“Peaceful Atom” in Russia: Recent Developments

The Russian nuclear industry is one of the most advanced in the world in terms of scientific and technical developments in the design of reactors, nuclear fuel, nuclear power plant (NPP) operational experience, and access to NPP personnel. The industry has accumulated vast experience in solving large-scale tasks such as the creation of the world’s first NPP (1954) and the development of fuel to use in it. Russia has the most advanced enrichment technologies in the world and projects in which NPPs use water-cooled power reactors have proven their reliability via thousands of reactor-years of trouble-free operation. The nuclear industry can act as a driving force for the development of other sectors. It provides orders and therefore represents a developmental resource for machine building, metallurgy, buildings and infrastructure, and other industries.

ROSATOM Is an Absolute Global Leader in the Nuclear Industry

The Russian nuclear industry is a world leader in the peaceful use of atoms thanks to its retraining of the many cadres it still has from the days of the Soviet Union and to its dynamic of developing new nuclear technologies. The potential of the Russian nuclear industry lies in ROSATOM and the Russian defense industry. It is through them that industrial development is capable of drawing on the reindustrialization of post-Soviet Russia.

ROSATOM Atomic Energy State Corporation, the largest company in Russia, has been actively building new power units in the Russian Federation and abroad. Today, the nuclear industry in Russia is a powerful complex of more than 350 enterprises and organizations that employ over 250,000 people. ROSATOM provides 33% of electricity production in the European part of the country. ROSATOM is ranked second in the world in uranium reserves and fourth in terms of uranium creation, and second place in the world in nuclear power generation providing 36% of the world market for uranium enrichment services and 17% of the nuclear fuel market. The volume of uranium production in 2017 amounted to about 3000 tons (in the Russian Federation, not including mining abroad) and electricity generation at the NPPs amounted to 202.868 billion kWh. The share of NPPs in the production of electricity in Russia has risen to 18.9% and in the European part of the country it now exceeds 40%.

The ambitions of ROSATOM are remarkable: the corporation plans to increase its revenues fivefold in the next 16 years—up to $75 billion. The company already controls 25% of the world nuclear market. There are plans for the corporation to enter the Latin American market. ROSATOM is in second place in the world when it comes to controlled uranium reserves having bought a 100% stake in Canada’s Uranium One Inc. The company has a globally diversified portfolio of assets in Kazakhstan, the United States, and Australia, and is developing the Mkuju River mine in Tanzania.

Russia’s ROSATOM is continuously awarded contracts for the construction of NPPs worldwide. Although China has two state-owned nuclear companies and two local Chinese companies are building 25 reactors, ROSATOM is building 30 reactors there. The aggregate volume of ROSATOM’s contracts worldwide is a massive $69.3 billion.

Nuclear Energy in Russia: Recent Developments

In recent years nuclear energy has become one of the most critical sectors of the Russian economy, which is actively developing. The total number of power units under construction in Russia is six. The high quality of the products and services offered is confirmed by its success in acquiring international tracts of land for the development of NPPs outside the country. The portfolio of ROSATOM’s foreign orders in 2017 exceeded $130 billion.

Today, Russia is the world leader in the number of power units being built abroad. ROSATOM has signed contracts for the construction of 36 nuclear power units overseas such as the Akkuyu NPP (Turkey), the Belarusian NPP (Belarus), the second stage of the Bushehr NPP (Iran), the Kudankulam NPP (India), the Ruppur NPP (Bangladesh), the second stage of the Tianwan NPP (China), the Hanhikivi-1 NPP (Finland), and the Paks NPP (Hungary).

Dynamic development of the nuclear industry is critical to ensuring the energy independence of Russia and stable growth of the country’s economy. ROSATOM’s strategy until 2030 suggests that the development of nuclear power will be based on long-term growth and development of new-generation nuclear power technologies including fast-neutron reactors and closed nuclear fuel cycle technology. The export potential of Russian nuclear technologies (particularly, construction of NPPs, uranium enrichment services, and nuclear fuel) is massive.

There are currently (as of 2018) 10 NPPs in Russia operating 35 power units with a total capacity of almost 28 GW. In the overall energy balance of Russia the share of nuclear generation is about 18%. According to the Energy Strategy of Russia for the Period until 2030, electricity production at NPPs should increase between 2.2 and 2.7 times.

