Abstract
Ordinary moral thought is committed to non-relative moral truth, moral facts, and objective first-order properties like rightness and wrongness—in short, is committed to moral realism. Many metaethical theories deny all or some of these commitments. Moral non-cognitivists deny that first-order moral discourse is either true or false. Moral nihilists hold that first-order moral discourse is false because there are no moral properties. Moral relativisms—sociocultural, radical subjectivist, pragmatist, et al.—deny that there are any transcendently objective moral truths or facts. All of these views deny that there is anything specifically “moral” to metaphysically ground. Evolutionary morality locates moral truth and facts in nature, not in the sui generis “moral,” contrary to the view I develop in later chapters.
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Notes
- 1.
Not that Class 2 propositions aren’t viewed as problematic as well. But the root of alleged problems with Class 2 propositions is often located in problems with Class 1 propositions.
- 2.
This is roughly put: Does it mean, for example, that theft is wrong in all possible circumstances, or that it is only prima facie or pro tanto wrong? Our ordinary moral discourse does not usually trade in such precision, although it can—especially if we do not construe ‘ordinary moral discourse’ too narrowly. This matter will be dealt with several pages below.
- 3.
I discuss these matters in Knowing Moral Truth: A Theory of Metaethics and Moral Knowledge (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books/Rowman & Littlefield, 2017), Ch. 3.
- 4.
It is highly dubious, however, that proposition 2 is empirically confirmable/disconfirmable, as is 2*. We will focus closely on this later, especially in Chapter 5.
- 5.
Being no linguist by any stretch of the imagination, and I do not want to put too much weight on this claim.
- 6.
Moral truth is a central topic of Chapter 4. It is also one of the two principal topics of Ch. 2 of Knowing Moral Truth. Also see my “Moral Facts and the Centrality of Intuitions,” in The New Intuitionism, ed. Jill Graper Hernandez (New York and London: Continuum, 2011): 48–66.
- 7.
Fydor Dostoevsky, Notes from a Dead House, translated by Richard Pevear and Larissa Volokhonsky (New York: Vintage Books, 2015): 16; my insertion and emphasis.
- 8.
This isn’t to say that any given instantiation is absolutely morally wrong, i.e., morally wrong all things considered. That is a further question, which gives rise to substantial disagreement. Kantians, for example, would consider any act of coercive sexual intercourse to be impermissible, perhaps most clearly because it would violate the “Humanity Formulation” of the Categorical Imperative: “So act as to treat humanity, whether in thine own person or in that of any other, in every case as an end withal, never as means only” (Immanuel Kant, The Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysics of Morals, translated by Thomas K. Abbott [Buffalo; Prometheus Books, 1987]: 58, italics in the original). Utilitarians like John Stuart Mill, however, would say that it is possible that any given instance of coercive sexual intercourse is morally right because, in view of all relevant considerations, it maximized happiness for the greatest number in the long run. (This assumes an act-utilitarian interpretation of Mill—an admittedly dubious overall interpretation of Mill’s ethics.) Nevertheless, given the eminently plausible assumption that coercive sexual intercourse causes displeasure to the subject upon whom it is inflicted, the victim, not to mention other associated consequences, e.g., the negative effect it may have on the character of the perpetrator, Mill would agree that such acts are at least prima facie morally wrong. See Mill, Utilitarianism (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Co., 1979 [1861].)
- 9.
I do not use ‘imagine’ in a strong sense of the term. It is clear, for example, that many members of ISIS think it is perfectly permissible to rape women who are members of certain groups whom they consider enemies. Or one can imagine a psychopath or extreme misanthrope who sees nothing wrong with this sort of thing. So, one can imagine what their take on coercive sexual intercourse would be, at least in the rough. I use the term in a weaker sense, where one cannot imagine a plausible case being made in favor of rape.
- 10.
One can, however, imagine a day when we would no longer say this.
- 11.
I discuss moral facts in more detail in Chapter 4. Also see Chs. 2 and 3 of Knowing Moral Truth; and my “Moral Facts and the Centrality of Intuitions.”
- 12.
- 13.
