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More Pluralism, or Continued Authoritarianism?

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Cuba, From Fidel to Raúl and Beyond

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Abstract

This is the first of three chapters attempting to analyse how the political arena has evolved during the period studied in this book, including the expected impact of the 2019 constitutional reform. We are asking whether there is increasing space for pluralism in civil society, the academic world and the media, and what role the churches are playing. We are distinguishing between dissenters—working for the overthrow of the regime—and what we call ‘the grey zone’ of actors working for more reform and dialogue. The impact of migration reform and the informatics revolution is assessed, including on the role of independent information actors. Can we see the emergence of agents of change? The other side of this coin is whether there are signs of decreasing political authoritarianism, based on an assessment of new patterns of pluralism, ideology, mobilisation and leadership.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    We will in the following take the existing 1976 Constitution as point of departure and point out the modifications in the new 2019 Constitution 2018 (all quotes are translated by the author (S/E)). We will make some more general remarks on the constitutional reform process in a later section as part of a discussion about possible new ideological trends.

  2. 2.

    It is interesting to note that this text, by “recognizing” and “stimulating” “social organizations” representing “specific interests” of the “different sectors on the population”, if permitted to be free of State and Party control, would take the country a long way towards establishing what we discussed in Chap. 5 about more autonomous interest representation through ‘economic society’. It is important to remember that the new Constitution has been formulated by a very different society, where economic interests have become much more differentiated. The implication of “specific interests” is very different in 2019 from what it was in 1976.

  3. 3.

    Article 39 of the original proposal for the 2019 Constitution, in fact established such domestication for those treaties ratified by Cuba: “the inalienable, indivisible and interdependent exercise of human rights … are interpreted in accordance with the international human rights treaties ratified by Cuba”. The approved text is much more restrictive, stating that ratified treaties “are part of the national legal system”, but subordinated to the Cuban Constitution.

  4. 4.

    During the session, no less than 143 countries made statements, questions and/or recommendations to Cuba, and a total of 339 recommendations had to be examined by the Cuban Government. The responses (“noted” or “supported”) gave no concrete concessions, and can be found here: https://www.upr-info.org/database/index.php?limit=0&f_SUR=42&f_SMR=All&order=&orderDir=ASC&orderP=true&f_Issue=All&searchReco=&resultMax=300&response=&action_type=&session=&SuRRgrp=&SuROrg=&SMRRgrp=&SMROrg=&pledges=RecoOnly.

  5. 5.

    “Exigen al Gobierno cubano cesar hostigamiento a relatores de la ONU”, CubaNet, 13 March 2018; http://www.14ymedio.com/nacional/Gobierno-escala-prohibiciones-viajes-opositores_0_2417158266.html.

  6. 6.

    EFE, 11 May 2018: http://www.14ymedio.com/internacional/ONU-Cuba-bloquear-activistas-derechos_0_2434556526.html.

  7. 7.

    40% of the population had access to Internet in mid-2018; a quite dramatic increase from the negligible access ten years earlier; and a significant increase from 25% in 2015 (downloaded from Wikipedia, 23 January 2019). Cuba is the only country in the Americas reporting a 100% adult literacy rate, according to the World Bank: http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SE.ADT.LITR.ZS/countries. It is not known how many of these were subscriptions opened by tourists or diaspora Cubans (14ymedio, 12 April 2018: http://www.14ymedio.com/cienciaytecnologia/Cuba-millones-moviles-America-Latina_0_2417158264.html).

  8. 8.

    250,000 daily users, according to national telecom company Etecsa, November 2016.

  9. 9.

    This is still, by far, the lowest rate in the Western Hemisphere (44 per 100 inhabitants, but up from 22 in 2014), only better off than four other countries: North Korea, Eritrea, Central African Republic and South Sudan (according to World Bank statistics). A country like Vietnam has 128 mobile phone subscriptions per 100 inhabitants, China has 97.

  10. 10.

    In 2018, the pressure became so unbearable that the Directors of Cuba Posible seriously planned to leave the country.

  11. 11.

    A very worrisome account of these trends was reported by the Directors of Cuba Posible (Vega and Gonzales), themselves subject to personal threats, in an interview in February 2018. “Over the latest year, ‘the grey zone’ has almost been wiped out in Cuba”, they claim.

  12. 12.

    “Sobre la transición socialista en Cuba: Un simposio” (2007): Temas: 51–52, 126–162.

  13. 13.

    Former Minister of Economy (1998–2009) José Luís Rodríguez is probably the only case of an ex-minister or persons with a similarly ranking background, who retreated to an academic position from where to take part in academic debate (he confirmed this himself to the author in May 2018). More recently, Humberto Pérez, economic czar for ten years when he was Minister-President of Junta Central de Planificación (1976–1985) and Vice President of the Council of Ministers, re-appeared in academic discussions, after he had retired. He was an advocate of pro-market reforms with peasant markets and major enterprise autonomy—reforms supposedly supported by Raúl Castro—before Fidel Castro sacked him as part of a ‘rectification campaign’.