In Russian reactors virtually all internals are made of zirconium or rather its alloys E110 and E635. Zirconium has a tiny thermal neutron capture cross-section and a high melting point. Just like lead, zirconium under the influence of radiation inside a reactor has the unpleasant ability to transform from zirconium-92 into radioactive zirconium-93 with a life of 1.53 million years.

If zirconium-90 is used when constructing the fuel assembly, then a very long-lasting material is obtained. Inside the reactor it first transforms into zirconium-91, then to zirconium-92, and only then to the 93rd isotope. The probability a neutron will hit the same atom three times, even with absorption, is minuscule. Therefore, zirconium can be used many times. Thermal neutrons fly through it without hindrance and heat the coolant—not the assembly. The fuel burns more evenly, the fuel assemblies are less deformed, and the same highly active waste is 5–10 times smaller—this is already a considerable saving.

Development of Nuclear Power in Russia

The first circuits of NPP reactors work with water at much lower temperatures than modern coal blocks. Safety considerations dictate that the water temperature in the first course of the NPP is between 250 °C and 350 °C (termed “child”). Water-cooled reactors are now the main types of newly commissioned machines and already form the basis of the modern NPP park.

Before creating materials for the hulls of water-cooled reactors (including testing on “dirty” coal blocks), it was always necessary to choose between radiation and structural safety. Even at temperatures of 300 °C the pressure inside a VVER reactor shell reaches 160 atmospheres.

Unlike water–water reactors, the radioactive vapor from the primary circuit of such reactors goes directly to the turbine. The water pressure in the first circuit of a boiling water reactor is only about 70 atmospheres compared with the 160 atmospheres of a water–water reactor. At this pressure water boils in the core volume at a temperature of 280 °C, which is below the 350 °C of VVER reactors.

Boiling water reactors have several advantages over non-boiling water–water reactors. In boiling water reactors the housing operates at a lower pressure, there is no steam generator in the NPP scheme to transfer heat from the primary circuit to the second circuit in water-cooled reactors, and the daily regulation of such a reactor is much simpler than in the case of a water-powered machine.

However, for stable operation of a boiling water reactor a regime is required in which the mass vapor content in the core does not exceed a specific value. When the collective vapor content is high, operation of the reactor can be unstable. This instability is explained by the fact that steam displaces water from the core and in so doing enlarges the free path of neutrons until the moment of deceleration. If boiling is too rapid, the free path of neutrons enlarges to such a degree that the reactor receives negative reactivity and the power of the reactor begins to fall. Neutrons “fly out” from the core without having any effect on the chain reaction.

In other words, boiling water reactors can be viewed, on the one hand, as rather simple automatic machines whereas, on the other hand, they have much more unstable regimes under which they run the risk of completely “jamming” and bringing about a thermal explosion.

After all is said and done, included in this type of boiling water reactor was the infamous RBMK reactor installed at the Chernobyl NPP. RBMK is the classic boiling water reactor and direct heir of the first Kurchatov reactor at the Obninsk NPP. Lack of understanding of personnel at the station about handling and regulating a boiling water reactor coupled with a mass of abnormal regimes drove the reactor into a state of thermal explosion.

Moreover, because of the low pressures characteristic of boiling water reactors the RBMK at Chernobyl was made without a meaningful body structure; hence, even an explosion of average force could scatter its remains over a vast area. The main problem after the explorion was systematic scraping of graphite from the bitumen roof and cesium from the armor of bulldozers—not reactor shutdown as it cooled down in a week. By the way, the Fukushima NPP was also equipped with boiling water reactors, but they were the American version of the RBMK called the BWR (boiling water reactor). Boiling water reactors and reactors close to the sea under pressure are highly dependent on the coolant and ultimately are unsuccessful from the nuclear physics point of view.

The USSR and then Russia have been investigating sodium reactors for many years starting back in 1959 with the launch in Obninsk of the first fast-neutron reactor, the BR-5, that worked right up to 2002. Its “son,” the BOR-60 reactor, is still operational helping to evaluate materials used in the “grandson” of the first BR-5 that is operating now as the BN-600. On the road colloquially called the “Sodium Highway” to sodium fast reactors the USSR and then Russia made errors and incurred losses. Russia lost the BN-350 along this road since it remained in independent Kazakhstan with the break-up of the Soviet Union. Kazakhstan lost its only nuclear reactor as a result of not having personnel skilled enough to maintain such a sophisticated unit in operation.

