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The Indispensable Nation?

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A Democratic Foreign Policy

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Abstract

Americans have been consistently smug about their political system, capitalist economy, social cohesion, and way of life. They have not for the most part questioned the stability of their political and economic institutions since the Great Depression of the 1930s. Their survival, in contrast to the collapse of so many European democracies, and subsequent robust performance in the postwar era, reaffirmed the view of many Americans that providence had blessed them. They were fulfilling their prophecy as “the city on the hill,” a phrase from the Sermon on the Mount used by Puritan preacher Jonathan Edwards in 1630 to describe the Massachusetts Bay Colony on the eve of its founding. President Kennedy would refer to Edward’s sermon in his first post-election speech, as Ronald Reagan did on the eve of his presidency.

This smugness also affects foreign policy. In the twentieth century it was most marked in Woodrow Wilson, president from 1913 to 1921, author of the Fourteen Points, and founder of the League of Nations. Son of a Presbyterian minister, he was a deep believer in Caucasian superiority and American superiority over other Caucasians. The country’s God-given mission was to spread democracy, which he believed would eliminate the threat of war.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    John Winthrop, “A Model of Christian Charity,” Collection of Massachusetts Historical Society, http://history.hanover.edu/texts/winthmod.html (accessed 22 February 2017).

  2. 2.

    Address of President-Elect John F. Kennedy Delivered to a Joint Convention of the General Court of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 9 January 1961, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/City_upon_a_Hill; Ronald Reagan, “Election Eve Address: ‘A Vision for America,’” 3 November 1980, The American Presidency Project, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=85199 (both accessed 22 February 2017).

  3. 3.

    Michael Dobbs and John M. Goshko, “Albright’s Personal Odyssey Shaped Foreign Policy Beliefs,” Washington Post, 6 December 1996, p. A25.

  4. 4.

    Barrack Obama in the third presidential debate on foreign policy, “America remains the one indispensable nation. And the world needs a strong America.” Transcript And Audio: Third Presidential Debate,” 22 October 2012, http://www.npr.org/2012/10/22/163436694/transcript-3rd-obama-romney-presidential-debate.

  5. 5.

    Stuart J. Kaufman, Richard Little and William C. Wohlforth, The Balance of Power in World History (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), p. 7, describe hierarchy, which they all but equate with hegemony, as the political-military “domination” of a single unit “over most of the international system.” Michael W. Doyle, Empires (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1986), p. 40, understands hegemony “to mean controlling leadership of the international system as a whole.

  6. 6.

    Michael Mastanduno, “Hegemonic Order, September 11, and the Consequences of the Bush Revolution,” International Relations of the Asia Pacific, 5 (2005), pp. 177–96.

  7. 7.

    Stephen G. Brooks and William C. Wohlforth, World Out of Balance: International Relations and the Challenge of American Primacy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008).

  8. 8.

    Robert Jervis, “The Remaking of a Unipolar World,” Washington Quarterly, 29, no. 3 (2006), pp. 7–19.

  9. 9.

    Carla Norrlof, America’s Global Advantage: US Hegemony and International Cooperation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), pp. 19–21.

  10. 10.

    Christopher M. Dent, “Regional Leadership in East Asia: Towards New Analytical Approaches,” in Christopher M. Dent, ed., China, Japan and Regional Leadership in East Asia (Cheltenham: Edward Elgard, 2008); Brooks and Wohlforth, World Out of Balance, p. 28. For critiques, Lavina R. Lee, Hegemony an International Legitimacy: Norms, Power and Followership in the Wars in Iraq (London: Routledge, 2010); Ian Clark, Hegemony in International Society (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011).

  11. 11.

    Roger Simon, Gramsci’s Political Thought: An Introduction (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1982); Mark Haugard, “Power and Hegemony in Social Theory,” in Mark Haugard and Howard H. Lentner, eds., Hegemony and Power: Consensus and Coercion in Contemporary Politics (Lanham, Md.: Lexington, 2006), p. 50; Richard Ned Lebow, The Tragic Vision of Politics: Ethics, Interests and Orders (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), pp. 283–84; Clark, Hegemony in International Society, pp. 18–23.

  12. 12.

    John G. Ikenberry and Charles A. Kupchan, “Socialization and Hegemonic Power,” International Organization 44, no. 3 (Summer 1990), pp. 283–315. Also Simon, Gramsci’s Political Thought, p. 21.

  13. 13.

    Richard Ned Lebow, Tragic Vision of Politics: Ethics, Interests, Orders, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), pp. 283–84; Ian Hurd, “Making and Breaking Norms: American Revisionism and Crises of Legitimacy,” International Politics, 44, nos. 2/3 (2007), pp. 194–213; Clark, Hegemony in International Society, pp. 23–28.

