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Knowing How and the Semantics/Pragmatics Debate

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Pragmatics and Philosophy. Connections and Ramifications

Part of the book series: Perspectives in Pragmatics, Philosophy & Psychology ((PEPRPHPS,volume 22))

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Abstract

In this chapter, I deal with know how vs. know that from a linguistic point of view and I point out a number of pragmatic inferential phenomena. It is of some interest that this is a chapter in which linguistics and philosophy intersect and that a linguistic treatment of inferential behavior has to be provided in an illuminating way for philosophy. I mainly use and develop ideas by Stanley and Williamson (J Philos 2001).

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Notes

  1. 1.

    This example is originally Cohen (1971).

  2. 2.

    Communication may also be of a non-linguistic type.

  3. 3.

    Brogaard (2009) leads us in this direction, although he is not specific about pragmatic intrusion and what kind of underdetermined logical form is needed.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Cognitive Science, University of Messina, Messina, Messina, Italy

    Alessandro Capone

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Capone, A. (2019). Knowing How and the Semantics/Pragmatics Debate. In: Pragmatics and Philosophy. Connections and Ramifications. Perspectives in Pragmatics, Philosophy & Psychology, vol 22. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-19146-7_6

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