Abstract
We continue in this chapter our elucidation of Solov’ëv’s major ethical treatise the Justification of the Moral Good. In its central chapters, Solov’ëv considered utilitarianism as well as Kant’s ethical theory. Although highly critical of the former, he demonstrated decided affinities with the latter despite its theoretical rejection of metaphysics as knowledge and its acceptance of God’s existence as a mere postulate of practical reason. The natural feeling of respect or piety reveals the existence of God. One cannot respect the object of a mere postulate. A major concern in the Justification is with social morality through history. Solov’ëv, contrary to some theories in his time, recognized the role of the individual in history. But the central thrust of his remarks is to reveal the development of human moral consciousness over historical time.
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Notes
- 1.
Solov’ëv’s distinction between dobro and blago translates approximately into Kant’s distinction between das Gute and das Wohl, if we allow for the particular differences between the two proposed moral theories. See Kant 1996a: 188 (Ak 5: 59–60). The distinction between these two concepts in Solov’ëv has attracted little attention. If one were to rely on English-language scholarship, one would draw the conclusion that the two terms are synonymous. Indeed, even relying on recent Russian-language reference books one may get the same impression, for example: “In the narrower, properly ethical sense of the word, the concept “blago” is synonymous with the word “dobro.” Filosofskij 1983: 55. Of course, in this case the concern was with the terms in general and not specifically with respect to Solov’ëv. But even his closest friends failed to read his book very carefully and analytically. In a review of it, N. Ja. Grot asked, “Why the term ‘dobro’ instead of the usual term ‘blago’?” Grot 1897: 157.
- 2.
Kant 1996b: 58 (Ak 6: 4).
- 3.
Solov’ëv 2015: 117; SS, vol. 8: 162. That we must have such an understanding before answering the question occurred to Solov’ëv only between 1897 and 1899. He had earlier considered it only a desideratum.
- 4.
Solov’ëv 2015: 138; SS, vol. 8: 184.
- 5.
Solov’ëv took this as a criticism of Kant’s view of the role of conscience based on his own contention that the conscience is “the real support for his ethical point of view.” Solov’ëv 2015:137; SS, vol. 8: 183. On what grounds Solov’ëv made this claim is unclear. He provided no reference. Conscience plays no significant role in either the Groundwork or in the second Critique. Kant acknowledged in The Metaphysics of Morals – and Solov’ëv agreed – that the voice of conscience is a fact. Kant 1996a: 529 (Ak 6: 400). But for Kant that voice is an expression of duty. Thus, if Solov’ëv understood “support” to mean “foundation,” he is wrong; if he understood “support” to mean “collaborative evidence,” he is correct. For another treatment of conscience in Kant and Solov’ëv, see Buller 2009.
- 6.
Although Solov’ëv certainly wants us to think that his reasoning here parallels Kant’s minus the transcendental, Kant, unlike Solov’ëv, withholds saying that the human being is the absolute law-giver. Instead, we are to adopt maxims as if we are absolute law-givers, but not that we are such. Kant 1996a: 73 (Ak 4: 421).
- 7.
Kant 1996a: 257 (Ak 5: 146).
- 8.
Solov’ëv considerably mollified his statement for both the 1897 and 1899 versions of the compiled work, by stating that God and the immortality of the soul were “constituting forces of moral reality” – whatever that might mean. Solov’ëv 2015: 140 f.
- 9.
Solov’ëv 2015: 122; SS, vol. 8: 164.
- 10.
Solov’ëv 2015: 143; SS, vol. 8: 189.
- 11.
The connection between a religious experience, viz., the experience of reverence, and the religious attitude is unclear. Solov’ëv gave no indication that a religious attitude is required for a religious experience.
- 12.
Solov’ëv 2015: 154; SS, vol. 8: 203. Solov’ëv also wrote here that the directives issued from this imperative are clear and definite if we so desire them to be. Little credence can be given to such a statement unless we assume that in all cases where the directive was unclear and indefinite the individual did not truly desire clarity and definiteness. It is interesting to compare Solov’ëv’s moral imperative to be perfect with that of Christian Wolff, who pronounced the same imperative albeit without explicitly connecting it with a religious perspective. “Do what makes you and your condition, or that of another, more perfect: forego what makes it imperfect.” Wolff 1736: 12 (§12).
- 13.
In a similar vein, Kant wrote, “Now it is our universal human duty to elevate ourselves to this ideal of moral perfection, i.e. to the prototype of moral disposition in its entire purity, and for this the very idea, which is presented to us by reason for emulation, can give us force.” Kant 1996b: 104 (Ak 6: 61).
