Abstract
This chapter examines the critique of three medieval negative theologians with regard to the Name. It begins by illustrating the efforts of R. Bahya Ibn Paqudah and R. Abraham Ibn Daud to abolish the status of YHWH as a proper name. I show how these two thinkers interpreted YHWH as either a common name or a homonym (Ibn Daud), or a mere arbitrary sign (Ibn Paqudah). The chapter then contrasts these views to Maimonides’ audacious proposal in chapters 61–63 in part I of The Guide for the Perplexed. By denying YHWH any grammatical connections to natural language, Maimonides gave this name the status of a Kripkean “rigid designator”. As a rigid designator, the name YHWH succeeds in pointing directly at the named entity—God—without describing Him.
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Notes
- 1.
Ibn Paqudah, Duties of the Heart, introduction. Citations follow the Sebag edition (2017), with slight changes by the author.
- 2.
Ibid., Gate of Unity of God, Ch. 10: “For all affirmative attributes ascribed to G-d must necessarily ascribe properties of etzem (substance) or mikre (accident), and He who created substance and accident has not the properties of His creatures in His glorious essence. But the denial of such properties to Him is undoubtedly true and appropriate to Him. For He is above all attributes and forms, similarity or comparison.”
- 3.
For a comparison of the idea of unity in Ibn Paqudah and Maimonides, see Arieli, ha-Maḥshavah ha-Yehudit, 176–195.
- 4.
ד’את/ד’אתה, in the original.
- 5.
On Neoplatonist ideas in Ibn Paqudah, see Lobel, Sufi-Jewish Dialogue, 66–95.
- 6.
Duties of the Heart, Gate of Unity of God, Ch. 2.
- 7.
Ibid.
- 8.
Ibid.
- 9.
See Husik’s comprehensive discussion of God’s unity in Ibn Paqudah, History, 81–94.
- 10.
The profound influence of Neoplatonist thought on Ibn Paqudah has been the subject of extensive scholarship. See fn. 5.
- 11.
Duties of the Heart, Gate of Unity of God, Ch. 8.
- 12.
Ibid.
- 13.
Ibid.
- 14.
Ibid.
- 15.
See Lobel, A Sufi-Jewish Dialogue, 80–85, for a detailed reading of this text in Ibn Paqudah; cf. Plato’s analogy of the divided line. Lobel also identifies a distinction in Ibn Paqudah between the mathematical One and the divine One that is the true One. I do not see this distinction between theory and practice as central here. Rather, it is the question of plurality and of sensual perception that forms the major distinction between the two meanings of the true One.
- 16.
Duties of the Heart, Gate of Unity of God, Ch. 8.
- 17.
Ibn Paqudah combines two arguments here. The first is that plurality necessarily leads to a primal idea of One that enables plurality, as we have seen in the discussion of the mathematical One. The second argument deduces from the partial plurality of things that there is One whose unity is complete. See Lobel, A Sufi-Jewish Dialogue, 88.
- 18.
Duties of the Heart, Gate of Unity of God, Ch. 9.
- 19.
See discussion of Ibn Ezra above (ch. 4). See, also, Rosenberg, “Signification of Names”.
- 20.
Duties of the Heart, Gate of Unity of God, Ch. 10.
- 21.
Were the One in His true sense not eternal, it follows that He would have had a moment of creation and there would have been an entity that preceded Him, making him not the true One. In any case, it is clear that a blemish on the idea of His existence indicates a lack that cannot belong to the One.
- 22.
Ibid.
- 23.
Ibid.
- 24.
For a detailed discussion of Asharite and Mu’tazilite debates on essential attributes, see Maimonides, Guide of the Perplexed, I:50.
- 25.
Duties of the Heart, Gate of Unity of God, Ch. 10.
- 26.
