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Profit, Interest, Rent, and Fictitious Profit

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Financial Speculation and Fictitious Profits

Abstract

In the light of some phenomena that have gained world importance in the recent decades, such as the exponential growth of derivatives markets and the relevance assumed by intellectual property, Mauricio de S. Sabadini and Gustavo M. de C. Mello seek to conceptualize the different forms of income of the capital on the basis of the Marxian analyses of the categories of profit, interest, and ground rent. Articulated to the tendency of increasing rate and means of exploitation of the labor force in the midst of a reconfiguration of the international division of labor, the authors seek to debate the category of fictitious profits, pari passu to the expansion of the fictitious forms of capital. Against this background a critical dialog with some representative theories about financialization is established.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Available at https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG

  2. 2.

    Cf. https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NE.GDI.FTOT.KD.ZG

  3. 3.

    There will be no discussion here of a third dimension of capital subsumption, which, in its totalitarian impetus, is to advance the various dimensions of social life. In this, cultural industry can be considered as the cultural form of capital (Adorno and Horkheimer 2002), and the modern state as its political form (Pashukanis 2003).

  4. 4.

    For the theme of this item, cf. Chap. 5 of this book.

  5. 5.

    “Capital in general, as distinct from individual capitals, does indeed appear (1) only as an abstraction; not an arbitrary abstraction but one which grasps the specific differences which distinguish capital from all other forms of wealth or modes in which (social) production develops. These are determinations which are common to every capital as such, or which make any specific sum of values into capital [...]. But (2) capital in general is itself a real existence distinct from individual real capitals [...]. While on the one hand the general is therefore only a set of specific differences in thought, it is at the same time a particular real form alongside the form of the particular and individual” (Marx 1993, p. 449). Furthermore, “we can see that each individual capitalist, just like the totality of all capitalists in each particular sphere of production, participates in the exploitation of the entire working class by capital as a whole, and in the level of this exploitation” (Marx 1991, p. 298).

  6. 6.

    On the importance of the circulation of total social capital to the understanding of the process of autonomization of the functional forms of capital and for the analysis of financialization, cf. Chap. 5 of this book.

  7. 7.

    As explained in Chap. 5, despite this autonomization, at a concrete level, individual capitals represent the most distinct functions related to the production and circulation of capital, especially in a context of the intense centralization of capital and the intensification of competition for the appropriation of abstract wealth in the form of interest, dividends and rent, as will be seen below.

  8. 8.

    “Did not the introduction of our present banks, in its day, revolutionise the conditions of production? Would large-scale modern industry have become possible without this new financial institution, without the concentration of credit which it created, without the state revenues which it created in antithesis to ground rent, without finance in antithesis to landed property, without the moneyed interest in antithesis to the landed interest; without these things could there have been stock companies etc., and the thousand forms of circulating paper which are as much the preconditions as the product of modern commerce and modern industry?” (Marx 1993, p. 122).

  9. 9.

    “The form of interest-bearing capital makes any definite and regular monetary revenue appear as the interest on a capital, whether it actually derives from a capital or not. Money income is first transformed into interest, and with the interest we then have the capital from which it derives” (Marx 1991, p. 595). Or even, “any regular periodic income can be capitalised by, reckoning it up, on the basis of the average rate of interest, as the sum that a capital lent out at this interest rate would yield” (Marx 1991, p. 597).

  10. 10.

    In our view, Sotiropoulos and Lapatsioras (2014, p. 91) are mistaken in considering that, “interest-bearing capital is fictitious capital”.

  11. 11.

    Cf. Chap. 8 of this book.

  12. 12.

    Another of these impulses was the gradual monopolization of the task of providing credit to government by large banking institutions, fuelling public debt, a powerful lever for capital accumulation, under which the modern credit system was built (Marx 1990, Ch. 24).

  13. 13.

    Cf. Prado (2016) and Chap. 4 of this book.

  14. 14.

    For a detailed analysis of the recent evolution of derivatives and the different forms of fictitious capital, cf. Chap. 8 of this book. By way of illustration, it should be noted that the sum of banking assets and other financial institutions reached approximately US$ 84.8 trillion in 2017, according to BIS estimates, and that in the same year the global stock market exceeded US$ 79.2 trillion, with world GDP of US$ 80.7 trillion, according to World Bank estimates (cf. https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD)

  15. 15.

    Incidentally, secondary markets give rise to vigorous arbitrage and leverage operations, since the initial margins required for such transactions are rather low. Thus, such markets have an extreme speculative character. The competition there is so fierce that it is heavily invested in fiber optic networks and in the automation of operations, since the window of time to arbitrate with the prices of financial assets tends to reduce each time smaller fractions of a second (Paraná 2019).

