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The Internal Senses in the Aristotelian Tradition pp 115–136Cite as

Estimative Power as a Social Sense

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Part of the book series: Studies in the History of Philosophy of Mind ((SHPM,volume 22))

Abstract

The estimative power has been widely discussed in modern scholarly literature. This chapter complements the existing picture by analysing medieval Latin views concerning its role as the explanans of the social behaviour of humans and other animals. Although medieval authors rarely focus on this function, the chapter shows that the estimative power plays an important explanatory role both in philosophical psychology and political philosophy.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    See Dominik Perler, “Why Is the Sheep Afraid of the Wolf? Medieval Debates on Animal Passions,” in Emotion and Cognitive Life in Medieval and Early Modern Philosophy, ed. Martin Pickavé and Lisa Shapiro (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 35; Deborah Black, “Imagination and Estimation: Arabic Paradigms and Western Transformations,” Topoi 19 (2000): 68.

  2. 2.

    The literature on the estimative power in Avicenna and his Latin followers is voluminous. One may begin with Dag Nikolaus Hasse, Avicenna’s De Anima in the Latin West: The Formation of a Peripatetic Philosophy of the Soul 1160–1300 (London/Turin: The Warburg Institute/Nino Aragno Editore, 2000), 127–53. A useful philosophical analysis is Anselm Oelze, Animal Rationality: Later Medieval Theories 1250–1350 (Leiden: Brill, 2018), esp. 52–120.

  3. 3.

    Peter von Moos has analysed the social role of the sensus communis in psychological and theological discussions of the middle ages. He mentions the estimative power, but his approach is quite different form the one adopted here: the social element is related to the early traces of the modern notion of common sense as some kind of shared understanding in which people can be reasonably expected to agree. See Peter von Moos, “Le Sens Commun Au Moyen Âge: Sixieme Sens et Sens Social. Aspects Épistémologiques, Ecclésiologiques, et Eschatologiques,” in Entre Histoire et Littérature: Communication et Culture au Moyen Âge (Firenze: Sismel/Edizioni del Galluzzo, 2005), 525–78.

  4. 4.

    For instance, the theological idea of original sin had an important explanatory role in medieval theories of human sociability, as medieval authors often considered political power as a remedy for the fallenness of humankind (see, e.g. Herbert A. Deane, The Political and Social Ideas of St. Augustine (New York/London: Columbia University Press, 1963); Paul Weithman, “Augustine and Aquinas on Original Sin and the Purposes of Political Authority,” Journal of the History of Philosophy 30, no. 3 (1992): 353–76.). A comprehensive exposition of medieval theories of sociability would have to take this idea into account, but it can be left aside here.

  5. 5.

    In particular, I pay no attention to terminological differences. Medieval authors used aestimativa, vis aestimativa, aestimatio, and (often in relation to humans) the variants of vis cogitativa. It was quite typical to consider the latter as the human counterpart of the animal estimation. For discussion, see Carla di Martino, Ratio Particularis: Doctrines des Senses Internes d’Avicenne à Thomas d’Aquin, Études de Philosophie Médiévale 94 (Paris: Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, 2008); Juhana Toivanen, Perception and the Internal Senses: Peter of John Olivi on the Cognitive Functions of the Sensitive Soul (Leiden/Boston: Brill, 2013), 231–45.

  6. 6.

    “Deinde est vis aestimationis […] quae est in ove diiudicans quod ab hoc lupo est fugiendum, et quod huius agni est miserendum.” (Avicenna, Avicenna Latinus: Liber de Anima Seu Sextus de Naturalibus, ed. S. Van Riet, vol. 1 (Louvain/Leiden: E. Peeters/Brill, 1972), 1.5, 89.) Miserere means literally “to feel compassion”, “to pity.”

  7. 7.

    Apprehendere is a general term that covers an array of cognitive operations ranging from sense perception to intellectual understanding. Medieval Latin authors often use it in relation to the estimative power, probably because they want to emphasise that, strictly speaking, the estimative act is not a perception.