- 14.
Although he need not have done so, he, as a committed Christian, unequivocally stated that Jesus of Nazareth was the embodiment of individual moral perfection. Solov’ëv 2015: 166; SS, vol. 8: 216. However, Solov’ëv presented neither argument nor factual evidence for Jesus’s moral perfection. Thus, Solov’ëv again introduced a personal religious belief, although in this instance it forms merely an example and not a premise in a logical argument.
- 15.
Solov’ëv 2015: 168, 173; SS, vol. 8: 219, 224. Solov’ëv had already presented his claim concerning Christ’s appearance in the “middle of history” in his 1891 article “From the Philosophy of History.” See SS, vol. 6: 349.
- 16.
- 17.
- 18.
One cannot help but be amused that both the Orthodox Christian Solov’ëv and the atheist F. Engels (in his 1884 Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State) turned to Morgan for support of their respective viewpoints. Whether Solov’ëv had any knowledge of Engels’ work is unknown.
- 19.
An issue that to the best of my knowledge remains unexplored is the possible influence of the historical views of Solov’ëv’s father Sergej in this matter. Vladimir, surely, knew his father’s work on the history of Russia and quite probably was also familiar with the dispute between his father and Konstantin Aksakov on the role of the commune versus the gens (or clan) that lasted through the 1850s.
- 20.
Solov’ëv’s sweeping assertion cannot have been based on any empirical data. He surely made his possibly questionable historical claim purely on the basis of his preconceived “philosophy” of history. Possibly – we cannot qualify our claim any stronger – Solov’ëv was influenced here by the early writings of Kavelin, who, in his 1846/47 work A View of the Juridical Way of Life in Ancient Russia, held that ancient Russian social life was constructed exclusively along blood lines. The “Russian Slavs had no idea at the time of other relationships.” Kavelin 1859: 312. But Kavelin unmistakably did not assert that every historical community was similar. In the absence of reference, we cannot, of course, be sure that Solov’ëv knew of Kavelin’s work. However, he, certainly, knew Kavelin, and as one scholar today opines this early work of Kavelin’s “established him at the age of 28 as a leading figure in the intellectual life of the nation.” Offord 1985: 178. Unlike Solov’ëv, Kavelin did not project his own three-stage schema of Russia’s development onto world history.
- 21.
Solov’ëv 2015: 189; SS, vol. 8: 242.
- 22.
de Courten correctly remarks that Solov’ëv’s attack was “aimed at the socialist perspective, which emphasized the group, collectivity as the main actor of history, at the expense of the individual.” Courten 2004: 160.
- 23.
Solov’ëv 2015: 189f. Solov’ëv and Kareev knew each other already in their early school days but drifted apart while attending Moscow University. A brief renewal of friendly relations occurred in 1891 when both served as respective editors of the philosophical and historical sections of the Encyclopedic Dictionary. For a summary of the Solov’ëv-Kareev relationship, see Malinov 2003.
- 24.
See Kareev 1890. Kareev charged that other participants in the Society’s discussions had not looked at the human individual pragmatically, i.e., as influenced by and influencing others. Instead, the respective examinations had always been from the abstract viewpoint of a single individual.
- 25.
SS, vol. 6: 364, 366.
- 26.
SS, vol. 6: 370. In light of Kareev’s affirmation of a “cosmic process,” Solov’ëv also took umbrage with Kareev’s declarations that human beings have no moral relations to nature.
- 27.
Solov’ëv 2015: 195; SS, vol. 8: 249. In the same way that we can speak of psychologism as a “reductionism” to psychology, of economism as a “reductionism” of other social facts to economic determinations, so too can we speak of Solov’ëv’s” ethicism.” And just as Marxist economism is in practice unfalsifiable, so too is ethicism. The proponent can always reply to any critic’s counterexample that he/she has not investigated to its ultimate bases. Solov’ëv provided no criteria, the omission of which would discount or falsify his thesis that all conflicts in world history are ultimately moral conflicts.
- 28.
Kant 1996b: 133 (Ak 6: 98).
- 29.
Kant 1996a: 240 (Ak 5: 125).
- 30.
Kant 1996a: 243 (Ak 5: 128).
- 31.
The entirety of Part Three of Kant’s work is pertinent in this matter. See Kant 1996b: 129–171 (Ak 6: 83–147). Given the philosophical density of Kant’s text, we cannot discuss his ideas in greater depth. Nevertheless, there is much in Kant’s Religion that Solov’ëv could have found quite supportive of his own stand. For example, the emergence of an “ethical community” – Solov’ëv’s Kingdom of God – requires commands of a single legislator, who cannot be a member of that community. Kant 1996b: 133 (Ak 6: 98–99). In our own time, a quite admirable attempt to view similarities between the respective “Kingdoms” of Solov’ëv and Kant is Poole 2014.
