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Institutional Adaptation: A Case of trompe-l’oeil?

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The French Parliament and the European Union

Part of the book series: French Politics, Society and Culture ((FPSC))

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Abstract

The history of the institutional adaptation of the French Parliament to the EU has developed since the late 1970s. It shows that a recurrent and paradoxical convergence of pro-European and Eurosceptic forces contributed to those developments. The assessment of the prerogatives, structures and activities specialized in EU affairs is mixed. On the one hand, the rights obtained are far from negligible given the general weakness of the both assemblies in France. European activities in Parliament also reached a level which is significant, both compared to domestic activities and to other parliamentary assemblies in Europe. On the other hand, an in-depth investigation makes clear the superficiality of those developments. EU activities are left to a small club of parliamentary actors. They are in practice largely delegated to clerks and assistants. And they prove to be unable to weigh on domestic debates and European policies.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    For a complete legal overview: Blanc 2004; Fromage 2015; Fuchs-Cessot 2004; Nuttens 2001; Saulnier 2002.

  2. 2.

    The italicised quotations in this text are cited from interviews conducted by the author. The quotations not in italics are from other sources. Interview in Paris, 24 July 2003, name of interviewee given with his permission.

  3. 3.

    Law of 6 July 1979.

  4. 4.

    The Call of Cochin, delivered on 6 December 1978, was Jacques Chirac’s severe critique of the government’s pro-European policy. Chirac protested against ‘the policy of supranationalism, […] economic subjugation’ and ‘the international erasure of France’.

  5. 5.

    Law 90-385 of 10 May 1990.

  6. 6.

    Decision 59-3 DC of 25 June 1959 banning the Parliament from seeking to influence or control the government’s action without liability.

  7. 7.

    See Chap. 7 on the role played by Bayrou during this time.

  8. 8.

    Law no. 94-476 of 10 June 1994.

  9. 9.

    The main body in charge of the international organisation of the assembly.

  10. 10.

    Circular of 19 July 1994 relating to taking the French Parliament’s position into account during the formulation of Community acts. See Chap. 6 on the implementation of this decision by Séguin and Pandraud.

  11. 11.

    Constitutional law no. 2008-724 of 23 July 2008. Some elements had already been introduced in February 2008 in view of ratifying the Lisbon treaty but were not yet implemented in July as their enforcement depended on the implementation of the treaty. The same as true of the revision realized in 2005 in view of implementing the Draft European Constitution which was not enforced.

  12. 12.

    Law no. 2009-689 of 15 June 2009.

  13. 13.

    During the legislative procedure, in addition to the relevant standing committee, the other committees can give their views through a report and speaking time on the floor. They are said to be ‘seized for information’ (saisie pour avis). This is what was refused to EU committees.

  14. 14.

    For an example of the broad range of literature on this narrow subject: Kiiver 2012.

  15. 15.

    Unicameral parliaments have two votes. Chambers of bicameral parliaments have one vote each, with no obligation to agree or cooperate with one another. The threshold is lowered to one quarter of the votes for draft acts related to liberty, security and justice matters.

  16. 16.

    Since the constitutional revision of 2008, activities on the floor should be dedicated to oversight activities, and not legislation, for one week out of four.

  17. 17.

    COSAC, Seventh Bi-annual Report, ‘Developments in European Union Procedures and Practices Relevant to Parliamentary Scrutiny’, no. 17, 2012, p. 10.

  18. 18.

    The SGAE, General Secretariat for European Affairs, is an inter-ministerial body in charge of preparing French national positions on EU issues. Formally called the SGCI, it operates under the responsibility of the Prime Minister.

  19. 19.

    Information report no. 3195, ‘L’Assemblée nationale et l’Union européenne: quel bilan? quelles perspectives?’, National Assembly, 14th Parliament, European Affairs Committee, presented by Philip Cordery and Pierre Lequiller, 2015, p. 29.

  20. 20.

    COSAC, Eighth bi-annual report, ‘Developments in European Union Procedures and Practices Relevant to Parliamentary Scrutiny’, no. 8, 2007, p. 16ff.

  21. 21.

    Source for this and following information on the Senate: http://www.senat.fr/europe/dpue-bilan.html accessed 27 July 2015.

  22. 22.

    For a complete explanation of the whole index: Auel et al. 2015.

  23. 23.

    An election year, 2012 was less propitious for French Parliament activity, particularly in the Assembly.

  24. 24.

    COSAC, Twentieth Bi-annual Report, ‘Developments in European Procedures and Practices Relevant to Parliamentary’, no. 20, 2013, p. 19.

  25. 25.

    An initiative of President Barroso established in 2006 and continued since. The Commission invites each assembly to share its observations on any text directly and commits itself to responding. The entire correspondence is then published.

  26. 26.

    The party in parentheses and columns is that to which the parliamentarian belonged at the time of the interview. See the appendix for corresponding abbreviations.

  27. 27.

    http://www2.assemblee-nationale.fr/recherche/questions, accessed on 29 July 2015.

  28. 28.

    Estelle Grellier in information report no. 3195, National Assembly, 14th Parliament, ref. cit., p. 64.

  29. 29.

    In 2007, President Sarkozy asked the former Prime Minister Edouard Balladur to chair a special committee on the reforms of the Fifth Republic’s institutions. The report prepared the 2008 constitutional revision.

  30. 30.

    Committee for Reflection and Proposal on the Modernisation and Rebalancing of the Institutions of the Fifth Republic, Une Ve République plus démocratique, Présidence de la République, 2007, p. 58.

  31. 31.

    Information report no. 3195, National Assembly, 14th Parliament, ref. cit., p. 42.

  32. 32.

    See Chap. 7 on the downfall of Séguin.

  33. 33.

    I50 refers to the interview no. 50 conducted for this study. It is indicated only when the name of the interviewee is kept secret—which is the case for interviews with non-political actors such as clerks, civil servants, and collaborators.

  34. 34.

    At the time, leader of the UMP, the main right-wing party.

  35. 35.

    Samuel Le Goff, ‘L’audition d’un commissaire européen, un non-événement au Parlement français’, www.contexte.com, 1 December 2016.

  36. 36.

    Comité de réflexion…, op. cit., p. 51 and 58.

  37. 37.

    Ex-ante debates have been far more numerous these last years, but still depend on the willingness and availability of the government (Fromage 2017).

  38. 38.

    Information report no. 3195, National Assembly, 14th Parliament, ref. cit., pp. 22–23.

  39. 39.

    The reports are detailed but, unfortunately, are drafted after the decision is made and only deal with legislative acts. Information report no. 441 (2015–2016) by Jean Bizet, for the European Affairs Committee, Senate, 4 March 2016.

  40. 40.

    Constitutional bill no. 3686, National Assembly, 2 April 2002.

  41. 41.

    This and the following verbatim excerpts: JO, AN, CR, second sitting of 26 November 2014, p. 9269ff.

  42. 42.

    Law no. 2010-1645 of 28 December 2010.

  43. 43.

    During the first session of Wednesday 6 May 2015. Law no. 2014-1653 of 29 December 2014 on planning of public financing for 2014 to 2019.

  44. 44.

    Information report no. 3195, National Assembly, 14th Parliament, ref. cit., p. 33.

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  1. Centre for European Studies and Comparative Politics, Sciences Po, Paris, France

    Olivier Rozenberg

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Rozenberg, O. (2020). Institutional Adaptation: A Case of trompe-l’oeil?. In: The French Parliament and the European Union. French Politics, Society and Culture. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-19791-9_2

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