The BN-800 is being constructed and the BN-1200 is being designed. The Sodium Highway confidently and gradually provided and continues to provide Russia with technologies that are unique to it in the new world where natural uranium-235 costs at least $260 per kilogram and hundreds of thousands of tons of “useless” uranium-238 lies concentrated in Russian enterprises.

Russia plans to build reactors with lead coolant (BREST) and lead–bismuth eutectic (SVBR). In addition to improving the technology of the proven water-cooled WWER reactor the current version the VVER-1000 is planned to be replaced by the VVER-1200 and in the future by the even more powerful and scientifically enhanced VVER-TOI.

The high quality of ROSATOM’s products and services offered is confirmed by its success in international competition (especially, tenders for the construction of NPPs outside the country). The portfolio of ROSATOM’s foreign orders in 2017 exceeded $130 billion. Today, Russia is the world leader in the number of power units being built abroad because of ROSATOM.

Current State of Nuclear Power in Russia

The nuclear power industry in Russia is a powerful energy complex in which more than 350 enterprises operated in 2018 and at least 250,000 people were employed. It includes four research and production complexes: research institutes scattered throughout the country, engineering enterprises, fuel cycle enterprises, and the defense complex. Development of the industry guarantees the energy independence of the country.

The nuclear power industry continues to develop by actively improving the performance of enterprises. There are currently 10 NPPs in Russia including 35 power units. In 2016 atomic power plants produced 196.37 billion kWh of energy. The share of nuclear energy in the total amount of electricity produced in the country was 18.3%. Russian scientific institutions continue to develop advanced technologies for peaceful use of the atom.

Nuclear energy directly depends on the economic and political world situation. Various events provoke a surge and a fall in interest in the technology of generating electricity from nuclear fuel.

At the same time, new technologies are making the operation of NPPs more secure and preventing emergencies. Russia is not going to curtail its nuclear program since it remains a priority direction for the nation. Russia has vast reserves of energy resources. Russia’s powerful fuel and energy complex is the basis of economic development and acts as a robust foundation for domestic and foreign policy. The energy sector ensures the livelihood of people in all areas of the national economy, contributes to consolidation of the constituent entities of the Russian Federation, and ensures the country’s economic stability by reliable operation of the energy complex and fuel.

The purpose of the national energy policy is to maximize the efficient use of natural fuel and energy resources, to develop the potential of the energy sector, to ensure economic growth, and to enhance the quality of life of the nation’s people. Fuel and energy resources should in the long term allow the structure of power generation to be improved (in particular, increased production at NPPs and fuller use of hydropower). The location of generating facilities determines how electric power industry is developed: either by technical re-equipment of existing thermal power plants, creation of combined cycle power plants, or maximum growth of NPPs. Although solar and other non-traditional sources of electricity can supplement the total energy supply, they cannot substitute for nuclear energy.

Nuclear Weapons of Russia

Russia’s Strategic Nuclear Forces (SNF) currently maintain a balance between its combat capabilities and those of US strategic offensive forces. Nuclear weapons, as defined in the updated Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation approved by President Putin on December 25, 2014, “will remain an important factor in preventing nuclear military conflicts and military conflicts with the use of conventional weapons of mass destruction whether large-scale war or regional war” (https://www.offiziere.ch/wp-content/uploads-001/2015/08/Russia-s-2014-Military-Doctrine). This message makes clear the Russian Federation’s objective to contain and prevent military conflicts by maintaining nuclear deterrence at a level that is sufficient.

Since the main contribution to Russian nuclear deterrence is made by the SNF (Strategic Nuclear Force) it is interesting to assess their current state and development prospects for the foreseeable future. The SNF of Russia are intended to bring about global nuclear deterrence and include the Strategic Missile Forces, the Strategic Nuclear Forces, the Strategic Nuclear Forces, and the systems providing them. Maintaining the composition, state of combat readiness, mobilization readiness, and preparedness of the SNF of Russia at a level that guarantees damage is unacceptable to any aggressor in any situation is given the highest state priority.

According to the latest exchange of information by parties to the defunct (as of September 1, 2014) START III Treaty, Russia had 911 units of deployed and non-deployed strategic offensive weapons and the United States had 912 units. When it comes to means of delivering these Russia had 528 units with 1643 warheads and the United States had 784 units with 1642 warheads.