  8. 8.

    “[…] et concordia quam apprehendit de sua socia et omnino intentio qua gratulatur cum illa […]” (Avicenna, Liber de Anima, vol 2, 4.1, 7). Dominik Perler translates concordia in this context as “sociability” (Perler, “Why Is the Sheep Afraid,” 35), and although the translation is far from literal, it grasps the social aspect of the term well.

  9. 9.

    Dimitri Gutas, “The Empiricism of Avicenna,” Oriens 40 (2012), 430–31. On estimative judgement, see Oelze, Animal Rationality, 100–129.

  10. 10.

    “Et huius quidem virtutis sedes est medius ventriculus cerebri. Hec virtus est instrumentum virtutis, que proculdubio in animali est occulta apprehensiva vel estimativa; ipsa quidem est virtus, qua ovis iudicat, quod lupus est inimicus et filius est dilectus, et hoc iudicium secundum modum existit non rationale. Amicitia enim et inimicitia non sunt sensu percepte, non ergo eas comprehendit nisi virtus alia […]” (John of la Rochelle, Tractatus de Divisione Multiplici Potentiarum Animae, ed. P. Michaud-Quantin, Textes Philosophiques Du Moyen Age 11 (Paris: Vrin, 1964), 2.35, 110).

  11. 11.

    For instance, Peter Olivi (c. 1248–98) argues that intentiones are not a special kind of objects (Peter of John Olivi, Quaestiones in Secundum Librum Sententiarum, ed. B. Jansen, Bibliotheca Franciscana Scholastica Medii Aevi 4–6 (Florence: Collegium S. Bonaventurae, 1922) (hereafter Summa II), q. 64, vol. 2, 603–606; see Toivanen, Perception and the Internal Senses, 335–8 (note that I have changed my mind with respect to Avicenna’s view).

  12. 12.

    “Et sic est de multis que sunt nociva et contraria complexioni animalium, et eodem modo de utilibus et convenientibus. Nam si agnus numquam viderit agnum, currit ad eum et libenter moratur cum eo, et sic de aliis. Bruta igitur aliquid sentiunt in rebus convenientibus et nocivis. […] Nam oportet quod sit magis activum et alterativum corporis sentientis quam lux et color, quia non solum inducit comprehensionem, sed affectum timoris vel amoris vel fuge. Et hec est qualitas complexionis cuiuslibet rei qua assimulatur alii in natura speciali vel generali, per quam ad invicem confortantur et vigorantur […]” (Roger Bacon, Perspectiva, ed. D.C. Lindberg, Roger Bacon and the Origins of Perspectiva in the Middle Ages (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996), 1.1.4, 12–13.)

  13. 13.

    “[…] et econtrario species substantie amice et convenientis alterius ovis comfortat organum estimative, et ideo non fugit una ovis aliam.” (Roger Bacon, De Multiplicatione Specierum, ed. David C. Lindberg, Roger Bacon’s Philosophy of Nature: A Critical Edition, with English Translation, Introduction, and Notes, of De Multiplicatione Specierum and De Speculis Comburentibus (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983), 1.2, 24–25.) Bacon uses here another technical term, species, which refers to a form of the object that transmits the information from the object to the perceiver.

  14. 14.

    “Ad hoc dicendum quod amicitia et inimicitia est in animalibus mediante extimatiua, que est suprema in istis […]” (Peter of Spain, Questiones Super Libro De Animalibus Aristotelis, ed. F.N. Sánchez, Medicine in the Medieval Mediterranean (Farnham/Burlington: Ashgate, 2015), 8.2, 240).

  15. 15.