Based on this interpretation of biblical language, Ibn Paqudah formulates a method of contemplation for mystical union with God based on systemically eliminating anthropomorphic images of God. See Lobel, A Sufi-Jewish Dialogue, 115–116; Afterman, One Flesh, 99–101.
- 27.
Duties of the Heart, Gate of Unity of God, Ch. 10.
- 28.
In stark contrast to views examined further on, such as Nahmanides’ famous assertion that “the whole Torah is comprised of Names of the Holy One, blessed be He” (Introduction, 3–4. See elaborate discussion in the next chapter), Ibn Paqudah’s interpretive stance does not see the Torah as a key to deciphering divinity. Human language, in all of its workings, is incapable of generating such broad metaphysical access. He believes that the prophets who wrote the Torah and the Bible intentionally chose to describe God in earthly, natural terms, using the only language available, not because they believed they were truly describing God and His actions. On the contrary: the meaning of the expression “The Torah speaks in human language” (דיברה התורה בלשון בני אדם) is not that the Torah must be understood literally, with the tools of regular human language, but rather that the Torah did, indeed, speak to humans with pictures and worldly images that are conceivable, and on rare occasions “gave few hints of spiritual matters” (Duties of the Heart, Gate of Unity of God, Ch. 10). Even the attributes that describe God’s actions, rather than his essence, are barely an adequate means of talking about God, “we were permitted, however, to ascribe these attributes to Him because of the forced necessity to acquaint ourselves with, and realize His existence, in order that we assume on ourselves the duty of His service” (ibid.). The purpose of handing down the Torah in this form is to create as broad a layer as possible of believers, so that “even though all people have different views of God’s glorious essence, nevertheless, all people are equal with regard to knowing the existence of the Creator”.
- 29.
Ibid.
- 30.
Slight variations for this paragraph appear in manuscripts. Cf. ms Oxford Bod. 1225: “ולו אמכנא אדראכ חקיקה’ מעאנה לם יתערפ אלינא בע’ירה”; and on the other hand mss. Paris 756, St. Petersburg Firkowicz 1498, 1499: “לם יצ’ף אלא ע’ירה ענד תעריפנא בה”.
- 31.
Duties of the Heart, Gate of Unity of God, Ch. 10.
- 32.
Ibn Daud, The Exalted Faith, Book 1, ch. 1, 50.
- 33.
Ibid., Book 2, ch. 3, 144.
- 34.
Ibid., 148.
- 35.
Ibid., ch. 1, 224.
- 36.
Ibid., 225.
- 37.
Ibid.
- 38.
Gen. 31:13; ibid. 16; ibid. 32:25; Exod. 3:1–2; Judg. 6:1; Hosea 12:5; and others. See Ibn Daud, The Exalted Faith, Book 2, 225. This argument is already hinted at in R. Judah Halevi, Kuzari 4:3, in the discussion of the terms “angel of God (mal’ach)” and “God’s glory (kavod)”.
- 39.
Ibn Daud, The Exalted Faith, Book 2, 233.
- 40.
See Wolfson, “Negative Attributes”, 411–443; Stern, Matter and Form, 191–249; Halbertal, Maimonides, 288–300; Husik, History, 236–266; Stroumsa, Maimonides in his World, 38–50. See, also, Lorberbaum’s discussion of the shared and equivocal names in the Guide and in the Treatise on Logic, in Dazzled by Beauty, 83–85.
- 41.
The question of Maimonides’ position on the broad spectrum of negative theology has been the subject of extensive scholarship. See, for example, Pines, “Dieu et L’Etre”, 16–24; idem., “Limits of Human Knowledge”, 82–109; Ivry, “Philosophical Sources”, 58–82.
- 42.
Regarding a possible Arabic source for the category of duties of the heart, see Goldreich, “Possible Arabic Sources”, 179–208.
- 43.
Maimonides, Guide of the Perplexed, I:35, 80.
- 44.
Ibid., 54, 124.
- 45.
See Yovel, “God’s Transcendence”, 271, 274–276.