  16. 16.

    “In other words, capitalisation is not possible unless there is some specification of risk, that is to say, unless specific events are objectified, accessed, and estimated as risks” (Sotiropoulos and Lapatsioras 2014, p. 93).

  17. 17.

    In a sense Braga et al. (2017) have a point when they see a contemporary process of financialization, understood as, “a systemic pattern of wealth that has a distinctive feature relative to previous stages of capitalism: the increasing share of financial assets in contemporary wealth. To be more specific: financialization, as a systemic pattern of wealth, establishes new ways of defining, managing and realising the wealth, which affects the spending decisions of the main economic actors, impacts economic policies and thus the ups and downs of business cycles, as well as leading to crises” (Braga et al. 2017, p. 830). Further on there some divergences in relation to this approach will be explained.

  18. 18.

    As Marx exemplifies in the first chapter of Capital (1990, p. 202), if, for instance, one branch of production receives many investments, even if under adequate technical and organizational conditions, so that total output exceeds demand, there is a waste of resources, and it is as if more work had been mobilized than socially necessary.

  19. 19.

    “This much is clear, then, which already follows from the difference introduced by fixed capital into the industrial cycle, namely that it engages the production of subsequent years, and just as it contributes to the creation of a large revenue, it anticipates future labour as a counter-value. The anticipation of future fruits of labour is therefore in no way a consequence of state debt, etc., in short, not an invention of the credit system. It has its roots in the specific mode of realisation, mode of turnover, mode of reproduction of fixed capital” (Marx 1992, p. 731–2).

  20. 20.

    This does not mean, as has already been pointed out, that fictitious forms of capital are absolutely autonomous in relation to the effective value accumulation process, but this point will be duly considered in the next item of the text.

  21. 21.

    “The counterpart to the growth of fictitious capital relative to wealth produced is financial profits’ increasing share of overall profits. But these financial profits are not themselves fictitious. Paid in hard cash, they have all the attributes of monetary power, firstly in terms of what is usually called purchasing power – the immediate drawing rights on wealth produced” (Durand 2017, p. 155).

  22. 22.

    “Financial profits give life to value but do not result from value production. We should thus conceive of them as transfers of income away from those activities that do produce value – that is, the revenues that come from labour and/or profits drawn from the production of goods and services” (Durand 2017, p. 156).

  23. 23.

    In this text, fictitious capital is discussed as forms of founder’s profits, differential and fictitious, and presents the similarities and differences between the last two.

  24. 24.

    Comprehensive empirical studies by authors such as Maito (2016), Roberts (2016), Jones (2014), and those of Kliman (2012) and Choonara (2018), specifically on the American economy, to name but a few, state that since the end of the 1960s there has been a significant tendency to increase capital appreciation (or exploitation) rates, to increase the organic composition of capital, to accelerate capital turnover and to lower average rates of profit, the sting in the tail of capitalist production. We will return to this.

  25. 25.

    That occurs by “outsourcing” business activities, in which a given company starts to contract other independent companies for the supply of goods and the provision of services, and for the establishment of productive units of the company itself in other countries.

  26. 26.

    That process thus contributes to the spread of piece-work wages (Marx 1990, Ch. 21) and the elimination of formal and stable labour ties. This is particularly true in the case of “uberization”, the profusion of applications that leave workers available virtually full-time for bosses and customers, while serving as efficient mechanisms for controlling the work done.

  27. 27.

    The so-called immaterial theorists, like André Gorz and Antônio Negri, besides confusing the category of service with that of immaterial labor, improperly amplifying the scope of the latter, falling back on the fetishistic illusion of confusing the nature of social relations with its material substrates (Prado 2005). It is the “fetishistic notion, peculiar to the capitalist mode of production and its derivation from its essence, that the formal economic determinations, such as that of being a commodity, or being productive labour, etc., are qualities belonging to the material repositories of these formal determinations or categories in and for themselves” (Marx 1993, p. 450). These misconceptions allow such authors to propose that capitalism would have surpassed abstract labour as the substance of value, precisely the opposite of what happens with the even greater universalization of the real subsumption of labour to capital. The indistinction between production and appropriation of surplus value, between value and exchange value, and the absence of an analysis of the Marxian ground rent categories, among others, charge a high price in these “theories”.

  28. 28.

    Durand (2017) notes that, “the spectacular boom in credit to the non-financial private sector has been a general phenomenon since the 1970’s. If at that time it amounted to 72 per cent of the average GDP, this figure had risen to 174 per cent by 2007” (p. 115).

  29. 29.