Nuclear Legacy of Russia

The presence of nuclear weapons in Russia is both an asset and to a small extent a liability. The chronicle of Russia gaining real and complete control over its nuclear arsenal is replete with good and bad points much like the history of Russia in the early 1990s. The difference is that here the risks went far beyond the borders of the former Soviet Union.

In each of the 15 Soviet republics there was some nuclear activity or nuclear weapons. Moscow was aware of the fact that if atomic weapons remained for an extended period beyond the territory of the Russian Federation, it would be tough to ensure its safety. Tension was fueled by rumors that appeared in the American and Israeli press in early 1992 leaked by “knowledgeable sources in intelligence” that Kazakhstan had allegedly sold Iran one or two nuclear warheads. Although it was clear at the time that these rumors were groundless and had a political connotation, it is unlikely that anyone in Moscow could guarantee such a “fantasy” would not turn into reality.

Russia’s nuclear policy called for all the tactical nuclear weapons (TNWs) of the former Soviet Union to be located in Russia, the Ukraine, and Belarus. The Soviet military was able to anticipate the situation and do this before the collapse of the Soviet Union. This significantly reduced the real threat of nuclear proliferation, which would otherwise have become inevitable with the collapse of the Soviet Union.

Withdrawal of TNWs from Azerbaijan was carried out in secrecy from a military airfield. However, a group of civilians from the Popular Front heard about it and blocked the runway in an unsuccessful attempt to stop the planes from taking off. The main problem after the disintegration of the Soviet Union was the deployment of strategic nuclear weapons in the three new states of the Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan (in addition to Russia). Suffice it to say that the nuclear arsenal at the time of the collapse of the Soviet Union in Kazakhstan exceeded the atomic arsenals of the United Kingdom, France, and China combined.

On December 21, 1991, two weeks after the formation of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and the day the Commonwealth of Kazakhstan was adopted, four states signed in Alma-Ata (now Almaty) an agreement on joint measures to control nuclear weapons. Then on December 30, 1991 in Minsk the CIS states concluded a deal in which they recognized the need for joint command of strategic forces and the preservation of unified control over nuclear weapons.

On June 6, 1992 nine CIS states (Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and the Ukraine) confirmed that they supported Russia’s participation in the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) as a state possessing nuclear weapons and stated that they were ready to join the NPT as non-nuclear states. On this day the question of succession for Russia as a state possessing nuclear weapons was finally resolved.

However, it took another two years for all strategic nuclear weapons to be withdrawn from Belarus, Kazakhstan, and the Ukraine. No problems arose with Belarus and by the end of 1996 there were no nuclear weapons in its territory. Kazakhstan was technologically much the same as the Ukraine and certainly more advanced than Belarus. Despite being capable of independently producing atomic weapons a brief but turbulent discussion arose over whether to become a nuclear state. However, it was severely suppressed by President Nazarbayev who decided to make his country an example of movement toward a nuclear-free world. By the fall of 1996 there were no nuclear weapons in Kazakhstan.

Nuclear Weapons in the World

In January 1994 the Ukraine finally confirmed its non-nuclear status and committed itself to allowing withdrawal of its nuclear weapons (to Russia) in the Trilateral Statement of the Presidents of Russia, the Ukraine, and the United States. At the same time, Kyiv achieved all its goals including Russia’s stated obligations to “refrain from economic coercion” and “respect existing borders.”

At first, Moscow was convinced that the withdrawal of nuclear weapons from the Ukraine would be resolved in a “brotherly” fashion and without outside interference. As a result, the entire nuclear arsenal of the Soviet Union ended up concentrated in Russia. However, no attempt was made by Yeltsin’s Russia to cement cooperation with the CIS states in the field of nuclear energy or nuclear safety as compensation for the withdrawal of nuclear weapons from their territories.

In 1994 Russia ignored a request by Kazakhstan to take several tens of kilograms of enriched uranium. In 1998 Russia refused to accept more than 4 kg of enriched uranium from Georgia. Taking advantage of the hiatus the United States took on the essential role played by Russia in the Soviet Union. The United States began to work systematically with nuclear institutes and specialists from CIS countries. The self-elimination of Russia logically led to its leadership of the CIS being eroded.

The deep economic and social crisis that shook Russian society in the early 1990s almost brought about the collapse of the Russian state, something for which the Russian nuclear industry and the nuclear weapons complex as a whole was completely unprepared.

