Wittgenstein’s ‘Grammatical Naturalism’

Abstract

The dominant interpretation of the later Wittgenstein as a naturalist is that he endorses a form of liberal naturalism. This chapter argues that liberal naturalism cannot be ascribed to Wittgenstein for four reasons: first, liberal naturalism offers an ontology; second, liberal naturalism can be construed as a theory; third, Wittgenstein sometimes appears to be hostile towards science; fourth, Wittgenstein does not reject all forms of supernaturalism. It is argued that Wittgenstein’s later philosophy can nonetheless be described as ‘naturalistic’ for two reasons. First, observations concerning natural facts play an important role in his method of providing surveyable representations of grammar. Second, his opposition to metaphysics and the absence of recourse to metaphysical phenomena in his philosophical investigations. While ascribing naturalism to the later Wittgenstein is misleading because of the four caveats raised, the chapter suggests that if we are to describe the later Wittgenstein as a naturalist, his position can be described as such insofar as there are the two naturalistic strands in his later philosophy, both of which are important to his method of grammatical investigation. This position is dubbed ‘grammatical naturalism’.

Was wir liefern, sind eigentlich Bemerkungen zur Naturgeschichte des Menschen; aber nicht kuriose Beiträge, sondern Feststellungen, an denen niemand gezweifelt hat, und die dem Bemerktwerden nur entgehen, weil sie ständig vor unsern Augen sind.

What we are supplying are really remarks on the natural history of human beings; we are not contributing curiosities however, but observations which no one has doubted, but which have escaped remark only because they are always before our eyes.

Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations §415

Earlier versions of this chapter were presented to the London Wittgenstein Discussion Group in September 2018; at the University of Hertfordshire’s Philosophy Research Seminar in November 2018; and at the University of Reading’s Wittgenstein Forum in December 2018. Many thanks to the participants at these events for helpful points and discussion. This chapter draws upon my review of Kevin M. Cahill and Thomas Raleigh (eds.), Wittgenstein and Naturalism (New York: Routledge, 2018), published in Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, July 22, 2018 (http://ndpr.nd.edu/news/wittgenstein-and-naturalism/). I am grateful to the publishers for permission to draw on that material, particularly to the late Founder and long-time Co-Editor-in-Chief of Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, Gary Gutting, who invited me to review that book and sadly passed away earlier this year.