  14. 14.

    Lebow, Tragic Vision of Politics, pp. 283–84; Gerry Simpson, Great Powers and Outlaw States: Unequal Sovereigns in the International Legal Order (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004); Ian Hurd, “Making and Breaking Norms: American Revisionism and Crises of Legitimacy,” International Politics, 44, nos. 2/3 (2007), pp. 194–213; Andrew Hurrell, On Global Order: Power, Values, and the Constitution of International Society (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007); Clark, Hegemony in International Society, pp. 23–28.

  15. 15.

    G. John Ikenberry, After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order after Major War (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001).

  16. 16.

    G. John Ikenberry, The Liberal Leviathan (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011), p. 2.

  17. 17.

    Ibid., p. 3.

  18. 18.

    George Friedman, The Coming War with Japan (St-Martin Press, New York, 1991).

  19. 19.

    Richard Ned Lebow, “Windows of Opportunity: Do States Jump Through Them?,” International Security 9, no. 1 (1984), pp. 147–86.

  20. 20.

    Christopher Layne, “The Waning of U.S. Hegemony—Myth or Reality? A Review Essay,” International Security 34, No. 1 (2009), pp. 147–172, especially p. 148; Aaron L. Freidberg, “The Future of U.S.-China Relations: Is Conflict Inevitable?” International Security, 30, No. 2 (2005), pp. 7–45; John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, p. 400; Michael H. Hunt, The American Ascendancy: How the United States Gained and Wielded Global Dominance (Chapel Hill, N.C.: University of North Carolina Press, 2007), p. 322; Michael Cox, “Is the United States in Decline—Again? An Essay,” International Affairs, 83, no. 4 (2007), pp. 261–76; Fareed Zakaria, The Post-American World (London: Allen Lane, 2008); Hunt, American Ascendancy, p. 322; Cox, “Is the United States in Decline—Again?”; Fareed Zakaria, The Post-American World (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2008); Charles Glaser, “Will China’s Rise Lead to War? Why Realism Does Not Mean Pessimism,” Foreign Affairs (March/April 2011), http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/67479/charles-glaser/will-chinas-rise-lead-to-war; Steven W. Mosher, Hegemon: China’s Plan to Dominate Asia and the World (San Francisco, CA: Encounter Books, 2000); Stefan Halper, The Beijing Consensus: How China’s Authoritarian Model Will Dominate the Twenty-First Century (NY: Basic Books, 2010).

  21. 21.

    See Chap. 6 for a discussion.

  22. 22.

    Graham Allison, Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides’ Trap? (New York: Houghton-Mifflin, 2017); Judith Shapiro, “America’s collision Course with China,” New York Times, 15 June 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/15/books/review/everything-under-the-heavens-howard-french-destined-for-war-graham-allison.html; Richard Ned Lebow and Daniel Tompkins, “The Thucydides Claptrap,” Washington Monthly, 28 June 2016, https://washingtonmonthly.com/thucydides-claptrap; Tom Christensen, (all accessed 9 October 2018).

  23. 23.

    United States National Security Council, US National Security Strategy 2010, p. 43, http://www.whitehouse.gov/nscnss/2010 (accessed 25 February 2013).

  24. 24.

    Michael Mandelbaum, The Frugal Superpower: America’s Global Leadership in a Cash-Strapped Era (Philadelphia, Public Affairs, 2010), pp. 3–8; Roger C. Altman and Richard N. Haass, “American Profligacy and American Power,” Foreign Affairs 89, no. 6 (2010), pp. 25–34.

  25. 25.

    Ivo Daalder and James Lindsay, The Empty Throne: America’s Abdication of Global Leadership (New York: Global Affairs, 2018).

  26. 26.

    Michael Dobbs and John M. Goshko, “Albright’s Personal Odyssey Shaped Foreign Policy Beliefs,” The Washington Post, 6 December 1996, p. A25; Madeleine K. Albright, Interview on NBC-TV “The Today Show” with Matt Lauer, Columbus, Ohio, 19 February 1998; Daniel Deudney and G. John Ikenberry, Democratic Internationalism: An American Grand Strategy for a Post-Exceptionalist Era (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 2012), p. 1.

  27. 27.

