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Abstract

Unbridled competition between America and China has serious consequences for regional and international order. These two countries command the world’s largest economies, strongest militaries, and most advanced industrial and technological bases. Their relationship is going to determine the shape of world order in this century, especially in the Asia-Pacific region. A military clash between these titans would be calamitous and tragic for the region, if not the world. Even a cold war would be seriously damaging and certainly forestall the possible evolution of China toward more Democratic forms of governance.

America and China have every good reason to live in harmony and benefit themselves and the world by doing so. No territorial disputes divide them the way they did other great power rivalries that led to war. Neither power believes the other to be intent on attacking it. They disagree on many substantive issues, but none that should cause a rupture, and none whose effects cannot be addressed or softened, or even resolved, by goodwill and effective diplomacy. Yet, in both capitals, there are officials and pundits who think that the two most powerful countries of the twenty-first century are on a collision course. Why is this so and what can be done about it?

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Notes

  1. 1.

    President of the United States, “National Security Strategy of the United States of America” (Washington, DC: The White House, 2017), pp. 25, 45.

  2. 2.

    United States Department of Defense, “Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America: Sharpening the American Military’s Competitive Edge” (Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2018), p. 2.

  3. 3.

    Hannah Beech, “China’s Sea Control Is a Done Deal, ‘Short of War with the U.S.,’” New York Times, September 20, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/20/world/asia/south-china-sea-navy.html (accessed 30 September 2018).

  4. 4.

    The Economist, “China Is Getting Tougher on Taiwan,” January 18, 2018, https://www.economist.com/china/2018/01/18/china-is-getting-tougher-on-taiwan (accessed 1 October 2018).

  5. 5.

    Phil Stewart and Idrees Ali, “At Delicate Moment, U.S. Weighs Warship Passage through Taiwan Strait,” Reuters, June 5, 2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-taiwan-military-exclusive/exclusive-at-delicate-moment-us-weighs-warship-passage-through-taiwan-strait-idUSKCN1J030R (access 30 September 2018).

  6. 6.

    Mark Landler, “Trump Accuses China of Undermining Diplomacy with North Korea,” New York Times, August 29, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/29/us/politics/trump-mattis-north-korea.html (accessed 30 September 2018).

  7. 7.

    Jane Perlez, “China Cancels High-Level Security Talks with the U.S.” New York Times, September 30, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/30/world/asia/china-us-security-mattis.html (accessed 1 October 2018).

  8. 8.

    Jim Tankersley and Keith Bradsher, “Trump Hits China with Tariffs on $200 Billion in Goods, Escalating Trade War,” New York Times, September 17, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/17/us/politics/trump-china-tariffs-trade.html (accessed 30 September 2018).

  9. 9.

    Mark Landler, “Trump Accuses China of Interfering in Midterm Elections,” New York Times, September 26, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/26/world/asia/trump-china-election.html (accessed 3 October 2018).

  10. 10.

    The White House, “Background Briefing by a Senior Administration Official on Chinese Interference,” New York, September 26, 2018; Thomas G. Mahnken, and Toshi Yoshihara, “Countering Comprehensive Coercion: Competitive Strategies Against Authoritarian Political Warfare” (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2018); Josh Rogin, “China’s Interference in U.S. Politics Is Just Beginning,” Washington Post, September 20, 2018, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/global-opinions/chinas-interference-in-us-politics-is-just-beginning/2018/09/20/2b462558-bd0f-11e8-8792-78719177250f_story.html?noredirect=on&utm_term=.a3471d09bb7d (accessed 29 September 2018).

  11. 11.

    Jeffrey Bader, “U.S.-China Relations: Is It Time to End the Engagement?” (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 2018).

  12. 12.

    CNBC, “CNBC Exclusive: CNBC’s Michelle Caruso-Cabrera Interviews Steve Bannon From CNBC Institutional Investor Delivering Alpha Conference,” New York, July 18, 2018, https://www.cnbc.com/2018/07/18/cnbc-exclusive-cnbcs-michelle-caruso-cabrera-interviews-steve-bannon.html (accessed 30 September 2018).

  13. 13.