The nuclear industry could only be saved by export orders. Any romantic ideas about cooperating with a new friend—the United States—quickly struck a number of harsh realities such as the US anti-dumping measures against Russian uranium, sanctions against Glavkosmos for cooperation with India, and the systematic effort of the Clinton administration to undermine Russia. The first Chechen war also caught Russia by surprise. Terrorists looked at nuclear facilities that had no air cover. The situation in the Armed Forces was dire. The Russian atomic shield outwardly somehow held, but knowledgeable people saw that it was broken. The second internal problem was connected with Yeltsin whose decision-making can best be described as a mess. The final result was that Russia became an easy target for the Clinton administration.

Strategic Missile Forces of Russia

Because of its geostrategic position the Soviet Union and then Russia traditionally put the main emphasis on SMF when setting up the SNF.

The leading role played by SMF in the strategic nuclear triad (land-based ICBMs, strategic bombers, and submarine-launched ballistic missiles) is determined not only by their prevalence in terms of the number of carriers (i.e., any device conveying nuclear warheads) deployed (more than 60%) and the number of nuclear warheads (up to 66% of the total amount), but also by their high operational readiness for combat missions (just a few minutes) and the stability of combat control under possible counteraction by an aggressor.

Today the SMF comprise troops in constant combat readiness prepared and willing to carry out combat missions. They represent an independent army in the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation. The Strategic Missile Force includes three missile armies: the 27th Guards Red Army (headquarters in Vladimir), the 31st Guards Red Army (headquarters in Orenburg), and the 33rd Guards Red Army (headquarters in Omsk). It is estimated that the number of ICBMs deployed is about 350 conveying approximately 1200 nuclear warheads. Up to 96% of this strike group is contained in readiness for immediate application.

Prospects for the Development of Strategic Nuclear Forces

Three main directions have been earmarked for future (until 2020) development of SNF (Strategic Nuclear Forces):

  • creation and deployment of new land- and sea-based weapons and delivery systems;

  • development and production of diplomatic combat vehicles for advanced combat equipment with specialized combat units and effective means of overcoming missile defenses;

  • improvement of the system of centralized combat control of SNF that ensures the delivery of orders to strategic carriers in any situation.

The National Center for Defense Management (NCMC) of the Russian Federation was created in 2014 to evaluate the use of nuclear weapons and to develop an early-warning system and combat management system for the Unified Space System (CEN). It is planned to have an orbital grouping of 10 specialized spacecraft. Modernized command posts will provide control of the orbital cluster, reception, processing, and transmission of private information in automatic mode making it possible to improve the timeliness of detection of a missile attack on Russia, the reliability and efficiency of bringing orders from centralized combat control to the SNF in response to a nuclear attack on Russia.

The fact that Russia will not be able to achieve parity with the United States in the number of strategic offensive weapons by 2019 will no longer be critical to national security. Based on the assessments made by the Russian expert community, it seems acceptable to have 530–570 carriers deployed conveying about 1550 warheads in the SNF of Russia by this date.

There is no doubt that by 2018 the US SNF had 700 carriers deployed conveying 1550 warheads. What is more, the Americans will have a so-called return potential when it comes to strategic offensive weapons. However, this superiority the Americans have in terms of their return potential will not have a significant impact on Russia’s nuclear deterrence potential. By 2021 Russia is expected to have 700 carriers deployed in any case. That will ensure maintaining Russia’s SNF at a level that not only solves the problem of inflicting damage that is unacceptable to any aggressor, but also strategically deterring any nation from unleashing a war against Russia and its allies in any military–strategic situation.

The American Pressure on Russia Regarding Iran and India

By signing an agreement for the construction of the Bushehr NPP in Iran in 1992 Russia felt that it was gradually getting entangled. On the one hand, desperately needed revenue would come from the first Russian nuclear contract in the Middle East. This would lead to new contracts not only in the atomic sphere, but also in hydrocarbon power engineering and military–technical cooperation. On the other hand, Russia’s Foreign Intelligence Service said in 1993 that Iran was implementing a “program of military applied nuclear research.”

Back in 1995 Moscow proposed considering Russian–Iranian nuclear cooperation as “a kind of training ground on which the possibility and necessity of the fulfillment by the member state of the nuclear club of its obligations under Article IV of the NPT, in which the parties to the Treaty should promote equitable, non-discriminatory cooperation in the field of peaceful nuclear energy, but at the same time not to allow conditions for the proliferation of atomic weapons.”

