary and psychological identity. The identity is spread through imitation of the sheikh, mürşid, or mürşid-i kâmil by the mürid or derviş through the menkıbe or the sheikh’s charisma. This diffusion generates pious behavior and spiritual emotions. These characteristics should not be understood merely as a simple description, but rather as a sense of the community (tarikat) which is based on these values and practices.

Shiism and the Turks

General Aspects of Shiism and Its Geographic Distribution Among the Turks in Belgium

Shiism constitutes an Islamic denomination, the followers of which have a particular attachment to Imam Ali, son-in-law and cousin of the Prophet, and to members of Ehl-i Beyt (the Prophet’s family). This attachment generated a different conception of successor as Islamic leadership and political authority after the death of the Prophet and gave rise to some religious rituals specific to Shiism. These divergences were not merely the outcome of different points of view between Sunni and Shia Muslims, but also they developed through historical facts: the most important was the fact that the Shiites favored the right of the successor (Muslim caliph) belonging to a member of the Prophet’s family, while the Sunnis preferred to elect a successor. A full discussion of the differences between Shiism and Sunnism lies beyond the scope of this study. I will refer to them when it is necessary to explain certain essential points of my research.

Shiites represent about 10 percent of the Muslim population throughout the world. Iran, Iraq, and Bahrain’s populations are majority Shiite, while Yemen, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Lebanon have important Shia minority communities. Azerbaijan is a unique Turkic-speaking country (Azeri belonging to the Turkic language category) where the majority of the population is Shiite.

In contemporary Turkey, the Shiites, who are a minority as well, mainly come from the eastern provinces, in particular Kars and Iğdır.⁴² Shiism is more widespread among the Turkmen (or the Azeri) who live near the Iranian border (Turkmen⁴³ are a Turkish sub-ethnic group). This geographic specificity also explains why Shiism is present among Turks living in Belgium as well. The topic of Shiism indeed enables us to underline a significant fact: the composition of ethnic and confessional groups among the Turks and Kurds in Belgium depends on particularities regarding the places of origin of the people who come from Anatolia. The researcher should take into account this geographic aspect, which has a temporal dimension, to explain the presence of religious communities in Belgium. For example, people coming from Afyon do not manifest the same ethnic, social, and confessional characteristics as people coming from Iğdır, although they share certainly common points. The difference in religious denomination at times coincides with a different ethnicity, sub-ethnicity, or regionalization.⁴⁴ Turkish-speaking people who immigrated from the Caucasus are part of this Shia community as well.⁴⁵ They are usually Turkmen and Azeri sub-ethnic communities. The Shiites with whom I conducted interviews generally showed a strong dual sense of belonging to both the Turkish identity and Shiism.

How is the Turkish Shia community geographically distributed in Belgium? There is no statistical data or document providing this information. Based on my field investigations, Brussels harbors most of the Turkish Shiites, together with Beringen, Genk, Maasmechelen, and Antwerp. Since they constitute a quantitatively small minority community compared to the Sunnis, cultural and economic solidarity characterizes their members. It is possible to observe endogamous marriages as well as solidarity in economic affairs such as the catering, construction, and industrial sectors among the Shiites. This community maintains relations with non-Turkish-speaking Shia communities like the Lebanese and Turkish Shiites in Europe, particularly in the Netherlands.

The Shiites also are organized around the mosques from religious and social perspectives. There are at least ten Turkish Shia associations in Belgium, which are mostly in Brussels, Genk, and Beringen. Associations, founded according to the local dynamics of the Shia community in the region concerned, seem to operate autonomously with each other. But, as stated above, collective solidarity among the Shia population gives rise to cooperation and exchange at the national (Belgian) and trans-regional levels (between the Shia communities in Belgium and the Netherlands). Every mosque has a Shiite imam who plays the key role in the organization of religious rituals and activities.

To clarify the specificity of this community, it is pertinent to underline that Shiism is characterized by different movements. The majority of the Turkish Shia population belongs to Caferism (or Jafarism in English). It is a duodecimal doctrine (ithna ʿashara), which constitutes the most widespread Shia movement. Shia movements differ from each other according to divergent genealogy and the lineage of the imams. For the Twelvers (duodecimal Shiism), the succession of the imams terminates with the twelfth imam; whereas, for example, for the Septimanian or Ismailis, the lineage terminates with the seventh imam. For the Caferis in general, including Turkish-speaking Caferis, the twelfth imam, Mahdi, is the hidden imam, the returning of whom will bring the reign of peace, justice, and Islamic truth.

This being said, which is also believed by the Sunni people but in a less nuanced or central way, it is relevant to outline the Turkish Shia community’s ritual practices and social activities in Belgium.