  14. 14.

    These observations are based on a large number of conversations, over many years, with economists e.g. at the prominent pro-reform Center for the Study of the Cuban Economy (CEEC), and similar institutions. An interesting and possibly new opening in this regard was noted in President Díaz-Canel’s speech in mid-June 2019 to a Congress of economists: “I read continuously the analyzes and questions that have begun to proliferate in the networks in the last months, and I understand and share the anguish of those who, honestly, want to speed up solutions of the biggest problems. In that we agree absolutely (...) we value the criteria and take their validity into account in what we decide and plan, although I know that some expect more, perhaps a public acknowledgment that you are right.” (S/E). (Díaz-Canel: «La tarea fundamental de la Revolución hoy es la economía»Discurso pronunciado por Miguel M. Díaz-Canel Bermúdez, Presidente de los Consejos de Estado y de Ministros, en la clausura del VIII Congreso de la Asociación Nacional de Economistas y Contadores de Cuba. Granma, 15.06.19)

  15. 15.

    See the extensive interviews presented in Terrero (2014). The fact that the website Cubaprofunda, and thereby implicitly the Ministry of Culture gave so much attention to these critical economists is a good illustration of the degree of criticism being tolerated and perhaps even encouraged by those within the power structures who were promoting the economic reforms in Cuba.

  16. 16.

    “En Cuba hay que hablar seria y profundamente sobre desigualdad”, Revista Temas (La Habana), Interview with Ricardo Torres Pérez, 4 September 2018: http://temas.cult.cu/catalejo/en-cuba-hay-que-hablar-seria-y-profundamente-sobre-desigualdad.

  17. 17.

    Ernesto Pérez Chang (2016): “La propiedad privada sigue siendo el demonio.” Article dated 26.01.2016, reproduced in ASCE News No. 695, 28 January 2016, quoting an interview with “a prominent researcher” at the CEEC, whose identity “for reasons of security” is not revealed.

  18. 18.

    OnCuba presents itself as “a communication platform legally based in Havana through a press Bureau, recognised by the Center for International Press (CPI) of the Cuban Ministry for Foreign Affairs … owned by public US company”. OnCuba Magazine (www.oncubamagazine.com) is a printed magazine in English with abstracts in Spanish. Its 22,000 copies are bimonthly distributed in the US and “also travels onboard of almost all the flights from the US to Cuba”. Then Vice-President Díaz-Canel in February 2017, however, threatened that the magazine would disappear. This did not happen, but the magazine’s Cuban-American Havana correspondents (who had their office in a building belonging to the Council of State) have felt obliged to leave the country. It has been pointed out that this magazine may represent an important bridge to the US that may be particularly useful under President Trump.

  19. 19.

    See list of relevant publications under the Appendix Sources.

  20. 20.

    The document was reproduced, along with several discussion articles, in the Catholic journal Espacio Laical no. 3, 2013, a journal that in principle is distributed through all Catholic churches in Cuba. The document was also reproduced and commented by several prominent intellectuals on the website of the cultural magazine Temas, issued with support from the Ministry of Culture.

  21. 21.

    The author followed the events around the departure of the former editors of Espacio Laical, and their decision to set up Cuba Posible, at close range because of collaboration with this group. These events reflected a decision by the Catholic hierarchy in Cuba, with support from and perhaps led by the former Vatican Nuncio (Ambassador) to Havana. This happened before Pope Francis took over as the Head of the Vatican, but little has in fact changed since.

  22. 22.

    14ymedio, 27 June 2016: http://www.14ymedio.com/nacional/arzobispo-Habana-quiere-socialismo-progrese_0_2024797511.html.

  23. 23.

    Three Catholic priests in an open letter to President Castro on 24 January 2018, also urging the Pope to speak out: “Sacerdotes cubanos llevan al Papa su petición de democracia y elecciones libres”. CadenaSer.com Internacional, 06 February 2018. One of these priests, José Conrado Rodríguez, has been a long-time well-known human rights critic of the Cuban government, particularly when he was the parish priest of Palma Soriano, close to Santiago, where he was accused of bringing young people into opposition activities (see e.g. Padraza 2007).

  24. 24.

    One example of this was the blog called Periodismo de Barrio, led by Elaine Díaz, with the purpose of reporting on communities affected by natural disasters. Winner of the prestigious Harvard University Nieman scholarship for investigative journalism, she was first officially mentioned as a constructive alternative to what pro-government sources termed ‘cyber-terrorists’. But in connection with her coverage of hurricane Matthew’s devastating impact in Baracoa and neighbouring communities in September 2016, she and her colleagues were detained and deported to the capital, with reference to the existing state of emergency. The message was clear: the official media does not want any alternative journalism in a situation of emergency.