    G. John Ikenberry, Michael Mastanduno and William Wohlforth, eds., Unipolarity and International Relations Theory (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011); G. John Ikenberry and Joseph Grieco, State Power and World Markets: The International Political Economy (New York: Norton, 2003); G. John Ikenberry and Michael Mastanduno, eds., International Relations Theory and the Asia-Pacific (New York: Columbia University Press, 2003); G. John Ikenberry, David A. Lake, and Michael Mastanduno, eds., The State and American Foreign Economic Policy (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988); G. John Ikenberry and Charles A. Kupchan, “Socialization and Hegemonic Power,” International Organization 44, no. 3 (Summer 1990), pp. 283–315; Stephen G. Brooks, G. John Ikenberry and William C. Wohlforth, “Don’t Come Home, America: The Case against Retrenchment,” International Security 37, no. 3 (Winter 2012/13), pp. 7–51.

  28. 28.

    Brooks, Ikenberry and Wohlforth, “Don’t Come Home, America.”

  29. 29.

    Geir Lundstadt, The American “Empire” (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990); Charles S. Maier, “Alliance and Autonomy: European Identity and U.S. Foreign Policy Objectives in the Truman years,” in Michael Lacey, ed., The Truman Presidency (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991); John Lewis Gaddis, We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997); Thomas F. Madden, Empires of Trust: How Rome Built—and America Is Building—A New World (London: Plume, 2009).

  30. 30.

    Ikenberry, Liberal Leviathan, p. 10.

  31. 31.

    Walden Bellow, Dilemmas of Domination: The Unmaking of the American Empire (NY: Metropolitan Books, 2005); Chalmers Johnson, Blowback: The Costs and Consequences of the American Empire (London: Time Warner Paperbacks, 2002) and Dismantling the Empire: America’s Last Best Hope (NY: Metropolitan Books, 2010). For American intervention in European domestic politics, Tony Judt, Postwar: A History of Europe Since 1945 (NY: Penguin Press, 2005); Michael Cox and Caroline Kennedy-Pipes, “The Tragedy of American Diplomacy? Rethinking the Marshall Plan,” Journal of Cold War Studies 7, no. 1 (2005), pp. 97–134; Michael J. Hogan, The Marshall Plan: America, Britain and the Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1947–1952 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987); Alan Milward, The Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1945–1951 (London: Methuen, 1984); William Appleman Williams, The Tragedy of American Diplomacy (New York: Norton, 1988).

  32. 32.

    Robert Kagan, The Jungle Grows Back: America and Our Imperiled World (New York: Knopf, 2018).

  33. 33.

    For a variant approach to global engagement, also rooted in a more pragmatic and less ideological and paradigmatic approach to foreign policy, see Steven Weber and Bruce W. Jentleson, The End of Arrogance: America in the Global Competition of Ideas (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2010).

  34. 34.

    See notes 42–43.

  35. 35.

    Richard Wike, Bruce Stokes, Jacob Poushter, Laura Silver, Janell Fetterolf and Kat Devlin, “Trump’s International Ratings Remain Low, Especially Among Key Allies,” Pew Research Center, 1 October 2018, http://www.pewglobal.org/2018/10/01/trumps-international-ratings-remain-low-especially-among-key-allies/ (accessed 17 November 2018).

  36. 36.

    Angus Maddison, Monitoring the World Economy, 1820–1992 (Paris: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, 1995). Even Robert Gilpin, renowned proponent of hegemonic stability theory, acknowledges the fact that the US’s global dominance was fleeting. See his War and Change in World Politics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987), pp. 173–175.

  37. 37.

    Charles P. Kindleberger, “Dominance and Leadership in the International Economy: Exploitation, Public Goods, and Free Rides,” International Studies Quarterly, 25, no. 2 (1981) pp. 242, 248; Simon Reich, Restraining Trade to Invoke Investment: MITI and the Japanese Auto Producers: Case Studies in International Negotiation (Washington, D.C.: Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, 2002).

  38. 38.

    Andrew Mack, “The Changing Face of Global Violence (Part 1),” in The Human Security Report 2005 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), http://www.humansecurityreport.info/HSR2005_PDF/Part1.pdf (accessed 5 February 2013).

  39. 39.

    Rajan Menon, “Yemen’s descent into hell,” Le Monde Diplomatique, 18 September 2018, https://mondediplo.com/openpage/yemen-hell (accessed 9 October 2018).

  40. 40.

    Julian Borger, “Yemen ceasefire resolution blocked at UN after Saudi and UAE ‘blackmail’,” Guardian, 29 November 2018, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/nov/29/un-yemen-ceasefire-resolution-blocked-saudi-uae-blackmail (accessed 29 November 2018).

  41. 41.