    “[…] vis quae est in ove diiudicans quod ab hoc lupo est fugiendum et quod huius agni est miserendum.” (Dominicus Gundissalinus, “The Treatise De Anima of Dominicus Gundissalinus,” ed. J.T. Muckle, Mediaeval Studies 2 (1940) (hereafter De anima): 9, 71.) “Sed quae non sunt sensibiles ex natura sua sunt sicut inimicitiae et militia et quae a se diffugiunt sicut hoc quod ovis apprehendit de lupo, et concordia quam habet cum socia sua.” (Ibid., 9, 73.) There is a difference in wording: Avicenna Latinus speaks about “concordia quam apprehendit de sua socia,” and Gundissalinus about “concordia quam habet de socia sua.” I do not think that the difference is philosophically significant.

  16. 16.

    Gundissalinus’ view can be found in De anima, 9, 80–81. For discussion, see Simo Knuuttila, Emotions in Ancient and Medieval Philosophy (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2004), 226–36.

  17. 17.

    “Aliquando autem invenitur in animalibus affectus non ad concupiscentias suas, sed sicut affectus matris circa filium suum et uxoris circa virum suum et sicut affectus eius qui desiderat exire a carcere vel a compedibus. […] Hae autem omnes sequuntur virtutes aestimativas, non enim appetunt nisi postquam aestimaverint volitum.” (Gundissalinus, De anima, 9, 81.) The text quotes almost verbatim Gundissalinus’ own translation of Avicenna, but the translation uses caveis instead of carcere. The latter term refers to a human prison rather than to an animal cage, whereas the former is used more in relation to animals.

  18. 18.

    The example of escaping is particularly odd. One might think that getting free would be pleasant for the subject; it is also unclear why the situation is not explained in terms of an irascible passion away from a harmful thing, the shackles. For discussion on the same passage in Avicenna, see Knuuttila, Emotions, 222–24.

  19. 19.

    Thomas Aquinas, Sentencia Libri De Anima, Opera Omnia Iussu Leonis XIII P.M. Edita 45/1 (Rome/Paris: Commissio Leonina/Les Editions du Cerf, 1984), 2.13, 122; Robert Pasnau, Thomas Aquinas on Human Nature: A Philosophical Study of Summa Theologiae Ia 75–89 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 270–72; Oelze, Animal Rationality, 57–69.

  20. 20.

    “Est autem estimativa, sicut dicit Avicenna, vis ordinata in summo concavitatis medie cerebri, apprehendens intentiones sensibilium, sicut est vis in ove, diiudicans quod a lupo est fugiendum, et quod cum agno cohabitandum.” (John of la Rochelle, Summa de Anima, ed. J.G. Bougerol, Textes Philosophiques Du Moyen Age 19 (Paris: Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, 1995), 2.101, 248.) Otherwise the point is familiar, but John uses the term cohabitatio, which suggests that the estimative power incites the sheep to live with its lamb.

  21. 21.

    “[…] estimatio est vis ordinata in media concavitate cerebri ad apprehendendum intentiones non sensatas que sunt in rebus singularibus et sensibus, diiudicans […] quod huius agni, qui est agnus ipsius ovis, est miserendum. Intentionem appellat Commentator qualitatem singularem non cadentem in sensum, que est vel rei nocitiva vel expediens. Nocitiva, ut illa proprietas que est in lupo propter quam ovis fugit lupum; expediens, ut illa proprietas que est in ove propter quam eam appetit agnus.” (John Blund, Treatise on the Soul, ed. D.A. Callus and R.W. Hunt, trans. Michael W. Dunne, Auctores Britannici Medii Aevi 2 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 19, 137–39).

  22. 22.