  25. 25.

    “Yoani Sanchez Talks About Cuba’s ‘Changes’”. The Havana Times, 14 June 2016: http://www.havanatimes.org/?p=119362.

  26. 26.

    “Carta de protesta del Comité de Base de la UJC del diario ‘Vanguardia’”, published and commented in Diario de Cuba, 01 July 2016.

  27. 27.

    Diario de Cuba (DDC), 15 July 2018.

  28. 28.

    See Cameron (2016) for a good discussion on this struggle.

  29. 29.

    https://rsf.org/en/cuba, 2017 edition, ranking Cuba as no. 173 out of 180 countries on its “Press Freedom Index” (but with a score well ahead that of both Vietnam and China). The same organisation also publishes a list of ‘internet enemies’, where Cuba appears as one of 12 countries (also Vietnam and China among them). It is noteworthy, though, that no journalist was killed or disappeared in Cuba, different from other Latin American countries with a much better position on this ranking.

  30. 30.

    Skype interview 21 January 2018 with Norges Rodríguez, temporarily residing in the US.

  31. 31.

    The project managed to collect more than the minimum 10,000 signatures required to demand a referendum on a proposal for a constitutional reform that would have introduced a series of civic and political freedoms in Cuba, later rejected by the National Assembly.

  32. 32.

    https://cubadecide.org.

  33. 33.

    14ymedio, 11 April 2018: http://translatingcuba.com/paya-award-winners-former-presidents-in-support-of-democracy/.

  34. 34.

    “Antonio Rodiles, opositor cubano: ‘Donald Trump es buena noticia para Cuba’”. El País, 24 December 2016. As an example of the widening space even for an unconditional enemy of the regime like Rodiles, this interview was made in Miami, after his visit to Madrid, after which he returned safely to Havana (where he is the victim of constant harassment and detentions, but still carries on his political activism). Very interestingly, it was Rodiles’ organisation Estado de Sats that managed to get hold of the infamous video of Miguel Díaz-Canel from February 2017. Many observers are asking themselves how this could happen, and whether this had been possible without some kind of links between his organisation and the Cuban intelligence.

  35. 35.

    http://ccdhrn.org/informes-mensuales-de-represion-politica/.

  36. 36.

    This is the explanation given by the two directors of Cuba Posible, interviewed in February 2018.

  37. 37.

    In its 2017/2018 report on Cuba, AI summarised the human rights situation in the following way: “Arbitrary detentions, discriminatory dismissals from state jobs, and harassment in self-employment continued to be used to silence criticism. Advances in education were undermined by ongoing online and offline censorship. Cuba remained mostly closed to independent human rights monitors”. https://www.amnesty.org/en/countries/americas/cuba/report-cuba/. Regarding prisoners in general, Cuba is number 7 on the list of prisoners per capita in the world (510 per 100,000 inhabitants), a list headed by the US (730). Russia has about the same index as Cuba, while China and Vietnam have much lower figures (see International Centre for Prison Studies: http://www.prisonstudies.org/).

  38. 38.

    In 2018, President Trump announced that the US would withdraw from the Human Rights Council.

  39. 39.

    See: https://theconversation.com/chinas-social-credit-system-puts-its-people-under-pressure-to-be-model-citizens-89963.

  40. 40.

    See: http://www.elnuevoherald.com/opinion-es/article161283643.html; https://cubaposible.com/introduccion-debate-centrismo/.

  41. 41.

    Cubadebate presents itself as “the voice of Periodistas Cubanos contra el Terrorismo, an organisation created … with the purpose of denouncing actions organised and financed by the US government against our country”. Appearing in Spanish and seven other languages, it claims to count with no other resources than the “non-remunerated time and work of its collaborators”. No official link to the Party or Government appears on its pages. President Díaz-Canel said in a TV interview with Telesur that he normally reads the Cubadebate webpage every morning.

  42. 42.

    Iroel Sánchez presents himself as a “Cuban engineer and journalist. Works for the Office for the informatization of the Cuban society. Was previously President of the Instituto Cubano del Libro”.

  43. 43.

    According to well-informed sources, until he took over as President, he was leading a weekly Monday morning meeting to plan the ideological campaigns.

  44. 44.

    The loss of 11 lives during the 2012 hurricane Sandy (http://abcnews.go.com/ABC_Univision/News/hurricane-sandy-leaves-destruction-wake/story?id=17588956), and 10 lives during the 2017 Hurricane Irma; (http://edition.cnn.com/2017/09/11/americas/irma-cuba/index.html), was noted with great concern in a country that normally prides itself with an extraordinary mobilisation capacity avoiding the loss of human lives during natural disasters.

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Bye, V. (2020). More Pluralism, or Continued Authoritarianism?. In: Cuba, From Fidel to Raúl and Beyond. Studies of the Americas. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-21806-5_6

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