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Legal Issues Relating to Risk and Systems Driven Verification

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Abstract

Broadly speaking, current verification approaches—exemplified by traditional IAEA safeguards—seek to show whether a declaration made by a state under a particular treaty is true or false. The IAEA safeguards experience shows the limits to this approach—not all situations are so neatly bivalent. A major focus for safeguards development over the last 20 years or so is the problem of detecting, and drawing conclusions about, undeclared nuclear material and activities. This involves the difficulty of proving a negative—can absence of evidence be taken to be evidence of absence? As the scope of arms control is extended and nuclear disarmament progresses, future verification missions will be dealing with increasing degrees of uncertainty, having to make judgments about unknowns. Risk and systems driven verification, involving greater use of qualitative methods and judgments, will be an essential aspect of this. With greater uncertainty, the confidence-building objective of verification will be more difficult, and at the same time more important. A less definitive verification environment has major implications for the application of legal precepts such as the standard of proof, the duty to cooperate, and non-discrimination, and related policy issues such as the use of information. Compared with the traditional emphasis on the right of the state, more focus will be required on the international interest—emphasising the need for cooperation and transparency. The need for an effective approach to managing uncertainty should also be reflected in the way new treaty regimes are developed, for example in decision-making processes, non-compliance determinations, adaptability of verification procedures to meet evolving circumstances, dispute resolution, enforcement, and so on. In the development of risk and systems driven verification, and the associated legal and institutional aspects, the IAEA verification system has a deep and rich experience to draw on.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    As a general rule international tribunals are not bound by strict rules of evidence or standards of proof. International practice is to take into account the circumstances of the case, particularly what is practical or realistic. This has led to the International Court of Justice and other tribunals adopting a preponderance of evidence test, drawn from the Civil Law system, in appropriate circumstances.

  2. 2.

    The final documents of the 1995, 2000 and 2010 NPT Review Conferences affirm that states should direct concerns regarding non-compliance by others, along with supporting evidence, to the IAEA to investigate and decide on necessary actions (there were no final documents agreed at the 2005 and 2015 Review Conferences).

  3. 3.

    The CTBT has not yet gained the necessary ratifications for entry into force. Pending entry into force, the CTBT’s International Monitoring System is operating on a provisional basis, but the treaty’s on-site inspection provisions are not in operation.

  4. 4.

    North Korea refused to allow the special inspection, leading to a non-compliance finding by the Board of Governors.

References

  1. International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) (1972) The Structure and Content of Agreements Between the Agency and States in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, INFCIRC/153 (Corrected)

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  2. International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) (2014) Supplementary Document to the Report on The Conceptualization and Development of Safeguards Implementation at the State Level (GOV/2013/38), GOV/2014/41, pp 46–48

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  3. International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) (1989) Statute

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  4. International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) (1997) Model Protocol Additional to the Agreement(s) between State(s) and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards, INFCIRC/540 (Corrected)

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  5. Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT)

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  6. Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)

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© 2020 This is a U.S. government work and not under copyright protection in the U.S.; foreign copyright protection may apply

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Carlson, J. (2020). Legal Issues Relating to Risk and Systems Driven Verification. In: Niemeyer, I., Dreicer, M., Stein, G. (eds) Nuclear Non-proliferation and Arms Control Verification. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-29537-0_4

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-29537-0_4

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  • Publisher Name: Springer, Cham

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-030-29536-3

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-030-29537-0

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