    Henry Kissinger and J. Stapleton Roy, “‘The Key Problem of Our Time’: A Conversation with Henry Kissinger on Sino-U.S. Relations,” New York, September 20, 2810, https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/the-key-problem-our-time-conversation-henry-kissinger-sino-us-relations (accessed 30 September 2018).

  14. 14.

    John Pomfret, “As China-U.S. Feud Enters Uncharted Territory, Beijing Can Only Blame Itself,” Washington Post, September 26, 2018, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/global-opinions/wp/2018/09/26/as-china-u-s-feud-enters-uncharted-territory-beijing-can-only-blame-itself/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.423ed74fe08d (accessed 29 September 2018).

  15. 15.

    Teddy Ng, “Cold War Mentality Will Harm US-China Relations, Top Diplomat Warns Kissinger,” South China Morning Post, September 26, 2018, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/2165775/cold-war-mentality-will-harm-us-china-relations-top-diplomat (accessed 29 September 2018).

  16. 16.

    Kristin Huang, “China Sets Up Think Tank Alliance to Better Understand US as Trade War Continues,” South China Morning Post, July 17, 2018, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/article/2155678/china-sets-think-tank-alliance-better-understand-us (accessed 1 October 2018).

  17. 17.

    The Economist, “America’s Trade Strategy Has Many Risks and Few Upsides,” March 28, 2018, https://www.economist.com/news/finance-and-economics/21739726-it-undermining-rules-based-trade-order-and-could-start-series (accessed 2 April 2018).

  18. 18.

    Barry Naughton, “Economic Policy under Trade War Conditions: Can China Move Beyond Tit for Tat?” China Leadership Monitor, No. 57 (Fall 2018), pp. 1–12.

  19. 19.

    Javier C. Hernández, “For Xi Jinping, Beijing a Man of the People Means Looking the Part,” New York Times, September 28, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/28/world/asia/xi-jinping-china-propaganda.html (accessed 29 September 2018).

  20. 20.

    Max Weber, Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology, 2 vols. Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich, eds. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), I, pp. 909–11.

  21. 21.

    For a review of this literature, Richard Ned Lebow, “What Can International Relations Theory Learn from the Origins of World War I?” International Relations, 28, no. 4 (2014), pp. 387–411, and “World War I: Recent Historical Scholarship and IR Theory?” International Relations, 28, no. 2 (2014), pp. 245–50.

  22. 22.

    Richard Ned Lebow, A Cultural Theory of International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), ch. 9.

  23. 23.

    Richard Ned Lebow, The Tragic Vision of Politics: Ethics, Interests and Orders (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003).

  24. 24.

    Richard Ned Lebow and Benjamin A. Valentino, “Lost in Transition: A Critique of Power Transition Theories,” International Relations, 23, no. 3 (2009), pp. 389–410; Richard Ned Lebow and Daniel Tompkins, “The Thucydides Claptrap,” Washington Monthly, June 2016.

  25. 25.

    Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein, We All Lost the Cold War (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994); Jian Chen, Mao’s China and the Cold War: Beijing and the Taiwan Strait Crisis of 1958 (Chapel Hill, N.C.: University of North Carolina Press, 2001), ch. 7.

  26. 26.

    Feng Zhang and Richard Ned Lebow, Taming American-Chinese Rivalry (under review).

  27. 27.

    Kurt M. Campbell, The Pivot; The Future of American Statecraft in Asia (Boston: Little Brown, 2016), p. 232.

  28. 28.

    Yuan Peng, “Zhongguo wei lishi nanti xunzhao xin da’an” [China Is Seeking a New Answer to a Historically Difficult Question], Caokao Xiaoxi [Reference News], http://www.guancha.cn/YuanPeng/2016_08_31_372956_s.shtml (accessed 29 March 2018).

  29. 29.

    Author’s interview with Ministry of Foreign Affairs official, Beijing, September 9, 2016.

  30. 30.

    Wang, “Guodu kuozhang,” p. 17.

  31. 31.

    Feng Zhang, “Challenge Accepted: China’s Response to the US Rebalance to the Asia-Pacific,” Security Challenges 12, no. 3 (2016), pp. 45–60.

  32. 32.

    Yuan, “Zhongguo wei lishi nanti xunzhao xin da’an.”

