Abstract
In order to properly comprehend the abstract mysteries of Putin’s popularity and actions, this research must first outline the historical foundations and operational points of Putinism. Langdon and Tismaneanu begin by elaborating upon some of the best operational definitions of ideology. After establishing Putinism as an ideology, they explore the intellectual origins of Putinism. The authors consider the contributions of philosophers such as Ivan Ilyin and Aleksandr Dugin and concepts such as (neo-)Eurasianism. While these Russian philosophers and concepts do not define Putinism or its parameters, they nevertheless exemplify the fact that Putinist ideology was never created by Putin alone. Instead, it built itself off of historical trends, cultural desires, and socially constructed myths.
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Notes
- 1.
Anton Barbashin, “Ivan Ilyin: A Fashionable Fascist,” Intersection Project, 13 April 2017. In this article, Barbashin explicitly writes, “To call Putin a politician who is pursuing any sort of ideological or philosophical concept on practice is, by and large, as valid as calling Trump a true republican-conservative: meaning it is total nonsense.”
- 2.
Archie Brown, “How did the end of the Cold War become today’s dangerous tensions with Russia?” The Washington Post, 4 May 2018.
- 3.
Jacob L. Shapiro, “Ideology is Dead,” Geopolitical Futures, 8 April 2018.
- 4.
Benn Steil, “Russia’s Clash With the West is About Geography, Not Ideology,” Foreign Policy, 12 February 2018.
- 5.
Vladimir Putin, “Rossija na rubezhe tysjacheletij,” speech, 30 December 1999.
- 6.
Edward Lucas, The New Cold War: Putin’s Russia and the Threat to the West (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2014), p. 23; Peter Pomerantsev, Nothing is True and Everything is Possible: The Surreal Heart of the New Russia (New York: PublicAffairs, 2014), p. 105; Cheng Chen, The Return of Ideology: The Search for Regime Identities in Postcommunist Russia and China (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2016), pp. 22–24.
- 7.
Lev Gudkov and Eva Hartog, “The Evolution of Homo Sovieticus to Putin’s Man,” The Moscow Times, 13 October 2017.
- 8.
Willard A. Mullins, “On the Concept of Ideology in Political Science,” The American Political Science Review, Vol. 66, No. 2 (June 1972), p. 498; Hannah Arendt, Origins of Totalitarianism (New York: Meridian Books, 1958), p. 468.
- 9.
Václav Havel, “The Power of the Powerless,” trans. Paul Wilson, International Journal of Politics, Vol. 15, No 3 (January 1985), pp. 28–29.
- 10.
Vladimir Tismaneanu, The Crisis of Marxist Ideology in Eastern Europe: The Poverty of Utopia (New York: Routledge, 1988), p. 2.
- 11.
Brown, “How did the end of the Cold War become today’s dangerous tensions with Russia?” In this article, Brown asserts, “Nothing comparable [to the Soviet system’s ideology] exists today. To the extent that Russia has an ideology, it is one of Russian nationalism and belief in a strong state. We could call it ‘Russia First.’” Unfortunately, this statement gravely underestimates the ideological component of Putin’s Russia. Underplaying such a fundamental aspect of an entire society will perpetuate global misunderstanding of Russian politics. To believe the false notion that Russia’s ideology is nothing special is to live in ignorance and sow the seeds for future discord when it comes to relations with Russia and the promotion of human rights across the world.
- 12.
Chen, The Return of Ideology, p. 24.
- 13.
G. John Ikenberry, “The Illusion of Geopolitics: The Enduring Power of the Liberal Order,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 93, No. 3 (May 2014), p. 81; Francis Fukuyama, “The End of History?” The National Interest, No. 16 (Summer 1989), p. 13.
- 14.
John L. Stanley, “Is Totalitarianism a New Phenomenon? Reflections on Hannah Arendt’s Origins of Totalitarianism,” The Review of Politics, Vol. 49, No. 2 (1987), pp. 184 and 196; Mullins, “On the Concept of Ideology,” p. 507.
- 15.
Phillip Converse, “The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics,” in Ideology and Discontent, ed. David E. Apter (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1964), pp. 207 and 214.
- 16.
Wendy Brown, Walled States, Waning Sovereignty (New York: Zone Books, 2010), p. 77.
- 17.