In general, the activities of Shia associations are similar to those of Sunni organizations. The daily prayer is the principal ritual in the mosque of the Shiites, like the mosque of the Sunnis. Fasting is practiced during Ramadan, a period in which religious practices intensify. Fasting is also practiced during the month of Muharram (a term derived from the root harama, meaning forbidden), which is the first month of the Islamic calendar.

Distinct from Hanafism, which characterizes most of the mosques affiliated with the Sunni Turks, Shia imams follow the Caferi conception of fiqh (jurisprudence) and science of kalâm. The detailed differences between the two judicial and philosophical conceptions (Caferism and Hanafism) go beyond this research. They are not simple religious thought differences given that they influence the rules, modalities of practices regarding the rituals, rights, prohibitions, and activities occurring within the religious frame. For example, the Shiites organize the ceremonies of Karbala to commemorate the different sessions of mâtem (mourning or grief) and mersiye (elegy) during the month of Muharram in Belgium, because Imam Hüseyin was killed in Kerbela on the tenth day of Muharram (the year 61 in the Islamic lunar calendar, or the year 680 in the Gregorian calendar). This day of celebration is commonly referred to as aşure günü in Turkish.

The social and cultural fields are also characterized by similar activities in Sunni communities: there are identical sports and festive activities, like the Kermes, as presented above. The people who participate in these activities are different, however, because the Shia population of Belgium includes Shia Turks, Azeris, and Lebanese who organize the activities. The Erenler, an Alevi group (as discussed below), supports and participates in certain activities, because it is a religious group close to Shiism. I noticed on the other hand some cultural singularities like the feast of Nevruz, which is organized by Shia who come from eastern Anatolia. It is a celebration of the arrival of spring on March 21, organized also by the Kurds and the Persians in their associations, but not by the Turks who come from Central Anatolia. Nevruz brings people together, but the feast is not of a religious nature.

The Alevıs

Alevism is a minority⁴⁶ in Islam. The term Alevi generally designates people or communities attached to Imam Ali, son-in-law of the Prophet, and to Ehl-i Beyt (the family of the Prophet). Alevism is a religious movement close to Shiism, at least due to its origin, but because of the divergence of religious practices and Alevi way of life throughout history, it would be fruitful to avoid qualifying today’s Alevism as a branch of Shiism. Alevism may have developed among nomadic or semi-nomadic Turkic peoples, who immigrated from Central Asia to Anatolia during the Seljuk and Ottoman periods.

The appellation bektashism (or bektâshiyya), usually tied to Alevism, draws its name from Hacı Bektaş-ı Veli (thirteenth century) and was institutionalized in Anatolia by Balım Sultan (?–1516). Bektashism developed as a tarikat within Alevism, but they should not be used as interchangeable terms. The philosophy of Hacı Bektaş-ı Veli as well as other similar figures like Pir Sultan Abdal (sixteenth century) served as a common framework of reference for Alevism, which is founded upon mysticism and love for humankind. Kızılbaş (which signifies “red head” in Turkish) is another term employed at times to designate the Alevis, referring to the partisans of Shia Safavids who wore red head coverings in the sixteenth century. The progressive institutionalization of Sunni authority and the Ottoman’s political and military victory against the Shia Safavid empire resulted in the marginalization of the Alevi community in Anatolia. This process did not interrupt republican Turkey, because the modern state favored the Sunni conception. Nowadays, between fifteen and twenty million Alevis are estimated to live in Turkey. They belong to both Turkish and Kurdish ethnicities and live in areas such as Dersim, Erzincan, Maraş, Bingöl, Adıyaman, Malatya (in the east and southeast of the country), Çorum, Sivas, Mersin, Edirne, and Istanbul.

Organization of Alevism in Belgium

Belgium currently harbors about 35,000 Alevis. The context of immigration needs to be clarified, because it differs from other communities’ immigration in Belgium. Alevis coming from Afyon immigrated to Belgium in the 1960s and 1970s; namely, at the same time as the Sunni population’s immigration from Turkey to Belgium. There are other processes of displacement of the Alevis from Turkey to Belgium, such as the Alevi massacre at Maraş, a Kurdish Turkish province, in 1978 and the massacre at Gâzi, a popular district in Istanbul, in 1995. Such violent processes impacted the community in Turkey, part of whom eventually immigrated to Europe.