  33. 33.

    Yang Jiemian, “US Rebalance to Asia-Pacific and Sino-US Relations,” speech to the Boao Forum for Asia’s Strategic Planning Workshop, October 15, 2016, http://mp.weixin.qq.com/s?__biz=MzAwODc2MDY2Nw==&mid=2247484038&idx=2&sn=277c9f5425b8da0afaadbb5dbfeeea37&chksm=9b68beb2ac1f37a4caf5360bbcf802494432ad2b451c49e3e4fbe007bca556f21b440d10bca8&scene=0&from=groupmessage&isappinstalled=0#wechat redirect (accessed October 26, 2016).

  34. 34.

    David M. Lampton, Three Faces of Chinese Power: Might, Money, and Mind (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2008), pp. 37–76.

  35. 35.

    Feng Zhang, “Chinese Thinking on the South China Sea and the Future of Regional Security,” Political Science Quarterly 132, no. 3 (2017), pp. 435–66.

  36. 36.

    Eric Heginbotham, Michael S. Chase, Jacob L. Heim, Bonny Lin, Mark R. Cozad, Lyle J. Morris, Christopher P. Twomey, Forrest E. Morgan, Michael Nixon, Cristina L. Garafola, and Samuel K. Berkowitz, China’s Evolving Nuclear Deterrent: Major Drivers and Issues for the United States (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 2017), p. xi.

  37. 37.

    Arms Control Association, “Arms Control and Proliferation Profile: China,” https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/chinaprofile#nw (accessed 30 September 2018).

  38. 38.

    Arms Control Association, “US Nuclear Modernization Programs,” August 2012, http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/USNuclearModernization (accessed February 16, 2013).

  39. 39.

    United State Department of Defense, “Nuclear Posture Review” (Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2018).

  40. 40.

    Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, “The Top 10 Military Spenders,” SIPRI Yearbook 2011: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), p. 9; “Military Expenditure by Country, in Constant (2015) US$m., 1988–1996, 1997–2006, 2007–2016,” SIPRI Military Expenditure Database, https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/Milex-constant-2015-USD.pdf (accessed March 18, 2018).

  41. 41.

    “Military Expenditure (% of GDP),” World Bank Data, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/MS.MIL.XPND.GD.ZS (accessed February 8, 2013).

  42. 42.

    “Data for All Countries from 1988–2016 as a Share of GDP,” SIPRI Military Expenditure Database, https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/Milex-constant-2015-USD.pdf (accessed March 18, 2018).

  43. 43.

    Sebastien Roblin, “The Real Reason the World Needs to Pay Attention to China’s Growing Aircraft Carrier Fleet,” National Interest, May 1, 2017, http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/the-real-reason-the-world-needs-pay-attention-chinas-growing-20406 (accessed May 8, 2017).

  44. 44.

    Silove, “The Pivot before the Pivot.”

  45. 45.

    Campbell, The Pivot, p. 150.

  46. 46.

    Ibid., p. 206.

  47. 47.

    Thomas J. Christensen, “Obama and Asia: Confronting the China Challenge,” Foreign Affairs 94, no. 5 (2015), pp. 28–36, at p. 29; Christensen, The China Challenge, pp. 250–1.

  48. 48.

    Robert S. Ross, “The Problem with the Pivot,” Foreign Affairs, November/December 2012, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/asia/2012-11-01/problem-pivot (accessed 20 October 2018).

  49. 49.

    For the text of the document, see Kerry Dumbaugh, “Taiwan: Texts of the Taiwan Relations Act, the U.S.-China Communiques, and the ‘Six Assurances’” (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 1998).

  50. 50.

    John J. Tkacik, “Donald Trump Has Disrupted Years of Broken Taiwan Policy,” The National Interest, December 5, 2016, emphasis in original, http://nationalinterest.org/feature/donald-trump-has-disrupted-years-broken-taiwan-policy-18609 (accessed January 3, 2018). See also Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, “Strategic Ambiguity or Strategic Clarity?” in Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, ed., Dangerous Strait: The U.S.-Taiwan-China Crisis (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005), pp. 186–211, at p. 209; Richard C. Bush, Untying the Knot: Making Peace in the Taiwan Strait (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2005), p. 90; Shelley Rigger, Why Taiwan Matters: Small Island, Global Powerhouse (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2011), p. 180.