Arendt, Origins of Totalitarianism, p. 452.
- 18.
Vladimir Tismaneanu, Reinventing Politics: Eastern Europe from Stalin to Havel (New York: The Free Press, 1992), p. 137.
- 19.
Chen, The Return of Ideology, pp. 38–39; André Glucksmann, Cynisme et passion (Paris: Grasset, 1981), p. 241.
- 20.
David Brooks, “Putin Can’t Stop,” New York Times, 3 March 2014. Interestingly, media outlets across the globe reported in 2013 that Kim Jong-Un, the dictator of North Korea, gifted copies of Adolf Hitler’s Mein Kampf to his top government officials for his own birthday in January. The North Korean regime denounced these reports days later and alleged they were nothing but lies disseminated by defectors. Of course, the regime subsequently vowed to murder those “human scum” liars, thereby failing to redeem its credibility in any way. Regardless of whether or not the story is true, there is either a precedent for dictatorial leaders to push their selected philosophy on people and/or track down supposed traitors to their regime. It is nevertheless a theme that ideological dictatorships have shared throughout time and space, and one that should always remind the rest of the world of the danger that might come with ideology in power. BBC News, “North Korea condemns Hitler Mein Kampf report,” BBC News, 19 June 2013.
- 21.
Barbashin, “Ivan Ilyin.”
- 22.
Marlene Laruelle, “In Search of Putin’s Philosopher,” Intersection Project, 3 March 2017; Walter Laqueur, Putinism: Russia and Its Future with the West (New York: Thomas Dunne Books, 2015), pp. 176–184; Ivan Ilyin, Sil’naja vlast’. Russkaja ideja (Moscow: Eksmo, reprint 2017).
- 23.
Ivan Ilyin, “Rossii neobkhodima svoboda” [Freedom is indispensible to Russia], in Our Mission, Vol. 2, Book 1, p. 163, as quoted in Michel Eltchaninoff, Inside the Mind of Vladimir Putin, trans. James Ferguson (London: C. Hurst and Co. Publishers Ltd., 2018).
- 24.
Timothy Snyder, The Road to Unfreedom: Russia, Europe, America (New York: Tim Duggan Books, 2018), p. 47.
- 25.
Timothy Snyder, “Ivan Ilyin, Putin’s Philosopher of Russian Fascism,” The New York Review of Books, 16 March 2018; Anton Barbashin and Hannah Thoburn, “Putin’s Philosopher: Ivan Ilyin and the Ideology of Moscow’s Rule,” Foreign Affairs, 20 September 2015.
- 26.
Jacob L. Talmon, The Origins of Totalitarian Democracy (London: Secker and Warburg, 1952), pp. 45 and 79–80.
- 27.
As further proof that Ilyin is not the intellectual force behind Putinism, we wish to point out that Ilyin was not entirely consistent in his writings. While Ilyin himself is a well-established fascist, it is also important to note that not everything the man wrote construes itself in an overtly fascist manner. Take a quote from his work Our Tasks, in which Ilyin stated, “It is not possible to build the great and powerful Russia on any hatred, not on [hatred of] class (social democrats, Communists, anarchists), nor on [hatred of] race (racists, anti-Semites), nor on [hatred of] political party membership.” This excerpt cannot redeem Ilyin—after all, Nazis believed what they were doing was for the greater good and pledged plenty of supposedly warm-hearted hopes, similar to this statement by Ilyin—but it also does not reek of a particular ism. Putin has not utilized the aforementioned quote in his public speeches, even though such a quote would play well as part of the Russian government’s façade of a “good,” respectful government; his omission of such low-hanging fruit suggests that Putin is not a diehard follower of Ilyin’s philosophy, especially when one considers the relatively low number of times Putin has publicly spoken about Ilyin. (Furthermore, in addition to the fact that Putin has failed to exploit the “friendly” quote, readers should also keep in mind that Putin’s Russia is in large part built on hatred of certain groups, as will be discussed in Chap. 5.) Ivan Ilyin, Nacional’naja Rossija: nashi zadachi (Moscow: Eksmo, reprint 2011).
- 28.
