Abstract
Commercial off-the-shelf unmanned aerial vehicles are becoming a powerful force-multiplier in asymmetric conflicts. These platforms have been readily adopted by both state and non-state actors for a variety of military tasks including intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition, reconnaissance, and increasingly for direct strike missions. This chapter provides an overview of the evolution of these platforms, and discusses their use for the deployment of conventional munitions as well as chemical, biological, and radiological payloads. The chapter highlights factors that determine the effectiveness of such non-conventional attacks, including agent properties, target characteristics, and methods of delivery. It then describes factors that constrain the acquisition of CBR agents by non-state actors, as well as other barriers to a successful CBR attack using COTS small UAVs. Whilst these platforms have significant advantages over traditional ground-based CBR delivery vectors such as precision, access to targets, difficulty of interception, optimised dispersion, reduced risk of detention, anonymity, and a demonstration of ‘modern’ capabilities, their utility is limited by, amongst other factors, UAV characteristics such as payload size, range, and flight time. Governments, nevertheless, are adopting regulatory and technical control measures to manage security risks associated with the proliferation of these delivery vehicles. Manufacturers are also responding to real and perceived risk, integrating restrictions such as ‘geofencing’ and IFF systems into their products. At the same time, non-state actors have begun implementing steps to circumvent such countermeasures. On balance, although the threat of a CBR terror event using COTS UAVs remains lower than that of other attack modes, ongoing assessments of the feasibility of such attacks and of appropriate defences must remain part of the counter-terror dialogue.
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Notes
- 1.
The term ‘CBR’ is derived from the more widespread term ‘CBRN’, which encompasses chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons, and is based on military terminology. Military terms previously in vogue have included ‘ABC’ (atomic, biological, chemical) and ‘NBC’ (nuclear, biological, chemical). Another term, ‘WMD’ (weapon of mass destruction), is now also in common use, but can also encompass high explosives and other effects that can result in high casualty rates (Smith 2018a). For the purpose of this chapter, the term ‘CBR’ is preferred as it refers discretely to the agents under consideration.
- 2.
The sand, which the perpetrator had collected from Fukushima Prefecture, was contaminated with trace amounts of the radionuclide caesium-137. Whilst Yamamoto’s stated goal was to protest Japanese nuclear energy policy, he indicated in blog entries that he understood his actions to constitute ‘a terror act’ (Asahi Shimbun 2015).
- 3.
A related threat is that of attacks using COTS small UAVs to delivering high explosive munitions targeting sites which contain CBR materials, occasioning their release. In 2018, for example, a UAV flew within the security perimeter of the Bugey nuclear plant in Lyon, France (De Clercq 2018). Such a threat is beyond the scope of this chapter.
- 4.
See, for example, Ballard et al. (2001).
- 5.
This gross take-off weight stipulation means that most examples would fall within the US Department of Defense’s ‘Group 1’ and ‘Group 2’ classifications (0–20 and 21–55 lbs, respectively) (DoD 2011).
- 6.
For a more thorough discussion of the component parts of this definition, see Friese et al. (2016).
- 7.
The initial military uses for ‘prosumer’-type tactical UAVs were primarily related to reconnaissance, providing small-unit formations with a better understanding of the ground in front of them (Smith 2018a). These roles remain important today, and the technology has been similarly adopted by non-state actors (Friese et al. 2016).
- 8.
In the case of larger UAVs that do not fall within the 20 kg limit of a ‘small’ UAV, various agricultural sprayer models exist that could be modified to disperse chemical or biological agents. Some of these can carry a liquid payload of up to 50 kg, however they remain restricted in terms of range and flight duration (Smith 2018a).
- 9.
The M383 weighs 340 g, contains 55 g of RDX, and produces a 15 m fragmentation radius (Jenzen-Jones and Wright 2018a).
- 10.
In at least one case, propaganda leaflets were dropped by an IS UAV (ARES n.d.).
- 11.
See, for example, NDPC (2016).
- 12.
UAVs of this type are often improperly referred to as ‘suicide drones’ or similar. Some of these types of systems may be considered to overlap with so-called ‘loitering munitions’ (ARES 2018b).
- 13.
