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A Psychohistorical Philosophy for the Science of the Arts

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Abstract

To introduce the reader to the philosophical debates about the science of the arts, I review existing research and discuss three philosophical theses. As a background claim, I begin with the co-dependence thesis, which states that dependence relations have tied arts and sciences together in the past and continue to interlink them in the current historical context. The co-dependence thesis is contested in the debate about the foundations of the science of art. Recent scientific investigations into the arts and aesthetic evaluations have raised two questions. First, is a science art feasible? Second, if such a science is feasible, what are the principles and methods that should provide its conceptual foundations? To examine these questions, I first discuss an objection from art’s specificity, which rests on the idea that empirical studies of art have failed to identify and explain the factors that are distinctive of art. It is one of the most influential philosophical objections to research aimed at developing an empirically-grounded science of art. Notwithstanding this objection, I defend and apply to art theory the thesis of critical naturalism, which holds that scientific and empirical investigations of artistic practices and aesthetic experiences can contribute to our descriptive and normative understanding of the arts. The science of the arts is made of works that create, analyse and test interdisciplinary models of art practices and appreciation. To implement critical naturalism, I introduce the psychohistorical thesis, which states that a method apt for developing integrative explanations of artistic practices and experiences consists in combining research on the mental capacities engaged in the arts with enquiries into the historical and cultural genealogy of such practices. The three theses I present are philosophical heuristics understood as general thoughts that can orient interdisciplinary enquiry and suggest research hypotheses. Although these three theses should not be understood as empirical hypotheses, some ideas derived from these theses have been operationalised as hypotheses and tested by empirical methods.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    In the present chapter, I use the terms model and theory interchangeably.

  2. 2.

    For a sample of influential accounts of scientific explanation, see Hempel (1965), Salmon (1992), Thagard (1992) and Simon (2000).

  3. 3.

    See, for example, Woodward (2003) and Craver and Bechtel (2006).

  4. 4.

    For the discussion of the neuroscience of music, see Peretz and Zatorre (2003), Levitin (2006), Levitin and Tirovolas 2009), Thompson (2009), and Patel (2010).

  5. 5.

    For a defence of the search for laws in empirical aesthetics, see Martindale (1990), pp. 3–13.

  6. 6.

    See Aiken (1998, pp. 24–25), Dutton (2005), Fodor (1993, pp. 51–53), Peretz (2006), Pinker (1997, Chap. 8), and Pinker (2002, Chap. 20), Zeki (1998).

  7. 7.

    See Zeki and Lamb (1994) and Zeki (1999).

  8. 8.

    Mechanistic explanations in science use the functional decomposition of a mechanism into parts and activities. Thagard (1992, 2006, 2019), Bechtel (2008), Bechtel and Richardson (1993/2010), and Craver (2007) have argued that mechanistic explanations is an important type of explanation in biology in general and neuroscience in particular.

  9. 9.

    Artists, humanists, and social scientists typically engage with artistic practices with contextualist approaches (Bullot and Reber 2013a; Danto 1964; Harrop and Bullot in press; Hogan 2013; Levinson 2007). Their view is contextualist in the sense that they understand works of art within the constraints of the careful interpretation of unique social and historical contexts (or artworlds). Fields such as the continental philosophy of art, art history and visual culture, media studies typically analyse artistic practices as anchored into a cultural and social context. Some contextualists, such as the anthropologist Geertz (1973), claim that the explanation of social practices (e.g., ceremonial and artistic practices) need to be explained by means of ‘thick descriptions’ that capture the significance of each social practice in its unique cultural context.

  10. 10.

    See Margolis (1980, 1995, 2000), McFee (2011: Chap. 8), Gopnik (2012), Davies (2013), and Langer (2016).

  11. 11.

    The argument can also be run with a focus on the evaluation of the social rules that govern artistic practices and judgements. When debating artistry and artistic values, people make normative judgements in relation to whether particular artistic decisions are good or bad, apt or inapt. But, says the pessimist, good and bad artistic decisions will engage the same shared mental systems. This idea again refers to the premise of the shared systems in the objection from art’s specificity. From this the pessimist concludes that the biological and cognitive sciences describing these shared systems will not be of any use in understanding or justifying our normative artistic judgements. These sciences, consequently, fail to locate art (or good art) because such sciences do not offer us resources to understand the normative dimension of artistic creation and appreciation.

  12. 12.

    I proposed the idea of a psycho-historical model in Bullot (2009) and expanded this idea in Bullot and Reber (2013a).

  13. 13.

    In this narrative, the character of ‘Clement’ is loosely inspired by Greenberg’s (1999) methods in art criticism, which emphasised intuition and immediate experience.

  14. 14.

    The company operates today out of Alice Springs and is widely regarded as the premier purveyor of Aboriginal art in Central Australia.

  15. 15.

    In addition to the work’s connection with core concepts from Pitjantjatjara people in central Australia (like the Tjukurrpa [Dreamtime]), we can discover that the painted figures were intended to be pictograms and diagrams. The painting is symbolic, it includes exemplifications and representations, as explained by notes made by the curator who worked with the artist.

  16. 16.

    The historical categories that we use to identify works of art include: (1) categories of genre of fine arts such as painting, music, and photography; (2) technical concepts associated with a particular field of artistic practice (e.g., chiaroscuro, tonality, synthesizer, chance operation); (3) concepts of artistic styles, such as the baroque style, the minimalist style, or the hip hop style; (4) categories of norms used to identity and value of works of art, such as the concept of formalism and modernism.

  17. 17.

    This research includes enquiries into the effects of training and expertise on art appreciation (Else et al. 2015; Hekkert and van Wieringen 1996b; Nodine et al. 1993), framing effects caused by artistic labels (Huang et al. 2011; Kirk et al. 2009; Silveira et al. 2015), and the importance of information regarding artistic authenticity (Newman and Bloom 2012).

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Correspondence to Nicolas J. Bullot .

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Bullot, N.J. (2019). A Psychohistorical Philosophy for the Science of the Arts. In: Wuppuluri, S., Wu, D. (eds) On Art and Science. The Frontiers Collection. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-27577-8_14

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