  51. 51.

    Bush, Untying the Knot, p. 254.

  52. 52.

    The text is in Dumbaugh, “Taiwan.”

  53. 53.

    On the TRA’s defense comment as modest and nonbinding, see Bush, Untying the Knot, pp. 22, 110.

  54. 54.

    Dumbaugh, “Taiwan,” P. 2.

  55. 55.

    Allen S. Whiting, “China’s Use of Force, 1950–96, and Taiwan,” International Security 26, no. 2 (2001), pp. 103–31.

  56. 56.

    Nancy Bernkopf Tucker and Bonnie Glaser, “Should the United States Abandon Taiwan?” Washington Quarterly 34, no. 4 (2011), pp. 23–37, at p. 23.

  57. 57.

    Bush, Uncharted Strait, p. 7.

  58. 58.

    Dumbaugh, “Taiwan,” p. 17.

  59. 59.

    Michael D. Swaine, “The Real Challenge in the Pacific: A Response to ‘How to Deter China,’” Foreign Affairs 94, no. 3 (2015), pp. 145–53, at p. 150.

  60. 60.

    Tucker, “Strategic Ambiguity or Strategic Clarity?”; Bush, Untying the Knot, pp. 255–6; Rigger, Why Taiwan Matters, p. 181.

  61. 61.

    Bush, Uncharted Strait, p. 18.

  62. 62.

    Swaine, “Trouble in Taiwan,” p. 43.

  63. 63.

    On the process-centered nature of US policy, see Bush, Uncharted Strait, p. 214; Rigger, Why Taiwan Matters, p. 193.

  64. 64.

    Bush, Untying the Knot, p. 10; Bush, Uncharted Strait, p. 72.

  65. 65.

    Peter Baker and Rick Gladstone, “With Combative Style and Epithets, Trump Takes America First to the U.N.,” New York Times, September 19, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/19/world/trump-un-north-korea-iran.html (accessed 1 October 2018).

  66. 66.

    The account of the North Korean nuclear crisis draws on Leon V. Sigal, Disarming Strangers: Nuclear Diplomacy with North Korea (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999); Charles L. Pritchard, Failed Diplomacy: The Tragic Story of How North Korea Got the Bomb (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2007); Mike Chinoy, Meltdown: The Inside Story of the North Korean Nuclear Crisis (New York: St. Martin’s, 2009); Victor Cha, The Impossible State: North Korea, Past and Future (New York: Vintage, 2012).

  67. 67.

    Pritchard, Failed Diplomacy, p. 97.

  68. 68.

    Peter Baker and Rick Gladstone, “With Combative Style and Epithets, Trump Takes America First to the U.N.,” New York Times, September 19, 2017.

  69. 69.

    Josh Mitchell and Eric Morath, “Trump Leaves Open Possibility of Military Action against North Korea,” Wall Street Journal, April 30, 2017.

  70. 70.

    Mark Landler, “The Trump-Kim Summit Was Unprecedented, but the Statement Was Vague,” New York Times, June 12, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/12/world/asia/north-korea-summit.html (accessed 1 October 2018).

  71. 71.

    Wang Yi, “Xiwang gefang lengjing panduan xingshi, zuochu mingzhi xuanze” [I Hope All Parties Judge the Situation Coolly and Make Wise Choices], March 18, 2017, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/web/zyxw/t1446819.shtml (accessed January 9, 2018); see also Fu Ying, “The Korean Nuclear Issue: Past, Present, and Future: A Chinese Perspective” (Washington, DC: John L. Thornton China Center at Brookings, 2017), p. 23.

  72. 72.

    Cha, The Impossible State, pp. 342–45.

  73. 73.

    Yao Yunzhu, Zhang Tuosheng, Zhao Xiaozhuo, Lyu Jinghua, and Li Chen, “China-US Military Relations: Evolution, Prospect, and Recommendations,” in Fu and Wang, China-US Relations, pp. 122–80, at p. 136.

  74. 74.

    Author’s interview with Chinese officials and scholars, Beijing, December 2017.

  75. 75.

