Abstract
We consider a finite horizon dynamic competition model in discrete time in which firms are not restricted from cooperation with each other and can form coalitions of any size. For every coalition of firms, we determine profits of its members by two approaches: without the redistribution of profits inside the coalition and with such redistribution using a solution from cooperative game theory. Next, for each approach we examine the stability of a coalition structure in the game. When we find a stable coalition structure, we then verify whether it is dynamically stable, that is, stable over time with respect to the same profit distribution method chosen in the initial time period.
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This research was supported by the Russian Science Foundation under grant No. 17-11-01079.
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Parilina, E., Sedakov, A. (2020). Stable Coalition Structures in Dynamic Competitive Environment. In: Pineau, PO., Sigué, S., Taboubi, S. (eds) Games in Management Science. International Series in Operations Research & Management Science, vol 280. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-19107-8_21
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-19107-8_21
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