‘Property’ is a rather fancy term, common in philosophical and scientific circles, but not in ordinary discourse. Perhaps ‘feature’, or ‘characteristic’, or ‘attribute’ are more commonly encountered terms.
- 14.
Note that there may be overlap regarding classifications of properties. For example, if F is a temporal property, we may wish to say that F is also a physical property , but not conversely; for we may hold that the set of temporal properties is a proper sub-set of the set of physical properties . This sounds roughly correct to me, but others may object, given an endorsement of different analysis of temporality. (I see no cogent case, however, in favor of any such overlap between the numerical and the physical.) I shall not pause to consider these matters further here.
- 15.
Actually, I have left a lot undefined. What counts as an act? What conditions must be fulfilled for an act to be performed? I leave all of this sort of thing aside as unnecessary for current purposes. Moreover, there are specific reasons for not trying to define these terms here, which will become apparent momentarily.
- 16.
The following is based on Ayer’s famous Language, Truth, and Logic (New York: Dover, 1952).
- 17.
In symbols, where ‘Bx’ stands for ‘x is a bachelor, and ‘Ux’ stands for ‘x is an unmarried male’: (x) (Bx → Ux).
- 18.
Contrast Kant’s famous analysis of analytic propositions, wherein he held that the concept of the subject contains the concept of the predicate. See Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, translated by Norman Kemp Smith (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1965 [1787]): 48. More about this matter in Sect. 2.4.
- 19.
See Ayer, Language, Truth, and Logic, “Introduction” to 2nd edition.
- 20.
Of course, not all locutions about God or other metaphysical pseudo-concepts are meaningless. Second-order discourse about God, i.e., discourse about God-discourse, is fine, because discourse per se is a perfectly meaningful subject matter amenable of empirical investigation. Linguists, for example, quite properly engage in it all the time.
- 21.
That is, Class 1 normative discourse, such as ‘It is morally wrong to commit burglary’. Class 2 first-order moral discourse, such as Kant’s version of deontology is more consistent than W. D. Ross’s would, however, appear to be propositional. Some may object that this is not properly an instance of moral discourse, being rather a matter concerning logic—about the internal consistency of two theories. I shall pass over these matters as not directly germane to present discussion.
- 22.
Indeed, nothing has any metaphysical foundations, for the simple fact that there is no such thing as a “metaphysical foundation.” It’s rather like having a saddle serve as a good “foundation” when you are riding a unicorn: you can’t, because there aren’t any unicorns.
- 23.
See his Ethics and Language (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1944).
- 24.
Quoted from ibid.: 21; his italics. Strictly, Stevenson considers these “definitions” to be provisional, as “working model[s]”: 61. For more refined statement, see Chapter 4. These versions, however, will do for our purposes.
- 25.
See Allan Gibbard, Wise Choices, Apt Feelings (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1990); and Thinking How to Live (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2003). I here refer to his earlier, and perhaps better known, text.
- 26.
Gibbard, Wise Choices, Apt Feelings: 8.
- 27.
Ibid.: 7. Gibbard refines this statement in Chapter 2 and following.
- 28.
See R. M. Hare, The Language of Morals (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1952).
- 29.
See ibid.: 16.
- 30.
That is, the “Humanity Formulation” of Kant’s Categorical Imperative.
- 31.
See Simon Blackburn, “Securing the Nots: Moral Epistemology for the Quasi-Realist,” in Moral Knowledge? New Readings in Moral Epistemology, edited by Walter Sinnott-Armstrong and Mark Timmons (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996): 82–100, esp. 82–8.
- 32.
See, for example, Alexander Miller, Contemporary Metaethics, 2nd edition (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2013): Ch. 4. (Miller’s discussion of Blackburn is very useful.) Blackburn speaks in terms of expressivism: see his “Securing the Nots: Moral Epistemology for the Quasi-Realist.”
- 33.
Simon Blackburn, Spreading the Word (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984): 180; my emphasis.
- 34.
See Miller, op. cit.: 71ff.
- 35.
Blackburn, Spreading the Word: 196–97; author’s emphasis.
- 36.
Blackburn, “Securing the Nots: Moral Epistemology for the Quasi-Realist”: 83; my emphasis.
- 37.
