Abstract
The State-level approach to safeguards aims to draw safeguards conclusions about the State as a whole in contrast to facility-specific classical safeguards. To do so, the integrated safeguards approach aims to integrate all safeguards-relevant information about each State. To achieve this goal procedures and metrics are needed for generating standardized and measurable results on the basis of the available data. While the information pertaining to the declared nuclear fuel cycle is quantitative and measurable, activities outside the declared nuclear fuel cycle may either not be well defined or quantifiable. Some of that information may be quantitative while other may be descriptive and qualitative. Also information about possible clandestine undeclared activities, by its nature, includes uncertainties about its validity and accuracy. The uncertainties inherent in the information available for evaluating the State as a whole present a challenge to the development of a safeguards system that is objective and transparent. This chapter examines the challenges associated with the development of such a system and specifies the necessary attributes and metrics of the information used in the development of such a system. It associates a set of metrics for the attributes of correctness, completeness, transparency and timeliness that can be used to measure the relevance of the information to the evaluation of the State as a whole.
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Kyriakopoulos, N. (2020). Metrics for Detecting Undeclared Materials and Activities. In: Niemeyer, I., Dreicer, M., Stein, G. (eds) Nuclear Non-proliferation and Arms Control Verification. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-29537-0_10
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-29537-0_10
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