US pressure on Russia in connection with its cooperation with India was another painful lesson. In 1992 Senator Al Gore during the election campaign initiated a ban on Russia supplying cryogenic rocket engines to India. Moreover, although Russia was not at the time a member of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and had no such obligations, it was forced to comply with US requirements.

In 2000 Russia decided to supply 58 tons of uranium dioxide to India at an NPP in Tarapur to ensure safe operation of the plant. Washington regarded this as a “serious threat” to the non-proliferation regime. Although Russia did not give in, the irony of the situation—and the lesson—is that in a few years it will be the United States that initiates the lifting of restrictions on nuclear trade with India imposed by the Nuclear Suppliers Group.

Implications for US Nuclear Deterrence and Missile Defense

Russia has modernized almost 60% of its strategic forces. It has declared that it will “continue a massive program of nuclear rearmament, deploying modern ICBMs on land and sea, and modernizing the strategic bomber force. This new strategy allows for the first use of nuclear weapons in limited conventional warfare” (https://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/research_papers/2009_RP12_kle_ks; The Priority Tasks of the Development of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, The Defense Ministry of the Russian Federation, 2003, p. 70).

Vice-Admiral (Retd.) Robert Monroe, former Director of the Defense Nuclear Agency in the United States, has recently warned that Russia is now 20 years ahead of the U.S. in these weapons. However, this may simply be a ploy of the Pentagon to get more funds.

Currently Russia is developing two new systems: the improved Moscow Anti-Ballistic Missile system and the S-500, both of which are effective against any ICBMs (Interfax, December 19, 2012). Deputy Defense Minister Yuri Borisov said the S-500 “could destroy aerodynamic and ballistic targets of all types…” (TASS, March 26, 2015). He said that the S-500 could intercept “low-orbital satellites and space weapons” and “intercontinental ballistic missiles in the terminal phase of the trajectory and, within definite limits, in the midcourse sector” (Interfax-AVN, Moscow, April 24, 2013). The S-500 is more capable than the new Russian S-400 against stealth aircraft.

In 2018 Russia announced that it was reviving the military program set up during the Cold War to provide the general population with concrete shelters against nuclear attack. That was in response to US plans that included withdrawing from the agreement on intermediate-range and short-range missiles (SMRBMs) and thinking of launching a preventive (first and unannounced) disarming massive nuclear missile strike against Russia’s SNF with intermediate-range nuclear weapons (NWM).

We live in a world based on nuclear capabilities. Russia is indeed one of the most significant nuclear powers and is improving its strike systems. Some are already in service and others will be delivered by 2020. In short, the Russian Federation is actively developing systems similar to its Iskander and Caliber missile systems. Although both have conventional warheads, they can also carry nuclear weapons. In addition, new atomic military systems have been set up in Russia such as the Avangard, the Sarmat, the Poseidon, the Kinzhal, the Bulava (on nuclear submarines), the Caliber, the Rubezh, and the Yars, all of which automatically operate the Perimeter Dead Hand system. Thus, the strategy of pre-emptive strategic deterrence allows Russia not to increase defense expenditures by developing nuclear weapons and not to participate in the arms race in response. According to Dave Majumdar, an expert from the US Institute of Defense and Strategic Studies, “Russia’s SNF rearmament programs are at an advanced stage. Currently, Russia already has a solid advantage over the U.S. in terms of quality and diversity of delivery systems, and can reliably ensure the strategic effectiveness of its nuclear forces shortly” (https://inosmi.ru/politic/20180622/242556917.html).

However, although Russia’s military doctrine in the use of nuclear weapons does not include a preventive strike, it does include a reciprocal response to attack. This means that Russia is ready to use nuclear weapons only when a potential aggressor strikes Russian territory. The entire history of Russia shows that it has never been the initiator of such catastrophes. However, as the President of Russia said in 2018 at a meeting of the Valdai International Club, “The aggressor should know that we, as martyrs, will go to heaven, and the aggressor will simply die before he has time to repent” (https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/). Thus, the President of Russia declared that the nation’s readiness to deploy new super-technological strategic systems was only a “pre-emptive deterrent” to the arms race and nuclear war. That once again reminds the world of the irreversibility of the end of the 500-year domination of the West worldwide. To reverse the course of history, the West is essentially starting a new Cold War to regain positions lost over the past decades. However, the world is different now and the result will be different.