    Simon Denyer, “China’s Korea Policy ‘in Tatters’ as Both North and South Defy Sanctions,” Washington Post, April 17, 2017.

  76. 76.

    Alastair Gale and Carol E. Lee, “U.S. Agreed to North Korea Peace Talks before Latest Nuclear Test,” Wall Street Journal, February 21, 2016.

  77. 77.

    David E. Sanger, “Trump on North Korea: Tactic? ‘Madman Theory’? Or Just Mixed Messages,” New York Times, April 28, 2017.

  78. 78.

    Haggard and Noland, Hard Target, p. 7.

  79. 79.

    John Delury, “Kim Jong-un Has a Dream. The U.S. Should Help Him Realize It,” New York Times, September 21, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/21/opinion/kim-jong-un-moon-economic-development-north-korea-denuclearization.html (accessed 1 October 2018).

  80. 80.

    Henry A. Kissinger, “How to Resolve the North Korea Crisis,” Wall Street Journal, August 11, 2017; Stephen Krasner, “A Least Worst Option on North Korea,” Lawfare, May 15, 2017, https://lawfareblog.com/least-worst-option-north-korea (accessed January 12, 2018).

  81. 81.

    On the danger of war as a result of the Trump administration’s combative rhetoric, see Sagan, “The Korean Missile Crisis.”

  82. 82.

    As the crisis escalated in 2017, more analysts have called on the US to make such an offer. See, for example, Yasuhiro Izumikawa, “Acting on the North Korea Playbook: Japan’s Responses to North Korea’s Provocations,” Asia Policy 23, January (2017), pp. 90–6, at p. 96; Krasner, “A Least Worst Option on North Korea.”

  83. 83.

    Cha, The Impossible State, p. 304.

  84. 84.

    Philip Bobbitt, “What to do about North Korea,” Lawfare, December 18, 2017, https://www.lawfareblog.com/what-do-about-north-korea (accessed January 12, 2018).

  85. 85.

    Victor Cha argues that an alliance becomes potentially a powerful instrument for a great power to control its smaller ally if the alliance relationship is asymmetrical and unequal. Victor D. Cha, Powerplay: The Origins of the American Alliance System in Asia (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2016), p. 30.

  86. 86.

    Ronald O’Rourke, “Maritime Territorial and Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) Disputes Involving China: Issues for Congress” (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2017).

  87. 87.

    Xi Jinping, “Tuidong haiyang qiangguo jianshe” [Building a Maritime Great Power], July 30, 2013, http://jhsjk.people.cn/article/22402107 (accessed January 15, 2018).

  88. 88.

    Zhu, Huang, and Hu, “Competing Perspectives between China and the United States,” p. 79.

  89. 89.

    Michael J. Green, Kathleen H. Hicks, Zack Cooper, John Schaus, and Jake Douglas, Countering Coercion in Maritime Asia: The Theory and Practice of Gray Zone Deterrence (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2017).

  90. 90.

    Xi, “Building a Maritime Great Power.”

  91. 91.

    For the text of these treaties concerning the US defense commitments, see O’Rourke, “Maritime Territorial and Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) Disputes,” pp. 61–2.

  92. 92.

    John Reed, “Pompeo warns China on Philippines ‘threat,’” Financial Times, 2–3 March 2019, p. 7.

  93. 93.

    Feng Zhang, “Assessing China’s Response to the South China Sea Arbitration Ruling,” Australian Journal of International Affairs 71, no. 4 (2017), pp. 440–59.

  94. 94.

    Richard McGregor, Asia’s Reckoning: The Struggle for Global Dominance (London: Allen Lane, 2017), pp. 67–8.

  95. 95.

    Ibid.

  96. 96.

    Zhang, “Assessing China’s Response,” p. 450.

  97. 97.

    Government of the People’s Republic of China, “Zhonghua renmin gongheguo zhengfu guanyu zai nanhai de lingtu zhuquan he haiyang quanyi de shengming” [Statement of the Government of the People’s Republic of China on China’s territorial sovereignty and maritime rights and interests in the South China Sea], July 12, 2016, http://www.mfa.gov.cn/nanhai/chn/snhwtlcwj/t1380021.htm (accessed January 16, 2018).