We will define neo-Eurasianism and its predecessor, Eurasianism, upon the conclusion of this discussion of Aleksandr Dugin. Until then, we will offer an on-the-surface definition of neo-Eurasianism here as a conservative ideology holding that Russia is more closely related to Asian history and culture than it is to those of Europe or the West. Charles Clover, Black Wind, White Snow: The Rise of Russia’s New Nationalism (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2016), p. 233.
- 29.
Tatyana Medvedeva, “Aleksandr Dugin: ‘Nuzhno borot’sja s “shestoj kolonnoj.”’” Gazeta Kultura, 10 October 2014; Sergei Prostakov, “Aleksandr Dugin i prihod Putina k vlasti,” Otkrytaja Rossija, 21 May 2017; Sean MacCormac, “Aleksandr Dugin: Putin’s Rasputin?” Center for Security Policy, 4 March 2015.
- 30.
Maksim Sokolov, “Putin absoljuten,” Izvestia, 5 October 2007. Additionally, it might be interesting to note that Dugin expressed his support for Donald Trump in the 2016 U.S. presidential election. Furthermore, Nina Kouprianova, the woman who served as Dugin’s promoter in the United States and as his English translator, is married to Richard Spencer, the leader of the “alt-right” Neo-Nazi movement in the United States. On this point, the authors would like to emphasize that these ideological connections are real and reach far beyond the confines of Russian borders, making it all the more important to understand what drives Putinism. Masha Gessen, The Future is History: How Totalitarianism Reclaimed Russia (New York: Riverhead Books, 2017), p. 482.
- 31.
Dmitrii Rusanov, “Vojna nachalas’! Prizyvat’ k miru – predatel’stvo! Aleksandr Dugin,” ANNA, 6 May 2014; Catherine A. Fitzpatrick, “Russia This Week: Dugin Dismissed from Moscow State University? (23–29 June),” The Interpreter, 27 June 2014. Dugin told interviewers from the pro-Russian separatist news outlet ANNA in Ukraine that Ukrainians “must be killed, killed, killed.” Additionally, here it should be noted that Putin did commit genocide against Ukrainians—just not a complete or successful one. See Chap. 7 for more.
- 32.
We admit that we cannot vouch for the actual reason why Dugin was fired from MGU: was it truly a technical error (unlikely), was the Kremlin disgusted by Dugin’s genocidal encouragement (even more unlikely), was the Kremlin enraged by Dugin’s limitless calls for violence and mass mobilization, or was something else at play? How involved was President Putin in the decision to silence Dugin? The Russian regime and Putinism are fond of the long game, after all, so actions that the international community might deem to be respectable—such as firing a bloodthirsty professor from his university—might actually have been committed for the wrong reasons, that is, agreeing with the professor’s bloodthirsty views but fearing the backlash his opinions could unleash among the population and the poor reflection they might have on Vladimir Putin. To put it simply: we stand firm behind the likelihood that Dugin was fired with the Kremlin’s approval because of the zealous statements he made, various ones among which called for genocidal violence against Ukrainians. He was not fired because the Kremlin disagreed with his goals. Rather, he was removed from power as an academic because the Kremlin feared his opinions were too mobilizing (and that, if enough of the Russian population heard his views, then they would find Putin to be a failure). The reasoning had nothing to do with morals or respect for humanity in any way. Readers should consider this individual Icarus story as proof that (1) Putinism is not ruled by any one individual, and (2) the Kremlin’s secrecy is always lurking when it comes to information flows.
- 33.
Mark Kramer, “Theoretical Introduction: Political Power and Political Discourse in Russia: Conceptual Issues,” in State and Political Discourse in Russia, ed. Riccardo Mario Cucciolla (Rome: Reset-Dialogues on Civilizations, 2017), pp. 86–87.
- 34.
Berel Lang, Post-Holocaust: Interpretation, Misinterpretation, and the Claims of History (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2005), p. 162.
- 35.
