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The Future of Economic Design pp 3–8Cite as

On the Future of Economic Design—The Personal Ruminations of a Matching Theorist

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Part of the book series: Studies in Economic Design ((DESI))

Abstract

This note is a brief personal rumination on the state of economic design, advocating the importance of theory and listing broadly desirable features of future theoretical research agendas.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    See Hurwicz (1973).

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Economics, Concordia University, 1455 de Maisonneuve Blvd. West, Montreal, QC, H3G 1M8, Canada

    Szilvia Papai

Authors
  1. Szilvia Papai
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Correspondence to Szilvia Papai .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. CNRS - Paris School of Economics, Paris, France

    Jean-François Laslier

  2. University of Glasgow, Glasgow, UK

    Hervé Moulin

  3. Université Paris-Dauphine, Université PSL, CNRS, LAMSADE, Paris, France

    M. Remzi Sanver

  4. Union College, Schenectady, NY, USA

    William S. Zwicker

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Papai, S. (2019). On the Future of Economic Design—The Personal Ruminations of a Matching Theorist. In: Laslier, JF., Moulin, H., Sanver, M., Zwicker, W. (eds) The Future of Economic Design. Studies in Economic Design. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-18050-8_1

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