Abstract
This chapter analyzes the involvement of the Tunisian General Labour Union (Union Générale Tunisienne du Travail—UGTT) in the process of constitutional reform, which followed the revolution and constituted a key element in the country’s transition to democracy. The chapter argues that, while the mediating role of the UGTT constitutes its best-known contribution to Tunisia’s transition to democracy, a focus on this “political” dimension misses important parts of the picture. In fact, the UGTT has contributed to the constitutional reform process by adopting three roles that are intertwined but can be distinguished analytically: as a force for proposals; as a force of equilibrium; and as a force for political pressure. The chapter analyzes these three roles empirically, by means of a qualitative case study based on interviews as well as on an analysis of primary documents and media reports. It shows that the UGTT indeed played an indispensable role in facilitating a successful constitutional reform process, but that its specific contributions in terms of the contents of the new constitution have been rather limited. To a certain extent, therefore, the UGTT’s role as a political mediator in the post-revolutionary transformation process has reduced its function as the national representation of organized labor.
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Notes
- 1.
- 2.
On the same day, the Bey enacted a new criminal code which formally prohibited corporal punishment.
- 3.
For a detailed account of the UGTT’s role in the 2011 revolution, see for example Netterstrøm (2016).
- 4.
The interim government itself held power pursuant to Article 57 of the constitution, which deals with cases of vacancy of the presidency.
- 5.
For more details, see Ben Achour and Ben Achour (2012).
- 6.
“Revolutionary message” refers to the slogan or values expressed and defended by protestors during the struggle against the authoritarian regime. In the Tunisian case, the revolutionary message around which all protestors rallied, regardless of their political affiliations, was freedom and dignity. See Ben Achour (2012, 2014).
- 7.
Following the General Assembly of the UGTT in December 2011 (Tabarka Assembly), Abdessalem Jerad was replaced by Houssine Abassi.
- 8.
In the end, however, this proposal was not mentioned in the final declaration of the following UGTT General Assembly held in December 2011.
- 9.
In June 1961, just a few months after enactment of the constitution, decree-law 61–23 was passed that established this council.
- 10.
In the first and second drafts, no provisions dealt with youth conditions. Following the public consultation organized in different regions (December 2012–January 2013), the constituent assembly’s sub-committees took into account popular propositions and inserted some rules dealing with youth. The third draft included Article 19 on this issue.
- 11.
Similar to Article 8, provisions relating to social justice, sustainable development, and balance among regions were inserted after the popular consultation (Article 8 of the third draft, 22 April 2013). Finally, the fourth draft (from 1 June 2013) reiterated this content on the basis of the consensual and coordinated committee proposal which added the reference to economic indicators.
- 12.
The 2014 constitution does, however, provide for five new independent constitutional bodies which are vested with the powers of adjustment and regulation. Matters that fall within their jurisdiction are elections, audiovisual communications, human rights, sustainable development, and the fight against corruption. Out of these five new constitutional bodies, at the time of writing, only the Elections Commission (called ISIE) has been established.
- 13.
The National Social Dialogue Council shall replace the Committee of Social Dialogue that has been established in accordance with Article 335 of the Labor Code, because the committee suffers from a lack of autonomy. In contrast, the council is provided with legal status as well as administrative and financial autonomy. Its internal organization is meant to obey the principle of separation between deliberative and executive organs.
- 14.
Expected to last one year from the NCA election, the constitution-making process could not be accomplished by 23 October 2012. When this expected deadline was approaching, fixed by the decree that had convened the elections, it was clear that the assembly would be unable to finish its work.
- 15.
On 18 June 2012, that is, a year before the crisis, the UGTT had already called for creation of a National Council of Dialogue in order to bring together all political parties and social organizations with the aim of finding consensual solutions to the economic, political, and security crises. This initiative comprised six points and served as a basis for a National Dialogue Conference held on 16 October 2012. In all, 50 parties, 22 organizations, and more than 200 journalists took part in this conference. However, the Ennahdha party and Congress for the Republic, which had both confirmed their participation, decided in the end not to participate—a decision that interrupted the process. See M’rad (2015).
- 16.
While calling for the government’s resignation, the opposition suggested entrusting a constitutional expert group with helping the NCA with formulating the constitutional provisions and the electoral act.
- 17.
In spite of not being a signatory to “the salvation front declaration,” approved by the boycotters and some political parties and social organizations on 26 July 2013, the UGTT shared a number of goals with the signatories. One of the assistant secretaries general, Bouali Mbarki, said in an interview that the UGTT approved the intention to replace the government in office by another composed of technocrats. He also stressed that, owing to its historical role, the UGTT had obtained a kind of popular remit to pilot the process. See Hakaeik online electronic newsletter, 10/08/2013.
- 18.
UGTT leaders are known for being experienced negotiators as well as patient and tireless activists. They have honed their skills over decades of settling disputes and negotiating deals (see Omri 2014).
- 19.
Interview, 5 September 2013.
- 20.
The UGTT’s notification, 25/08/2011.
- 21.
These working methods—or the design of the constitution-making process—include the method of drafting or the general organization of the various steps leading to the adoption of the constitution’s contents. They also refer to the way the Constituent Assembly works by drawing plans for discussing and approving the final version as well as setting the drafting method and the deadline to vote for the constitution. The design of the process also includes determining who is involved (and how) during the multiple phases of phrasing, discussing, and approving the text. See Ginsburg et al. (2009, p. 204).
- 22.
UGTT, Press release 06/08/2013.
- 23.
Rabaa H, “Tunisie? Samir Dilou, ennahdha n’aurait jamais pensé rentrer dans un bras de fer avec l’UGTT,” Tunisienumérique.com, 2 December 2012.
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Karray, B. (2020). Proposals, Intermediation, and Pressure: The Three Roles of the UGTT in Tunisia’s Post-revolutionary Constitutional Process. In: Weipert-Fenner, I., Wolff, J. (eds) Socioeconomic Protests in MENA and Latin America. Middle East Today. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-19621-9_5
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