Abstract
Some of the reasons one acts on in joint action are shared with fellow participants. But others are proprietary: reasons of one’s own that have no direct practical significance for other participants. The compatibility of joint action with proprietary reasons serves to distinguish the former from other forms of collective agency; moreover, it is arguably a desirable feature of joint action. Advocates of “team reasoning” link the special collective intention individual participants have when acting together with a distinctive form of practical reasoning that purports to put individuals in touch with group or collective reasons. Such views entail the surprising conclusion that one cannot engage in joint action for proprietary reasons. Suppose we understand the contrast between minimal and robust forms of joint action in terms of the extent to which participants act on proprietary reasons as opposed to shared reasons. Then, if the team reasoning view of joint intention and action is correct, it makes no sense to talk of minimal joint action. As soon as the reason for which one participates is proprietary, then one is not, on this view, genuinely engaged in joint action.
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Notes
- 1.
- 2.
We might allow for what Bratman (1992) calls the mesh of sub-plans. Participants need not have the same sub-aims, so long as carrying out the differing sub-plans is compatible with the success of both.
- 3.
Of course, it might be relevant in other ways. For example, it might have a moral significance for you; and that’s something that you would presumably have to take into consideration.
- 4.
See a passage at Tuomela (2007), 101 that suggests the possibility of private or proprietary reasons. I take this not as evidence for a proper compatibilism but for the possibility of mixed cases that are less than fully ideal instances of joint action.
- 5.
There are many discussions of team reasoning, and some variety in what exactly is encompassed by the term. See Bacharach (2006), Sugden (1993), Gold and Sugden (2007), Anderson (2001) and Hurley (1989), as well as more recent discussion such as Pacherie (2018), Hakli, Miller and Tuomela (2010), and Roth (2012).
- 6.
Roth (2012).
- 7.
For example, Jackson (1987).
- 8.
On my understanding, intentions formed when one undertakes team reasoning are quite distinct from ordinary individual intentions. The origin of the former attitude makes an important difference, such as the fact that when one acts on the intention one acts for group reasons – reasons that are not necessarily available as such to one from the individual perspective. For a contrasting view of intentions resulting from team reasoning, (see Kutz 2000). Kutz argues that joint action should be understood in terms of participatory intentions – an intention each participant has regarding his or her contribution to the collective action or outcome. Kutz argues for his participatory intention account of joint action in part by invoking team reasoning. But Kutz characterizes participatory intention as an ordinary individual intention, albeit with collective subject matter. I think that the upshot of my discussion is that Kutz is not entitled to this characterization of participatory intention; at the very least he needs to say more to justify it. Downstream causal/functional role might have tempted Kutz to disregard the difference in provenance between individual and collective intention. Consider for example snap judgment vs. judgment arrived at through deliberation and weighing of reasons. Both count as judgments presumably because of their downstream roles, despite their very different origins. However, both snap and deliberative judgments are subject to critical assessment by the same sorts of reasons or considerations. Whereas, individual and collective intentions arrived at through individual and team reasoning respectively seem not to be subject to assessments by the same standards or reasons; indeed, the point of team reasoning was to take on a perspective quite distinct from the individual perspective; indeed, to take up the individual perspective and to act from reasons from within that perspective, would undermine the commitment embodied in the collective intention stemming from team reasoning. (And if we were to ensure that the individual consideration were merely to ratify the collective intention, then it’s not clearly an efficacious consideration.)
- 9.
I’m setting aside the debate as to whether team reasoning might collapse into a form of individual reasoning. I will assume that it does not. Nevertheless, one might wonder whether one can for personal reasons become a team reasoner.
- 10.
Parfit (1984) argues that the fact that an egoist might have reasons to become altruistic is not an argument against egoism. This may be right. However, I don’t think that this shows that one’s actions subsequent to the transformation are done for egoistic reasons.
- 11.
And indeed, proprietary reasons might be necessary if we’re to avoid turning joint action into monolithic individual agency.
- 12.
This is not to say that sometimes you don’t want this perspective, as in the case of temptation.
- 13.
Searle (1990).
- 14.
If you are also aiming for me to win, then you are not in the fullest sense playing this game.
- 15.
Some might be tempted to think that one cannot even act on such a proprietary reason (defined in terms of the aim of winning against you) outside the framework established by some joint activity. But can I not have this reason and act on it outside such a framework? After all, might it explain why I seek to play the game with you? This is indeed a proprietary reason, but it’s not clear that this is the reason one is acting on when one is really playing the game. I want to beat you at a game. And this might explain why I seek out the opportunity, and why I engage in it. But when we play the game – really play it together – then it’s no longer clear that this is the relevant reason that explains my particular moves within the game. It seems now that I have a new framework defined goal and reason for action. It’s a mistake to run together reasons inside and outside the framework of the game, even if they are superficially similar.
At least, this is true for joint activity engaged in through team reasoning. There may be forms of joint action that are more individualistic and don’t require team reasoning.
- 16.
Though I might explicitly take on this end.
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Roth, A. (2020). Proprietary Reasons and Joint Action. In: Fiebich, A. (eds) Minimal Cooperation and Shared Agency. Studies in the Philosophy of Sociality, vol 11. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-29783-1_10
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