This is the claim that those like Richard Rorty endorse. See, for example, his Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979).
- 38.
We have already noted Mackie in Sect. 1.5. See J. L. Mackie, Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong (Viking Press, 1977); also see his “A Refutation of Morals,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 24, No. 1 and 2 (1946): 77–90.
- 39.
Let’s ignore any possible problems with temporal indexicality in P1 and P3, and simply regard them as making (or being employed to make) tenseless assertions.
- 40.
If one construes P1** as saying that Boothe’s act of assassinating Lincoln had no moral content—as denying the moral assessiblity of the act—then that proposition would be true.
- 41.
It seems, however, that other sorts of first-order moral propositions may on Mackie’s view be true. For example, the proposition ‘Kant’s deontological theory of ethics entails similar treatment for persons under similar conditions’ may be true, because even if Kant’s theory is false, it may be the case that the set of false propositions constituting the theory—some of which may be true, others false—nevertheless entail the proposition in question. This type of first-order moral proposition, however, is not the type in question, where moral properties—properties like goodness and rightness—are at issue.
- 42.
Friedrich Nietzsche, The Will to Power, edited by Walter Kaufman, translated by Walter Kaufman and R. J. Hollingdale (New York: Vintage Books, 1968): sec. 258; italics in the original.
- 43.
Ibid.: sec. 428.
- 44.
This is the scheme I employ in Knowing Moral Truth. See §4.3.
- 45.
As is well known, how to interpret ‘prevailing moral beliefs’ is problematic. Does it mean 100% of the society’s members? A majority of its members? A super majority? Interpreting it as 100% agreement is quite implausible, because gaining complete agreement on most anything in a society/culture may be a virtual impossibility: the result would be that de facto, if not de jure, no society/culture would have any “prevailing moral beliefs.” The question then becomes how to specify in a non-arbitrary way what percentage of agreement must be attained to have a majority. And what about cases where various members of that society are members of different sub-cultures possessing different moral beliefs—a matter that becomes all the more pressing as the size and heterogeneity of the society increases? We shall, however, bypass such issues here.
- 46.
Some understand moral relativism as a normative thesis, not as a metaethical thesis as I do here. Thus, in the case of sociocultural moral relativism , they would understand relativism to be the view that the moral norms actually endorsed by society/culture X are created by that society, as opposed to metaethical sociocultural relativism, which holds that the moral norms of any society/culture X are necessarily created by society. Thus, normative moral relativism underscores that a society or culture may construct and act upon a set of moral norms {n1, n2, n3}, even though this set of norms is false, i.e., that there is some other set of moral norms {nn, n+1, n+2, n+3…n+n} that is true, but not a member of the first set. The version of relativism we are dealing with here, however, holds that if a society manifests (endorses, embraces as its own) a set of moral values (as surely it does), then that society constructs those values, and that is the end of it. There is no supra-societal set of norms to which appeal is possible.
- 47.
Put still more strictly, the ordered n-tuple of X’s normative beliefs, which I shall represent as ‘<MB>’, determines {MP}, but this increased precision is not necessary here, and introduces unwelcome requirements of explanation. The less strict interpretation will suffice. Also, note that I refer to “normative moral beliefs,” because we are referring here to the status of first-order moral matters expressed by what I have called Class 1 first-order moral propositions. “Moral beliefs” in the sense of beliefs about the nature and status of morality, i.e., second-order moral beliefs, are not the issue here.
- 48.
Clearly an assumption almost surely not fulfilled by any actual society/culture, their moral belief-sets being far too complex to insure complete consistency. We can presume here, however, an approximation to the ideal. More about these matters below.
- 49.
I am not striving to provide a full explication of the truth conditions of this assertion—only those factors relevant to our inquiry.
- 50.
See Kant, Critique of Pure Reason: 48f.
- 51.
This is very similar to Rik Peels’ interpretation of occurrent belief in his excellent Responsible Belief: A Theory in Ethics and Epistemology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017): 31. I note that it is widely recognized that not all belief is propositional. For example, objectual belief: one may believe, say, that there is an object overhead, but have no idea what it is or precisely where it is located, nor be able to provide any description of it. This form of belief lacks the conceptual sophistication requisite for propositional belief. Morality, however, most directly has to do with propositional belief, the sort of belief of which minded beings are capable, and so we shall stick with it. (For worthwhile discussion of objectual vs. propositional belief, see Robert Audi, Epistemology, 3rd edition [New York and London: Routledge, 2011].)