    The connection between estimative acts and sociability appears also in Peter Olivi’s Summa quaestionum super Sententias. He claims that the apprehension of friendliness, friendship, sociability, and usefulness—not only for oneself but also for one’s kin and friends—is an estimative act of the soul: “[…] inimicum vero nobis dicimus quod ad nostrum malum habet promptum affectum, per contrarium vero sentimus illud nobis esse amicum quod nostro bono sentimus esse benevolum et sociale. Ergo haec non possunt ab aliqua potentia apprehendi nisi in respectu ad praedicta, puta, quia apprehenditur ut utile ad delectationem hanc vel illam vel ad vitandam hanc poenam vel illam vel utile ad perfectionem sui vel suorum vel amicorum.” (Peter of John Olivi, Summa II q. 64, vol. 2, 604.) “Praeterea, ipse amor ovis ad agnum, quem sentit agnus eius per sensibilia signa, quae sentit in ove, non est minor aut ignobilior respectu in ipso fundato, immo et forte idem est sentire unum quod et reliquum.” (ibid., 606).

  23. 23.

    Albertus Magnus, De animalibus Libri XXVI, ed. H. Stadler (Münster: Aschendorffische Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1916), 8.1.2–3, 574–81; id., Quaestiones Super De Animalibus, ed. E. Filthaut, Alberti Magni Opera Omnia, Vol. 12 (Münster: Aschendorff, 1955), 1.8, 85–86; Thomas Aquinas, Sententia Libri Ethicorum, Opera Omnia Iussu Leonis XIII P.M. Edita 47.1–2 (Rome: Ad Sanctae Sabinae, 1969), 8.1, 443a.

  24. 24.

    “Corvus autem niger est amicus vulpis […] Corvus autem et cocodrilli genus […] amicantur et cohabitant frequenter. […] serpens quidam manet in lapidibus et montanis et est amicus vulpis, sicut sit de genere eius. Leopardi autem manent simul propter amicitiam eorum ad invicem.” (Albertus Magnus, De animalibus 8.1.3, 580–81; translated by K.F. Kitchell & I.M. Resnick, in Albertus Magnus, On Animals: A Medieval Summa Zoologica (Baltimore/London: The Johns Hopkins UP, 1999), 677–78, slightly modified.)

  25. 25.

    “Tertius autem gradus apprehensionis est, quo accipimus non tantum sensibilia, sed etiam quasdam intentiones quae non imprimuntur sensibus, sed tamen sine sensibilibus numquam nobis innotescunt, sicut est esse socialem et amicum et delectabilem in convictu et affabilem et his contraria […]” (Albertus Magnus, De Anima, ed. C. Stroick, Alberti Magni Opera Omnia 7/1 (Aschendorff: Monasterii Westfalorum, 1968), 2.3.4, 101–102).

  26. 26.

    “Quando etiam canis per doctrinam et assuessionem acquirit aliquos habitus […] ita quod habitualiter amat et aestimat multa quae prius non amabat vel odiebat nec noverat: tunc utique habitualis amicitia et prudentia eius potentiis et organis acquiritur […]” (Peter Olivi, Summa II, q. 63, 601). “Unde videmus canes et leones magnam fidelitatem habere amicitiae ad nutritores et dominos suos.” (Ibid., q. 111, 282.) See also Bacon, Perspectiva, 2.3.9, 246–47. Note that Olivi attributes the estimative function to the common sense and not to a distinct estimative power (Juhana Toivanen, “Peter Olivi on Internal Senses,” British Journal for the History of Philosophy 15, no. 3 (2007): 427–54).

  27. 27.

    For discussion, see Jacob Klein, “The Stoic Argument from Oikeiôsis,” in Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 50 (2016), 143–200; Juhana Toivanen, “Perceptual Self-Awareness in Seneca, Augustine, and Olivi,” Journal of the History of Philosophy 51, no. 3 (2013): 355–82. For the presence of Stoicism in the Middle Ages, see Gerard Verbeke, The Presence of Stoicism in Medieval Thought (Washington DC: The Catholic university of America Press, 1983); Sten Ebbesen, “Where Were the Stoics in the Late Middle Ages?” in Stoicism: Traditions and Transformations, ed. S.K. Strange & J. Zupko (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 108–31.

  28. 28.