The Alevis began to organize in Belgium in the 1970s. This mobilization resulted in the establishment of associations in the region of Limbourg, Brussels, Charleroi, and Liège. At present, the Alevi organization is gathered around a federation called Belçika Alevi Birlikleri Federasyonu (Union Federation of the Alevis in Belgium; Fédération Union des Alevis de Belgique in French; Federatie van Belgische Alevitische Verenigingen in Flemish), founded in 2003. It is located in Brussels and includes five Alevi cultural centers in Antwerp, Liège, Charleroi, Brussels, and Verviers. These regions also are the places where the majority of the Alevi population who immigrated live, particularly those from the Turkish and Kurdish provinces and the Balkan countries. On the other hand, two types of Alevi associations differ from the federation and are not part of it.

The first is the Alevi association Erenler, an organization established by Alevis coming from the village of Karacalar (located in Emirdağ, Afyon) and directed by the family of Şahbaz, a native of this village for a long time. The Erenler has two cultural centers, one in Brussels⁴⁷ and one in Ghent. The migrant community from the Karacalar village, who lives in Brussels and Ghent, demonstrates social solidarity (endogamous marriages, common commercial activities, gathering and visiting places, etc.) and is perhaps more knitted and cohesive than the community of Emirdağ, because it is smaller and thus fosters collective action. When members of a small social group immigrate together from one place to another, they have the capacity to fulfill the social, cultural, and psychological needs of members in this new place. This is more apparent when most of the people personally know each other.

The second type of non-partisan association of the Alevi federation is the Kurdish Alevi organization located in Verviers, oriented by Kurdish nationalism. The Alevi population thus does not constitute a homogenous community from either a social or associative aspect in Belgium. When the Alevis are asked, they generally identify themselves with different historical moments, and different social and ethnic factors. Some of them promote the Alevi identity, while others closely identify themselves with Kemalism; others mobilize the Kurdish cause or the radical left, and consequently act independently from each other, even in opposite ways.⁴⁸

Alevism is also present in certain segments of Turkish-speaking communities who immigrated from the Balkans, in particular Bulgaria. However, the fact that people from the Balkans are Alevi-Bektaşi does not necessarily lead to association. There are sometimes religious elements which determines men’s and women’s identities. Although these elements are categories of action which belong in individual and daily lives, they do not automatically give rise to a social organization capable of defending the mutual interests of a particular group.

Alevi Ritual Practices and Cultural Activities in Belgium

Alevi practices have particularities from the point of view of organization, form, and content. The central religious place is called cem evi (literally “house of meeting”; cem signifies “assembly” in Arabic and ev is “home” or “house” in Turkish). The dede (literally grandfather in Turkish) or the pîr (old man in Kurdish and Farsi) is the central figure of both religious and social mobilization: he holds an authority which organizes Alevism. When dede (or pîr ) is absent, the Alevism faces difficulties mobilizing, which is perhaps the case for Alevism in Belgium. I will continue to discuss this topic in Chap. 3. Below are the principal Alevi activities.

Cem is the Alevi’s principal ritual, which takes place under the leadership of a dede . There are different hierarchized practices in the cem, a detailed explanation of which would go beyond the scope of this study. Cem’s essential root is found in the kırklar cemi or “assembly of the 40s.” For the Alevis, this is a symbolic ritual of cem which refers to the assembly of the 40 saints. The assembly of the 40s corresponds to an event which is believed to have taken place during the period of the first Muslim community in Medina and is interpreted in different ways, over which there is not consensus between the Sunnis and the Alevis. Another religious practice performed by the Alevis is fasting, especially during the month of Muharram, the moment at which Imam Hüseyin⁴⁹ was killed in 680. Different from the fasting during the month of Ramadan, practiced by the Sunnis, it lasts twelve days.

Music constitutes another repertoire of action which is both religious and cultural to the Alevis. The semah is a religious ritual performed by rhythmic words during the procedure of cem. It is indeed a session of dance where men and women turn around, accompanied by a music played with a saz, an instrument that is a long-necked lute.

There are also specific political and social motives which differentiate the field of Alevi action. An important part of the collective action conducted by the Alevi associations in Belgium aims at the recognition of Alevism, which is a religious minority, but this demand is especially oriented toward Turkey, and is not necessarily or exclusively in Belgium. This is one of the differences from Turkish Sunni groups who claim so few demands vis-à-vis the Turkish government. (This aspect should not be confused with the network extending to the native country, an important issue which will be handled in Chap. 3). Moreover, Kurdish Alevi associations mobilize in favor of the Kurdish cause and engage in protest acts against the Turkish government, more than they conduct Alevi-oriented rituals and activities. In addition, there are political activities conducted by the Alevis who are involved in the Turkish radical left and have refugee status in Belgium; they do not claim a religious cause. These activities undertaken by the Alevis, involved in the Kurdish movement or Turkish left groups, show the shift of the Alevi cause toward ethnic or political motivations.