    Gardiner Harris, Eric Schmitt, Helene Cooper and Nicholas Fandos, “Senators, Furious Over Khashoggi Killing, Spurn President on War in Yemen,” New York Times, 28 November 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/28/us/politics/trump-saudi-arabia-yemen.html?emc=edit_mbe_20181129&nl=morning-briefing-europe&nlid=6995046520181129&te=1 (accessed 28 November 2018).

  42. 42.

    Steve Schifferes, “U.S. names coalition of the willing,” BBC News, 18 March 2003. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/2862343.stm, (accessed 5 February 2013); Time Europe 2 June 2003, http://www.time.com/time/europe/gdml/peace2003.html (broken link).

  43. 43.

    The Pew Global Attitudes Project, “America’s Image Slips, but Allies Share U.S. Concerns over Iran, Hamas,” released 13 June 2006, http://www.pewglobal.org/2006/06/13/americas-image-slips-but-allies-share-us-concerns-over-iran-hamas/ (accessed 25 February 2013).

  44. 44.

    BBC World Service Poll, “Israel and Iran Share Most Negative Ratings in Global Poll,” 6 March 2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/06_03_07_perceptions.pdf (accessed 5 February 2013); Wike, Stokes, Poushter, Silver, Fetterolf and Devlin, “Trump’s International Ratings Remain Low, Especially Among Key Allies.”

  45. 45.

    WorldPublicOpion.org, Program on International Policy Attitudes (PIPA), Global Views of United States Improve While Other Countries Decline, http://www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/articles/views_on_countriesregions_bt/660.php, 10 April 2010 (accessed December 22, 2010).

  46. 46.

    Pew Global Attitudes Project, “Global Opinion of Obama Slips, International Policies Faulted,” 13 June 2012, http://www.pewglobal.org/2012/06/13/global-opinion-of-obama-slips-international-policies-faulted/ (accessed 17 August 2012).

  47. 47.

    Pew Research Center, Global Attitudes and Trends, “Trump’s International Ratings Remain Low, Especially Among Kew Allies,” 1 October 2018, http://www.pewglobal.org/ (accessed 9 October 2018).

  48. 48.

    Joshua Aizenman, “On the causes of global imbalances and their persistence: Myths, facts and conjectures,” in Stijn Claessens, Simon Evenett and Bernard Hoekman, eds., Rebalancing the Global Economy: A Primer for Policymaking (Centre for Economic Policy Research: London, 2010), pp. 23–30.

  49. 49.

    Ibid., p. 24.

  50. 50.

    The personal savings rate is calculated by taking the difference between disposable personal income and personal consumption expenditures and then dividing this quantity by disposable personal income.

  51. 51.

    Massimo Guidolin and Elizabeth A. La Jeunesse, “The Decline in the U.S. Personal Saving Rate: Is It Real and Is It a Puzzle?” Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review 89, no. 6 (2007), pp. 491–514. See Figure 1, pp. 492.

  52. 52.

    Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Federal Reserve Statistical Release, “Z.1-Flow of Funds Accounts of the United States,” 9 March 2006, http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/Z1/20060309/data.htm, p. 8, 102 (accessed 29 January 2011).

  53. 53.

    Wikipedia, “National Debt of the United States,” citing US Treasury sources, January 2018, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_debt_of_the_United_States#cite_note-treasurydirect.gov-5 (accessed 9 October 2018).

  54. 54.

    Pew Survey, “Obama More Popular Abroad Than At Home, Global Image of U.S. Continues to Benefit,” 17 June 2011, http://www.pewglobal.org/2010/06/17/obama-more-popular-abroad-than-at-home/ (accessed 26 September 2011); Wike, Stokes, Poushter, Silver, Fetterolf and Devlin, “Trump’s International Ratings Remain Low, Especially Among Key Allies.”

  55. 55.

    For one prominent example, The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, “Remarks by the President in State of Union Address,” United States Capitol, Washington, D.C., 25 January 2011, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/01/25/remarks-president-state-union-address (accessed January 29, 2011).

  56. 56.

    James Traub, in “Wallowing in Decline,” Foreign Policy, September 24, 2010. http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/09/24/wallowing_in_decline?page=0,1 (accessed December 27, 2010) http://walt.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/09/22/the_virtues_of_competence (accessed December 27, 2010); Aaron L. Freidberg, “The Future of U.S.-China Relations: Is Conflict Inevitable?” International Security, 30, no. 2 (2005), pp. 7–45; Michael Mandelbaum, The Frugal Superpower: America’s Global Leadership in a Cash-Strapped Era (Philadelphia, Public Affairs, 2010), especially pp. 3–5. For critics, Stephen G. Brooks and William C. Wohlforth, World Out of Balance: International Relations and the Challenge of U.S. Primacy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008); William C. Wohlforth, “The Stability of a Unipolar World,” International Security 24, No. 1 (1999), pp. 5–41; William C. Wohlforth, “U.S. Strategy in a Unipolar World,” in G. John Ikenberry, ed., America Unrivaled: The Future of the Balance of Power (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2002), pp. 98–120. For a summary of realist views, see Christopher Layne, “The Waning of U.S. Hegemony—Myth or Reality?” International Security 34, no. 1 (2009), pp. 147–172.