    To cite just a few: the New York Stock Exchange crisis in 1987, the pound crisis in 1992, the Mexican peso crisis in 1995, the Asian Tigers crisis in 1997, the Rubel crisis in 1998, the Real crisis in 1999, the Argentine peso crisis in 2001, the dot.com crisis in 2001, the 2007–8 subprime crisis, as well as the European sovereign debt crisis that followed. Despite speculative attacks and bubble bursting, such crises have had devastating economic and social impacts, which again points to the imbrication between the fictitious and real dimensions of accumulation.

  30. 30.

    “This fictitious money capital is enormously reduced during crises, and with it the power of its owners to use it to borrow money in the market. The reduction in the money value of these securities on the stock exchange has, however, nothing to do with the real capital that they represent. As against this, it has a lot to do with the solvency of their owners” (Marx 1991, p. 625).

  31. 31.

    In his words, “Finally, by the prevalence of a monopoly price in many cases, and particularly the most shameless exploitation of poverty (for poverty is a more fruitful source for house-rent than the mines of Potosi were for Spain), the tremendous power this gives landed property when it is combined together with industrial capital in the same hands enables capital practically to exclude workers engaged in a struggle over wages from the very earth itself as their habitat” (Marx 1991, p. 908).

  32. 32.

    Here too, cf. Chap. 8 of this book.

  33. 33.

    Without neglecting the long history of the process of business conglomeration, Chesnais (2016) analyzes in detail this contemporary process of concentration and centralization of capital, forming what he calls financial capital, bringing together the giants of industry, retail and wholesale, and of finance. According to Durand (2017), “we can observe that, on the eve of the current crisis, just 147 companies concentrated some 40% of the value of all multinationals, and even these were themselves dominated by a core of eighteen financial entities” (p. 170).

  34. 34.

    In addition to the extraordinary magnitude reached by these conglomerates, attention must be paid to the fact that they are linked through complex financing and investment strategies, including cross-ownership. Incidentally, sometimes the purchase of shares does not matter as an investment per se, but rather assures the buyer of information about specific markets and the strategies of their current and potential competitors.

  35. 35.

    “By maintaining a tight monetary policy and forcing an overvaluation of the dollar, the Fed has in practice retaken control of its own banks and the rest of the international private banking system and linked the interests of the herd to its advantage. Interest rate and exchange rate fluctuations were again tied to the dollar, and through them the international liquidity movement was put at the service of American fiscal policy” (Tavares 1997, p. 34). In addition, “The ‘macroeconomic equilibrium’ of the world economy, given the generalised ‘dollarisation’ of the credit system, obliges most countries to practice restrictive monetary and fiscal policies and to obtain increasing trade surpluses to compensate for the global deficit situation of the hegemonic power” (Tavares 1997, p. 36).

  36. 36.

    “The policy-decisions of the US and UK governments to liberalise financial markets were based upon them seeing the financial sector as a key area of the global economy in which they had a competitive advantage. This advantage is based upon the British and US imperialist role in the world-economy, and it was an important option for them, especially given how difficult it was to try and regain industrial competitiveness” (Norfield 2012, p. 112).

  37. 37.

    For a bibliographic review of these studies, cf. Auvray e Rabinovich (2019).

  38. 38.

    In a recent report by The Economist on the process of the concentration and centralization of capital in various branches of production, one concludes that, “the American economy has become a capitalist dystopia, a system of extraction by ingrained giants. The increasing protectionism and increased digitisation are likely to make things worse. The stakes are high” (The Economist 2018). Contrary to what the report implies, as we have seen, it is not about aberrations or deviations, but about necessary expressions of the dynamic contradiction of capital accumulation. The expanded reproduction of capital engenders barbarism, violence, and destruction on a magnified and intensified scale; it is its own sickness.

  39. 39.

    “Our results confirm the nexus as the financial payouts variables were significant for firms belonging to industries with the highest level of offshoring only. For corporations that distribute financial payouts at the expense of their capital accumulation, the real source of the cash distributed to shareholders should be found in GVCs” (Auvray and Rabinovich 2019, p. 33).

  40. 40.

    Some of his discoveries around the north-American economy are synthesized by him as follows: “(i) The ratio of intangible assets to the capital stock increased in general. This increase is highest for firms in high-technology, healthcare, nondurables and telecommunications, (ii) Industries with higher intangible asset ratios have lower investment to profit ratios, (iii) Industries with higher intangible asset ratios have higher mark-ups and profit- ability. [...] Yet, intangible-intensive industries’ profitability has increased faster than their share of investment or total assets. All in all, these findings are in line with the suggestion that the increased use of intangible assets enables firms to have high profitability without a corresponding increase in investment” (Orhangazi 2018, p. 1).

