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Non-majoritarian Institutions, Conditionality and Domestic Reform

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The Depoliticisation of Greece’s Public Revenue Administration

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Abstract

The purpose of this chapter is twofold. First, it places this reform in its broader context, i.e. the increasing use of non-majoritarian institutions and executive agencies that operate at arm’s length from the government in advanced liberal democracies (and beyond). This reform exemplifies this trend. The key element of this reform—and the central idea behind it—is the notion of depoliticisation. The first section of this chapter explores this notion. The second section discusses the logic that underpins the increasing use of these institutions, and then highlights their limitations, especially in terms of design, accountability and effectiveness. The chapter’s second purpose is to set out the logic of the key tool (conditionality) used for the purpose of bringing about this domestic reform in Greece. The final section discusses the logic of conditionality, sets out its main characteristics in the European Union’s context and then presents the three hypotheses that are examined empirically in the remainder of this book.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    For a useful overview, see Buller et al. (2019).

  2. 2.

    This ‘post-politics’ argument has been challenged empirically (Dean 2013; Hay 2007) and an array of scholars—including Mouffe, Žižek and Rancière—discuss ways out of it although, as Buller et al. note (2019: 8) the systemic nature of depoliticisation seen in this vein, means that change appears to require a revolution.

  3. 3.

    It is also akin to what Wood and Flinders call ‘governmental depoliticisation ’ (Flinders and Wood 2014: 145).

  4. 4.

    For a discussion of their emergence in Europe (see Thatcher 2002: 126ff.). As regards the motivation for delegation in parliamentary democracies, see Strøm (2003).

  5. 5.

    In the area of monetary policy, this relates to the fixed rules versus discretion dilemma (Kydland and Prescott 1977).

  6. 6.

    One could also mention two additional rationales, namely the need for efficiency (with politicians dealing with the broad terms of policy while NMIs deal with narrow, specific issues and problems) and blame avoidance when it comes to unpopular policies (Thatcher and Stone Sweet 2002: 4) but they are arguably more specific forms of the need for expertise and policy credibility , respectively.

  7. 7.

    In Central and Eastern Europe, the enactment of laws that sought to insulate the civil service from political interference did not stop such interference (Meyer-Sahling 2004: 72).

  8. 8.

    These were as follows: ‘does the job need to be done at all (e.g. cuts)? Does the government have to be responsible for it (e.g. privatisation )? Does the government have to carry out the task itself (e.g. market testing)? Is the organisation properly structured and focused on the job to be done (e.g. agencification)?’ (Rhodes 1996: 7–8).

  9. 9.

    See Majone (1996: 12–13) on the one that occurred in the USA since the passage of the Administrative Procedures Act (APA) in 1946.

  10. 10.

    This has to do with a myriad of factors including conditionality’s relationship with justice (European Network on Debt and Development 2006) and democracy (Montinola 2007).

  11. 11.

    Here we are referring to the provision of international aid. The use of conditionality within the EU is not new (see the next sub-section).

  12. 12.

    For a useful overview, see Spanou (2016).

  13. 13.

    Koeberle notes (2003: 255–256) that more conditions ‘tend to be negatively correlated with ratings for adjustment loan outcomes’.

  14. 14.

    Differences in time horizons also characterize the two central organisations with which the Greek authorities had to deal in the context of the crisis. While the IMF is used to acting in an aid-receiving country over a short period of 2–3 years, for the EU ‘Greece is part of the family’, as a senior official put in at a meeting held in London in January 2018 under the Chatham House rule.

  15. 15.

    This is the standard model in the study of World Bank- or IMF -related programmes (see, e.g. Haggard and Webb 1994) and it is also a key feature of the literature on Europeanisation (Hix and Goetz 2000).

  16. 16.

    As Schimmelfenning and Sedelmaier (2005a, b: 11) note other alternative strategies include reinforcement by punishment (which entails inflicting costs for non-compliance) and reinforcement by support (through the provision of additional benefits).

  17. 17.

    On the contrary, the first model highlights the important of rewards offered by the EU while the second underlines the role of its efforts at persuading domestic actors.

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  1. Department of Politics, Birkbeck, University of London, London, UK

    Dionyssis Dimitrakopoulos

  2. Department of International, European and Area Studies, Panteion University of Social and Political Sciences, Athens, Greece

    Argyris Passas

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Dimitrakopoulos, D., Passas, A. (2020). Non-majoritarian Institutions, Conditionality and Domestic Reform. In: The Depoliticisation of Greece’s Public Revenue Administration. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-23213-9_2

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