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Do Markets Corrupt Our Morals? pp 233–247Cite as

Palgrave Macmillan

What If Markets Are Really Moral?

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Abstract

This chapter teases out the implications of our conclusion that markets are moral spaces that depend on and encourage morality. It is important to note that saying that markets are not morally corrupting is not to say that markets should exist in everything. It is possible to accept that we are correct that markets are moral and still maintain that certain markets in certain goods and services are noxious and should be limited. Our arguments do imply, however, that, rather than there being moral costs associated with engaging in market activity, there are moral costs that will result from curtailing market activity.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    We, however, strongly disagree with Bowles and Gintis (1978, [1986] 2012) who argued that democracy and capitalism are inherently incompatible systems. Bowles and Gintis ([1986] 2012: 3) argued that “capitalism and democracy are not complementary systems” and that they are sharply contrasting institutions where,

    the one is characterized by the preeminence of economic privilege based on property rights [i.e. promotes and relies on inequalities], the other insists on the priority of liberty and democratic accountability based on the exercise of personal rights [i.e. promotes and relies on an egalitarian principle].

    More recently, Kuttner (2018) also defended this argument. A number of market societies, however, are also democracies. Additionally, though not definitive, our analysis does suggest that being a market society is more critical than being a democracy for economic, social, and moral development (see Appendix).

  2. 2.

    Doucouliagos and Ulubaşoğlu (2008: 62) specified that, of the 483 regression estimates, “15% of the estimates [were] negative and statistically significant, 21% of the estimates [were] negative and statistically insignificant, 37% of the estimates [were] positive and statistically insignificant, and 27% of the estimates [were] positive and statistically significant.”

  3. 3.

    See Acemoglu et al. (2015) for a comprehensive overview of the topic of democracy, income redistribution, and income inequality.

  4. 4.

    Lavoie and Chamlee-Wright (2000) and Storr (2013) offered extensive critiques of Harrison’s view of culture. Rather than viewing culture as a constraint or causal force, for instance, Storr agreed with Geertz that culture shapes but does not cause economic activity. “As interworked systems of construable signs,” Geertz (1973: 14) wrote, “culture is not a power, something to which social events, behaviors, institutions, or processes can be causally attributed; it is a context, something within which they can be intelligibly – that is, thickly – described.”

  5. 5.

    See Appendix for additional details on and results from the regression analysis.

  6. 6.

    There now exists a growing literature on the material and social benefits of markets. Recall, for instance, our discussion in Chap. 4. See also Berggren (2003) for a survey of papers on the benefits of economic freedom.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Economics, George Mason University, Fairfax, VA, USA

    Virgil Henry Storr

  2. The Mercatus Center at George Mason University, Arlington, VA, USA

    Ginny Seung Choi

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  1. Virgil Henry Storr
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Storr, V.H., Choi, G.S. (2019). What If Markets Are Really Moral?. In: Do Markets Corrupt Our Morals?. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-18416-2_7

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