- 52.
We of course haven’t specified here what the nature of belief is, and shall not try to do so. As usually understood, however, belief it is necessarily connected with mental activity of some sort. Even a thoroughgoing materialist would agree that if S believes that p, i.e., that S has a propositional belief, then S possess mind, whatever mind turns out to be. Animal belief—a dog’s, for example—is perhaps a limiting case, but it does not appear a misuse of language to say, “Rover believes that there is a squirrel hiding in the tree’s branches,” although Rover’s belief is not propositional—does not meet the requisite degree of conceptual sophistication. A more problematic case is presented by artificial intelligence—a silicon-based computer, for example. The materialist can certainly allow, however, that a necessary conceptual condition for the possesssion of mind is not biological “wet-ware.” Note too that this whole issue becomes a bit sticky, in that one might argue that were X to qualify as a society, to say nothing of a culture, that we are talking about a complex, interrelated group of persons, rather than a “society” or “culture” comprised of non-persons—bees or buffalo, say. So, the question then arises whether a society of persons, the members of which by definition possess the sort of higher-order cognitive capacities with which we are all familiar, could fail to possess moral beliefs? Still, this is not quite right, because we could imagine a society of non-terrestrial persons, or even a society of artificial intelligences—computers, for example—which utterly lack the sort of beliefs manifested by humans that we call “moral beliefs.” So, the more refined question is, could a society of human persons lack moral beliefs? I strongly doubt it; but that said, I regard this as in part, if not largely, an empirical question, perhaps better answered by psychologists and the like than by philosophers.
- 53.
Note that this does not mean that moral properties—certainly not all of them—can be present, or instantiated, without mind. For example, ‘S was morally wrong’ clearly requires that S be a minded being: moral wrongness does not apply to beings without minds, e.g., to trees or frogs. This isn’t of course to say that in order to have moral status, a being must possess mind. Dogs and cats have moral status, owing to their capacity to suffer. I would argue that a human fetus, even during the first trimester of gestation, has moral status owing to its potentiality. Clearly, none of these beings possess mind, at least not minds rising to the level that permit rightfully attaching moral predicates such as ‘moral wrongness’ or ‘moral responsibility’ to their behavior. We shall flesh out some associated issues in Chapters 4 and 5.
- 54.
I discuss radical moral subjectivism in Knowing Moral Truth, §4.3. The account here closely parallels that account.
- 55.
Plato, Theaetetus, translated by F. M. Cornford, in Plato: The Collected Dialogues, eds. Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961): 151e.
- 56.
For excellent discussion of the proper interpretation of Protagoras’s relativism, see Taylor, C. C. W. and Lee Mi-Kyoung, “The Sophists”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Winter 2016 Edition, ed. Edward N. Zalta, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2016/entries/sophists/.
- 57.
Note that in discussion of sociocultural moral relativism and moral subjectivism, we have been talking of ordered sets. Here, the ordering is not relevant, so I shall use the standard symbolism, braces.
- 58.
Thus second-order moral concepts do not themselves determine whether, for example, coercive sexual intercourse is wrong.
- 59.
Ludwig Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations, 3rd edition, translated by G. E. M. Anscombe (New York: Macmillan, 1958) is the magnum opus bearing on this perspective. It is, however, a somewhat contested matter as to exactly how Wittgenstein himself conceived of ethics. Many believe that there is a religious, even mystical element to his moral thought. See Ray Monk, Ludwig Wittgenstein: The Duty of Genius (New York and London: Penguin, 1990).
- 60.
Wittgenstein, in his later work, famously held that philosophers, with their “special methods of analysis,” have nothing useful to bring to the table. (Indeed, Wittgenstein would be unhappy with much of this book. We shall soldier on nevertheless.)
- 61.
I am speaking here of natural languages. Standard computer languages, mathematical systems, etc., can be expected not to have these features. Moreover, semantics appears to be the sine qua non of moral discourse.