    It is notable that Cicero uses the terms concordia and aestimare in connection to Stoic teaching (Marcus Tullius Cicero, De Finibus Bonorum et Malorum Libri Quinque, ed. L.D. Reynolds (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 3.21). However, he seems to attribute the apprehension of concordia only to humans and it does not refer explicitly to social concord.

  29. 29.

    Note that for Aristotle, the desire to leave behind a similar to oneself is a form of self-preservation in the sense that reproduction allows individual animals to partake in the everlasting species. See DA 2.4, 415b3–8; GA 2.1, 731b24–732a1; J.G. Lennox, “Are Aristotelian Species Eternal?,” in Aristotle’s Philosophy of Biology: Studies in the Origins of Life Science (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 131–59. Albertus Magnus argues that: “Et prima est mariti et uxoris, quae convenit homini secundum quod coniugale animal, per naturam inditam ei communiter cum omnibus animalibus et plantis, secundum quam inditum est unicuique appetere tale, alterum relinquere posse, quale est ipsum: hoc enim est esse divinum quod omnia appetunt propter conservationem speciei.” (Albertus Magnus, Commentarii in Octo Libros Politicorum Aristotelis, ed. A. Borgnet, B. Alberti Magni Opera Omnia, Vol. 8 (Paris: Vivès, 1891), 1.1, 9a.) See also Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, ed. P. Caramello (Turin: Marietti, 1948–50), 1.60.5 ad3.

  30. 30.

    De animalibus is a collection of Aristotle’s three major writings concerning the animal kingdom (Historia animalium, De generatione animalium, and De partibus animalium), translated by Michael Scot from the Arabic in 1220 or a little earlier. For the Latin reception of De animalibus see Miguel Asúa, The Organization of Discourse on Animals in the Thirteenth Century: Peter of Spain, Albert the Great, and the Commentaries on “De Animalibus” (Ann Arbor: UMI, 1991); Baudoin van den Abeele, “Le ‘De Animalibus’ d’Aristote Dans le Monde Latin: Modalités de Sa Réception Médiévale,” Frühmittelalterliche Studien 33 (1999): 287–318.

  31. 31.

    “Utrum aliqua animalia debeant vivere in societate?” (Albertus Magnus, Quaest. de animal., 1.8, 85.) There is a caveat with respect to Albertus’ Quaestiones. It is a reportatio of a series of disputed questions from 1258, written down by Albertus’ student Conrad of Austria, and it may not be a completely accurate representation of Albertus’ position. See Irven M. Resnick and Kenneth F. Jr. Kitchell, “Introduction,” in Albert the Great, Questions Concerning Aristotle’s On Animals, trans. Irven M. Resnick and Kenneth F. Jr. Kitchell, The Fathers of the Church Medieval Continuation 9 (Washington D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2008), 4–6.

  32. 32.

    “Dicendum, quod quaedam animalia sunt aggregabilia vel sociabilia et quaedam solitaria et quaedam se habent utroque modo. Ad cuius evidentiam intelligendum, quod cum quattuor sint vires sensitivae interiores, scilicet sensus communis et imaginativa, aestimativa et memorativa, et aestimativa est receptiva intentionum, quas sensus non recipit, secundum quod animalia meliorem aestimativam habent, secundum hoc melius sibi cavent et melius provident. Unde quaedam animalia volatilia propter siccitatem cerebri, in quo viget aestimativa, semper sunt in societate, sicut grues et apes.” (Albertus Magnus, Quaest. de animal., 1.8, 85.)

  33. 33.

    This is roughly one of the arguments that Aquinas gives for human sociability in his De regno. In comparison to many animals, humans are less competent in estimating which things are useful and harmful to them. That is why they need to live with others and specialise in one task. See Thomas Aquinas, De regno ad regem Cypri, Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII P. M. edita, vol. 42 (Roma: Editori di San Tommaso, 1979), 1.1, 449b–50a.

  34. 34.