Whilst most naturally occurring toxins are classified as biological weapons, a subset (such as chemically toxic metals) or all are sometimes considered chemical weapons. The term ‘biochemical weapons’ is sometimes encountered, further blurring the categories. There exists no bright line between the two, but toxins are covered by both the Biological Weapons Convention and the Chemical Weapons Convention, and some are even listed in the CWC schedules (e.g. ricin, saxitoxin) (Ganesan et al. 2010; Pitschmann 2014; OPCW 1993).
- 14.
Variations may include ‘formulated agents’, a term implying a higher standard of production and development. Formulated agents may incorporate vitamins, opportunistic infection inhibitors, surfactants, cushioning materials, and other additives, and may be processed in such a way to ensure optimal compatibility with desired delivery methods and pathways of attack (Weber 2012).
- 15.
Note that when TICs are weaponised, they are considered to be chemical weapons under the Chemical Weapons Convention (ARES 2018a).
- 16.
Some notable exceptions are known. These are withheld on security grounds.
- 17.
Aerosolisation (or ‘atomisation’) may be achieved through a variety of methods, including explosion, expulsion, hydraulic, airblast, or mechanical (Weber 2012).
- 18.
Too large, and particles will be trapped by the body’s natural defences (e.g. nasal hair or mucus in the airway); too small and they will be immediately breathed out (Smith 2018a).
- 19.
Properly the ‘Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction’. See OPCW (1993).
- 20.
Properly the ‘Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction’. See UNODA (1975).
- 21.
- 22.
As a weapon, chlorine gas functions as a choking agent, attacking a victim’s respiratory system. Concentrations of 1–3 parts per million (ppm) will begin to irritate they eyes, nose, and throat. At 30 ppm, chlorine gas will typically induce shortness of breath, coughing, and chest pain, whilst at 60 ppm, victims may suffer from pulmonary edema, as the body responds to chlorine’s corrosive effects on the alveoli. Once concentrations reach 400 ppm, exposure is likely to prove fatal after 30 minutes; at 800 ppm, victims may survive only a few minutes (Smith 2018b).
- 23.
One exception to this general rule is the 7 April 2018 Douma incident involving TIC IADMs. The combination of atypical symptoms (like extreme pupil dilation) and the high fatality rate (49) may indicate that another agent with greater toxicity was involved (Jenzen-Jones and Wright 2018b).
- 24.
For a more detailed discussion of the targeting process, see Cross et al. (2016), pp. 40–46.
- 25.
‘Indirect on-target’ attacks are theoretically possible (e.g. a UAV flying overhead in full view of the target and dropping contaminated consumables that people subsequently ingest), but in practice likely to be a rarity.
- 26.
One estimate for an attack with a nominal biological agent put the difference at ‘a few grams’ versus ‘hundreds of grams’ (Weber 2012).
- 27.
Biological agents that cause particularly horrible illnesses (for example, haemorrhagic fever viruses, such as Ebola or Marburg) may be selected for similar reasons (Riedel 2004).
- 28.
Legitimate researchers or goverment representatives are invited to contact ARES for further information at: contact@armamentresearch.com.
- 29.
It is important to add that, despite the relatively profusion of modern ‘drone jammer’ rifles, most Islamic State UAVs which were successfully engaged during the battle of Mosul were brought down with machine gun fire (Fulmer and Jenzen-Jones 2017).
- 30.
The name is somewhat misleading, as the system can only truly identify ‘friendly’ or other responsive aircraft from unknown (unresponsive) aircraft.
- 31.
Similar techniques have exploited vulnerabilities in commercial airliners. See, for example, Biesecker (2017).
- 32.
Non-state actors may also exploit cyber vulnerabilities to access classified or sensitive documents regarding UAVs or CBR agents online, or purchase such documents off other disreputable parties. In 2018, for example, a vendor on the dark web was offering sensitive documents related to the US military’s Reaper UAV (Brewser 2018).
- 33.
Author interview with confidential security source, January 2019.
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Acknowledgements
The author would like to acknowledge the generous contributions of his colleagues at Armament Research Services (ARES), including Jerry Smith, Larry Friese, Sean Flachs, and Daniel Hughes. Mr. Smith, in particular, provided detailed analysis of the CBR threats outlined herein, drawing on his considerable expertise. Thanks are also due to those who shared their input and feedback on the condition of anonymity. All errors remain those of the author alone.
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Jenzen-Jones, N.R. (2020). Understanding the Threat Posed by COTS Small UAVs Armed with CBR Payloads. In: Martellini, M., Trapp, R. (eds) 21st Century Prometheus. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-28285-1_9
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