Abstract
Political parties formed primarily for negotiating patronage rarely become the consistent opposition organizations that are purported to bolster democracy and accountability. Focused on the Wade era, this chapter explains the determinants of whether parties pursue trajectories of consistent opposition, or instead pursue tactical alliances or relationships of co-optation with the president and his ruling coalition. The analysis is based on comparative case studies and descriptive statistical analysis of an original dataset that captures party trajectories of all 46 parties created during 1998–2003, as well as their leaders’ relevant endowments of state experience and international private financing. This research shows that when they are reliant on personal resources for party-building on the uneven playing field, party leaders rarely possess the two endowments that facilitate consistent opposition: prior experience as high-level state administrators and international sources of private financing. The analysis also illustrates that party leaders with both endowments are best able to resist opportunities for government collaboration that presidents offer politicians in order to fragment the opposition. With prior experience as state administrators, party leaders can market themselves as capable replacements to incumbents. With international private financing, they can compete for office using the clientelist strategies that citizens expect of serious candidates.
The statements and analysis expressed are solely those of the author and have not been approved by the House of Delegates or the Board of Governors of the American Bar Association and do not represent the position or policy of the American Bar Association.
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- 1.
Because the ruling party enjoyed a legislative majority on its own throughout the period under study, the definition of consistent opposition does not allow for opposition alliances with the government that would be “acceptable” opposition party behavior in either presidential or parliamentary systems in which no single party has the majority.
- 2.
These party trajectories are coded as co-optation because of the satellite role they opt to play, albeit within the opposition. Alone, the leaders of these parties are not able to present themselves as viable, alternative, national-level political leaders, so they are not coded as consistent opposition forces.
- 3.
There are 13 parties that refused to work with Wade, whether through the pursuit of consistent opposition or through the pursuit of co-optation into a regularly competing opposition figure’s coalition. There was complete data on long-term party trajectories for 41 of 46 parties in the sample. Thus, 32% is the estimate of parties consistently refusing to co-operate with Wade (13 of 41 parties with full data available).
- 4.
Twelve percent is the estimate based on five of 41 parties with complete data.
- 5.
Accumulating international private financing does not necessarily entail corruption, whose detection, if it is even part of the story, is beyond the scope of this book.
- 6.
Interviews with Abdou Lô, 3/12/12, Omar Sarr, 8/6/10.
- 7.
The sampled party leaders coded as high: own international oil companies, worked in international maritime commerce, acquired international shipping companies, have international consultancies, or worked in US law firms.
- 8.
The roster for 1998–2012 is available through the Official Journal of the Republic of Senegal, as well as ministerial profiles in Ndiaye and Ndiaye 2006.
- 9.
The results reported from the full sample are based on a binary coding of whether party leaders have each endowment or not. Party leaders with medium or high levels of either endowment count as having it; leaders with low levels lack it.
- 10.
Seventeen of 30 had neither endowment; five had one endowment; three had both; and five had missing data.
- 11.
Interview with Mbaye Niang, 1/9/12, Dakar; Tanor Dieng dismisses this claim, but figures like Alioune Tine of the African Assembly of Human Rights (RADDHO), assert its truth. See Interview with Tine, 6/18/12, Dakar.
- 12.
Interview with Souleymane Ndiaye, 1/23/12, Thiès.
- 13.
Interview with Mbaye Diouf, 3/3/12, Dakar.
- 14.
Although the Reform Party (PR) did not run in the first presidential and legislative elections that occurred after its founding, it is included in the PR in the sample of party leaders with vote-mobilizing potential because Agne headed one of Senegal’s three major opposition coalitions in the local elections two years the PR’s birth.
- 15.
Interview with Mousapha Niasse, 7/5/15, Dakar.
- 16.
Ibid.
- 17.
They had agreed upon a platform for a parliamentary system, no individual accumulation of multiple political posts, the decentralization of executive power, the pursuit of audits, etc. (Niang 2004: 22).
- 18.
Interview with Moustapha Niasse, 7/5/15, Dakar.
- 19.
Ibid.
- 20.
Niasse’s initial ability to access international private financing may have helped him place third in the 2000 elections. This is one reason that Wade was interested in making Niasse his Prime Minister in exchange for his support in the 2000 runoff. Once Niasse accepted this offer and joined Wade’s camp, Kâ (the fourth place finisher) had to choose between taking a lower rung in the future Wade government or taking Diouf’s promise of the Prime Ministership.
- 21.
Interview with Djibo Kâ, 7/22/15, Dakar.
- 22.
Ibid.
- 23.
Ibid.
- 24.
Interview with Mbaye-Jacques Diop, 6/5/12, Rufisque.
- 25.
Interview with Amadou Sène Niang, 10/26/11, Dakar.
- 26.
Interview with Diop, op.cit.
- 27.
Interview with Samba Diouldé Thiam, 11/22/11, Dakar.
- 28.
The Alliance for Justice/Jëf-Jël, founded by Talla Sylla, also engaged in a trajectory of consistent opposition but without always running in opposition on the presidential level but was less committed to specific programmatic issues on a consistent basis than RES-Les Verts or MRDS. Jëf-Jël grew out of Youth for Turnover (JPA), a nationwide student movement that Sylla had started in the early 1990s as a graduate student in France, after leading the Senegalese student union in his hometown, Thiès. Sylla was widely known for his incendiary style of public speaking, often geared toward criticizing government corruption, and attracted disaffected urban youth through focus on this issue, particularly during Wade’s first term (FKA/CESTI 2001). Without extensive international private financing to run, and facing the internal difficulties within Jëf-Jël that arose as he invested more into a parallel movement, Wallu Askanu Senegal (The Senegalese People’s Part), Sylla did not run for president in 2012.
- 29.
Interview with Ousmane Sow Huchard, 2/18/12, Dakar.
- 30.
Interview with Huchard, op. cit. He was the chief curator of the Dynamic Museum of Dakar (1983–1988), technical counselor in the Minister of Culture (1986–1988), commissar for foreign art expositions (1989–1990), and president of the Scientific Committee of the Biennale of Contemporary Art in Dakar (1993–1999).
- 31.
Interview with Huchard, op. cit.
- 32.
Interview with Niang, op. cit.
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Kelly, C.L. (2020). Negotiators or Adversaries? Tracing the Sources of Party Trajectories. In: Party Proliferation and Political Contestation in Africa. Contemporary African Political Economy. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-19617-2_4
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