    Peter of Spain states explicitly in his De animalibus that the estimative power functions better and accounts for social behaviour in those animals whose brain is dry. I have not been able to confirm that Albertus accepts the idea that dryness of brain indicates a well-functioning estimation, but he uses Peter’s commentary amply, and he also writes that: “Aestimatio autem talis maxime inest apibus propter opera artificiosa, quae faciunt, et propter yconomicam et regnum, quod custodiunt domestice et civiliter collaborantes.” (Albertus Magnus, De animalibus 7.1.1, 496; On animals, 586.) Moreover, (1) he argues elsewhere that excessive dryness and humidity hinder the use of the estimative power (Albertus Magnus, De animalibus, 8.6.1, 669), which shows that a well-tempered brain is best for estimation but does not rule out the possibility that dryness is beneficial within certain limits; (2) memory was generally thought to be better if dry, and imagination was at least occasionally treated in the same way; (3) birds were usually thought to have good estimative powers, as they build nests and so forth; (4) bees were generally considered as highly sophisticated animals, capable of doing various things that require good estimative power. On memory, see David Bloch, Aristotle on Memory and Recollection (Leiden/Boston: Brill, 2007), 137–228; Ruth E. Harvey, The Inward Wits: Psychological Theory in the Middle Ages and the Renaissance (London: The Warburg Institute, 1975), 18 & 26. On bees, see Guy Guldentops, “The Sagacity of the Bees: An Aristotelian Topos in Thirteenth Century Philosophy,” in Aristotle’s Animals in the Middle Ages and Renaissance, ed. C. Steel, G. Guldentops, and P. Beullens (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 1999), 275–96. On the relation between Albertus and Peter, see Asúa, Discourse on Animals, 115–26. For dryness of brain and social function of the estimative power, see also Peter of Spain, Quaest. de animalibus, 1.2, 130–31; Ps.-Peter of Spain, “Problemata,” in The Organization of Discourse on Animals in the Thirteenth Century: Peter of Spain, Albert the Great, and the Commentaries on “De Animalibus,” ed. Miguel Asúa (Ann Arbor: UMI, 1991), 361–62.

  35. 35.

    Albertus Magnus, De animalibus, 1.1.3, 15–18; see also Peter of Spain, Quaest. de animalibus, 1.2, 130–32.

  36. 36.

    “Item, si aliqua passio conveniat alicui propter aliquod medium, posito medio poneretur et passio. Nunc autem animalia non viverent in societate, nisi ut melius convenientia operentur et fugiant nociva; sed hoc est utile cuilibet animali; ergo omnia animalia erunt sociabilia. […] Ad secundam rationem dicendum, quod licet utile esset omni animali esse in societate, ut melius consequatur convenientia et fugiat nociva, tamen diversa animalia per diversas aestimativas diversimode moventur. Columbae enim cum nutrimentum quaerunt, videtur esse eis utilius in societate, et similiter anatibus et ancis. Unde viso accipitre vel falcone in unum conveniunt et hoc propter timorem avium rapacium et inimicarum. Sed avibus rapacibus videtur melius esse in solitudine, quia non timent nisi aves sui generis, per quas impediantur a suis praedis.” (Albertus Magnus, Quaest. de animal., 1.8, 85–86.)

  37. 37.

    This point is often made in commentaries on the Politics. Medieval authors argue that animals lead different ways of life depending on the abundance of their food. See, e.g., Anonymous of Milan, Quaestiones in Libros Politicorum, Milano BAmbros. A 100 Inf., 1.14, fol. 6va–7ra; Peter of Auvergne, Quaestiones Super Libros Politicorum, Paris BN Lat. 16089, 1.19, fol. 279va–280ra.

  38. 38.

    Aristotle’s view is complicated, and various interpretations have been presented. One may begin with David Depew, “Humans and Other Political Animals in Aristotle’s History of Animals,” Phronesis 40, no. 2 (1995): 156–81; Geoffrey Lloyd, “Aristotle on the Natural Sociability, Skills and Intelligence of Animals,” in Politeia in Greek and Roman Philosophy, ed. V. Harte & M. Lane (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 277–93.