- 62.
See Harman, “Moral Relativism Defended,” Philosophical Review, Vol. 84 (1975): 3–22; The Nature of Morality: An Introduction to Ethics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977); and “Moral Relativism,” in Moral Relativism and Moral Objectivity, Gilbert Harman and Judith Jarvis Thomson (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 1996): 3–64. What I say here is mainly based on the view as developed in “Moral Relativism Defended.”
- 63.
Harman, “Moral Relativism Defended”: 3.
- 64.
Ibid.
- 65.
Charles Sanders Peirce, Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce, ed. Charles Hartshorne and Paul Weiss (1931), Vol. 5: Par. 5.9 (1905).
- 66.
James puts it thus: The true is “the name of whatever proves itself to be good in the way of belief, and good, too, for definite assignable reasons” (William James, Pragmatism and the Meaning of Truth, 42 [Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1978]).
- 67.
Charles S. Peirce, “How to Make Our Ideas Clear,” 5: 388–410. Peirce in fact says a number of things, with dubious compatibility, about what he means by truth. Sometimes he sounds quite realist, e.g., “Every man is fully satisfied that there is such a thing as truth, or he would not ask any question. That truth consists in a conformity to something independent of his thinking it to be so, or of any man’s opinion on that subject” (Collected Papers: 5.211; author’s emphasis); and “Truth [is] overwhelmingly forced upon the mind in experience as the effect of an independent reality” (Collected Papers: 5.564; my insertion). Peirce quotations here from Susan Haack, ed., Pragmatism Old and New (New York: Prometheus Books, 2006): 677. I should note that James too sometimes sounds rather realist: see, e.g., his comments about truth in “The Will to Believe,” delivered to the Philosophical Clubs of Yale and Brown Universities; reprinted in Essays in Pragmatism, edited by Albury Castell, New York: Hafner Publishing Co., 1948 [1896]: 88–109.
- 68.
See John Dewey, “Reconstruction in Philosophy,” in John Dewey: The Middle Works, 1899–1924, Vol. 12, 1920: 77–201; 156.
- 69.
Richard Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (Princeton University Press, 1979): 176. I should note that rarely if ever does pragmatism lapse into a thoroughly implausible radical subjectivism. All of the great pragmatists had far too much respect for the efficacy of collective human inquiry, and far too much respect for the efficacy of science in particular, to allow this to happen. Rorty would be an exception regarding science, if indeed he qualifies as a great pragmatist. Dewey and Peirce are certainly great pragmatists, and are exemplars of pragmatist admiration for science. On Dewey and science, and the implications of science for traditional epistemology, see my The End of Epistemology (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1992): Ch. 2.
- 70.
I discuss this issue in “Moral Facts and the Centrality of Intuitions”; and also in Knowing Moral Truth, esp. Ch. 2. We will look much more carefully at truth in Chapter 4.
- 71.
Using terminology owing to William P. Alston, after the Greek word for truth, ‘aletheia’ . See Alston, A Realist Conception of Truth (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996); and his “Realism and the Tasks of Epistemology,” in Realism/Antirealism and Epistemology, ed. Christopher B. Kulp (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1997): 53–94.
- 72.
The spirit of views of this type grows out of Charles Darwin, The Descent of Man (London: Penguin, 2004 [1871]), especially the chapter entitled, “On the Development of the Intellectual and Moral Faculties of Civilized Times of Man.”
- 73.
Nevertheless, I think that most of us would agree that evolution surely has had a bearing on our normative perspective—on our strong inclination to value human life; on our social and political averseness to pain and suffering, especially when inflicted upon those about whom we care; on our pro tanto approval of cooperative behavior; etc.
- 74.
We will refine our conceptions of the natural and the physical in Chapter 5.
- 75.
Any such judgment depends, of course, on humans being essentially “what they are.” Were we substantially different biologically, moral judgment would need to reflect this. Thus, X might be bad for us in any practically conceivable embedment, but not were we organisms differently constituted.
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Kulp, C.B. (2019). Ordinary Morality and Its Detractors. In: Metaphysics of Morality. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-23410-2_2
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