- 46.
Lorberbaum, Dazzled by Beauty, 85–90.
- 47.
Maimonides, Guide of the Perplexed, 1:59, 139.
- 48.
Ibid., 139–140.
- 49.
On the skeptical and mystical paths, see Halbertal, Maimonides, 301–310. See also Lorberbaum, Dazzled by beauty, 72–121, for a discussion on venturing beyond the limitations of language in Maimonides.
- 50.
Stern, Matter and Form, 204–225, identifies three Maimonidean attempts at asserting the being of God while avoiding the problematic syntax of ordinary language: YHWH, Ehyeh, and the Arabic term anniyya [Being with no further qualification of God’s quiddity]. I argue that YHWH belongs to a different status from the other two as it is a rigid designator rather than an expression of God’s necessary existence.
- 51.
Maimonides, Guide of the Perplexed, I:61.
- 52.
The verb irtajal reappears at the beginning of ch. 62: “the dictum, The sages transmit the name having four letters once a week to their sons and their pupils, refers not only to their teaching the mode of pronouncing this name but also to their making known the notion because of which this name has been originated without any derivation”.
- 53.
Lane, Arabic-English Lexicon, 1044, definition no. 8. Tarajal in stem\root 5 refers to a person leaving a vehicle and continuing on foot.
- 54.
Another meaning of tarajal in stem\root 5 is a girl imitating a man’s walk.
- 55.
Dozy, dictionnaires arabes, rijl VIII, vol. 1, 514.
- 56.
See Weiss, Otiyot she-nivre’u, 149, on claims concerning the ontological independence of the name YHWH.
- 57.
This observation is made by Stern, Matter and Form, 221–222, who also points out the clear influence of Al-Farabi over Maimonides’ discussion of descriptions.
- 58.
Maimonides, Guide of the Perplexed, part I:61, 148. See, also, ibid., I:58.
- 59.
See elaborate discussion in Lorberbaum, Dazzled by beauty, 96.
- 60.
Maimonides qualifies this statement by adding that the Tetragrammaton may have originally had meaning that has since been lost. Yet that meaning, too, functioned as an indication of God’s existence rather than as a means of explaining His nature or conveying information about His essence. Its sole function was to mark the fact that analytically, He must exist, given the very notion of divinity (Guide, I:61): “Perhaps it indicates the notion of a necessary existence, according to the [Hebrew] language, of which we today know only a very scant portion and also with regard to its pronunciation”. See discussion in the following section on the notion of necessary existence in Maimonides and its connection to Avicenna’s theory.
- 61.
This enables descriptive theory to offer a solution to the complicated question of validating what a name signifies.
- 62.
The christening event consists of directly indicating an object while naming it, or of cementing this indication by providing a description that serves as a rigid designator or definition itself. Kripke, Naming and Necessity, 96, 106–107.
- 63.
Maimonides, Guide of the Perplexed, I:58.
- 64.
Other parts of the Guide show that in general, Maimonides believes proper names contain no conceptual content regarding the essence of their referent. Learning a proper name is the lowest kind of knowledge. Maimonides gives an example of how the idea of “ship” is handed down from the original naming event through an entire chain of deductions, so that by the time it reaches the tenth person, he “knows nothing about it but the name” (ibid., I:60).
- 65.
Ibid., I:61.
- 66.
Maimonides adopts the core of Avicenna’s differentiation between essence and existence. For both thinkers, existence is an accidental addition to essence. Essence, in line with Aristotle, is both a concrete individual thing and the universal “what” that defines its true being (e.g. man’s essence as a rational animal). The fact that a specific essence—a form—was brought to actuality in a specific matter to create an individual substance is what Maimonides refers to here as “accidental”. This event happens due to an agent outside of the essence—that is God—who caused informed matter of all kinds to be as it is, and causes existence by His will, thus reinforcing its “accidental” nature. Existence in all things other than God, then, is what “happens” to the thing, from the outside, and does not simply latently exist in the thing’s essence. In God’s case, “existence is not merely actual but necessary” (Altmann, “Essence and Existence”, 303). For an in-depth discussion of Avicenna’s view see Rahman, “Essence and Existence”, 1–16; Altmann, Ëssence and Existence, 295–297.