  39. 39.

    For discussion, see Irène Rosier-Catach, “Communauté Politique et Communauté Linguistique,” in La Légitimité Implicite, ed. J.-F. Genet, vol. 1, Histoire Ancienne et Médiévale 135 (Rome/Paris: École française de Rome/Publications de la Sorbonne, 2015), 232–37; ead., “‘Il N’a Été Qu’à L’homme Donné de Parler’: Dante, Les Anges et Les Animaux,” in Ut Philosophia Poiesis: Questions Philosophiques Dans L’oeuvre de Dante, Pétrarque et Boccace, ed. J. Biard & F. Marian (Paris: Vrin, 2008), 13–37.

  40. 40.

    Aristotle also provides a slightly different account of the fundamental constituents of a polis which focuses on citizens instead of households. See Mogens Herman Hansen, Reflections on Aristotle’s Politics (Copenhagen: Museum Tusculanum Press, 2013), 19–31.

  41. 41.

    Pol. 1.2, 1252a24–1253a4.

  42. 42.

    “Hoc igitur non competit ei ex electione, id est secundum quod habet rationem eligentem, set competit ei secundum rationem communem sibi et animalibus et etiam plantis. Omnibus enim hiis inest naturalis appetitus ut post se derelinquat alterum tale quale ipsum est, ut sic per generationem conseruetur in specie quod idem numero conseruari non potest. Est quidem igitur huiusmodi naturalis appetitus etiam in omnibus aliis rebus naturalibus corruptibilibus.” (Thomas Aquinas, Sententia Libri Politicorum, Opera Omnia Iussu Leonis XIII P.M. Edita, vol. 48 (Rome: Ad Sanctae Sabinae, 1971), 1.1/a, 73b, trans. R.J. Regan in Thomas Aquinas, Commentary on Aristotle’s Politics (Indianapolis/Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company, 2007), 10; I have slightly amended the translation.)

  43. 43.

    Aquinas argues elsewhere that animal desires always require a cognitive act (ST, II-1.26.1). Moreover, all emotions are based on an estimative judgement (see, e.g., Knuuttila, Emotions, 239).

  44. 44.

    For instance, Avicenna presents different divisions of the internal senses—threefold in medicine and fivefold in philosophy (Avicenna, The Canon of Medicine (Al-Qānūn Fī’l-Tibb), ed. L. Bakhtiar, trans. O.C. Gruner and M.H. Shah (Great Books of the Islamic World inc., 1999), 8.1, §557, 163–64). This suggests that the division into different powers is an analytical tool that reflects our theoretical needs (Kaukua, “Avicenna on the Soul’s Activity,” 102). I have argued in favour of this interpretation in relation to Latin authors in Juhana Toivanen, “Perceptual Experience: Assembling a Medieval Puzzle,” in The History of the Philosophy of Mind, vol. 2, Philosophy of Mind in the Early and High Middle Ages, ed. M. Cameron (London/New York: Routledge, 2019), 134–56.

  45. 45.

    The idea that human beings choose their partners was widely accepted. See Pavel Blažek, Die Mittelalterliche Rezeption der Aristotelischen Philosophie der Ehe von Robert Grosseteste bis Bartholomäus von Brügge (1246/1247–1309) (Leiden/Boston: Brill, 2007); Marco Toste, “The Naturalness of Human Association in Medieval Political Thought Revisited,” in La Nature Comme Source de La Morale Au Moyen Âge, ed. M. van der Lugt (Firenze: SISMEL–Edizioni del Galluzzo, 2014), 113–88.

  46. 46.

    “[…] in hominibus mas et femina cohabitant non solum causa procreationis filiorum, sed etiam propter ea. quae sunt necessaria ad humanam vitam […]” (Thomas Aquinas, Sent. EN 8.12, 488b.)

  47. 47.

