Abstract
Contracts and management of public investment contracts are particularly vulnerable to fraud and corruption. This is due in large part to the large scale of these investments, which are followed by huge amounts of money and sometimes the difficulties associated with effective oversight of a large number of contracts. Disclosure of illegal payments often hinders public investment, leads to their failure or improper implementation. As a result, there are big losses incurred by the state budget. This paper examines 75 companies involved in the procurement process to identify the most common corrupt practices used by awarding entities at various stages of the proceedings. The paper also attempts to formulate recommendations concerning the economic policy of the state in the examined area.
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Borowiec, A. (2019). Corrupt Practices in Public Procurement: Evidence from Poland. In: Bilgin, M., Danis, H., Demir, E., Can, U. (eds) Eurasian Economic Perspectives. Eurasian Studies in Business and Economics, vol 11/1. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-18565-7_6
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