- 32.
Solov’ëv 2015: 235; SS, vol. 8: 296. Solov’ëv expressed these ideas in a chapter of his Justification that originally appeared in the December 1894 issue of Vestnik Evropy. A year later in another article and in the same journal, he again reiterated much the same idea, writing “Every individual being, by virtue of his absolute significance (in the moral sense) has an inalienable right to existence and to perfection.” Soloviev 1895: 54; Solov’ëv 1989: 549.
- 33.
Solov’ëv 2015: 235; SS, vol. 8: 297.
- 34.
SS, vol. 6: 360.
- 35.
The expression occurs in the Justification’s first edition “Preface,” albeit without mentioning Tolstoy by name. See Solov’ëv 2015: lxv.
- 36.
SS, vol. 5: 11; Soloviev 2000: 9.
- 37.
SS, vol. 5: 424; Rosenthal and Bohachevsky-Chomiak 1990: 59.
- 38.
Solov’ëv 2015: 382; SS, vol. 8: 463.
- 39.
See Solov’ëv 2015: 261; SS, vol. 8: 325. Solov’ëv was not particularly sensitive either to the differences between various Protestant faiths or to their origins.
- 40.
Solov’ëv, undoubtedly, was thinking of Russia here and his own quasi-messianic message that his country should promote as its universal idea a Christianity of the original Church Fathers that had become contaminated over the centuries.
- 41.
Solov’ëv 2015: 265; SS, vol. 8: 330.
- 42.
Already in 1883, Solov’ëv wrote, “Just as Christian morality seeks the realization of the Kingdom of God within the individual, so Christian politics should prepare for the coming of the Kingdom of God for all of humanity as a whole, which consists of its major parts – nations, tribes, and the state.” SS, vol. 4: 3; vol. 5: 7.
- 43.
- 44.
SS, vol. 6: 427; Solov’ëv 1893: 154.
- 45.
- 46.
Strakhov 2013: xlii.
- 47.
Astaf’ev 1890: 39.
- 48.
See Solovief 1897. Since the prefatory remarks found in the 1899 second edition of the Justification were original to that edition, their absence in the French translation from 2 years earlier is understandable.
- 49.
Solov’ëv surely had Tolstoy in mind here. See, for example, Tolstoy 1894: 78. Let me be clear, though, that Solov’ëv did not name Tolstoy as the object of his attack. He did not have to do so; Tolstoy’s position was quite well known.
- 50.
Solov’ëv 2015: 276; SS, vol. 8: 344.
- 51.
Solov’ëv was, by no means, either the first in Imperial Russia to speak out against cruel punishment for crime or even to declare that with historical advancement societies look on such practices less and less approvingly. For example, Aleksandr Kistjakovskij, the father of the neo-Kantian philosopher of law Bogdan Kistjakovskij and himself a quite distinguished theorist, wrote in his magister’s thesis, “When the creation of a state is finished, the needs of the people change. The state and its institutions acquire a resilience that renders brutal measures to maintain them unnecessary. … Closely connected with this is the dissipation of the moral necessity of the death penalty. At the same time, there arises a philosophical awareness that the death penalty is an unjust, useless, and unnecessary punishment. Thus, it is an indisputable fact that as nations develop the need for applying and making use of the death penalty more and more decreases.” Kistjakovskij 1867: 278.
- 52.
It is somewhat odd that Solov’ëv now wishes to avoid the introduction of any empirically derived data from his ethical argument when he clearly has not previously refrained from doing so. Boris Chicherin, whose criticism of Solov’ëv’s positions in the Justification we will look at in more detail later, at this time too dismissed deterrence as the basis for criminal punishment. Yet Chicherin recognized that in the absence of other principles dictating the appropriate amount of punishment for each crime, disproportionate punishments amounting to torture and inhuman executions could easily be justified in the name of deterrence. “The greater the fear, the greater will be the protection.” Chicherin 1899a: 415. There would be few cases of petty theft in a society that meted out the severing of a hand – or worse – in response to such a crime.
- 53.
Solov’ëv 2015: 286; SS, vol. 8: 356.
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———. 2000. Politics, Law, and Morality. Trans. Vladimir Wozniuk. New Haven: Yale University Press, 368pp.
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Nemeth, T. (2019). Morality in History, Theory, and Practice. In: The Later Solov’ëv . Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-20611-6_8
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