    “[…] formicas et apes […] artificiose operentur casas, et provideant in futurum sibi, et operentur in commune.” (Albertus Magnus, De anima 3.1.7, 173; see also Albertus Magnus, De animalibus, 1.1.3, 16; ibid., 1.1.4, 21–23). Note that we must distinguish between collaboration and division of labour. Medieval authors seem to be unwilling to attribute the latter to animals, even though they usually accept that many animals set up a leader for themselves.

  48. 48.

    See, e.g., Rosier-Catach, “Communauté Politique,” 227–37.

  49. 49.

    In the Latin translation of Moerbeke, the sentence goes as follows: “Quod autem civile animal homo omni ape et omni gregali animali magis palam.” (Aristoteles latinus, in Thomas Aquinas, Sent. Pol., 1.1/b, 1253a8–9; I have used Reeve’s translation of Aristotle, but amended it slightly in order to reflect the Latin more closely.)

  50. 50.

    This reading is in line with Aristotle’s biological conception of the political animal that he develops especially in the Historia animalium. See Depew, “Humans and Other Political Animals,” 156–81.

  51. 51.

    Whether we should make a distinction between social life (based on the estimative power) and political life (that involves the rational aspect), or simply call both political but in different degrees, is a question that cannot be dealt with in this context. An informative discussion on political animals other than humans, and the idea that the human is more political than them, can be found in Jean Louis Labarrièrre, Langage, Vie Politique et Mouvement des Animaux: Études Aristotéliciennes (Paris: Vrin, 2004), 61–127.

  52. 52.

    Aristoteles Latinus, in Thomas Aquinas, Sent. Pol. 1.1/b, 1253a8–18.

  53. 53.

    See, e.g., Thomas Aquinas, Sent. Pol. 1.1/b, 79a; Giles of Rome, De Regimine Principum, ed. H. Samaritanius (Rome, 1607), 3.1.4, 409–10.

  54. 54.

    As a matter of fact, one might think that Aristotle himself should have altered the argument. Trevor Saunders has pointed out that the denial of aisthēsis of what is beneficial and harmful goes against what Aristotle says elsewhere (Aristotle, Politics, Books I and II (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), 69–70).

  55. 55.

    “Simplex enim vox est signum tristitie et doloris, et ideo data est non solum hominibus, sed etiam aliis animalibus, ut per vocem possint suas conceptiones mutuo nuntiare et ad invicem communicare. Et hoc est summum quod Deus dedit aliis animalibus. Faciunt enim propter virtutem extimativam, que est altior inter omnes potentias sensitivas. Sermo vero, sive locutio, non solum significat gaudium et dolorem, sed etiam utile et nocivum, que sunt materia iustitie et iniustitie. Nam habere plus vel minus quod oporteat de bono utili vel de nocivo, et inequale est et iniustum.” (Guido Vernani of Rimini, Super Politicam, Venice, BMarc. Lat. VI 94 (2492), 1.1.4, fol. 59rb; emphasis mine.)

  56. 56.

    The same idea can be found also in Aquinas’ commentary on the Politics: “[…] consistit enim iustitia et iniustitia ex hoc quod aliqui adequentur uel non equentur in rebus utilibus et nociuis.” (Thomas Aquinas, Sent. Pol. 1.1/b, 79a.)

  57. 57.

    This research has been funded by the Academy of Finland and Stiftelsen Riksbankens Jubileumsfond. I would like to thank the editors and the participants of the workshop The Internal Senses in the Aristotelian Tradition (Gothenburg 2016) for useful comments on an earlier version of this paper. I am also grateful to Ville Suomalainen for his assistance in practical matters.

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    Juhana Toivanen

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Toivanen, J. (2020). Estimative Power as a Social Sense. In: Mousavian, S., Fink, J. (eds) The Internal Senses in the Aristotelian Tradition. Studies in the History of Philosophy of Mind, vol 22. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-33408-6_7

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