  98. 98.

    Zhang, “Assessing China’s Response,” p. 450.

  99. 99.

    Feng Zhang, “Chinese Thinking on the South China Sea and the Future of Regional Security,” Political Science Quarterly 132, no. 3 (2017), pp. 435–66.

  100. 100.

    On the U-shaped line, see Zhiguo Gao and Bing Bing Jia, “The Nine-Dash Line in the South China Sea: History, Status, and Implications,” American Journal of International Law 107, no. 1 (2013), pp. 98–123; Chris P. C. Chung, “Drawing the U-Shaped Line: China’s Claim in the South China Sea, 1946–1974,” Modern China 42, no. 1 (2016), pp. 38–72.

  101. 101.

    Wu Xinbo and Michael Green, “Regional Security Roles and Challenges,” in Nina Hachigian, ed., Debating China: The US–China Relationship in Ten Conversations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), pp. 198–220, at p. 204.

  102. 102.

    G. John Ikenberry, Liberal Leviathan: The Origins, Crisis, and Transformation of the American World Order (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2011), pp. 208–9.

  103. 103.

    Victor D. Cha, “Complex Patchworks: US Alliances as Part of Asia’s Regional Architecture,” Asia Policy 11, January (2011), pp. 27–50, at p. 41.

  104. 104.

    Zhou Fangyin, “The U.S. Alliance System in Asia: A Chinese Perspective,” Asian Politics & Policy 8, no. 1 (2016), pp. 207–18, at p. 208.

  105. 105.

    Feng Zhang interview, Beijing, June 2017.

  106. 106.

    William T. Tow, “The Trilateral Strategic Dialogue, Minilateralism, and Asia-Pacific Order Building,” in Yuki Tatsumi, ed., US–Japan–Australia Security Cooperation: Prospects and Challenges (Washington, DC: Stimson Center, 2015), pp. 23–36.

  107. 107.

    Cha, Powerplay, p. 216.

  108. 108.

    Goldstein, Meeting China Halfway, pp. 226–27.

  109. 109.

    Cha, Powerplay, p. 204.

  110. 110.

    Art, “The United States and the Rise of China,” p. 385.

  111. 111.

    Michael Beckley, “The Emerging Military Balance in East Asia: How China’s Neighbors Can Check Chinese Naval Expansion,” International Security 42, no. 2 (2017), pp. 78–119.

  112. 112.

    Xi Jinping, “Xi Jinping zai di qishijie lianheguo dahui yibanxing bianlun shi de jianghua” [Remarks at the Seventieth United Nations General Assembly], New York, September 28, 2015, http://news.xinhuanet.com/world/2015-09/29/c_1116703645.htm (accessed January 20, 2018).

  113. 113.

    Cha, Powerplay, p. 204.

  114. 114.

    Amitav Acharya, Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia: ASEAN and the Problem of Regional Order, 2nd ed. (London: Routledge, 2009).

  115. 115.

    Kishore Mahbubani and Jeffrey Sng, The ASEAN Miracle: A Catalyst for Peace (Singapore: NUS Press, 2017), p. 101.

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    Simon Reich and Richard Ned Lebow, Good-Bye Hegemony! Power and Influence in the Global System (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2014); Richard Ned Lebow and Robert Kelly, “Thucydides and Hegemony: Athens and the United States,” Review of International Studies 27, no. 4 (2001), pp. 593–609.

  117. 117.

    Richard Ned Lebow, A Cultural Theory of International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), pp. 64, 84.

  118. 118.

    Yan Xuetong, Ancient Chinese Thought, Modern Chinese Power, eds. Daniel A. Bell and Sun Zhe, transl. Edmund Ryden (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2011).

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    Feng Zhang, Chinese Hegemony: Grand Strategy and International Institutions in East Asian History (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2015).

  120. 120.

    Xi Jinping, “Wei goujian zhongmei xinxing daguo guanxi er buxie nuli” [Persistently Working Toward a New Model of Sino-US Major Country Relationship], Beijing, June 6, 2016, http://jhsjk.people.cn/article/28416143 (accessed January 22, 2018).

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Lebow, R.N. (2020). China. In: A Democratic Foreign Policy. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-21519-4_5

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