  57. 57.

    Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the Modern World (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984); G. John Ikenberry, Liberal Leviathan: The Origins, Crisis, and Transformation of the American World Order (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011); Joseph S. Nye, Jr., “The Future of American Power,” Foreign Affairs 89, no. 6 (2010), pp. 2–12; Bruce Russett and John Oneal, Triangulating Peace: Democracy, Interdependence and International Organizations (NY: Norton, 2001).

  58. 58.

    Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein, We All Lost the Cold War (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), ch. 14, for elaboration.

  59. 59.

    Central Intelligence Agency, “Intelligence Report: The Economic Impact of Soviet Defense Spending,” April 1975, https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/DOC_0000380724.pdf; William Easterly and Stanley Fischer, “The Soviet Economic Decline,” World Bank Economic Review 9, no. 3 (1995), pp. 341–371.

  60. 60.

    David Bohmer Lebow and Richard Ned Lebow, “Mexico and Iraq: Continuity and Change in the Bush Administration,” in David B. MacDonald, The Bush Leadership, the Power of Ideas and the War on Terror (Farnham, Surrey: Ashgate, 2012), pp. 91–112.

  61. 61.

    Thomas Hobbes, Behemoth (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990), p. 16; Steven Weber and Bruce W. Jentleson, The End of Arrogance: America in the Global Competition of Ideas (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2010), for a related approach.

  62. 62.

    Joseph Nye, Jr., Soft Power: The Means to Success in Worlds Politics (New York: Public Affairs, 2004) pp. 5–11.

  63. 63.

    Joseph S. Nye, Jr., “The Future of American Power,” Foreign Affairs 89, no. 6 (2010), pp. 2–14; G. John Ikenberry, Liberal Order and Imperial Ambition (Cambridge: Polity, 2006), widely discussed in the introduction, pp. 1–18 and America Unrivaled: The Future of the Balance of Power (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2002); John M. Owen IV, “Transnational Liberalism and American Primacy: or, Benignity Is in the Eye of the Beholder,” pp. 239–259 and Thomas Risse, “U.S. Power in a Liberal Security, pp. 260–283, both in Ikenberry, America Unrivaled.

  64. 64.

    Hillary Rodham Clinton, “Leading Through Civilian Power: Redefining American Diplomacy and Development,” Foreign Affairs 89, no. 6 (2010), pp. 13–24.

  65. 65.

    Globescan/PIPA poll, “Global views of United States improves while others decline,” BBC Views, April 18, 2010, p. 7.

  66. 66.

    The Cold War demonstrated the irrelevance of certain raw forms of power. The USSR and US developed impressive nuclear arsenals and diverse delivery systems for them. These weapons were all but unusable. The principal purpose for which they were designed—all-out superpower war—would have constituted mutual, if not global, suicide. Intended to deter the other side, nuclear weapons and forward deployments of their delivery systems became a principal cause of superpower conflict and greatly extended the Cold War. See Lebow and Stein, We All Lost the Cold War, ch. 13.

  67. 67.

    Joel Greenberg, “Israel: Egypt’s President Mohamed Morsi pledges new peace efforts,” The Washington Post, 31 July 2012, http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2012-07-31/world/35489115_1_netanyahu-and-peres-president-morsi-peace-efforts (accessed 25 February 2013).

  68. 68.

    Cf., Calev Ben-David, “Israel Plans Iran Strike; Citizens Say Government Serious,” Bloomberg.com, 15 August 2012, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-08-14/israel-plans-for-iran-strike-as-citizens-say-government-serious.html (accessed 25 February 2013).

  69. 69.

    Ian Hurd, “Legitimacy and Authority in International Politics,” International Organization 53, no. 2 (1999), pp. 379–408.

  70. 70.

    Ibid.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. King’s College, London, UK

    Richard Ned Lebow

  2. Pembroke College, University of Cambridge, Cambridge, UK

    Richard Ned Lebow

  3. Dartmouth College, Hanover, NH, USA

    Richard Ned Lebow

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Lebow, R.N. (2020). The Indispensable Nation?. In: A Democratic Foreign Policy. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-21519-4_2

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