  41. 41.

    This has its origins in the Monthly Review school, that includes the great reference the work of Paul Sweezy and the durable Braudelian world-system perspective, emphasizing Giovanni Arrighi (to which one could add other, fairly heterogeneous, currents of Marxism from theoretical figures as different as François Chesnais, Robert Brenner, Robert Kurz, among others).

  42. 42.

    “It suggests that non-financial corporations of rich economies have been able to capture gains from the dynamism of developing economies and, at the same time, that investment opportunities in the developing world have discouraged domestic investment. The econometric results are consistent with this thesis” (Durand and Gueuder 2016, p. 24).

  43. 43.

    “The interaction between finance and the rest of the economy is mediated by a complex set of institutional structures that often reflect historical, political, customary and even cultural factors” (Lapavitsas 2013a, b, p. 799).

  44. 44.

    The authors point out, that to understand the growth of financial profits it is necessary to consider the role of the state , particularly with regard to the deregulation of financial markets the provision of abundant “liquidity” in financial markets and the maintenance of low interest rates, especially in the context of economic crises, which is, to a large extent, made possible by, “monopoly command over the final means of payment, which is no longer convertible by law into anything of produced value” (p. 8). It is not possible to discuss this important phenomenon here, which is an expression of the process of the autonomization of capital, but it is considered in Chap. 5, and especially in Chap. 8 of this book.

  45. 45.

    This form of spoliation could compete to raise the average rate of profit by reducing the magnitude of variable capital and channeling that mass of value thus released to the process of accumulation (CARCHEDI 2011).

  46. 46.

    If the channeling of capital to the financial markets occurs, to the detriment of their productive use, a counter to the fall in the rate of profits would emerge because this channeling, “prevents an increase in the organic composition of capital, and hence, a decrease in the rate of profit for a limited time. Put plainly, financialisation postpones the tendency for the rate of profit to fall” (Duman 2014, p. 244).

  47. 47.

    Resulting from the tendency to a fall in the rate of profit, Marx says, “the mass of small fragmented capitals are thereby forced onto adventurous paths: speculation, credit swindles, share swindles, crises” (Marx 1991, p. 359).

  48. 48.

    According to Lapatsioras et al. (2010), a “basic weakness” of this type of critique is that, “it is at the same time the link that holds them together – is that they represent the neoliberal formula for securing profitability of capital not as a question of producing surplus value but as a question of income redistribution pertaining essentially to the sphere of circulation. It thus appears that the developmental “ineptitude” and the instability of present-day capitalism are the result of a certain ‘insatiability’, or at any rate of bad regulation, in the relations governing income. Are we in the final analysis all Keynesians?” (Lapatsioras et al. 2010, p. 3). In a similar vein, Norfield (2012), propounds that, “simply to oppose finance, banks or derivatives is to miss the point that this is a single, integrated system of exploitation” (p. 129).

  49. 49.

    As Roberts (2018) sardonically recalls, if they do not want to listen to Marx, the reformist critics of financialization should at least listen to Joan Robinson, when she said that, “any government which had both the power and will to remedy the major defects of the capitalist system would have the will and power to abolish it altogether”.

  50. 50.

    It should be remembered that José Carlos Braga employs the notion of financial dominance in a pioneering way; in 1985, he had already said that, “Accumulation and competition operate under the dominance of the financial logic [...]. [No] it is more a question of capitalists using financial intermediation for a production process that is the means of accumulation [and seek to] simultaneously value themselves through the process of income (linked directly to production) and the capitalisation process” (Braga 1985, pp. 374–5). More recently, he argues that, “in contemporary capitalism, according to our hypothesis, financialisation is the systemic pattern of wealth” (Braga 1997, p. 195).

  51. 51.

    Paulani (2016), whose effort to mobilize Marxian rent analyses to understand contemporaneity, rightly concludes, concludes that, “the importance of rescuing Marx’s rent theory lies in showing that the foundation of several of the phenomena that have characterised the current stage of capitalism, and which we have tried to articulate in the summary of the regime of accumulation we have just presented, are in the same place where they have always been: the old and well-known unpaid labour, however much knowledge has actually grown in the productive process, no matter how brands and patents come to pontificate against conventional assets, even though finance seems to dispense with effective production” (p. 24).

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Mello, G.M.d.C., Sabadini, M.d.S. (2019). Profit, Interest, Rent, and Fictitious Profit. In: Mello, G., Sabadini, M. (eds) Financial Speculation and Fictitious Profits. Marx, Engels, and Marxisms. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-23360-0_7

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