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Robust/Recover Provable Data Possession Protocol

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Security with Intelligent Computing and Big-data Services (SICBS 2018)

Part of the book series: Advances in Intelligent Systems and Computing ((AISC,volume 895))

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Abstract

Provable data possession (PDP) allows a client that has stored data at remote server to verify that the server correctly possesses the original data. A long-standing problem is how to reduce I/O cost. Through the integration of Online-code and PDP, a challenge/check protocol that can verifies the possession is proposed. The protocol generates probabilistic proofs of possession by sampling tiny sets of data, which obviously reduces I/O cost. Meanwhile, the protocol can recover corrupted data. The authors formalize this notion in the Robust/Recover (RR) provable data possession guarantee. Briefly speaking, the client maintains a constant amount of metadata to verify the proof. The challenge/check protocol transmits a constant amount of data, which reduces communication complexity. The authors give a detailed analysis of this protocol and build a simulation to evaluate practicability in reliability, space overhead, computation complexity, and communication complexity.

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Acknowledgment

The authors would like to thank G. Ateniese, K. Bowers, Guomin Yang and Haiying Liu for sharing their deep insights about delegated computation and KEA1-assumption related matters. This work was supported in part by the National Natural Science Foundation of China (Grant No. 61701270) and Cooperation Foundation for The Youth Doctors of QiLu University of Technology (Shandong Academy of Sciences) (Grant No. 2017BSHZ008).

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Correspondence to Chao Feng .

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Feng, C., Wang, H., Wan, W., Li, Q., Xu, F. (2020). Robust/Recover Provable Data Possession Protocol. In: Yang, CN., Peng, SL., Jain, L. (eds) Security with Intelligent Computing and Big-data Services. SICBS 2018. Advances in Intelligent Systems and Computing, vol 895. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-16946-6_46

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