- 67.
Here, too, the original text uses murtajala for “without any derivation”.
- 68.
Unlike the signs of the rod and of leprosy that appear later in the burning bush theophany, the name Ehyeh is not handed down as proof that God has returned and will provide salvation.
- 69.
Ibid., ch. 63, 155.
- 70.
Ibid.
- 71.
See Stern, Matter and Form, 222, n. 31, for an important clarification of the term “necessary existence” and the difference between this expression and other definite descriptions. I thank Prof. Stern for bringing this point to my attention. Maimonides’ reading of Ehyeh asher ehyeh as proof of God’s existence exceeds the boundaries of ontological understanding, due to special phrasing. The fact that Ehyeh asher ehyeh can serve as a definite description about the existence of God stems precisely from these two qualities: on one hand, it is grammatically similar to a regular object-predicate sentence; on the other hand, the argument for existence usually supported by this structure is subverted by the double use of “Being” as both subject and predicate. The result leaves us with a unique instance of a negative attribute about God. See Lorberbaum, Nutsahnu bi-ne’imuto, 97, 105–106.
- 72.
See Stern, Matter and Form, 222–226; Schwartz, “Eckhart and Maimonides”, 400–408.
- 73.
Moreover, Maimonides assumes that the Hebrew verbs hayah (“was”) and nimzah (“was present”) are utterly synonymous—unlike the contrast that R. Judah Halevi, for example, draws between being and existing. The complete identification between the two verbs grounds the ambiguous meaning of the biblical passage within ontological terms of existence. Altogether, this reinforces the impression that Maimonides read Ehyeh asher ehyeh as a philosophical statement about the nature of God’s existence and its relation to His essence (a relation of complete identity), while the name YHWH is a rigid designator that is devoid of meaning.
- 74.
Narboni, Commentary, 10b.
- 75.
Ibid.
- 76.
Ibid.
- 77.
This position would argue, for instance, that names are derived from actions or qualities, but being is not a quality. This view is not shared by Ibn Sina and Averroes, as Narboni himself notes. Therefore, the fact that the Name indicates an aspect of God’s being does not include it in the category of derivative names that can be used as adjectives.
- 78.
Maimonides, Guide of the Perplexed, part I:62, 152.
- 79.
Ibid., I:63, 156.
- 80.
Mishnah Sanhedrin 10:1; possibly, also, Mishnah Sanh. 7:5.
- 81.
Exodus Rabbah 1:30; Numbers Rabbah 12:3; Deuteronomy Rabbah 1:26; ibid. 3:8; ibid. 11:10; Ecc. Rabbah 3:11, 3 (Freedman & Simon edition, vol. 8, 92); Pesikta de-Rav Kahanna 11:12, G (Neusner edition, vol. 1, 181).
- 82.
Bohak & Manekin, “Rav Hai Gaon’s Responsa”. See Idel, “Defining Kabbalah”, 99–101.
- 83.
Believing in the magical power of the Name is a categorical error no less profound than describing God in positive terms. Both these positions are incorrect in ascribing to God the wrong kind of relation to His created world.
- 84.
Maimonides, Guide of the Perplexed, part I:62.
- 85.
I believe this possibility lies at the heart of Lorberbaum’s poetic argument in Dazzled by beauty. A full discussion of its meaning lies beyond the scope of this book.
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Ben-Sasson, H. (2019). “Silence Is Praise to Thee”: The Name YHWH in the Negative Theology of Medieval Judaism. In: Understanding YHWH. Jewish Thought and Philosophy. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-32312-7_6
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