No other nation-state—not France, not Spain, not even Italy—claims the Roman Empire as a legitimizing factor in their own existence or extent of power today. Neither do they take credit for the civilizational gifts that the Roman Empire bestowed upon all the centuries to come. Russia and its (neo-)Eurasianists, however, maintain the hubris and ideological devotion by which to promote Moscow as the heir to the lost Roman Empire. What is more, (neo-)Eurasianists cling to this bold, mystical assumption despite the fact that they warn against modern Western culture, the basics of which the Roman Empire founded. In an illegitimate way, the (neo-)Eurasianists separate Roman culture and democratic foundations from Roman imperialism, ironically choosing to admire ancient Rome for the latter theme and its mythical nature. As if this were not an absurd enough reason to invoke the Roman Empire, it is important to note that (neo-)Eurasianists call upon the fantasy of Moscow as the reincarnation of the Roman nucleus precisely because it was an empire—an empire that, coincidentally, would have no license to exist in the twenty-first century, considering its dictatorial rule, lack of social equality, practice of slavery, and imperialist conquests of surrounding territories. Belief or desire for “Moscow, the Third Rome,” then, is inherently imperialist and ideological. It also insinuates a revision of global history, in that it rejects the legacies of the Roman Empire that appear in the Western world (e.g. republicanism in the United States, or democracy, in general) and asserts that Russia knows how to live by Byzantine civilization better than the rest of the world. In that sense, perhaps today’s Russia is the heir of the Roman Empire—an imperialist dictatorship masquerading with democratic elements—not in a messianic way, to the chagrin of (neo-)Eurasianists, but in the way that Benito Mussolini’s Italy claimed to be harbingers of the Third Rome. Martin Clark, Mussolini: Profiles in Power (London: Pearson Longman, 2005), Laqueur, Putinism, and Nicolas Zernov, Moscow, the Third Rome (New York: AMS Press, 1938).
- 36.
Snyder, The Road to Unfreedom, p. 89.
- 37.
Marlene Laruelle, Russian Eurasianism: An Ideology of Empire (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2008).
- 38.
For readers who wish to learn more specifically about Eurasianism and neo-Eurasianism in Russia, we recommend Clover, Black Wind, White Snow, pp. 233–248; Snyder, The Road to Unfreedom, pp. 84–99; and Laqueur, Putinism.
- 39.
Vladimir Tismaneanu, “BOOK REVIEW: The new tsar: the rise and reign of Vladimir Putin. By Steven Lee Myers,” International Affairs, Vol. 92, Iss. 3 (1 May 2016), p. 744; Vladimir Tismaneanu, The Devil in History: Communism, Fascism, and Some Lessons of the Twentieth Century (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2012); Chen, The Return of Ideology, p. 72.
- 40.
Eltchaninoff, Inside the Mind of Vladimir Putin, p. 10.
- 41.
Eltchaninoff, Inside the Mind of Vladimir Putin, p. 5.
- 42.
Carlos Rangel, Del buen Salvaje al Buen Revolucionario: Mitos y Realidades de América Latina, 10th ed. (Caracas: Monte Avila Editores C.A., 2009), pp. 379–387.
- 43.
Rangel, Del buen Salvaje al Buen Revolucionario, p. 129 and 365.
- 44.
Vladimir Tismaneanu and Jordan Luber, “Perón in the White House: The Perils of Ethnocentric Solipsism,” Public Seminar, 19 March 2017.
- 45.
The hopes of many political theorists that the advent of the Internet would make fascism and genocide impossible to commit (with the logic being that surely citizens would not support blatantly incorrect ideas anymore when they could look up proof for themselves) have proven to be very wrong. If anything, the reverse has become true—particularly in Russia, but admittedly everywhere, notably in the United States. In Russia, citizens refuse to fairly consider reports from outlets other than their state-controlled ones; in the United States, citizens make decisions via Facebook and Twitter, whose algorithms create a loop of reinforcement and fake news.
- 46.
Kenneth Rapoza, “U.K. Labor Leader Corbyn And Trump Have Something In Common: Russia,” Forbes, 9 June 2017; Ben Schreckinger, “Jill Stein Isn’t Sorry,” Politico, 20 June 2017; Gabriela Galindo, “Salvini: Italy ‘not afraid’ to use EU veto to lift Russian sanctions,” Politico, 16 July 2018; Alan Feuer and Andrew Higgins, “Extremists Turn to a Leader to Protect Western Values: Vladimir Putin,” New York Times, 3 December 2016; Stefan Jajecznyk, “The British Left’s affinity for Russian imperial lies,” New Eastern Europe, 4 February 2019.
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Langdon, K.C., Tismaneanu, V. (2020). The Intellectual Origins of Putinism. In: Putin’s Totalitarian Democracy. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-20579-9_4
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